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WHAT IS WRONG WITH INTEGRATION?

Abstract

The paper will first retrace the main arguments of the debate about the ideal of social, political and urban integration as it occurred in the United States after the publication of Elizabeth Anderson’s *The Imperative of Integration*; it will show that while the critics of Anderson’s ideal of «integration» raise important methodological and normative points, the alternative ideal of «differentiated solidarity», proposed earlier by Iris Marion Young, is not solidly grounded from a normative point of view. Then, taking the requirements of a non-ideal contextualist theorization seriously, I’ll propose to test the arguments for and against «integration» when they are translated, both conceptually and geographically, to a French context. In France, the concept of integration is part of a different semantic field and of another history of social relations. The minorities concerned by the issue of integration in France are immigrant racialized minorities: they are immigrant, unlike Anderson’s main African American focus, and racialized, as opposed to merely cultural groups – Young’s

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focus. To conclude, I’ll propose some qualified defense of a concept of integration in the French context and in a critical republican perspective, in which it is better conceived not as an imperative, but as an «essentially by-product» of deracialization. **Keywords:** Integration; Inclusion; Non-ideal theory; Colonization; Racial city.

**Pourquoi refuser l’idéal d’intégration ?**

**Résumé**

L’article commence par présenter les principaux arguments mobilisés dans le débat suscité par la parution de l’ouvrage d’Elizabeth Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, sur la nature et la valeur de l’idéal d’intégration. Si les critiques de cet idéal soulèvent d’importants points méthodologiques et normatifs, on se propose de montrer que l’idéal alternatif de «solidarité différenciée», proposé auparavant par Iris Marion Young, n’est pas plus satisfaisant d’un point de vue normatif. Prenant ensuite au sérieux les exigences méthodologiques d’une théorisation contextuelle non idéale de nos idéaux, l’article se propose de tester les arguments promouvant ou critiquant l’intégration en les situant dans un contexte français. Le concept d’intégration en français relève d’un champ sémantique et d’une histoire sociologique très différents de ceux du contexte nord-américain. Les minorités concernées par le problème de l’intégration en France sont des minorités immigrantes, contrairement à ce qui constitue le cœur de l’analyse de Anderson, mais racisées et non pas culturelles, contrairement à ce que propose Young. Le problème de l’intégration se pose d’abord au niveau local de la racialisation des politiques urbaines. L’article proposera pour conclure une défense qualifiée du concept d’intégration dans un contexte français et dans une perspective républicaine critique: il n’est pas conçu dans cette perspective comme un «impératif» mais plutôt comme un «effet essentiellement secondaire» de la déracialisation.

**Mots-clés:** Intégration; Inclusion; Théorie non idéale; Colonisation; Ville raciale.

**Introduction**

In 2010, Elizabeth Anderson published an important book, *The Imperative of Integration*. The meaning and uses of the idea of integration she for-

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mulates in it have triggered a wide debate in North American philosophy\(^2\). Many issues were raised, possibly leading one to conclude that there is something wrong with integration as a political or moral imperative. Ten years earlier, in *Inclusion and Democracy*, Iris Marion Young had already proposed what she called a «Critique of the ideal of integration» in her chapter on «Residential segregation and regional democracy»\(^3\). She opposed to it «an ideal of differentiated solidarity» as an alternative «ideal of social and political inclusion»\(^4\). The formulation of this ideal builds on some elements which had been presented in her chapter «City life and Difference» in *Justice and the Politics of Difference*\(^5\): in this earlier book, she contrasted an «ideal of community», «deny[ing] and repress[ing] social difference» by «privileging face-to-face relations», with «an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference».

In this presentation, I’ll first retrace the main arguments of the debate about the ideal of social, political and urban integration as it occurs in the United States. Then, taking the requirements of a non-ideal contextualist theorization seriously, I’ll propose to test the arguments when they are translated, both conceptually and geographically, to a European, and more specifically, French context. In France, the concept of integration is part of another semantic field and of another history of social relations. Iris Young is right when she states: «In Europe, the issue of integration is discussed today most often in terms of the situation of members of groups who have migrated to European countries from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean»\(^6\) – that is from former colonized regions or countries. However, I’ll argue that she is wrong to infer: «The arguments I have offered against an ideal of integration (…) apply as much to the situation of cultural minorities in Europe, I suggest, as to the context of the United States»\(^7\). I’ll rather propose some defense of a concept of integration in the French context and in a critical republican perspective, in which it is better conceived as an «essentially by-product» of non-domination. On these terms, there is nothing wrong with integration.


\(^4\) Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 221.


\(^6\) Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 219.

\(^7\) Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 220.
1. The imperative of integration: a means toward social relational egalitarian justice

Anderson’s book is best understood as an intrinsic part of her driving question in moral and political philosophy, that can be summarized by the title of her 1999 *Ethics* paper, «What is the point of equality?»⁸. In the paper, Anderson defends what she calls a «theory of democratic equality» against a theory of «equality of fortune». In a nutshell, she defends the idea that luck egalitarians, by focusing on correcting accidental inequality, due to brute luck, have lost sight of the «distinctively political aims of egalitarianism»⁹. She contrasts the structure of social justice grounded on relational equality, enabling equals to be free from oppression to participate both in the goods of society and in self-government, with the double institutional scheme of distributive justice grounded on equality of fortune: free markets, governing the distribution of goods for which individuals are deemed responsible, and the welfare state, that governs the distribution of goods that are beyond individuals’ control. The democratic theory of equality gives substance to the formal principle that the state should treat individuals with equal respect. Against luck egalitarianism’ unavoidable paternalism, Anderson’s relational theory suggests both that we ask what oppressed people themselves demand on their own account in the name of justice, and that we use objective tests, not subjective evaluations of well-being, to determine unjust disadvantage. One of the practical gains is that we find ourselves in a better position to match the remedy to the injustice: “if the injustice is exclusion, the remedy is inclusion”¹⁰.

*The imperative of integration* exemplifies the theory of democratic, relational, equality when it is applied to racial issues and to the marginalization and segregation of Black populations in American cities. The first part of the book shows that objective measurements all converge to document the impact of racial segregation on inequality and injustices; it concludes, «if racial segregation is the problem, it stands to reason that racial integration is the remedy»¹¹. Anderson defines integration as «the negation of segregation» (not simply its opposite, which would be mere desegregation, but its actual, and so

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¹⁰ Anderson, «What is the Point of Equality?», art. cit., p. 334.
to speak active, negation): it consists in «the free interaction of citizens from all walks of life on terms of equality and mutual regard in all institutions of civil society, and on voluntary terms in the intimate associations of private life».

The imperative of integration is an example of non-ideal philosophy. There are arguably many interpretations of the ideal vs. non-ideal theory divide. I shall use here the notion of non ideal theory in a broad sense, following Anderson’s suggestion: «I do not advance principles and ideals for a perfectly just society, but ones that we need to cope with the injustices in our current world, and to move us to something better»13. Non-ideal theory is concerned with theorizing the principles and norms that ought to guide us — i.e. historically and culturally situated, limited, rationally and affectively biased individuals — in non-ideal, or less than ideal, circumstances. In order to come up with these principles, normative philosophy needs empirical knowledge, i.e. empirical facts and their interpretations from various human and social sciences, sociology, economy, psychology, history, necessary to propose a coherent diagnosis of our current unjust condition. The remedy can only arise from an accurate diagnosis of the situation, but the work of philosophy is not done once the diagnosis is made: in order to avoid both abstract, idealized theory and merely descriptive social critique, an alliance between social sciences and normative philosophy is indispensable.

Anderson’s specific non-ideal perspective belongs explicitly, here as elsewhere, to pragmatism as a mode of critical theorization: she insists in several passages on the importance of democracy as «a mode of collective inquiry»14, or as a «society of equals»15, both dimensions being derived from John Dewey’s pragmatist emphasis on cooperation, on «personal day-by-day working together with others» as the core cultural meaning of democracy. Importantly, the collective social inquiry she calls for is based on a demanding ideal of inclusive participation: it supposes a kind of scientific and intelligent cooperation, which should be considered as a principle of epistemic democracy. In other words, social consensus cannot be considered as a given starting point of the normative labor; the inquiry supposes an epistemic pluralism that allows for disagreement and confrontation between different social perspectives. Moreover, if democratic non-ideal theorization is concerned with

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12 Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, op. cit., p. 95.
13 Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, op. cit., p. 3.
14 Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, op. cit., p. 95.
«moving us to something better», then we need to be concerned with developing the arguments that can be successfully employed by real protagonists in this debate about «current problems» in order to transform our social world. Then another criteria for non-ideal theory should be considered: whether the theorization is able to formulate the normative foundational premises which all protagonists (dominants and dominated) can accept and use as a common grounding basis for their commitment to improve the unjust, less-than-ideal situation.

2. Methodological and normative issues with the ideal of integration

If theoretical knowledge springs from empirics and if we understand non-ideal theory as the result of a collective inquiry, in which we must at least together come to an agreement on the terms of our inquiry (speak the same normative language), then the theorist has to be particularly careful to listen to the demands and perspectives of all ordinary citizens about segregation and integration. In this perspective, two difficulties arise in Anderson’s project:

First, objective measurements and subjective evaluations of segregation and integration are not on a par. According to Cara Wong, «[i]n general, people tend to perceive the environments in which they live as more diverse than they are ‘objectively’ speaking»16. The objectivity of objective measures is of course questionable: in social sciences as in natural sciences, the nature of the studied object is actually dependent on the instruments used to study it and on the observer, her situation and the goals she pursues in her analysis. But in a relational equality perspective, subjective representations matter, regardless of objective measures, since they reveal the perceived relations between individuals and groups, and individuals and their environment, when the individuals are differentially positioned on social hierarchies. A study that Cara Wong conducted with colleagues in 2012 shows that «ordinary citizens have idiosyncratic definitions of their local community that do not coincide with the official boundaries of administrative units used to calculate segregation indices, and that vary a great deal in size and are often not contiguous»17.

We rather need to take subjective perceptions of the city or of the neighborhood, and of their limits and delineation, into account, if we want to have a clearer and inclusive idea of our desired or required level of integration, and if we want citizens to endorse public policies designed to achieve this desired integration. Hence while objective measures are necessary, they are definitely not sufficient and, contrary to Anderson’s method, our theorization process should rather be discursively and subjectively initiated.

Second, there is disagreement about the meaning and value of segregation and integration, depending on the situation of the respondents. What an integrated environment refers to in people’s mental representations, both in terms of what constitutes the ideal number or percentage of diversity or demographic mixity, as well as in terms of what social gains or benefits are to be expected from integration, is heterogeneous depending on the racial, social, geographic and urban situation of the actors. Besides disagreement on the numbers and on the value of integration, there is even a more profound disagreement on the meaning of the concept. In Ron Sundstrom terms, «some might stress integration as combination, making whole, unity, and homogeneity, while others put greater emphasis on access, connection, and equal participation and membership»18. What’s more deterrent, and again in Ron Sundstrom’s terms,

what one hears when one listens to the voices of the diverse communities, is that sometimes integration does come up […], but it is not a prominent demand; rather, more often one hears claims for affordable, safe and decent housing, community-based development, and reference to principles such as community, democracy, accountability, equity, and inclusion19.

Lastly, some commentators suggest that not only is the concept of integration ambiguous and the language of integration mostly unheard among dominated groups, but the term itself is «sufficiently toxic to substantial segments of the black community as to disqualify it as a name for an ideal that they might find inspiring»20. Integration is taken as a substitute for assimila-

19 Sundstrom, «Commentary on E. Anderson’s The Imperative of Integration», art. cit., p. 2.
tion. The (privileged) theorist found herself in the position of translating the demands of groups negatively impacted by segregation into an «integration» discourse that may have largely twisted the nature of the claims.

Anderson bites the bullet and concedes that the term «integration» is inadequate to refer to the ideal she had in mind: she replies to her critics «I therefore propose, as a provisional remediation, to use the term ‘inclusion’ for what I call ‘integration’ in my book»21. Indeed, prima facie, inclusion can do all «integration» was supposed to do in Anderson’s view – it affirms the same goal: achieve free interaction between all citizens on terms of equality and mutual respect; and it avoids carrying the implicit meaning that it entails the dissolution of black community life. If inclusion, as opposed to integration, is the remedy to segregation, then at least part of our political commitment to justice should consist in encouraging ways to foster black solidarity and community building.

3. An alternative ideal of inclusion: the ideal of «differentiated solidarity»

The concept of inclusion, however, is rather vague and needs to be specified: Iris Young’s ideal of «differentiated solidarity», precisely offered as an ideal of «social and political inclusion» alternative to the «ideal of integration», could be a precious resource. Young, like Anderson, formulates her ideal by focusing on an analysis of residential segregation, both because «it is a major cause of other segregations» (school or employment segregation) and because «its spatial and jurisdictional aspects» make it a far-reaching phenomenon «for democratic practice»22. But according to Young, segregation should not be confused with «group clusterings»23: the problem with segregation rather lies with the processes of «exclusion from privileges and benefits» it entails, not with group differentiation itself. Young lists four such specific wrongs of residential racial segregation: first, it constrains groups in their housing options, thus «wrongly limits freedom of housing choice»; second, because of stigmatization processes and lack of investment in racially concentrated neighborhoods, it «reproduces and reinforces structures of privilege and disadvantage»; third, by creating social worlds that never meet, it «obscures the

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22 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, op. cit., p. 198.
23 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, op. cit., p. 204.
privilege it creates», making it invisible to the privileged groups; and fourth, as a result, it «impedes political communication», rendering «inclusive communicative democracy»24 impossible. The ideal of integration does not offer the right remedy to these wrongs, precisely because it wrongly focuses on group clustering instead of confronting the issue of exclusion from privileges. It takes «clustering itself as the problem and mixing as the solution»25. Because dominant groups «set the terms of integration to which the formerly segregated groups must conform», it denies the «validity of people’s desire to live and associate with others for whom they feel particular affinity»26. Integration considers that the main issue with segregation is that groups are spatially and institutionally distinguished, whereas, according to Young, there is nothing morally or politically wrong \textit{per se} in such grouping and distinction; and mixing is unable to address the real issue for a theory of justice, i.e. the processes through which dominant groups retain symbolic and material privilege.

By contrast, the ideal of differentiated solidarity «allows for a certain degree of separation» between groups, based on «affinity group differentiation », favoring «particularist and local self-affirmation and expression»27. Young takes pains to distinguish this ideal of differentiated solidarity from an ideal of community she had already rejected in «City life and Difference » in the name of what she called at the time «an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference»28. Solidarity and community, as normative ideals, should be carefully distinguished. The ideal of community, says Young, rests on the metaphysical illusion of an immediate co-presence of subjects in a local face-to-face direct democracy: it denies the unavoidable difference, and distance, between subjects; as a political consequence, «it often operates to exclude or oppress those experienced as different»29. There is now extensive scholarship about the risks associated with what Kwame Appiah called the «Medusa syndrome»30, the reification of group boundaries and excessive affirmation of internal uniformity or homogeneity within ethnic, cultural or religious groups, leading to marginalization and oppression of internal minorities or hybrid groups. Instead of favoring inclusion, it enhances a

\begin{footnotesize}
26  Young, \textit{Inclusion and Democracy}, op. cit., p. 216.
27 Young, \textit{Inclusion and Democracy}, op. cit., p. 221.
\end{footnotesize}
logic of camps, of friends and foes, and does not bring about the possibility of a common language or discourse. The ideal of differentiated group solidarity, that justifies and pushes forward the formation of affinity social groups in a city, should avoid these dire political consequences of the ideal of community.

This *caveat* presses an important point: the concept of solidarity is normatively dependent. It needs to be grounded on a more foundational norm that allows the theorist to differentiate between exclusive and inclusive, oppressive and emancipatory, just and unjust, solidarity groupings based on affinity. While clustering may not be a problem *per se*, some clusters are; and a non-ideal theory of democratic justice has to have normative criteria, shared and endorsed by all members of the political community, in order to discriminate between adequate and inadequate affinity groups. Young concedes this point: according to her, solidarity cannot simply be based on «fellow feeling and mutual identification», for that would confuse solidarity and community. She rather suggests that the only «moral basis» for solidarity is «that people live together»\(^{31}\), which she understands in a pragmatic, Deweyan, sense, although the reference to Dewey remains implicit: she suggests that to «live together» means that people’s activities are causally and institutionally related to one another and affect each other, even when people are strangers to each other. In this sense, which allows for social distance and «challenges conceptual and spatial boundaries»\(^{32}\), the scope of solidarity is the sphere of all those affected by our decisions and actions – something akin to what John Dewey had in mind when he advocated for a «great community»\(^{33}\). And such should be the sphere of our obligations of justice. However, in this case, the ideal of solidarity, backed by some non actual version of the «all-affected principle», potentially extends to the whole of humanity through mass media communication and economic relations, and becomes very tenuous, psychologically less convincing, or extremely demanding from a moral point of view. So while «fellow feeling and mutual identification» does not provide a normative grounding for solidarity, «that people live together» proves hardly consistent.

To sum up, it seems difficult to advocate for an ideal of «differentiated solidarity» that responds to the limits of the ideal of integration in the name of a better inclusion, but does not endorse a strong ideal of community. What if, in a renewed non-ideal perspective, «integration», not as an imperative, but as a by-product, could prove more inclusive than in Anderson’s view?

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31 Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 222.
4. Integration, assimilation and community in France

In Europe in general, and in France in particular, the concept of integration primarily refers to the issues of integrating immigrant groups. Contrary to Iris Young’s terms however, these groups are not merely «cultural» minorities, but deeply racialized minorities. For historical reasons, mainly because of the central role of imperial and colonial European states in shaping a massively unequal global order through race-based domination practices (through grabbing of natural resources and labor power, political marginalization or powerlessness, and cultural imperialism), migration phenomena today are still associated with a reproduction of disadvantage that is both racialized and racializing. Minority groups who are immigrating into European countries are, in their great majority, people from former European colonies who were placed in a position of political and economic disadvantage by colonizing countries, and they are received in the guest countries through an asymmetrical relation that reproduces the colonizer/colonized relationship. Sarah Fine summarizes the growing political theory literature on this point as follows: «[i]n short, race, racism, and racial and ethnic discrimination are embedded in the history of migration, in public responses to immigrations, in the apparatus of immigration controls, and in migration flows. And this is not just a regrettable historical fact; it remains true, even pervasive»\(^{34}\). Hence, understanding issues of integration in a European context with a cultural lense, or in multiculturalist terms, is deeply misleading: it undermines the inherent politically racialized dimension of the groups and of the relation between the national majority and immigrant minorities.

In France, the notion of integration was introduced at the end of the 1980’s both as a tentatively political substitute to the rightly depreciated notion of assimilation, and as an injunction to develop a French model of inclusion that would not reproduce the failures of the American so-called «melting pot» which was viewed as rigidifying ethnic identities. In 1989 it was institutionalized, not only as a word or a political objective, but as an administrative process\(^{35}\): a «Haut Conseil de l’intégration» (High Council of Integration) was created at the initiative of socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard, directly under the authority of the Prime Minister; the Council delivered annual

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reports until 2012, when it was dismissed. In its first report, it proposed the following definition of integration:

Without negating differences, knowing how to take them into account without exalting them, a politics of integration puts the emphasis on similarities and convergences, so that the various ethnic and cultural components of our society may live in solidarity, in the respect of equal rights and obligations, and so that it provides anyone, regardless of his origin, with the possibility to live in this society whose rules he accepted and in which he then becomes a constitutive element\textsuperscript{36}.

The same year, famous sociologist Dominique Schnapper published \textit{La France de l’intégration: sociologie de la nation en 1990\textsuperscript{37}}, in which she argued that the French nation did successfully integrate its immigrants. She defended a middle ground position between those who feared that foreigners may represent a threat for the French national identity, and those who advocated for a «multi-ethnic France». Hence the language of integration was constructed to oppose on one hand the identitarian nationalist vocabulary of assimilation, in which immigrants are supposed to be swallowed and disappear within the universalist and color-blind French body politic, and on the other hand the vocabulary of «communitarianism» and its perceived exaltation of sub-national group identities that threaten French cohesion and French republican principles. Integration, in the official French discourse (emanating both from political and intellectual authorities), was supposed to mean both the respect of differences and the sharing of Republican values.

As early as 1994, sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad wrote an important article, in which he denounced some aspects of this official semantic of integration\textsuperscript{38}. He argued that the meaning of the concept of integration was the result of previous sedimented layers of assimilationist meaning, originating in colonial context: hence, formulating an imperative of integration, or even an invitation to integrate, was always also a way to formulate a veiled accusation for a deficit of integration – the expression of a kind of suspicion attached to

\textsuperscript{36} Haut Conseil à l’intégration, \textit{Pour un modèle français d’intégration}, La Documentation française, Paris 1991, pp. 11-12.


\textsuperscript{38} Sayad, Abdelmayek, «Qu’est-ce que l’intégration? [What is integration?]», \textit{Hommes et Migrations} 1182 (1994) 8-14.
«any presence perceived as foreigner»39. Moreover, foreigner, in this integrative rhetoric, does not refer to a clear juridical status: suspicion is attached to «immigrants», those who are created as the object of «politics of integration»; and immigrants can be said «of second generation», i.e. born in France and with French nationality.

Despite his criticism however, Sayad didn’t dismiss integration altogether. Indeed, if one of the objectives of a non-ideal theorization of justice is also to formulate arguments that may be heard by dominant groups and incite them to renounce some of their privileges, in the French context where «communitarianism» is systematically considered as the acme of political evil, maintaining integration as a political concept is probably an efficient strategy. But Sayad’s point is more specific: he builds on Jon Elster’s analysis of some social and psychological states as «essentially by-products» of rationally oriented intentional actions undertaken for other ends40. Sayad suggests that integration is one these social objects that can’t be pursued consciously. He compares integration to forgetfulness or sleep: to want to forget something is precisely placing oneself in a mental state in which forgetfulness is impossible; to want to fall asleep prevents the occurrence of sleep. Likewise, integration can’t be an explicit democratic goal: it can only be the essentially by-product of actions and efforts aiming at something else. This is why integration «can’t be a predictive discourse», says Sayad41; to use it within a normatively prescriptive discourse comes down to a fallacy: integration can only be part of a descriptive discourse that occurs in retrospect, and with some delay, about the social reality it qualifies.

5. Integration: the essentially secondary effect of deracialization in a theorization of justice as non-domination

In this perspective, I want to suggest in my concluding section that integration can be conceived as the essentially by-product of the political aim of deracialization of the French political institutional order, by which I mean the visibilization of institutionalized hierarchies of racial subordination inherited from colonization, and their dismantling. The grounding norm of

41 Sayad, «Qu’est-ce que l’intégration? [What is integration?]», art. cit., p. 12.
such deracialization is non-domination in a critical republican perspective: an integrated society is what we can achieve if we pursue the distinctly political objective of racial non-domination as freedom from all racial arbitrary interference. And urban desegregation is the immediate political means to this political aim: French cities are, albeit this is denied in the French republican official discourse, racial cities, and reciprocally, racial issues are more easily heard when formulated in spatial terms.

Let me be clear: my goal here is not to defend a French version of Anderson’s ideal of integration. Not only, following Sayad, do I think that integration cannot be any kind of explicit «imperative», but I also contend that Anderson’s account of integration is grounded on a flawed principle that becomes apparent when the paradigm of integration is translated from a US to a French context. Anderson’s argument in favor of integration depends too heavily on the suggestion that racial segregation can be dissolved into a broader national identification or identity. Against Young, she thinks that «a sense of fellow feeling or mutual identification» is needed for citizens to join «in a common project of living together», and urges the Left «to put behind its preference for racial identities at the expense of national identities» that have to be constituted in order for racial justice to obtain. But the translation of the ideal of integration into a French context shows that the emphasis on a national «we» does not in itself generate cross-racial solidarity. On the contrary, it justifies «heightened antagonism toward immigrants, non-citizens and anyone seen as ‘foreign’».

What’s more, these «out-national-group» identities are racialized, and actively so through segregation processes that occur at the level of «racial cities». Race is space in the French context, although the racial dimension of urban segregation remains largely invisible or silenced. Anthropologist Giovanni Picker shows that the national state delegates racial enforcement to local authorities, to be conducted at a local level of space management and urban life regulation. Picker convincingly argues that this municipalization of race is a distinctive heritage of colonialism, in continuity with «the colonial experiments of race-space intersections as among the first modern regulatory mechanisms of territorial rule», when it was experimented in colonized cities, then transferred into the metropole, as a way of keeping perceived threats «spatially

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42 Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, op. cit., p. 188.
isolated from the colonizer». The colonies were a republican «laboratory»
used for the formulation and test of many republican concepts, norms of
identity and legal and administrative practices. Republican legal theory, with
its particular emphasis on the notion of citizenship, has been deeply shaped
by the relation between metropolitan France and the French colonies, and
civic statuses and rights associated with citizenship have been established by
differentiation with several minority statuses (colonial subjects, indigenous or
native persons, slaves, free colored, Whites, etc.). Segregation is the deliberate
effect of a series of political mechanisms aiming at keeping political exclusion
in place through spatial exclusion: Picker lists four such spatial devices, dis-
placement, omission, containment, and cohesion. These mechanisms inter-
twine with each other in various ways at a local, urban level, in order to create
specific cultural, economic and political orders of domination.

In order to dismantle these orders, non-domination has to be the norma-
tive core of the account of integration as essential by-product of deracializa-
tion I suggest here. Like relational equality, non-domination does not claim
that justice is done when material goods and liberties are equally distributed
(it focuses on hierarchical relations of oppression); but unlike it, it aims, more
radically and critically, at transforming relations of power (interpersonal and
structural). From Rainer Forst, I adopt the idea that non-domination involves
that «no political or social relations should exist that cannot be adequately justi-
fied toward those subjected to them». For him, non-domination is content
neutral, and it is enrolled in a procedural theory of justice whose fundamental
principle is a «principle of general and reciprocal justification». In sum, «[f]
undamental justice guarantees all citizens an effective status as justificatory
equals»
Hence, non-domination is, importantly, a justificatory ideal that
allows us to guard against a flawed procedure of inquiry. Beyond this meth-
odological gain, I also take non-domination as a grounding substantial norm
in a non-ideal theorization of justice. In Cécile Laborde’s critical republican
perspective, citizens are dominated by institutionalized cultural and social

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45 Vidal, Cécile (ed.), Français? La nation en débat entre colonies et métropole, XVIe-XIXe siècle,
Éditions de l’EHESS, Paris 2014, p. 9. She refers to Michel Foucault who noted that coloniza-
tion, with its political and juridical technics and weapons, of course transferred European models
to other continents, but also had many feed-back effects on power mechanisms in the West, on
power apparatus, institutions and technics (Michel Foucault, Il faut défendre la société, Gallimard,

46 Forst, Rainer, «Transnational Justice and Non domination, a discourse theoretical ap-
proach», in B. Buckinx - J. Treho-Mathys - T. Waligore (eds.), Domination and Global Political
norms when they are «humiliated, stigmatized, marginalized, silenced, indoctrinated, defined by others, and their capacity for (...) democratic voice is either denied or dismissed»47. In other words, X is dominated by Y (who can be an individual or a moral person, an institution as a system of rules, norms, procedures and objectives) if Y’s choices asymmetrically shape X’s capacity to express, define and pursue her ends and X cannot change the terms of the power relation between Y and her. Hence, in Cécile Laborde and Myriam Ronzoni’s words, non-domination grounds «a plausible conception of justice, understood as requiring the minimization of domination as a matter of right. A just order is one that minimizes the extent to which persons or groups are subject to domination – first and foremost by binding power and making it controllable by those who are subject to it (by legal, political and socio-economic means)»48. On this view, justice is primarily concerned with the nature and structure of power relationships; non-domination grounds the combat against social representations and norms that give meaning to individuals’ and groups’ positions. Promoting non-domination allows markers such as race to gain political signification as markers of how vulnerable a population is to arbitrary interference, and this vulnerability is inscribed in urban features. Integration as a by-product of deracialization will occur when, and if, France recognizes, and reduces, the dominated position of racialized groups, as groups negatively impacted by racialization processes that occur through some specific mechanisms of space urban management. From a methodological and non-ideal perspective, what we can learn from this journey of integration, from the US to France, is the deeply contextual nature of political concepts and the necessity for the political philosopher to never forget that they are part of situated political grammars in which our use of them may make sense.

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