In studies on thirteenth-century thinkers, the linguistic characteristics and the rhetorical style of their texts are usually neglected. There are two main reasons for this lack of interest in the *elocutio* of scholastic authors. In general, historians of philosophy (or theology), following the mainstream of Western thought, principally pursue some disembodied truth. Consequently, they argue or implicitly assume that an analysis of linguistic and rhetorical aspects of philosophy is irrelevant, since philosophers aim at «philosophical objectivity».

This deep-rooted skepticism toward a rhetorical approach of philosophical texts is reinforced by the observation that most scholastic commentaries and questions are written in a very dry and unpolished style. In contrast with twelfth-century humanists, the majority of the scholastics of the later Middle Ages did not attempt to produce literary works. Hence, it is thought useless to study these works from a rhetorical point of view. Even in the rare studies devoted to the language of outstanding scholastic thinkers, almost no attention is paid to the concrete features of their rhetorical style.

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1 A fine example of the philosophical contempt for the literary form is found in J.J.E. Gracia’s excellent *Philosophy and its History. Issues in Philosophical Historiography*, Albany 1992, pp. 259-261. After acknowledging «the connection between form and content», he denies that persuasion is the ultimate purpose of philosophy and concludes: «But if this is correct, then the analysis of the literary form of a text may not be as important for the understanding of the text as the literary critics claim». Gracia’s view rests on the questionable conviction that philosophy is not necessarily rhetorical; for a critical discussion of this conviction, see B. Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric*, Oxford 1990, pp. 209-213.

The aim of this paper is to characterize the style of the *Speculum divinorum*, the huge philosophical ‘encyclopedia’, which Henry Bate wrote at the request of his former pupil Guy of Avesnes. In previous studies, it has already been pointed out that Bate’s mannered style «is not a paragon of clarity and concision». With a view to refining this judgment, I shall sketch Bate’s stylistic ideal and examine, through an analysis of some selected passages, to what extent he lives up to this ideal in his *Speculum divinorum*.

1. Bate’s rhetorical ideal

Bate reckons rhetoric among the ‘linguistic’ sciences (*scientiae sermo-cinales*), which do not study (external) reality but only «diminished beings», i.e., mental

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concepts or expressions of such concepts. More precisely, he defines rhetoric as the science which deals with «persuasive discourses, intended to move the soul of the hearers»\(^6\). His critical attitude toward rhetoric becomes even more explicit when he claims that «speaking accurately or precisely does not pertain to the rhetorician»\(^7\). Since, then, Bate does not focus in his 'encyclopedia' on such 'linguistic' sciences, his rhetorical ideal must be reconstructed from a few scattered remarks.

As he notes in his dedicatory letter to Guy of Avesnes, the *Speculum divinorum* is a compilation that mainly consists of «words of philosophers and other wise men». With precise references, he quotes them «verbatim, as they stand in the original texts». For two reasons, such literal citations are inserted: first, the intention of the authors quoted should not be changed; second, a compiler should not appropriate ideas that others discovered or formulated in a better way than he himself could. Hence, Bate stresses that he has «chosen a style of writing and a mode of reasoning which are as much as possible in conformity with those [authors], that is, in harmony with the philosophical sciences»\(^8\). The main 'virtue' of the philosophical style is clarity\(^9\). This Aristotelian (and in general, classical) ideal is strengthened by a didactic consideration. Since Bate attempts in his *Speculum divinorum* to offer «solutions to many problems long ago raised» by his «dearest pupil», he naturally avoids a concise style that would cause obscurity and hinder his former student in gaining knowledge. Consequently, he admits that his *opusculum* is «fairly diffuse in style»\(^10\). Nevertheless, he also remarks in his


\(^7\) See *Spec.*, XV, 4, p. 166, ll. 42-43.

\(^8\) See *Spec.*, Epistola, p. 3, ll. 16-20; p. 4, ll. 37-47. Cfr. C. STEEL, «The *Speculum divinorum* (…)», cit., pp. XV-XVI.


\(^10\) See *Spec.*, Epistola, p. 3, ll. 12-16; pp. 4-5, ll. 54-60. *Opusculum*, which Bate also uses at the end of his 'encyclopedia' (*Spec.*, XXIII, 25, p. 512, l. 120) is an hyperbolic expression of modesty; Bartholomaeus Anglicus too calls his encyclopedia a «little work» (see Bartholomaei Anglici *De genuinis rerum coelestium, terrae et inferae Proprietatibus* (…), Procurante D.G. BARTHOLODO PONTANO, Francofurti 1601, p. 1261).
dedicatory letter that he intends «to use an enthymematic brevity in order that the
abundance of his discourse might not grow immoderately». This remark, however,
bears on the «mode of reasoning» rather than on the style of writing and implies
that Bate leaves it to the reader to transform all his arguments into formal
syllogisms.  

Because of his classical ideal of clarity, Bate regrets not only the brevity of
some of Aristotle’s arguments, but also the imagery of the Platonists. In his
opinion, Plato often has recourse to figurative language «either intentionally or
owing to a lack of knowledge of logic or because the philosophical manner [of
reasoning] is neglected in some other way». Bate, however, following Aristotle,
maintains that metaphors pertain to a rhetorical way of speaking, which should
best be avoided in philosophy. Philosophers «should proceed [in their arguments]
on the basis of proper words». Hence, he claims that the theologians who «hide
the truth in [metaphorical] coverings» do not deserve any serious attention: for the
superficial meaning of their words is ridiculous, while «the hidden truth is unclear».
Nevertheless, he also adopts the Neoplatonic view that metaphors are useful to
gain knowledge of immaterial things. He approvingly quotes ‘Themistius’ (actually
Philoponus) to the effect that «just as there is nothing more ridiculous than to take
poetic myths at face value, so there is nothing more divine than to search for the
hidden meaning in them». Accordingly, the Pythagoreans employed symbols
«because they thought that their wisdom should not be made known to the
[uninitiated] readers». They handed down their doctrines in a symbolic language,

12 See Spec., XXIII, 19, p. 484, ll. 227-228.
13 See Spec., VII, 7, p. 126, l. 34; XII, 8, p. l. 148, 41; XX, 1, p. 2, ll. 47-50; XXIII, 3, p. 385, l. 209.
14 See Spec., XII, 7, pp. 146-147, ll. 187-190.
15 Cfr. Aristotle, An. post., II, 13, 97b37; Meteor., II, 3, 357a27; Metaph., I, 9, 991a20-22 (this last
passage is quoted in Spec., VII, 17, p. 160, ll. 107-109). For a similar (though more systematically
elaborated) view, see Aquinas, Summa th., I, 1, 9, arg. 1 and ad 1; cfr. M.-D. Chenu, op. cit., p.
170; R. McInerny, Rhyme and Reason. St. Thomas and Modes of Discourse, Milwaukee 1981,
pp. 32-33.
17 See Spec., VII, 17, p. 161, ll. 129-137. The argument is based on Aristotle, Metaph., III, 4, 1000a9-
11; Averroes, Metaph., III, 15, f. 55B-C; and Aquinas, Metaph., III, 11, M.-R. Cathala – M.
Spiazzi (ed.), Taurini-Romae 1964, §§468-471. With «theologians», Bate primarily means the
mythological poets criticized by Aristotle.
thus «leading us to an investigation of the hidden truth». In the same vein, Calcidius remarks that Plato’s account of the ‘creation’ of the world requires a «mythical interpretation of sacred secrets». Likewise, Varro observes that it is useful for the common people to believe false stories and to ignore mysterious truths. Although Bate agrees with these views, he finds them insufficient. Since human beings derive scientific knowledge from sense-perception, it is «necessary to use some sensible similes, not only with a view to hiding, but also with a view to knowing things, particularly things that are removed from sense-perception, such as intellectual substances». In support of this idea, Bate cites Dionysius’ famous thesis that «the divine ray can shine upon us only when it is upliftingly concealed in a variety of holy veils». Moreover, he refers to Averroes, who argues that although metaphors are rhetorical and false, they are a didactical way leading toward understanding.


20 See Spec., VII, 17, pp. 162-163, ll. 164-169. Cfr. Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, I, 1, PG 3, 121B (= Dionysiaca, Ph. CHEVALLIER (éd.), Bruges 1937 [Nachdr. Stuttgart 1989], III, p. 733, ll. 1-3; transl. Scotus Eriugena). Bate’s argument is a philosophical translation of a theological argument expounded by Aquinas in his Summa th., I, 1, 9 (resp.), where the same Pseudo-Dionysian auctoritas is quoted. However, there is an important difference between Aquinas’ and Bate’s use of the metaphor of the ‘holy veils’. Aquinas regularly uses the quotation to substantiate his doctrine that all human knowledge requires phantasms (see Quaestiones disputatae De anima, 16, ed. B.C. BAZÁN, Roma-Paris, 1996, p. 145, ll. 314-318 (with further parallels) and S.T. BONINO, «'Les voiles sacrés': À propos d’une citation de Denys», in Storia del Tomismo. Fonti e Riflessi, Roma 1992, pp. 158-171, esp. 164-166). Bate, on the other hand, holds that some intellectual knowledge without phantasms is possible (cfr. Spec., XVI, 3, p. 253, ll. 75-83; XVI, 15, p. 334, ll. 37-44). Consequently the quotation from Pseudo-Dionysius occupies a peripherical place in his thought; he adopts the traditional interpretation, which identifies the ‘holy veils’ with sensible things that symbolize divine realities (on this traditional interpretation, see BONINO, art. cit., pp. 159-163).

Bate’s rhetorical ideal, which is largely in keeping with Aquinas’ ideal of scholastic language, can be summarized in two principles: (1) the style should be clear; (2) metaphors should be used sparingly\textsuperscript{22}.

### 2. Bate’s stylistic practice

Having sketched Bate’s rhetorical ideal, we are now in a position to judge his stylistic practice by his own standards. However, before looking at a number of passages, we should make a few general observations on his \textit{parole} and particularly on his use of metaphors.

Bate’s vocabulary is, like that of most scholastic philosophers, quite limited. While he has assimilated some ‘technical’ terms belonging to different areas of medieval science\textsuperscript{23}, his \textit{copia verborum} is actually restricted to the normal philosophical lexicon of the School\textsuperscript{24}. Moreover, he has not contributed to the development of the philosophical jargon by inventing neologisms or by providing new definitions of old-established terms. As to the syntax, it is evident that most of his sentences are polished. Even though he does not follow the rules of Ciceronian grammar, he generally composes grammatically correct sentences and avoids elliptical or asyndetic constructions. With regard to the stylistic \textit{ornatus}, it should


\textsuperscript{24} The main sources of this vocabulary are: the Bible, the Church Fathers (especially Augustine), and the translations of Aristotle and his commentators. For recent literature on the scholastic lexicon, see S.F. \textit{Brown}, «Theology and Philosophy», in F.A.C. \textit{Mantello} – A.G. \textit{Rigg} (eds.), \textit{Medieval Latin. An Introduction and Bibliographical Guide}, Washington, D.C. 1996, pp. 267-287, esp. 283-287; J. \textit{Hamesse} (ed.), \textit{Auxorigines du lexique philosophique européen. L’influence de la latinitas, Louvain-la-Neuve 1997}; J. \textit{Hamesse} – C. \textit{Steel} (eds.), \textit{L’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge}, Turnhout 2000. It would be interesting to compare Bate’s vocabulary with that of other thirteenth-century encyclopedists (particularly with that of Vincent of Beauvais); such a comparative study would probably show the relative poverty of Bate’s lexicon, in which specifically poetic and historiographical (juridical or military) words and many biological, medical, and alchemical terms are absent.
be noted that tropes, figures of speech, and figures of thought are employed rather seldom in the *Speculum divinorum*. As we may expect from a philosopher who prefers Aristotle's scientific matter-of-fact style to Plato's figurative locution, this also holds true of metaphorical language. Nevertheless, Bate colors his discourse with several traditional metaphors.

**a) Metaphors**

Bate's metaphors can be grouped in two types: (i) 'literary' metaphors, which merely reinforce his ideas or adorn his style; (ii) 'philosophical' metaphors, which have an essential function in his thought and are actually instances of catachresis.25

(i) Literary metaphors

Literary metaphors chiefly occur in polemical passages. A few examples will suffice to show that these metaphors, though not strictly philosophical, serve a rhetorical-philosophical goal.

* The Averroists attempt to save Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle's noetics and claim that his interpretation should be taken to mean that there is only one intellect for all human beings:

> Enimvero quidam *<salvare>* conantes expositionem hanc tamquam necessario *reta* <torquendum ad hoc*, ut hinc opinandum sit unum tantum in hominibus intellectum esse, *semetipsos illaqueant et in horribilem incidunt labyrinthus* (...)26.

Here, Bate suggests that the Averroists «entangle themselves and fall into a horrible labyrinth» because they believe that Averroes' words must be «twisted». The figurative use of *retorquere, illaqueare, incidere,* and *labyrinthus* is not original; the rhetorical power of this sentence lies in the associative accumulation of the metaphors.27

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25 *Abusio* is the use of a word (in a figurative sense) «to describe something for which no proper term exists» (cfr. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.*, VIII, 6, 34-35).


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* Having cited a passage from Philoponus’ commentary on *De anima* against Averroes’ interpretation, Bate observes:

Ecce qualiter ex his *vigore* expositionis quam Commentator proposuit, *enervatur*.

Again, it should be noted that the figurative use of «strength» and «weaken» is not new.

* In a non-polemical passage, Bate remarks that by the «certainty of experience», upon which all scientific knowledge is based, we know that we want to think only sometimes:

Illud autem *eodem fulcimento*, cui et ipse Philosophus (…) *innititur* — principia quippe scientiarum omnium super ipsum *fundari* docuit — experientiae, inquam, certitudine experimur quandoque velle nos intelligere, quandoque vero non (…).

The figurative meaning of «support», «rest on», and «being founded on» is quite common in scholastic Latin; the attractiveness of the passage again lies in the combination of the metaphors.

* Philosophers such as Siger of Brabant erroneously maintain that the intellect is united to man, not as his form, but only as his extrinsic mover. After deploying a battery of arguments against this heretic view, Bate triumphantly remarks that his opponents, «while trying to evade the dangerous and inescapable invasion of these proofs, ignore their own voice» and admit that the intellect is the intrinsic mover and form of the human body. Here, Bate reinforces his argument not only

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29 See *Spec.*, III, 7, p. 180, ll. 69-73. For *fulcimentum*, cfr. Deferrari, s.v.; Latham, s.v., 4c; for *innitii*, Deferrari, s.v., 2; Latham, s.v., 2b; for *fundare*, cfr. Lewis-Short, s.v., II; Deferrari, s.v., 2; Latham, s.v., 2c.


31 See *Spec.*, III, 17, p. 216-217, ll. 17-26: «Importunum itaque et inevitabilem harum demonstrationum *invasionem* aliquid mel evadere conantes, hi qui nobis intellectum asserunt uniri ut motorem tantum, propriam vocem ignorantes, dicunt quod intellectus in intelligendo est operans.
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with military metaphors, but also with the figura etymologica «invasionem ... evadere», with the hyperbole «propriam vocem ignorantes», with the geminating synonymy «importunam ... inevitabilem», and with the homoeoteleuton «conantes - ignorantes».

* In his critique of monopsychism, Bate discusses Averroes’ thesis that if the material intellect were individualized, it would be a corporeal power and could only receive notions that are potentially intelligible. This argument is invalid, insofar as it does not distinguish between the material and the immaterial individual: «et sic tota destruitur illa machina obiciendi». What is interesting in this sentence is not so much the figurative use of «destroy» as the combination «machina obiciendi»: taken literally, it denotes a «siege-engine», a «machine for hurling missiles», but here it refers to the «contrivance of [false] objections».

* Furthermore, Bate underlines that Averroes «falls upon Scylla while wishing to avoid Charybdis», because he erroneously claims that the intellect is not the form of a human being from the beginning.

* Aristotle’s argumentation against the superficial meaning of Plato’s texts was necessary in order to discover the true meaning of the theory of ideas:

(…) necessaria fuit disputatio Aristotelis contra sermones Platonis quatenus discusa verborum palea sermonisque metaphorici detrácto cortice granum remanet intentionis rectae et nucleus veritatis (…) ne post varios et superficialles litterae sensus hos vel illos in errorem vagetur intellectus.

Discutere, which in scholastic Latin mostly means ‘to discuss’, is used here in its original meaning (‘to shake out’), but through the combination with «verborum palea» it also receives a metaphorical sense. In Christian literature, palea often

intrinsicum ad corpus per suam naturam (...)). Bate cites Siger, De anima intellectiva, 3, B. BAZÁN (ed.), Louvain-Paris 1972, p. 85, ll. 80-85.

32 See Spec., VI, 22, p. 82, ll. 17-18. For destruere, cfr. OLD, s.v., 2b; DEFERRARI, s.v., 2; LATHAM, s.v., 4b; for machina, cfr. LEWIS-SHORT, s.v., II; OLD, s.v., 3a-b; O. WEIERS - M. GUMBERT-HEPP, Lexicon Nederlandicæ Medii Aevi, Leiden 1977-, s.v., 1a-b; for obicere, cfr. OLD, s.v., 8b and 10; DEFERRARI, s.v., 1a.

denotes the bad, external part of something. The use of *cortex* in reference to the superficial meaning, which is to be «drawn away», is well attested in medieval Latin. To the «chaff» and the «bark», Bate opposes the «grain», which he identifies with the «kernel of the truth»34. Like these agricultural metaphors, the figurative use of «wandering» is very traditional35.

* In his attack on Aquinas’ noetics and metaphysics, Bate employs some harsh metaphors: he asserts that Aquinas’ «intellect is veiled by a thick mist»36, and ironically wonders «how such a big man could base himself on such a weak foundation»37.

* After expounding his theory of the immaterial forms, Bate reacts severely against some contemporary philosophers who deny that material forms depend on superior formal causes. These *moderni* «philosophize in a juvenile manner» and «struggle against the stable foundation which has already been laid». Furthermore, Bate describes their attitude with metaphors which are reminiscent of classical philosophical literature. Indeed, «no hoary wisdom appears in them, just as it was once said to the Athenians in the *Timaeus*», and while boasting on their Aristotelianism, they «miss the door», that is to say, they do not pay attention to the self-evident principles of Aristotle’s philosophy38. As Bate indicates, the

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34 See *Spec.*, VII, 2, p. 105, ll. 5-10. For *discutere*, cfr. OLD, s.v., 2; BLAISE, s.v., 2; DEFFERRARI, s.v.; for *palea*, cfr. BLAISE, s.v.; WEUERS, s.v., 1b; DEFFERRARI, s.v. (see particularly Aquinas, *In Psalms*, VIII, 1, Parmae, 1862, p. 167a: «... separatio fit grani a paleis. Item a verbis litteraliter positis separatur sensus spiritualis»); for *cortex*, cfr. LATHAM, s.v., e; for *granum*, cfr. LATHAM, s.v., 1b; for *nucleus*, cfr. LEWIS-SHORT, s.v., II, A-B. The metaphor of the ‘bark’ perhaps influenced Nicholas of Cusa, who noted in the margin of *Spec.*, VII, 17: «nota quomodo ... aristoteles ad corticem reprehenderen nititur platonem» (cfr. E. VAN DE VYVER, «Appendice» in *Speculum divinorum*, Tome I, p. 227); see *De doctrina ignorantia*, II, 9, § 148. On Bate’s influence, see further C. STEEL, «Nature as Object of Science: On the Medieval Contribution to a Science of Nature», in C. Koyama (ed.), *Nature in Medieval Thought. Some Approaches East and West*, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2000, pp. 125-152, esp. 151-152.

35 For *vagari*, cfr. OLD, s.v., 4b and 5b. In scholastic Latin *error* is almost exclusively used in the (figurative) sense of ‘mistake’, ‘(moral or doctrinal) error’; cfr. DEFFERRARI, s.v.; LATHAM, s.v., 2-3.

36 See *Spec.*, XVI, 9, 1. 7: «crassa caligine velato quidem intellectu». For *velatus*, cfr. n. 46; for *caligo*, cfr. LEWIS-SHORT, s.v., II, B, 1; BLAISE, s.v.

37 See *Spec.*, XVI, 12, p. 314, II. 61-62: «Sane mirum est qualiter tantus vir super tam debile fundamentum sustentatus est (...).» For *fundamentum*, cfr. n. 29.

38 See *Spec.*, XVI, 10, pp. 294-295, ll. 4-11: «Atvero iuveniliter utique philosophantes moderni quidam, praesupposito iam fundamento stabili contranitentes, apud quos profecto non apparevit...»
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metaphor «cana sapientia» is borrowed from Plato\(^39\). The phrase «in foribus delinquere» is taken from Book II of the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle holds that truth is like the proverbial door which no one can miss\(^40\).

(ii) Philosophical metaphors

Besides the aforementioned metaphors, which invigorate the argumentation and give the text some elegance, there are metaphors which are intrinsic to Bate's thought. Most of these images derive from ancient philosophy and have a long history. Since such philosophical metaphors determine the world-picture of an author at a deep level, they deserve a careful study\(^41\). The different influences on the author's use of these images should be identified; the function of the similes in his works should be examined; and comparative research should investigate the manner in which his contemporaries use (or do not use) them. Although all these issues are very interesting, they exceed the limits of this paper. Therefore, I shall only briefly mention the most important philosophical metaphors which are at work in Bate's *Speculum Divinorum*. After outlining some time-honored similes, I shall focus more closely on Bate's metaphorical use of *extasis*, which is less stereotyped.


\(^{41}\) As H. Blumenberg («Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie», *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 6 (1960), pp. 7-142, esp. 9) has observed, such «absolute metaphors», which cannot be translated into 'proper' terms, are the «Grundbestände» of philosophical language. See also S. Isseling, *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict. An historical survey*, The Hague 1976, pp. 115-126.
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a) Traditional imagery

* Being enclosed in a «circle», all things proceed from God and return to God⁴².
* The heavens (and the universe) are represented as a «spiritual animal»⁴³.
* Material things are «images», «shadows» or «echoes» of the eternal ideas⁴⁴.
* Man is like a «minor cosmos»⁴⁵.
* Situated on a «border-line», man has an «intermediate condition» between heaven and earth⁴⁶.

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⁴² See Spec., XI, 24, p. 84, l. 120; p. 85, l. 131; XXIII, 8, p. 413, ll. 169-176; XXIII, 25, p. 508, ll. 8-12. In these texts, Bate quotes Proclus, In Timaeum, C. Steel (ed.), Leuven 1985, pp. 572-574, ll. 47-87; Eelm. th., props. 11, 12, and 33. This motif pervades the entirety of medieval philosophy; see, for instance, H. Anzulewicz, «Die Denkstruktur des Albertus Magnus. Ihre Dekodierung und ihre Relevanz für die Begrifflichkeit und Terminologie», in J. Hamesse - C. Steel (eds.), L’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge, cit., pp. 369-396, esp. 379-380 (with references to further literature).


The agent intellect is compared to "art" and "light"; the potential intellect is a "table on which nothing has been written". The human intellect "rules the body with a civil rule". The light of the human intellect is "veiled" by sense-perception and phantasy. An intellectual substance is "self-moving": it "proceeds" from its essential cause and "returns" to itself (i.e., to its cause), thus making a "circular operation".

Philosophy follows a "way": it "proceeds" toward that which is not

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47 See Spec., Prooemium, p. 58, ll. 49-51; p. 69, ll. 34-35; I, 1, p. 71, ll. 7-11; II, 9, p. 45, ll. 48-59; III, 1, p. 157, ll. 66-73; p. 160, ll. 44-61; XVI, 3, p. 253, ll. 93-95. The idea is based on Aristotle, De an., III, 5, 430a1-2 and 430a12-17.

48 See Spec., V, 10, p. 155, ll. 73-81; XVI, 3, p. 256, ll. 170-171. This metaphor derives from Aristotle's thesis that "the intellect rules the appetites with civil sway" (Pol., I, 5, 1254b4-6).

49 See Spec., Prooemium, p. 68, ll. 95-11; I, 32, p. 211, ll. 55-61; II, 12, p. 54, ll. 45-52; II, 37, p. 143, l. 71; III, 8, p. 188, l. 79; VI, 20, p. 76, ll. 90-93 and p. 77, l. 132; VI, 21, p. 78, ll. 5-6; VI, 25, p. 94, ll. 15-17; XIV, 7, p. 107, ll. 83-88; XV, 8, p. 194, ll. 163-167; XVI, 3, pp. 251-259, ll. 20/187/215/228/255; XVI, 4, pp. 260-261, ll. 527/36; XVI, 9, p. 285, l. 7; XVI, 15, pp. 334-335, ll. 26-28/53-62. The idea is based on Aristotle, De an., III, 3, 429a7-8. With this image, the simile of the night-owl is closely related: see Spec., Prooemium, p. 59, ll. 65-67; p. 68, ll. 9-11; VI, 10, p. 37, ll. 131-132; XIII, 1, p. 2, ll. 40-44; XIV, 11, p. 140, ll. 72-73; XVI, 3, pp. 251-252, ll. 45-47; XVI, 9, p. 286, ll. 50-53; XXIII, 2, 1, p. 371, ll. 15-16; XXIII, 9, p. 417, ll. 72-73; XXIII, 10, p. 420, l. 7-9. Cfr. Aristotle, Metaph., II, 1, 993b9-11: "As the owls' eyes are to daylight, so is the intellect of our soul to the entities which are by nature most manifest"; see further C. Steel, Der Adler und die Nachteule. Thomas und Albert über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik (Lectio Albertina), Münster 2001.

50 See Spec., XI, 25, p. 87, ll. 53-60; XI, 30, pp. 111-112, ll. 94-99; XXIII, 9, p. 415, ll. 12-19; XXIII, 25, p. 511, ll. 106-108. This idea is mainly derived from Proclus, Elem. th., props. 35, 39, and 42; for the notion of intellectual self-movement, Bate also refers to Aristotle, Metaph., XII, 7, 1072a30. Furthermore, he emphasizes that both Aristotle and Proclus speak of the intellect's self-movement "by way of a likeness and according to a proportional relation or comparison" (XI, 25, p. 87, ll. 57-58).

51 See Spec., I, 1, p. 71, ll. 4-6; V, 12, p. 164, ll. 87-89; XVI, 3, pp. 252-254, ll. 65/110; XVI, 9, p. 289, l. 124; XXIII, 22, p. 499, ll. 151-152, where Bate refers to the "natural way" sketched by Aristotle at the beginning of his Physics (I, 1, 184a16-22). These passages confirm J. DECORTE's thesis that medieval philosophers conceive their philosophical project as a rational "way" toward wisdom (see his Waarheid als weg. Beknopte geschiedenis van de middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte, Kapellen-Kampen 1992, esp. pp. 9-17 and 319-321); on the notion of 'way' in Aquinas, see J.A. AERTSEN, Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas' Way of Thought, Leiden 1988, esp. pp. 227-231.
immediately known to man\textsuperscript{52}, «flies the impurity and instability of corruptible things»\textsuperscript{53}, and «ascends» to the divine\textsuperscript{54}.

* Philosophers are «compelled by the truth»\textsuperscript{55}.

* The human intellect sometimes «touches» on intelligible entities (i.e., obtains some knowledge of them)\textsuperscript{56}.

* God eternally makes a circular revolution and rests in Himself\textsuperscript{57}.

* God is the «Source», «Maker» and «Architect» of everything; His Mind is the «Form of forms» and «Archetypal Cosmos» in which the exemplary ideas of all things are «contained»\textsuperscript{58}.

\textsuperscript{52} See Spec., XIV, 8, p. 113, ll. 18-24; XIV, 9, p. 124, ll. 39-47 and p. 128, ll. 150-157; XIV, 10, pp. 129-130, ll. 4-10; XV, 2, p. 159, l. 108; XV, 10, p. 202, ll. 64-65; XVI, 9, title and p. 292-294, ll. 214 and 256-260; XVI, 14, pp. 327-328, ll. 6-13; XVI, 15, p. 333, l. 24; XXIII, 1, pp. 371-372, ll. 24-30.

\textsuperscript{53} See Spec., VI, 21, pp. 78-79, 20-21; cf. VII, 2, p. 105, ll. 16-17: Plato says that «one should move away from the body».

\textsuperscript{54} See Spec., I, 32, p. 212, l. 75; XXIII, 25, p. 511, l. 119.


\textsuperscript{56} Although Bate sometimes uses pertingere to denote the knowledge of divine substances (see Spec., Prooemium, p. 62, 41), he prefers attingere, because perfect knowledge of those beings cannot be reached (see Spec., Prooemium, p. 65, ll. 19-22; p. 66, ll. 47/65; p. 69, l. 35; XIII, 12, pp. 52-53, ll. 116-123; XVI, 9, p. 287, l. 55; XXIII, 1, p. 371, l. 9; XXIII, 5, p. 398, l. 274; XXIII, 10, p. 420, l. 6 and p. 421, ll. 20/30; XXIII, 14, p. 442, ll. 5-6; XXIII, 15, p. 449, l. 5). Bate's metaphorical use of attingere is inspired by Aristotle, Metaph., IX, 10, 1051b24-27 (quoted in Spec., Prooemium, p. 60, ll. 00-2) and De part. an., I, 5, 644b33 (quoted in Spec., Prooemium, p. 69, ll. 28-29; XV, 7, p. 187, ll. 144-149; XVI, 9, p. 287, l. 55); attingere is also used in Proclus, In Tim., C. STEEL (ed.), Leuven, 1985, p. 574, l. 2 (quoted in Spec., XXIII, 10, p. 424, l. 129), in Philoponus, De an., III, p. 88, l. 59 (quoted in Spec., XIII, 12, p. 52, l. 117), by Albert, De anima, III, 3, 12, C. STROICK (ed.), Monastierii Westfalorum, 1968, p. 224, ll. 86-87 (quoted in Spec., XVI, 16, p. 352, ll. 334-339), and by Aquinas, Metaph., IX, 11, §1916 (quoted in Spec., Prooemium, p. 60, l. 8).

\textsuperscript{57} See Spec., XX, 34, p. 176, ll. 94-100. This conception is related to the general idea that intellectual substances have a circular motion (cf. n. 50).

\textsuperscript{58} See Spec., III, 14, p. 205, ll. 24-28; XI, I, p. 4, ll. 52-54; XII, 5, p. 138, ll. 65-75; XXIII, 15, p. 450, ll. 24-37. Bate refers for these similes to Plato, Tim., 29a30c; he also links it with the idea that «the work of nature is the work of Divine Art» (on this theme, see my «Albert's Influence on Bate's Metaphysics and Noetics», in W. SENNER (Hrsg.), Albertus Magnus. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren, Berlin 2001, pp. 195-206, esp. 199-200). For the metaphor of the 'architect', which is already used by Cicero (De natura deorum, I, 8, 19), cfr. Aquinas, Metaphys., V, 2, §769 (quoted in Spec., Prooemium, p. 60, l. 8).
BATE'S ELOCUTIO

* Bate considers his work a «mirror» whereby he intends to contemplate the divine substances.59

b) Extasis

In thirteenth-century scholasticism, the word extasis is most often employed in a theological context. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, regards ecstasy as a disposition in which one «is put outside oneself». In his view, ecstasy can affect the cognitive or the appetitive powers of the soul. The cognitive ecstasy can occur in two directions: a person is put outside the knowledge that is by nature proper to him either because he is lifted up to a higher level of knowledge, or because he is pressed down, for instance when he falls into madness.60 The second type of cognitive ecstasy, however, is not prominent in Aquinas’ writings. Following a long tradition, he conceives of ecstasy as a kind of prophetic state, as a rapture whereby one is drawn upward to the divine. Such ecstasy is primarily experienced by saints (e.g., St. Peter and St. Paul).61

Bate is well aware of the religious meaning of extasis and goes even so far as to associate the word with the verbs transformare and transsubstantiare, which normally have a theological meaning.62 Thus, he notes that the human will can be transformed


60 See Summa th., I-II, 28, 3, resp. For the two meanings of extasis ('trance' - 'loss of consciousness'), cfr. Latham, s.v., a-b.

61 See Summa th., II-II, 174, 1 ad 3; II, 175, 2, resp. Cfr. Isidore, Etymologiae, VII, 8 (on ecstasy as a the first kind of prophecy); Ps.-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 4, PG 3, 711 A (on St. Paul, whose ecstasy was caused by divine love); Gregorius Magnus, Dialogi, II (De vita et miraculis venerabilis Benedicti abbatis), 3, A. de Vogüé (ed.), Paris, 1979, pp. 144-146, 64-82 (on St. Peter, who was caught up in ecstasy by an angel).

62 See Blaise, s.v.; Deferrari, s.v.
into the more divine substances and that it is better for man to be somehow transubstantiated into another self «through an appetitive or loving ecstasy» than to remain below\(^63\). In such passages, extasis, transformare and transsubstantiare are not used in a metaphorical sense\(^64\), even though the strictly philosophical context in which they appear is quite different from the theological context in which they are normally used by scholastic authors. In contrast with Aquinas, Bate uses extasis outside a theological context, and sometimes even in a non-religious sense.

The following passage brings the three words together and illustrates their philosophical meaning:

The act of sensing, then, and in general every act of any passive cognition whatsoever, tends and is moved toward its object per se and primarily. Doesn’t this mean that [the sense] somehow undergoes an ecstasy and is somehow put outside [itself], as if it were somehow transubstantiated or transformed into its object\(^65\)?

Here, the verbs transsubstantiare and transformare are obviously taken in their etymological sense. Thus they mean «give another substance / form to», and in the passive voice, «being changed into another substance / form»\(^66\). As the adverb «tam-

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\(^63\) See Spec., Prooemium, pp. 65-66, l. 29-38; XV, 8, p. 194, ll. 174-180.

\(^64\) Since Bate does not describe mystical experiences, there are no ‘mystical’ metaphors in his Speculum. On such metaphors, see M. EGERDING, Die Metaphorik der spätmittelalterlichen Mystik, Paderborn-München-Wien-Zürich 1997.

\(^65\) See Spec., II, 29, p. 119, ll. 34-38: «Quod igitur actus sentiendi, et universaliter omnis actus cognitionis passivae quoquo modo dictae, per se et primo tendit et fertur in obiectum extra, quid hoc est aliud quam quod extasim patitur quodammodo et extrapositionem quandam, tamquam transsubstantiatus quoquo modo seu transformatus in obiectum? » On this text, see my «Henry Bate’s Theory of Sensible Species», Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 68 (2001), pp. 75-110, esp. 106-107. The interpretation of ‘ecstasy’ as «extrapositio» may be influenced by Aquinas (cfr. n. 60), but he does not use the word extrapositio; Albert, however, uses extra-se-positio (see Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, P. SIMON (ed.), Monasterii Westfalorum 1972, p. 110, ll. 65-66; p. 219, ll. 58-60).

\(^66\) Admittedly, Bate is not the only philosopher who uses transsubstantiatio in a philosophical sense. See, for instance, Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. 49, q. 5 (Badius (ed.), Paris 1520, f. 36N): «obiectum volitum sub ratione qua in ipsum transsubstantiatur volens»; Raimundus Lullus, Ars brevis, 10, A. MADRE (ed.), Turnholti 1984, p. 235, ll. 150-151: «Transubstantiation is the act of nature in that which is transubstantiated, when it has lost its old form and assumed a new form»; Ars generalis ultima, 9, A. MADRE (ed.), Turnholti 1986, p. 234, ll. 124-125, on the vegetative soul which «transubstantiates food into flesh» (I owe the Lullus references to Prof. F. Bossier). For the
quam» and the indefinite pronouns («quodam modo», «quandam», «quoquo modo») indicate, Bate is well aware of the fact that the terms are used here metaphorically. The metaphor consists in the transposition of words that usually occur in a theological context into psychology.

In the foregoing text, the words *extasis*, *transsubstantiare*, and *transformare* have a neutral meaning. However, in many other passages, *extasis* and *transformare* are used with a pejorative connotation. This meaning of *extasis* is partly based on Philoponus' commentary on *De anima*. The Grammarian indeed holds that «when phantasy takes on alien figures from sensible objects, it overclouds («obnubilans») the intellect and makes it depart («exstare facit») from its proper station and cognition».

In his quotation of Philoponus' argument, Bate interprets the verb «depart» as «to undergo ecstasy» and indicates its metaphorical character by adding «somehow». Furthermore, he explains that «apparently such an impediment neither comes from the part of the intellect nor occurs in it, since it is impassible and immaterial». Through experience we may learn that our understanding is impeded and veiled according as it is turned more or less carelessly toward phantasy. In that case, it is withdrawn from its proper activity, «as if it were transformed into another [activity]»67. Bate, then, describes this transformation as a kind of ecstasy:

> When the intellect is turned toward itself and understands itself, it is accordingly assimilated to a circular line, which loses the form of a circle if it is extended. Likewise, if the intellect extends its operation or itself by tending so to speak outside itself, namely toward another object, namely toward the quiddity of a sensible thing, which it necessarily considers in a phantasm as something that must be stripped [of matter], it abandons so to speak its proper activity, and is somehow transformed into another [activity], as if it has undergone an ecstasy. Indeed, we experience in ourselves that the more attentively we consider the quiddity of something sensible, the less we pay attention to the quiddity of the intellect itself68.

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In this text, Bate is influenced by Themistius, who observes that «Plato assimilates the operations of the intellect to smooth-running and straight circles, while Aristotle likens them to a line that is bent and straight, since the intellect becomes as it were double instead of single when it considers matter together with form». Bate, however, specifies the comparisons. First, he makes a clear distinction between the circularity of intellectual self-knowledge and the rightness which characterizes the intellect’s knowledge of its proper object (i.e., the universal quiddity of material objects). Thereafter, he compares the intellect’s knowledge of particular material things to a curved line. Just as a straight line which is broken or bent «deviates from the simple unity of its rightness», so the intellect, while «plunging itself» («se immergens») into the sensory power, passes («transits») into an act which is more composite. Thus, it is sometimes «withdrawn» («retrahitur») from its simpler and more proper operation and becomes veiled («velatur»).

In several chapters, Bate repeats these ideas, using the same metaphors. In other passages, however, he describes an ecstasy that occurs in the opposite direction. When a man «has turned away from the occupations of phantasy and the senses», he is able to behold immaterial beings merely by his intellect, without any phantasm. In

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69 Themistius, *De an.*, III, p. 219, ll. 2-5. Cf. Plato, *Tim.*, 37b-c; Aristotle, *De an.*, III, 4, 429b16-17. Although Themistius’ comment is based on these passages, it should be noted that neither Plato nor Aristotle explicitly compare the intellect to a circle; Plato deals with the World-Soul (cf. F.M. Cornford, *Plato’s Cosmology*, London, 1937, pp. 73 and 96-97), Aristotle remarks that we judge the essence of material things by a faculty which is either separated from the senses or «related to it as a bent line to itself when straightened». Bate’s association of extasis with extendere is based, not only Aristotle’s simile of the straightened line, but also on Albert’s observation that the human intellect knows material things «through its extension toward the sensory potencies» (*De an.*, III, 3, 2, p. 210, ll. 67-68, quoted in *Spec.*, XIII, 13, p. 59, ll. 74-78). Aquinas’ interpretation of 429b16-17 is quite different: in his view, the intellect knows the specific nature of a thing «directly by extending itself to it», while it knows the individual «through a kind of reflection, insofar as it returns over the phantasms, from which the intelligible species are abstracted». (*Sentencia libri De anima*, III, 2, ed. Leon., Roma-Paris 1984, p. 211, ll. 182-186).

70 See *Spec.*, II, 12, p. 56, ll. 00-11. For velare, cfr. n. 49; for the figurative use of immergere, cfr. Deferrari, s.v., 2-3.

71 See *Spec.*, II, 37, p. 141, ll. 2-12; p. 142, ll. 26-45; p. 143, ll. 55-57; p. 144, ll. 78-81; III, 8, p. 188, ll. 77-86; III, 9, p. 193, ll. 00-8; p. 194, ll. 42-46; III, 10, p. 195, ll. 63-66; V, 10, p. 154, ll. 42-47; VI, 20, pp. 76-78, ll. 106-140; VI, 25, p. 94, ll. 15-16; XVI, 3, pp. 257-258, ll. 201-229. The intellect is also said to be «somehow asleep» (XVI, 3, p. 256, ll. 165-166). For a similar use of consopitus, see Aquinas, *Summa th.*, I, 84, 4 (resp.); Aquinas, however, rejects this Platonic view.
that case, it is not the human intellect that is «ecstatically transposed into sense-perception, but rather conversely the sensory power or phantasy that has undergone an ecstasy [and is transposed] into the intellect»\(^{72}\). Furthermore, Bate explains that «when the intellect intensely directs itself («vehementer intenso») [to its own activity] and vigorously concentrates («vigente circa») on its proper intellectual activity and on the knowledge of itself and of the other immaterial beings, the material potencies are withdrawn and cease, and sometimes the phantasms are silent»\(^{73}\). In this manner, the intellect «comes back and returns over itself, bending back — so to speak — an extended line over itself, wheeling around in a circle»\(^{74}\).

b) Analysis of some selected sentences

Although metaphors are a basic component of Bate's language, they are mostly unoriginal. Consequently, his rhetorical skills must be sought at a higher level, namely in the construction of sentences. Indeed, unlike most Artists, he regularly composes oratorical periods, particularly when he attempts to summarize central ideas. In these periods, he emphasizes important notions with pleonasm and hyperbaton\(^ {75} \). Some examples may illustrate Bate's 'grandiloquent' style.

* Since an inferior intellect cannot completely understand superior intellectual substances, it finds its supreme perfection and pleasure in knowing that «the wealth of the higher excellence, which should be understood more perfectly and consequently loved more purely, overflows its own [i.e., the inferior's] power and the capacity of its potency»\(^ {76} \). Anticipating this conclusion, Bate elaborates an almost epical similitudo:

\[^{72}\] See Spec., II, 16, p. 69, ll. 14-25. Bate corroborates his view with a quotation from the *Phaedo*, where Socrates says that when a human being employs his pure intelligence only, he knows each of the really existing things; cfr. Plato, *Phaedo*, 66a.

\[^{73}\] See Spec., II, 16, p. 70, ll. 33-37; VI, 20, p. 78, ll. 140-145. The figurative use of *silere* is classical; cfr. Lewis-Short, s.v., II.

\[^{74}\] Spec., II, 37, p. 144, ll. 1-3. Notice the pleonasms: «... se ipsum intelligit super se rediens et conversus, quasi extensam lineam super se recurvans circulariter regyrando». For the metaphor of circularity, cfr. n. 50.

\[^{75}\] Although hyperbatons occur very frequently in Medieval Latin, they usually preserve their rhetorical (reinforcing and/or ornamental) function (*pace P. Storz, Handbuch zur lateinischen Sprache des Mittelalters. Vierter Band: Formenlehre, Syntax und Stilistik*, München 1998, p. 427, §1.18).

\[^{76}\] Spec., Prooemium, p. 66, ll. 51-55.
Considerandum itaque quod
quam modum vir liberalis thesaurum habens infinitum aut inaestimabilem,
quem expendere non posset nec evacuare,
quem adesse semper quidem superabundans esset,
quantumcumque de ipso liberaliter erogaret seu
effunderet magnifice,
non minus delectaretur, sed et magis
quam si terminatum haberet seu finitum,
quem tamen toti sufficeret elargitioni commensuratae
proportionaliter virtutis sue,
sic et intellectus inferior iuxta suam facultatem speculando superiores
maiori admiratione delectatur in hoc
quod repleta ac satiata totius desiderii sui capacitate,
tam in speculando quam in amando seu fruendo,
aduc sibi quidem abundat amabilis multum
et superest utique delectabilius,
ad quod sufficeret desiderandum, amandum et
fruendum non sufficit, sed deficit modus et capitatis sui
desiderii et amoris,
quem si ultra suae capacitatis modum nihil intelligendum
superesset nec amandum nec fruendum.\\n\\nIn this sumptuous period, the lofty style is perfectly adapted to the sublime
ideas expressed in it. The overall parallelism «quemadmodum ... delectetur ...»
quam si — sic ... delectatur ... quam si» has been worked out with variatio, which
resides in three elements: the unequal length of the subordinate and the main clause
of the comparison; the contrast between the modus irrealis of the subordinate clause
and the modus realis of the main clause; the difference in constructions (participle
«habens» vs. gerund «speculando»), adverb «magis» vs. nominal constituent «maiori
admiratione»). Likewise, the separate cola contain some variatio. This is due to
the use of various conjunctions («aut» / «nec» / «seu» / «sed» / «ac» / «tam ... quam»
/ «et»), the chiasm «liberaliter erogaret seu effunderet magnifice», and two tripartite
structures («desiderandum, amandum et fruendum»; «intelligendum ... nec aman-
dum nec fruendum»). Furthermore, the style is embellished with several figures:
- hyperbaton: «thesaurum ... infinitum»; «terminatum ... seu finitum»; «toti
 ... elargitioni»; «repleta ... capacitate»;

\textsuperscript{77} Spec., Prooemium, pp. 65-66, ll. 23-38.
- inversion: «abundat amabilius multum et superest ...»;
- antithetic correctio: «non ..., quinimmo ...»; «non minus ..., sed et magis»;
- geminating synonymy: «infinitum aut inaestimabilem»; «expendere ... nec evacuare»; «erogaret seu effunderet»; «terminatum ... seu finitum»; «repleta ac satiata»; «modus et capacitas»;
- pleonasm: «commensuratae proportionaliter»;
- incrementum: «desiderandum, amandum et fruendum»; «intelligendum ... nec amandum nec fruendum»;
- derivatio: «sufficienter ... sufficit»;
- figura etymologica: «non sufficit, sed deficit»;
- alliteration and assonance: «quinimmo semper quidem superabundans»; «tamen toti»; «intellectus inferior»; «speculando superiores»; «abundat amabilius»;
- homoeoteleuton (combined with homoeoptoton): «speculando .. amando seu fruendo»; «desiderandum, amandum, fruendum»; «intelligendum ... nec amandum nec fruendum».

Finally, it should be remarked that whereas a large number of sentences of the proem end with a *cursus velox*\(^{79}\), this elaborate period ends with the less usual *trispondiacus*: «amandum nec fruendum»\(^{80}\).

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\(^{78}\) On the theological-philosophical meaning of *frui*, cfr. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, I, 4, 4; DEFERRARI, s. v. *Frui* denotes the will’s quiet enjoyment of the (immaterial) goal it has reached.

\(^{79}\) As VAN DE VYVER («Introduction», p. xvii, n. 12) already observed, Part I of the Proem is written in a more or less rhythmical prose-style, in which the *cursus velox* is predominant; see for instance: proposuimus tibi Guida (p. 47, l. 12); clarius innotescat (p. 47, l. 21); purior invenitur (p. 48, l. 42); necesse est derivare (p. 49, l. 62); gloriam fortunatam (p. 50, l. 79); viribus Alexandri (p. 51, l. 00); Israel primitivum (p. 52, l. 19); interitum iam apparet (p. 52, l. 28); caesaris vectitarent (p. 53, l. 49); sensibiliter comprobatur (p. 54, l. 62); circulum revolvuntur (p. 54, l. 65); immortalis est, non humana (p. 55, l. 90); resonantiae sunt obscurae (p. 55, l. 95); exigit intellectus (p. 56, l. 2); necessario consequuntur (p. 58, l. 48); eminentiae praecellentes (p. 58, l. 60). However, the *cursus velox* is also present in Part II of the Proem: materia separatas (p. 59, l. 72); carentium transcendingo (p. 63, l. 81); desiderium amorosum (p. 66, l. 40); sincerius praetamandae (p. 66, l. 55); entium corrumpatur (p. 66, l. 59); ordini naturali (p. 66, l. 64). Examples of the *velox* are also to be found in some of the above-cited passages: incidunt labyrinthum; proposuit enervatur. The preference for the *cursus velox* is a wide-spread phenomenon in thirteenth-century prose (cfr. T. JANSON, *Prose Rhythm in Medieval Latin from the 9th to the 13th Century*, Stockholm 1975, p. 104).

\(^{80}\) The words «amandum nec fruendum» can be considered a *trispondiacus* only if «nec fruendum» is read as one whole; on such (proclitic) *consyllabicatio*, cfr. T. JANSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29. For
* Having discussed the (non-)existence of ideas of accidents, Bate sums up his position in a clearly structured period:

Secundum hunc itaque modum,
licet accidentibus, quia propagini substantiae assimilantur, non sint ideae propriae neque illis in quibus prius et posterius dicitur, propter quod neque propriam habent ideam numeri quod sunt de genere quantitatis, etiam quia non sunt entia per se et separata, ut dictum est, nihilominus eorum rationes in substantiam ideam tamquam in origine propaginis secundum multifarias diversorum respectuum analogias et habitudines atque participationes causaliter continentur.\(^{81}\)

The different parts of this period, which again ends with a *cursus velox*, are (more or less) equilibrated. The first part («Secundum ... dicitur») comprises 22 words, while the second part («propter quod ... dictum est») has 24 words. Moreover, the sub-clauses «licet ... dicitur» and «propter ... dictum est» have an equal number of syllables (47) and thus constitute a kind of isocolon. The main clause («nihilominus ... continentur») consists of 21 words, but the number of its syllables (76) surpasses the length of each of the sub-ordinate clauses. The sentence is adorned with a metaphor («tamquam in origine propaginis»), a pleonastic hendiadys («respectuum analogias et habitudines»), and hyperbata («propriam ... ideam»; «multifarias ... analogias»).

*After quoting passages from Averroes and Aquinas on motion, Bate concludes that the process of generation extends itself only to the first moment of the actual

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other examples of the *cursus trispondiacus* in Part I of the Proem: in esse generati (p. 48, l. 28); secundum veritatem (p. 48, l. 46); vita temporalis (p. 50, l. 71); nunc ima pervertentis (p. 53, l. 42); semper adoramini (p. 53, l. 55); rota collocetur (p. 54, l. 71); unit redamanti (p. 58, l. 44); and in Part II of the Proem: locum differatur (p. 60, l. 95); profecto diminuta (p. 67, l. 69); and vagetur intellectus (quoted above; cfr. n. 33). If we read «negue amandum negue fruendum», the period ends with a *cursus planus* (cfr. p. 65, l. 22: dignitatis existunt).


\(^{82}\) I have found only one parallel passage where accidents are represented as the «shoots» of substance (*Spec.*, II, 7, p. 41, l. 67). Bate contaminates two constructions in «propagini substantiae assimilantur» (one should expect either «propagini arboris assimilantur» or «quasi propago substantiae sunt»).
existence of the thing that is generated. Consequently, the causality of the efficient cause too stops at this first moment. Bate expresses these ideas, which are essential in his view (though they may seem rather trivial to us), in two extremely complex sentences:

Ex his igitur sic perlustratis palam est intuenti quod
postquam effectus huiusmodi, scilicet motus et fieri usque ad factum esse, et
universaliter exitus et eductio potentiae ad actum ita perducitur
quod ad secundum seu ad plura quam ad unum instans actus essendi
simpliciter et perfecti manentis non extenditur, sed ad primum
indivisible tantum,
in quo generati esse principium est et initium actus perfecti,

necesse est utique
proportionaliter se habentis generantis et motivae seu efficientis causae propriam
secundum se causalitatem ad indivisible principium essentiae generati dumtaxat
extendi seu ad initium sui actualis esse perfecti et per consequens etiam ad primum
nunc tantum seu instans actus et esse permanentis uniformiter,
ubi terminatur ipsum fieri seu imperfectus actus essendi, successive
quidem aliter et aliter se habens inquam, secundum quod huiusmodi.

Similiter et econverso
causalitatem causae talis,
eo quod propria est Ipsi fieri seu effectui causando,
secundum quod aliter et aliter se habenti,
quoadusque finaliter ad simplex perfectum esse terminatur in ultimo
nunc ipsius fieri, scilicet in facto esse,
quod idem est instanti seu nunc primo,
quod indivisible principium temporis est sequens
esse permanens mensurantis, non aliter scilicet et
aliter se habens,
in hoc inquam causando sic se habere ulterias, extendi scilicet ad secundum aliquod vel ad plura
quam ad unum solum instans initiale temporis uniformem hanc secundum quod huiusmodi
permanentiam essendi,
secundum quod absque transmutatione simpliciter est, mensurantis
impossibile est,
nisi quatenus causae formali coincidit,
secundum quod prius visum est83.

These sentences contain several elements that are typical of Bate’s scholastic idiom:

- The phrase «palam est intuenti» is one of Bate’s favorite formulae introducing an important remark or conclusion84.
- The clause depending on «palam ... quod» is an intricate period in which different subordinate clauses are heaped up: the causal clause «postquam ... actus perfecti»85 consists of a main clause and a subordinate consecutive clause («quod ... perfecti»); this consecutive clause has a bipartite antithetic structure («non ... sed»)86, the second part of which contains a relative clause. The main clause which depends on «palam ... quod» starts with «necesse est utique»; the accusativus cum infinitivo following «necesse est» is somewhat hidden, since the accusative «propriam ... causalitatem» is preceded by a number of genitives and separated from the infinitive «extendi» by an adverbial adjunct. The second adverbial adjunct «ad primum nunc ... uniformiter» is further determined by the relative clause «ubi ... huiusmodi».

- As the adverbs «Similiter et econverso» indicate, the second sentence is nothing but the negative reformulation of the first sentence. Except for some minor changes, «ad secundum aliquod ... ad unum solum instans» perfectly echoes «ad secundum ... ad unum instans»; likewise, «extendi» is used in both sentences. In the second sentence, the subject («causalitatem») and the verbs («se habere, extendi scilicet») of the accusativus cum infinitivo are separated from each other by five subordinate clauses. Moreover, the sentence-structure is obscured by two parallel hyperbata: «temporis ... esse ... mensurantis» and «temporis ... permanentiam ... mensurantis». The main clause «impossibile est» is followed by two short sub-clauses.

- Considered together, the two sentences constitute a macro-structural chiasm:

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84 Cfr. Spec., III, 14, p. 204, l. 1 («advertenti palam»); IV, 43, p. 113, l. 5 («palam est intelligenti»); XIV, 7, p. 110, ll. 156-157 («intuenti palam est»); XV, 8, p. 192, ll. 128-129 («inspicienti palam est»). Other frequent formulae are «non lateat» (cfr. XX, 6, p. 29, l. 188); «advertendum quod» (cf. XVI, 4, p. 260, l. 5); «non obliviscendum» (cf. XVI, 13, p. 327, ll. 133-134).

85 For the causal meaning of postquam, cfr. Lewis-Short, s.v., II; P Storz, op. cit., p. 415, §111.39. Bate often uses the conjunction in this sense.

86 Such antithetic structures are quite common in scholastic Latin; cfr. F. Bossier, «Aristoteles’ weg naar het Westen. Een beschouwing over de taal van het middeleeuws aristotelisme», Hermeneus 65 (1993), pp. 60-65, esp. 64.
(Ex his ...) - sub-clauses - necesse est - subject of AcI - adverbial adjunct - infinitive - adverbial adjuncts

(Similiter ...) - subject of AcI - sub-clauses - adverbial adjuncts - infinitives - adverbial adjuncts - impossibile est - sub-clauses.

- Both sentences contain a lot of Grecisms: the superfluous particle utique (here corresponding to the Greek ὅτι); the use of nunc as a substantive (synonymous with instans); the substantive use of infinitives (e.g., «fieri» / «factum esse» / «generati esse» / «ipsius fieri» / «sequens esse permanens»).

- Once again, the sentences are burdened with redundant words, geminating synonymy and figurai etymologicae: «exitus et eductio»; «eductio ... perducitur»; «principium ... et initium»; «motivae seu efficientis»; «causae ... causalitatem»; «nunc ... seu instans»; «causalitatem causae»; «finaliter ... terminatur»; «instanti seu nunc». Whereas these pleonasms probably have a stylistic (and perhaps even didactic) function, the frequent occurrence of almost meaningless words (such as secundum quod, scilicet, and inquam) and the repetition of the same colorless verbs (such as se habere and fieri) render the sentences boring and monotonous.

- Remarkably, neither the first nor the second period ends with a cursus. This proves that Bate has not paid careful attention to the stylistic details of this passage.

* A more beautiful example of Bate's periodical style is found at the end of Part XIV:

Recollectis igitur his quae in hac parte dieta sunt hactenus, manifestum est quod
omnis demonstrativa scientia cum suis quibuscumque partialibus demonstrationibus,
principium utique sumentibus ab eo quod quid est,
et universalter omnis cognitio seu operatio componentis intellectus
finaliter ordinatur ac tendit consummamanda quidem seu terminanda
ad illum terminum seu definitionem
qua simpliciter apprehendatur ipsum quod quid est,
simplex existens conceptus mentis et proprium intellectus obiectum,
circa quod, ut prius visum est, mentiri seu decipi non
contingit.  

87 The phrase «educere de potentia ad actum» is very usual in scholastic Latin; cfr. DEFERRARI, s.v.; WEIJERS, eductio, 2.

88 Bate uses inquam, not only in the original sense ('I say'/'I mean'), but also as a vague emphatic particle ('namely'/'indeed'); cfr. WEIJERS, s.v., 2c; LATHAM, s.v., 2a.
In this clear recapitulation, we meet the same rhetorical procedures which are found in the above-mentioned passages: pleonasm («in hac ...hactenus»); geminating synonymy («ordinatur ac tendit consummmanda ... seu terminanda»; «terminum seu definitionem»; «mentiri seu decipi»); and figura etymologica («demonstrativa ... demonstrationibus»; «terminanda ... terminum»; «simpliciter ... simplex»). In addition, Bate makes use of polyptoton («his ... hac») and anaphora («omnis ... omnis»). Owing to the varying, though roughly equal length of its parts⁹⁰, the sentence has a smooth symmetrical structure, which is concluded with a cursus velox.

* My last example is taken from a chapter in which Bate argues that the intellect is the formal principle of a human being. Having demonstrated this idea with a cento of quotations, he returns to the issue discussed in previous chapters, viz. the question of why speculative happiness is the privilege of some divine men:

Perspicaciter itaque pensatis his omnibus et singulis, relinquitur nullum inconveniens accidere, si quidem in una specie communi logice dicta sunt excellentes aliquae perfectiones occultae quorundam singularium, secundum quod excellentiiori vitae proportionale quidem oportet esse formale principium, felicitas autem vita quaedam est et operatio manens in anima operante, ut ait Philosophus, et quae perfectissima quidem est, speculativa scilicet, magis divina dicitur quam humana⁹¹.

The structure of this sentence is similar to that of the foregoing example: after the ablativus absolutus, the main clause follows; since this short main clause only indicates that something is evident, possible, or necessary, the principal idea of the entire sentence is formulated near the end in a dependent clause⁹². Here, however,  

⁹⁰ Toe sentence may be divided as follows: «Recollectis - hactenus» (10 words) / «manifestum - demonstrationibus» (11 words) / «principium - quid est» (8 words) / «et - intellectus» (8 words) / «finaliter - terminanda» (8 words) / «ad - quid est» (12 words) / «simpliciter - obiectum» (8 words) / «circa - contingit» (11 words).

⁹¹ See Spec., XVI, 8, p. 284, ll. 196-203. Bate refers to Aristotle, Eth. Nic., 1, 7, 1098a16-20; X, 8, 1178a21-22.

⁹² This structure (ablativus absolutus - grammatical main clause - dependent clause expressing the principal idea) is found in many of Bate’s sentences.

See Spec., XIV, 11, p. 142, ll. 132-140.
Bate has lengthened the main clause by using some redundant expressions. Instead of a simple formula, such as «possible est quod», he inserts the solemn phrase «relinquitur ... si quidem», which apparently must give more weight to his conclusion. Furthermore, the period is decorated with several stylistic frills: alliteration («perspicaciter ... pensatis»); geminating synonymy («omnibus et singulis»); litotes («nullum inconveniens»); polyptoton («excellentes ... excellentior»); and figura etymologica («operatio ... operante»). In the clause introduced by «secundum quod», the syntactic chiasm (predicate - copula - subject / subject - predicate1 - copula – predicate2) underlines the antithetic structure which is marked by the particles «quidem»93 and «autem». The sentence ends with a combination of a cursus planus and velox.

3. Conclusion

Without focusing on the 'linguistic' sciences, Bate makes clear with some obiter dicta that his rhetorical ideal consists in a clear style in which metaphors are used only to speak of immaterial beings. As our analysis has shown, his stylistic practice does not accord with his ideal. Important ideas are often expressed in impressive periods which have a very complicated structure. Metaphors are employed, not only with a view to formulating metaphysical ideas, but also with a purely rhetorical goal. Owing to the abundance of rhetorical figures, several passages of his Speculum divinorum are 'mannered'94. On the other hand, it should be stressed that most of his sentences have not been rhetorically embellished, but are written in the arid, impersonal style that is typical of most masters of arts.

From all this, however, we ought not to conclude that Bate's Latin has a barbaric character. Even though his style lacks the perspicuitas and elegantia of classical literature, and though he does not even equal the limpid prose style of medieval classics such as John of Salisbury or Thomas Aquinas, his language is readable enough and was perhaps even alluring to scholastic readers.

93 Whereas «quidem» after «si» and «perfectissima» has an emphatic-restrictive function (and is comparable to ye), «quidem» after «proportionale» is equivalent to mevn. On the redundant use of such particles in scholastic Latin, cfr. F. Bossier, l.c.

94 Evidently, this does not mean that he follows a manneristic program. On 'mannerism' (sensu latiore) in medieval literature, see E.R. Curtius, op. cit., pp. 273-291.