

American Grand Strategy in Africa: From Hegemony to the Balance of Power? ☐

M'lili Amina¹

Abstract

This paper explores the American grand strategy in Africa; more specifically in response to economic and security issues and socio-political instability in different regions of Africa. Having said that, this paper does not seek to re/appraise the US economic areas or/and security role and/or strategies to avert and halt the widespread terrorism in different parts of the African Continent. Instead, it explores the American grand strategy in Africa from a theoretical perspective. To capture this argument, the study uses Kenneth Waltz's theory of Balance of Power (1979) as the most advanced theoretical framework to illustrate that the United States, as a great power, is power balancing China's and Russia's expanding geopolitical influence in Africa through military and economic cooperation. The paper argues that the United States' goal behind power balancing with China and Russia is to make sure that their presence is not used to turn the African continent into the Eastern sphere of influence. The theoretical contribution of this research paper is to expand the understanding of Kenneth Waltz's Balance of Power theory; especially balance by engaging in the competitive acquisition of territory and forming alliances.

Keywords: The Theory of Balance of Power, American Grand Strategy, Africa, Hegemony, China, Russia.

☐ DOI: 10.21747/21846251/jour3a1

¹ University of 08 Mai 1945, Guelma.

Introduction

Since the end of the 1990s, it has been impossible to deny that the United States meets the requirements for being a superpower with a level of global influence well above that of other states. Although the majority of African states fell and continue to fall within France's zone of influence, the United States, since the end of the 1990s, continued to actively engage in some of the African states; especially in the Maghreb region by showing greater economic interest (e.g. the American Economic Program in North Africa launched in 1999). However, from the early 2000s, the United States has fallen behind the extraordinary rise of China² (Overholt, 1994) on the continent, which sought new perspectives and a fresh approach to a number of crucial concerns to strengthen unity and cooperation with Africa, especially in the contemporary era.

After the 9/11 tragic attacks, security/military cooperation between the US and the Maghreb and the Sahel regions experienced remarkable growth. It established security ties with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. Furthermore, considering the Sahel region's turbulent and complex characteristics, the US championed and applauded the 2015 Algiers Accord between the Malian Government and the rebels in the Sahel region of Africa. When it comes to America's economic involvement in Africa in terms of advancing prosperity through trade and investment, millions of Americans and Africans have benefited greatly from prior successes, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the President's Malaria Initiative, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and U.S. trade and investment hubs (Signé, 2021).

² Russia's current engagement with the African continent also indicates the severity of its search for security cooperation and having allies as part of a larger effort to increase its influence around the globe.

On a related note, America's economic engagement in Africa has been increasing with China's rise as an economic power in the region along with its emergence as an active player in the international arena.

Much ink has been spilled on US military/ security and economic interests in Africa. Accounts offered range from why the US decided to pay more attention to the Maghreb and how it developed to regional security cooperation (Zoubir, 2006; Iratni, 2019), what role the US played to ease the conflict in Mali and the Sahel region in general (Attalah, 2012; Bleck et al., 2015; Francis, 2013; Zoubir, 2009), the causes behind the United States' replacement of French influence in the areas (Schraeder, 2000) and ultimately US trade and investment compared to China trade and investment in Africa (Jones et al., 2022) among others. While these accounts bear validity, this article adds to the extant literature about the topic by providing a theoretical explanation of American foreign policy in Africa. The theory of Realism is explicitly adopted to illustrate that states are involved in a power struggle and that acquiring more power is their only foreign policy objective. This theoretical position is in harmony with Kenneth Waltz's theory of Balance of Power. By so doing, the aim of this article is to elucidate that the US, as a great power, is utilising military and economic cooperation to balance out China's and now Russia's growing geopolitical influence in Africa.

It is impossible to provide an in-depth analysis and discussion of the subject within the confines of this article, but the goal of this article is to add to the global discussion concerning the American grand strategy in Africa, particularly in the contemporary era. Africa is explored in broad terms in this article. This classification is problematic in that it sees Africa as a unified actor, ignoring the continent's various countries. While examining US efforts in each African country is worthwhile, they are not addressed here. This decision was made to present a theoretical explanation of the United States' grand strategy in Africa.

The research paper comprises five sections. The first section is the introduction. It sets the parameters of the argument and analyses. Section two

is dedicated to the literature on Realism theory and the concept of Balance of Power; a theoretical lens through which to consider America's grand strategy in Africa. Section three presents a short overview of the United States' grand strategy in Africa over the last two decades. While section five offers an analysis of the research topic from a theoretical standpoint, section five provides concluding remarks.

Realism and the Theory of Balance of Power

Since the core argument of this article is substantiated by theoretical underpinnings, this section is committed to the literature on the theory of Realism and the notion of Balance of Power. This theoretical account offers an alternative theoretical lens for thinking of the American grand strategy in Africa. It is important to note that no single theory of international relations can account for all important facets of a complex and multifaceted subject such as US foreign policy. As Steve Smith (2007: 11) has put it:

theories can be seen as different coloured lenses: if you put one of them in front of your eyes, you will see things differently. Some aspects of the world will look the same in some lenses, for example shapes, but many other features, such as lights and shade of colour, will look very different, so different in fact that they seem to show alternative worlds.

In other words, all international relations theories help us study and understand state behaviour, each of which reflects a different theoretical perspective and makes various assumptions about the same subject. This study has focused on the fundamental theory of international relations known as Realism. This theoretical position is in concert with Waltz's theory of balance of power.

Realism is a school of thought in the discipline of International Affairs (IR) that emphasises the competitive and conflictual aspects of international relations. The roots of realism are claimed to be found in some of history's earliest books, particularly Thucydides' narrative of the Peloponnesian War,

which was fought between 431 and 404 BCE (Antunes et al., 2018). The theory of Realism is based on three major assumptions. First and foremost, states are the most significant actors. Second, the international system is inherently anarchic. As a result, all states within the system seek narrow self-interests, as power and security are the core concerns of all governments to guarantee their survival (Jervis, 1999). It is important to note that Realism should not be interpreted as a single, homogeneous theoretical standpoint since different Realists have presented competing interpretations of some essential components of this theory. For that reason, Realism should be understood in its two chief variants: Classical Realism and Structural (also known as Neo-realism) Realism.

Classical Realism is the first variant developed by IR scholars Hans Morgenthau in 1948 in his book entitled *Politics among Nations*. He sought to develop a comprehensive international theory as he believed that “*politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.*” In other words, politics is regulated by laws that have their roots in human nature, much as society as a whole (Antunes et al., 2018). By removing Realism from its illogical presumptions about human nature, Kenneth Waltz modernised IR theory in his book *Theory of International Politics* (1979). As he placed a strong focus on the concept of “structure” in his explanation, his theoretical contribution was known as ‘Structural Realism’ or ‘Neo-realism’. For this variant, “*it is the structure or architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power*” (Dunne et al., 2013: 52). Simply put, Neo-realists argue that the behaviour of all the states is determined by the anarchic nature of the system in which they all reside. As a result, if the states are to exist and survive, they will have to compete with one another for power.

The above characterisation is central to the explanation of the balance of power advanced by Neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979: 118). It is closely in line with the Neo-realist version of Realism. As Claude (1962) has put it, in the theory of Balance of Power:

when any state or bloc becomes, or threatens to become, inordinately powerful, other states should recognise this as a threat to their security and respond by taking equivalent measures, individually and jointly, to enhance their power.

This, therefore, would prevent hegemony, allowing states to preserve their security, survival, autonomy, and their status in the system. In a related sense, Sheehan (1995: 14) argues:

Balance of power is never a static phenomenon and can never be taken for granted. It is always tending to move towards an imbalance. It, therefore, has to be constantly adjusted, either towards the restoration of an earlier equilibrium, or- more usually- the creation of a new one.

An argument that this essay aims to adopt in order to provide a systematic and theoretical account of the American grand strategy in Africa. It is important to note that it is not the intention of this article to provide a detailed account of the evolving US policies, objectives, and approaches, nor to offer an analysis of successes and deficiencies in US-Africa policy. It is the use of theoretical prisms that allowed this paper to provide a conclusion that can be considered an original contribution.

Although the primary focus of this work is a theoretical investigation, its conclusions have intriguing ramifications for empirical discussions of US foreign policy and IR studies. Having set the theoretical and methodological frameworks, the following section turns to outline briefly, and as a starting point, the different US strategies undertaken in Africa, focusing briefly on political, economic, and military strategies over the last two decades.

American Grand Strategy in Africa after the 9/11 Attacks

Throughout history, the United States of America had a longstanding relationship with Africa, but it did not constitute a vital region for US strategic concerns. Nevertheless, US-Africa relations post 9/11 attacks

shifted tremendously. An event not only influenced and changed the relationship between the US and Africa but also upgraded their partnership. After the 9/11 attacks, there has been a substantial increase in terrorism across the African continent. Three areas in Africa are particularly affected by violent extremism: the Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria), which has seen major Boko Haram activity; the Maghreb and the Sahel region (Ansar Dine, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al Mourabitoun); and the Horn of Africa (Al Shabaab) (Kenya and Uganda) (Wekesa, 2021).

In the context of the Global War on Terror, the United States reinforced a special type of policies that emphasised counter-terrorism, particularly in the Maghreb and the Sahel-Sahara. It collaborated with the Maghreb nations in the area of sharing intelligence on terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the US developed counterterrorism and security assistance programs on a bilateral basis. Starting by hosting presidents from several African nations who visited Washington (2002-2004) to offering various forms of American assistance to fight terrorism, such as the African Contingency Training and Assistance (ACOTA), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Some of these US programs are aimed at training military trainers to conduct peace support operations. Others sought to offer some African countries students and military personnel training and education on a grant basis to enhance their defence capability against terrorism.

In 2002, the political crisis in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger was also rapidly seized by the triumvirate of insurgent groups specialised in smuggling drugs, weapons, and the traffic of human beings. This prompted the US to start the Pan Sahel Initiative, which was subsequently superseded by the Tran-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in 2005. TSCTI's goal was to strengthen the region's capacity to combat terrorism by offering training and military experience. Additionally, the American Special Forces of the European Command (EUCOM) were assigned to train the security

forces of the Sahel states (Zoubir, 2006: 11). As part of the mission goals for 2018-2021, the United States as a member of the international community continue to support the efforts made to implement the 2015 Algiers Accord between the Malian government and the rebels to help its fragile peace, particularly by combatting terrorists and enhancing regional security (Bureau of African Affairs, 2021).

Meanwhile, areas of aid relations, diplomatic relations, and security issues were and continue to be of main importance when it comes to China's political and military involvement in Africa. On the basis of «*equal negotiation, boosting understanding, increasing consensus, deepening friendship and promoting collaboration,*» China founded the China-Africa Forum in 2000. Since its establishment, Africa has become a major focal point of Chinese diplomacy (“Report on Chinese Investment in Africa”, 2022). Moreover, China has always seen aid to Africa as a pillar of its foreign policy. For instance, President Hu promised to increase aid to Africa by 2009 at the China-Africa Summit in November 2006. In terms of military involvement in Africa, China has expanded its military support activities, from selling armaments to several nations to providing military training courses to African military officers such as Angola, Zimbabwe, and Sudan (Scobell, 2007: 01; Mc Laughlin, 2005: 01).

The extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy particularly in Africa has not gone unnoticed by US policymakers, especially that Chinese FDI flows to Africa have outpaced those from the United States, which have been steadily dropping since 2010 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2020). The majority of African nations choose to collaborate with China over western powers that impose governance conditions on their dealings with any country. For instance, because of their abuse of political influence at home, US businesses are not allowed to invest in Sudan or Zimbabwe (Goodman, 2004).

China's Ministry of Commerce reports that between 2004 and 2016, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa increased at an average

compound annual rate of 18%. China was the top exporter to Africa in 2016. More than 10,000 Chinese-owned businesses were active in Africa by the middle of 2017. In fact, since 2010, Chinese state-owned businesses have financed and built a third of Africa's infrastructure and electricity system (China Foreign Investment: Statistics, 2018).

In 2018, President Trump subsequently unveiled a new strategy titled 'A New Africa Strategy: Economic and Security Ties on the Basis of Mutual Respect.' According to Jones, Ndofor, and Li (2022), "*this strategy was more of countering China than engaging with Africa. Africa just happened to be the battlefield.*" The Biden administration has mainly continued this approach. In his opening remarks during his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in November 2019, Tibor Nagy, a former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, said that the US strategy for Africa needed to "*promote stability, expand trade and investment, harness the incredible potential of Africa's dynamic people, and counter malign influence from China and Russia*" (Nagy, 2019).

Indeed, the US interests have been detriment by China's rise in Africa and continue to be so. In addition to changing the dynamics in Africa, China's active economic, political, and security alliances are also changing the power structure in Africa, which has historically been characterised by the lengthy era of US hegemonic leadership through French and European influence.

After a brief review of the US' grand strategy in Africa over the past two decades, the focus shifts to a study of the research topic from a theoretical standpoint.


Theoretical Turn: from Hegemony to the Balance of Power?

The American grand strategy in Africa, especially in the last two decades, maintains a realist philosophical perspective. During that period, the United States sought to preserve equilibrium to reduce great power threats (China and more recently Russia) to its international environment through a strategy

of the economy and cooperative security and partnership in Africa. Basing the analysis on Waltz's model of the Balance of Power, this new American grand strategy in Africa is a result of a potential emerging order in the same region shaped by the balance of power impulses. In other words, with the rise of China, along with Russia as china's key ally, the US is no longer the only major great power in Africa. In fact, the American old relationship- through French influence- with Africa is in transition to a new sort of order.

The extraordinary growth of the Chinese economic cooperation and partnership, as well as the Russian building of new military and economic ties in Africa, demonstrates that the continent is moving away from an American-led hegemonic order. With the growth of Chinese powers followed by the Russian powers more recently and the demise of the French influence in Africa, the US goal is to move to a post-hegemonic order that is increasingly defined by a balance of power calculations and logics, where security rivalry and Cold War geopolitics are ruling. Therefore, the American grand strategy in Africa seeks to provide a counterbalance to a growing new power in the region in order to restrain their influence in Africa. The key elements of this strategy are power balancing, alliance building, and engaging in the competitive acquisition of territory.

**Illustration 01 - Post-Hegemony Order in Africa:
Balance of Power (2001-2022).**



Source: Own Elaboration

The illustration above demonstrates the main American grand strategy in Africa, especially with the rise of China, and more recently Russia, seeking a foothold in Africa. It represents the post-hegemonic order in Africa, specifically after the 9/11 attacks. Building on the Balance of Power theory, states, mostly great powers, act to preserve a balance of power in the international system in order to secure their first objectives, i.e. the preservation of their national interests, international and regional status, and most of all, to restrain states' power and its level of influence.

As the illustration indicates, China, through diplomatic, political, and economic engagements, is growing in power to the extent that it could dominate Africa. As a reaction, the US is engaging in policies namely political, economic, and security ones to achieve a balance of power or an equilibrium amongst in Africa to ensure that it cannot be dominated by China. In other words, since China experienced and continues to experience growth in power- an economic reason, the US, as a former single hegemonic actor³, is acting to balance that power in an effort to achieve equilibrium in Africa instead of restoring its hegemony.

Therefore, one would ask how America's position in Africa is changing as a result of China's ascent. As mentioned earlier in the article, the ties between the US and numerous African countries became stronger, especially after the 9/11 attacks. American emphasis shifted to policies that championed economic growth and political stability. It also established security partnerships to avoid the rise of terrorist organisations. By so doing, the idea was to pull Africa back into the western sphere of influence, since China's presence in Africa is steadily on the rise and moving towards being Africa's biggest trade partner.

It is important to note that the 9/ 11 tragic attacks, undoubtedly, encouraged the United States to pay much closer attention to the developments taking

³ Through French and European influence.

place in Africa as part of the framework of the “Global War on Terror”. However, it is clearly seen as geopolitical strategy hegemony and balance of power as this transformation is being driven by China’s attempts to project power and influence on the continent. This assertion serves as the foundation for the argument that the US grand strategy in Africa did not aim to end French hegemony in the continent. On the contrary, they have built stronger relations that are more complimentary than competitive (Zoubir, 2006: 01). More importantly, France lost influence across the African continent from the mid-1990s to 2022 (Mbembe, 2020), drove the US to actively engage in Africa, especially with the rise of Chinese economic, political and, diplomatic engagement followed by Russia steadily rebuilding its presence in Africa.

Conclusion

The events of the 9/11 attacks, without a doubt, changed the US foreign policy abroad and more particularly its grand strategy in Africa, which, from a realist point of view, is an inevitable process as the United States attempts to survive and maintain its position as a superpower, especially with the spectacular rise of China as a great power in Africa and the contemporary international system. It goes without saying that the US has had, and continues to have, a substantial impact on the African continent in the areas of politics, economics, and the military sector. The African continent does, however, appear to be transitioning from an American-led hegemonic order to a post-hegemonic order that is more characterised by a balance of power calculations and logics.

The United States is no longer the only significant power in the continent, as this article has already demonstrated. China is changing power dynamics on the African continent, as evidenced by the country’s unprecedented economic expansion and its aggressive political diplomacy there. In order to limit a rising new power’s impact on Africa, the new American

grand strategy in the continent aims to provide a counterbalance to it. This argument is supported by the US' recent diplomatic, economic and political initiatives in Africa to counterbalance, China's key ally, the Russian influence, particularly since Russia is seizing the opportunity to expand its military footprint there. To illustrate, as part of a new agreement signed during the First Russia-Africa Summit in (2019), Russia began by establishing a naval logistic centre in Port Sudan on the nation's Red Sea Coast. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it is regarded as the first military installation in Africa. In addition, Russia's security links to the continent go beyond that, as evidenced by its involvement in the use of private mercenary groups (Wagner group) in nations including the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mali, and Burkina Faso. More recently, The Wagner Group was in Mali to offer protection against Islamic extremist organizations. Its arrival in 2021 had an impact on France's decision to withdraw its soldiers from the country.

It is almost inevitable that the United States will struggle for leadership in Africa as the continent is becoming increasingly complex and decentralized. It is headed for post-hegemonic order often described as a multipolar balance of power system characterised by the presence of multiple centres of powers (the US, China, and Russia) in one continent. Therefore, the US is engaging and will continue to engage in policies in Africa to achieve a balance of power to ensure that the continent is not dominated by one actor via accommodating⁴ the rise of China and counteracting Russia.

⁴ letting China develop and grow in exchange for letting the US develop as well.

References

- Antunes, Sandrina, and Isabel Camisão. "Introducing Realism in International Relations Theory." *E-International Relations*, 2018, www.e-ir.info/2018/02/27/introducing-realism-in-international-relations-theory/#:~:text=In%20the%20discipline%20of%20International,conflictual%20side%20of%20international-%20relations.. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- Bleck, Jaimie, and Kristin Michelitch. "The 2012 Crisis in Mali: Ongoing Empirical State Failure." *African Affairs*, vol. 114, no. 457, 12 Sept. 2022, pp. 598–623, 10.1093/afraf/adv038. Accessed 24 May 2021.
- Bureau of African Affairs. "U.S. Relations with Mali." *Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet*, 16 Nov. 2021. *US Department of State*, www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-mali/. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- "China Foreign Investment: Statistics". 22 Nov. 2018. *Ministry of the Commerce People's Republic of China*, english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/foreigninvestment/. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- China-Africa Research Initiative. "Chinese Investment in Africa". 2020. *Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies*, www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- Claude, Inis L. *Power and International Relations*. New York edition ed., New York, Random House, New York edition, 1962.
- Dunne, Timothy, et al. *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. 3rd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Francis, David J. *The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali*. The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, Apr. 2013.
- Goodman, Peter. "China Invests Heavily in Sudan's Oil Industry." *Washington Post*, 23 Dec. 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/23/china-invests-heavily-in-sudans-oil-industry/1621ae06-9f18-4c83-aea8-1d390279c073/. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- Iratni, Belkacem. "US Policy towards the Maghreb: An Arduous Combination of Strategic Interests and Economic Stakes." *The Journal of US-Africa Studies International Journal of US and African Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2019, pp. 10-48, 10.21747/21846251/joura1. Accessed 12 Sept. 2022.

- Jervis, Robert. "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate." *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 1, 1999, pp. 42–63, 10.1162/016228899560040.
- Jones, Carla D, et al. *Chinese Economic Engagement in Africa: Implications for US Policy*. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 24 Jan. 2022.
- Mbembe, Achille. "Does Macron Understand How Much Influence France Has Lost in Africa?" *The African Report*, 1 Dec. 2020, www.theafricareport.com/52774/does-macron-understand-how-much-influence-france-has-lost-in-africa-achille-mbembe/. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- Mc Laughlin, Abraham. "A Rising China Encounters US Clout in Africa." *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 Mar. 2005, www.csmonitor.com/2005/0330/p01s01-woaf.html. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- Morgenthau, Hans J, and Kenneth W Thompson. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 1948.
- Nagy, Tibor P. "FY2020 Budget and U.S. – Africa Relations". 19 Nov. 2019. *US Embassy in Gabon*, ga.usembassy.gov/fy2020-budget-and-u-s-africa-relations/. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- Overholt, William H. "The Rise of China's Economy." *Business Economics*, vol. 29, no. 2, 1994, pp. 29–34. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23486239>. Accessed 11 Sep 2022.
- "Report on Chinese Investment in Africa". 2021. *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, www.focac.org/eng/. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- Schraeder, Peter J. "Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 115, no. 3, Sept. 2000, pp. 395–419, 10.2307/2658125. Accessed 25 July 2020.
- Scobell, A. "China Soft Policy Sell: Is the World Buying?" *China Brief*, vol. 26, no. 02, 24 Jan. 2007.
- Sheehan, Michael. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*. New York, Routledge, 1995.

- Signé, Landry. "How to Restore U.S. Credibility in Africa." *Foreign Policy*, 15 Jan. 2021, foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/united-states-africa-biden-administration-relations-china/#. Accessed 12 Sept. 2022.
- Smith, Steve. "Introduction: Diversity and Disciplinarity in International Relations Theory." *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, by Tim Dunne et al., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.
- Wekesa, Bob. "9/11 and Africa: Reflecting on Two Decades of U.S.-Africa Policies and Interests". 24 June 2021. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, www.fpri.org/article/2021/09/9-11-and-africa-reflecting-on-two-decades-of-u-s-africa-policies-and-interests/. Accessed 16 Sept. 2022.
- Zoubir, Yahia H. "American Policy in the Maghreb: The Conquest of the New Region?" *Elcano Royal Institut*, Working paper 13, 24 July 2006. Available at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/25177/WP%2013,%202006.pdf>
- . "The United States and Maghreb-Sahel Security." *International Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 5, Sept. 2009, pp. 977–995, 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00842.x.