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Capa: Olive trees and the Israeli Wall near Bethlehem. August, 2014. Photo: Carmo Matos.

Africana Studia

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Editorial

Palestine – Environment and Conflict

Several files published by *Africana Studia* included material about Arab speaking countries, from Northern Africa to the Middle East. Still, this is the first one to focus exclusively on a non-African reality and apparently one not framed within a comparative perspective. In fact, the comparative framework is clearly there. Palestine, like almost all African territories for about eight decades – and especially like South African apartheid between the 1950s and 1990's – is a conflict area with key lessons for colonial studies, which remain a “classical” field of interest for *Africana Studia*.

Palestinian heritage is rather complex – this is a land of cultural convergences since Ancient times – but its current status is quite simple: a colonial power controls the land, the sea, the air and the people. Colonial systems touch every territorial dimension, whether it is visible (geographical) or invisible (culture). Their mastering of spaces implies changes in landscape and in the environment as well as in the minds of their inhabitants. This is the case of the Palestinian territories under foreign control with its obvious impact on populations, environments and culture.

In order to contribute to the understanding of the general colonization phenomena throughout its Palestinian variant, a research network including Palestinian Universities and CEAUP was organized. The goal of the network was limited. Many aspects of the Palestinian colonial conflict have been addressed in the scientific literature regarding Law studies, Human Rights, refugees, political violence and resistance, no to speak of other broad issues on history and sociology. This current number of *Africana Studia* intends just to focus on a rather neglected but much needed dimension: the impact of the conflict on the living environment and the landscape of the Palestinian people.

It is now consensual that the global environmental situation is dire and that humanity faces a critical human rights junction. Numerous international fora, official documents, and scientific events and publications discuss climate change, habitat destruction, pollution, overexploitation, invasive species. However, few of them have addressed these topics in the context of colonial Palestine under Israeli occupation. We wish that the current collection of papers in your hand will provide a new path and that it may raise significant questions about this hidden face of Palestinian reality.

This current issue includes researches' results on:

- how Israel exploits natural resources in the geopolitical area C (60 % of the West Bank);
- the impact of the apartheid/segregation wall on the Palestinian Environment;
- the special and temporal changes in Shufat refugee camp in Jerusalem;

- the changes in Nablus area landscape/land usage;
- the unexpected findings of the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on biodiversity in Palestine.

It also includes analytic papers that also give future hope on:

- an urban self-development of a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Jerusalem, where Shufat refugee camp residents act on their own behalf (agency);
- the successful activity, against all odds, of by Palestinian institutions (Environment Quality Authority, NGOs, Academia) to research or protect the environment under the power imbalance between colonizers and colonized;
- an innovative model of education and awareness-raising in order to change behavioral change vis-à-vis climate change.

Two enlightening interviews with leading personalities with regards to research and action in favour of Palestinian Environment were added.

This collection of research papers provides building blocks in a highly demanding literature about the interplay between conflict and the environment. Still, much more research along the same genre is needed. We just hope to have accelerated its more than certain arrival in the upcoming years.

We thank the interest of the colleagues who responded to the open call and their contribution. We also thank Carla Delgado for her assistance in this special issue, which marks a special milestone in the geographical scope of *Africana Studia*.

After all, it may be not so exceptional: Palestine is located in the Sinai geologic microplate, which geologists mostly agree to be a subsection of the gigantic Nubian plate. Anyway, we are all Africans by origin. Plus: at least in the context of environmental issues we are – or we should be – all Palestinians.

Ahmad Abu Hammad*

Maciel Santos**

Mazin Qumsiyeh***

Mustapha El Hannani****


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
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Palestine – a Colonial Environment





Politics, powers and the environment in Palestine ☐

Mazin B. Qumsiyeh* e Issa Musa Albaradeiya**

pp. 9-18

Introduction

Many nations need both local and international instruments (including conventions and laws) to address the significant decline in the state of the environment including habitat destruction, desertification and climate change. The Palestinian environment, like many countries, did not improve significantly in almost any of the declared Aichi Targets in compliance with the Convention on Biological Diversity (EQA, 2021). Our environment and biodiversity suffer from the five major threats identified globally: climate change, habitat destruction, overexploitation, invasive species, and pollution. But unlike the vast majority of other countries, we suffer from another challenge: Israeli colonial occupation which adds and exacerbates these five threats.

After the Oslo Agreements 1993-1994, the newly established Palestinian National Authority (a state in the making) attempted to deal with the environmental problems and to identify stakeholders authorized to follow up the environmental conservation issues. Many authors and institutions have already raised the alarm on the deteriorating environment of historic Palestine that accompanied the political decline of native Palestinian power and the ascendancy of the Zionists culminating in a creation and development of a Jewish state in Palestine (Al-Haq, 2015: 1; EQA, 2021: 1; Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2014: 101; Tal, 2002: 1; Weizman, 2012: 1).

For successful environmental conservation planners should seriously take into consideration power dynamics and issues of environmental justice (Büscher and Fletcher, 2019: 283) especially in a neoliberal world order (Corson, 2010: 576). The global assessment by the Environment and Conflict Observatory highlights growing environmental risks to human security and thus interconnectivity between environment status and the political conflict that deprives Palestinians from self-determination and sovereignty¹.

Addressing these challenges requires detailed analysis that will vary from country to country. Since no such study on power dynamics of environmental conservation existed in Palestine before, we embarked on this study to summarize what is known about such things and based on our conclusions propose some things that can be done to effect change in power dynamics.

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¹ [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://ceobs.org/global-assessment-highlights-growing-environmental-risks-to-human-security/>.

External power dynamics

A number of UN General Assembly resolutions recognized the relationship between the environment and human rights. For example in 1990 declaring that 'all individuals are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health and well-being' (UNGA Res. 45/94). But these are not binding or enforced resolutions as testified to by dozens of such resolutions that condemned Israel for its violations of basic human rights and international law vis a vis its continued destruction and occupation of Palestine.

Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (to which Israel is a signatory) clearly states that:

the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

UN Security Council Resolution 465 of 1980 reads in part that:

all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

But Israel flagrantly violates these protocols (Isaac *et al.*, 2015: 1). Jewish colonial communities and industrial settlements continued to be built on Palestinian land while intentionally de-developing the local communities (Roy & Pfeifer, 1999: 1). But there are also other violations of even Israeli signed agreements such as issues of harmful waste disposal (Hammad and Qumsiyeh, 2013: 655; Khlaif and Qumsiyeh, 2017: 66; Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2014: 101).

The "Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement On The West Bank And The Gaza Strip" otherwise known as Oslo agreement had two parts (Oslo I and II) and the Paris economic agreement kept most of the West Bank under full Israeli control and only a small part of the areas under very limited Palestinian administration. This arrangement was supposed to be temporary for five years. Yet for 29 years as of now, the colonial activities continue to a point where about one million Israeli settlers live in the West Bank, more per square kilometers than inside the Green Line (this is the border before 1967) In Annex III (Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs). In Oslo II, we find relevant articles - 12 (on environment), 13 (Fisheries), 14 (Forests), and 15 (Gas, Fuel and Petroleum). In each of these articles, we found the imbalance of power and the subjugation of Palestinians to Israeli whims to be evident. This had a huge impact on the environment. For example, Israel retained per Oslo II the right to adjust or limit any issue for "security reasons" which was vague and allowed Israel to determine what it considered security. That included limiting Palestinian access to the sea, access to their agricultural lands, to nature reserves, to areas it deemed of "military importance" and much more.

The Palestinian Environmental Law 1999, Article (5) states that every person has a right to live in a sound and clean environment as well as enjoy the highest extent of public health and welfare and to protect the country's natural resources. It further sets guidelines for protection of natural heritage as a cultural and nationalist heritage. Yet, Article XVIII section 4 of the Oslo II agreement states that:

Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council or which is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the Declaration of Principles (DOP), this Agreement, or of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void ab initio.

Internal power dynamics

As part of the Oslo agreements, the two parties (Israel and the PLO) agreed to protect the environment in compliance with International standards, conduct Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), protect soil, and other natural resources etc. (UNEP, 2003). As early as January 1995, ARIJ and the Environmental Law Institute (Washington DC) drafted an environmental law for consideration by the nascent PNA. In December 1996, the Palestinian Environment Authority was created and then elevated to the Ministry of Environmental Affairs (MOEA) in 1998. In 2002, a Presidential Decree reformatted the Ministry of Environmental Affairs into the Environmental Quality Authority, and was given the same duties and powers. The agriculture Law no. 2 for the year 2003 is the legal reference for some aspects of protected areas.

The Oslo accords of 1993-1994 were supposed to be for 5-year transitional period and to conclude with final agreement no later than 1999 but this never happened and while the Palestinians continued to comply with the interim arrangements, Israel did not. Further the interim arrangement gave Israel "temporary" military and civilian control over 60 % of the land of the West Bank which is labeled as area C. There are tremendous challenges faced by Palestinians trying to work in area C where most of the protected areas are located (Ghattas *et al.*, 2016: 24).

The Key governmental entities concerned with nature protection currently include:

1. The Environment Quality Authority (EQA): The EQA does planning, approval of projects that could impact environment, maintain biodiversity, protect the environment, and encourage sustainable development practices.
2. Ministry of Agriculture (MOA): Under the Agriculture Law for the year 2003, the Ministry is responsible for implementing Article 9 of section 1 of this Law, stating: "The Ministry in cooperation with other competent authorities shall develop nature reserves management plan and conserve all plants and living organisms living in protected areas".
3. Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MOPAD, Previously MOPIC): Recruiting funds from potential donors to implement planning of Palestinian Development (MOPAD, 2014). MOPAD merged into the Ministry of Finance and Planning with some functions moved to Prime Minister's office and others to Ministry of Local Governorates.

4. Ministry of Local Government.
5. Ministry of Health (through Department of Environmental Health).
6. Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities: In charge of heritage sites and involved in areas like ecotourism.
7. Ministry of Education.
8. Ministry of Culture: Promote protection in the local communities and integrate protected areas in the network of cultural areas; may also be involved in museums and educational initiatives considering cultural and natural heritage.
9. Ministry of Interior: Law enforcement of environmental and agricultural laws.

These ministries do not have actual powers due to the dynamic of power under Israeli occupation. For example, there is a Palestine Water Authority and a number of strategies related to the water sector: Palestinian National Water Policy (NWP) 1995, Water Resources Management Strategy 1998, National Water Plan 2000, Palestinian Water Law N.º 3, 2002, National Integrated Water Resources Management Plan 2003, National Sector Strategy on Water and Wastewater 2011-2013; Decree N.º (14) relating to the water Law 2014, and Palestinian Water Authority Strategy plan 2016-2018. However, water is mostly controlled by the occupying power and the same for other natural resources (Abouali, 1998: 411). Similarly, the walls and other apartheid structures significantly affect sustainable development and environmental planning (Mizrachi and Shaveh, 2019: 1; Qumsiyeh, 2004: 2; Ben-Naftali *et al.*, 2005: 551).

Conventions and Treaties signed by Palestine and the issue of power

Since 2014, the state of Palestine has signed dozens of international conventions and treaties on basic human rights, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and the environment. The environment related conventions include the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Basel Convention Controlling Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Cartagena Protocol (treaty governing the movements of living modified organisms LMOs), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. The State of Palestine, even not a signatory, is active in a number of other international treaties that are not directly concerned with conservation and biodiversity, but related to other environmental issues. The Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution adopted in 1976 includes legal protocols on Dumping Protocol (from ships and aircraft), Prevention and Emergency Protocol (pollution from ships and emergency situations), Land-based Sources and Activities Protocol, Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity Protocol, Offshore Protocol (pollution from exploration and exploitation), Hazardous Wastes Protocol, and Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM). Even though Palestine is not a signatory to some of these treaties and conventions, Palestine is involved in some of the meetings and programs of signatory parties.

Similarly the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) are slated to be joined. CITES would be highly beneficial in curbing trade in endangered species even

though now Palestine has no control of its ports of entry (still done by Israel). The potentiality of independence would make it more urgent to do this and prepare to implement this (EQA is now studying this issue). CMS should likewise be joined because 500 million birds migrate through Palestine (on annual migrations between Eurasia and Africa). This would ensure protection of this important migratory site.

Joining international agreements carries legal, political and international ramifications that should be considered (Jaradat and Awad Allah, 2015: 1). It does promote international solidarity and may help assert need for sovereignty over natural resources and geographical boundaries. However, implementing and complying with the provisions of these treaties are made almost physically impossible due to the Israeli occupation practices. For example, the control by the Israeli occupation over the Palestinian natural resources prevents any meaningful measures the EQA can take to manage these resources. Furthermore, the Israeli occupation closed many springs for example taking water directly from the source to serve Jewish colonial settlements and this damaged free-flowing water essential for habitats and for indigenous people use.

Discussion

Generally, dealing with environmental issues in areas of conflict and war has received less attention than international rules related to human rights like the 4th Geneva Convention (Sands, 2003: 1). A main exception to this seems to be World Heritage Conventions (Debonnet, 2005: 28; Gillespie, 2007: 1). Dealing with this is not easy especially in developing countries and requires creative ways developed in a participatory way locally (Cedeño Bonilla *et al.*, 2004: 1; Oglethorpe, 2004: 2). While the challenges above seem complex and insurmountable, there were some local Palestinian successes including in environmental education, use of alternative energy, and research in areas of biodiversity (EQA, 2021: 1; Garstecki, 2010: 1; Qumsiyeh & Amr, 2016: 25).

There are many challenges to enforcement of laws relating to environmental protection in Palestine. For example article 41 of the environmental law on preventing hunting and trading of wildlife needs more enforcement (Handal *et al.*, 2021: 636). The main obstacle to doing the needed work for environmental protection, water and other issues is that the PNA actually has very little authority to carry out normal functioning of governments because the West Bank and Gaza remain under occupation. Other challenges due to imbalance of power is the significant poverty and reliance on international and local government aid. As is well known, poverty and imbalance of power reduces environmental conservation efforts.

There is some debate about whether some nations are able to advance their regulatory and enforcement standards to protect their environment in an increasingly globalized system (Vogel, 1997: 556) let alone under colonial occupation (Qumsiyeh & Amr, 2016: 25; Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2017: 340). Between 1949 until 1967 the environmental laws in the West Bank and Gaza were those of Jordan and Egypt, respectively. The second Israeli Military Order issued immediately after the occupation of both areas (issued 7 June 1967) designated all water resources in the newly occupied Palestinian Territories were to be "state owned by Israel" (UNEP, 2003: 1). The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) did attempt to legislate on issues of water and other natural resources for example via the water law signed by Arafat on 17 July 2002. Yet, these remain wishful thinking in context of continued occupation. The PNA tried to get Israel to agree to waste water and solid waste facil-

ities but frequently Israel refused to authorize unless Palestinians agree to take in waste from colonial settlement (illegal settlements per international law).

The PNA developed a ten-year environmental strategy for 2000–2010 and in August 2000 a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) for plans and projects for the three-year period 2000–2002. There were also a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan proposed in 1999 followed by a number of Environment Strategies (for 2011–2013, 2014–2016, 2017–2022, 2020–2022). These are in line with the CBD Aichi Targets and in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Yet, in its remarkable honesty the EQA states that the targets for 2015 for sustainability and environmental issues will not be reached because of “lack of control over natural resources, particularly water and land, due to occupation, and early stage of environmental protection.”

SWOT analysis: Conclusions/Recommendations on shifting power dynamics

Based on the analysis above we can create a small-scale SWOT analysis for fixing and improving power dynamics related to the environment.

Strengths

- Highly educated Palestinian population who have a very rich native/endogenous heritage going back thousands of years living in relative harmony with nature.
- Proliferation of NGOs, GOs, Academic centers and others interested in environmental conservation.
- The EQA has a cadre of qualified technical and administrative personnel.
- Palestine signed a number of international treaties relating to environment and is trying hard to match local laws with International commitments.

Weaknesses

- Entrenched Israeli colonial practices that damage the environment and drives Palestinians out and limits access even of professionals and conservationists to key areas.
- De-development of the economy (a policy of the Israeli occupation) resulting in impoverishments and added population pressures.

Opportunities

- Building & empowering communities and individuals.
- Leveraging International support.
- Using International law and signed conventions to challenge environmental injustice (Israel has signed some agreements also and can be held to account for lack of compliance with these).
- Use the media (mainstream and mass media) to highlight environmental damage in ways that empower communities.

Threats

- Climate change, overexploitation, pollution, habitat destruction, invasive species.
- Conflict and instability.
- Continued colonization and de-development.

Prospects Going Forward

Büscher and Fletcher (2019) argue that “power is *both* structural and dispersed in micro-settings” and hence challenging prevailing systems at the macro and micro level are important and that dispersed forms of resistance to power structure matters. Such a resistance is not merely to get a “piece of the pie” but to hold others accountable and transform society to become sustainable (for nature and humans). Alatout (2006) showed that differences in perception of power relationships impacts perceptions of issues of environmental justice between Palestinians and Israelis. Basically, those in power view environmental issues in terms of improvements in their quality of life while Palestinians view them as issues of sovereignty, property rights, and mere survival.

It is clear that the margin for environmental work is very limited under colonial occupation. The system cannot continue like this for a long time or the environment will be damaged irrevocably. We also believe the struggle for environmental justice is an essential component of the liberation struggle that Palestinians are engaged in (Al-Butmeh *et al.*, 2019: 153; Harley & Scandrett, 2019: 1; Qumsiyeh, 2012: 1). Environmental justice in the legal context has often been about environmental equity, or equitable distribution of environmental harms and environmental goods, and about due process, or the rights of people to have a voice in the decision-making process.

Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs) must have access and benefit sharing². Increasingly, indigenous knowledge of value and management of ecosystems and biodiversity are recognized as key components for sustainability (Karki *et al.*, 2017: 1; Nakashima & Krupnik, 2018: 1; Roué & Molnar, 2017: 1; Wilshusen, 2019: 104). Since colonization disempowers and tries to take away ability of locals to have sustainable human and natural communities, then it is logical to conclude that all actions to protect the environment against all odds (Alleson & Schoenfeld, 2007: 371; Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2017: 1; Qumsiyeh & Amr, 2020: 29; Qumsiyeh, 2004: 1, 2012: 1) is empowerment and strength for indigenous people.

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Impact of the Israeli Segregation and Annexation Wall on Palestinian Biodiversity

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pp. 19-26

Introduction

The natural landscape includes ecological boundaries (ecozones, gradients, transition zones etc.) (Cadenasso *et al.*, 2003: 750). These boundaries reflect spatial heterogeneity and play an important role for the function and the structure of the ecosystem and biodiversity. During the domestication of plants in the Fertile Crescent some 12 million years ago (Kilian and Salamini, 2010: 137), human started building small terraces which increased during the Hellenistic period and especially during the Islamic period of the last 700 years. These terraces intended to maximize land for agriculture and to facilitate the preservation of the soil. (Ron, 1966: 33; Sayej, 1999: 201; Pastor, 2013: 1; Arnáez *et al.*, 2015: 122; Gadot *et al.*, 2016: 397). However, another class of boundaries are socio-political such as the political borders that rarely reflect geographic or ecological aspects (Dallimer and Strange, 2015: 132). This class, constructed not for ecological reasons, can affect the management of biodiversity and conservation because the borders can separate one contiguous ecosystem and impact its management (Dallimer and Strange, 2015: 132; Miller, 2020: 473).

The domestication of plants and animals in Palestine was followed by the formation of city states and then kingdoms and empires which this created shifting socio-political borders that also did not correspond to the geographic or ecological borders (Bar-Yosef, 1998: 159; Hatuka, 2012: 347). Cities like Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Jericho also had built defensive walls around them. Yet, the city remained in direct contact and dependency on the rural areas that supplied food and other raw materials (Walmsley, 1996: 126).

During the human dominance established over the past few millennia (the Anthropocene), physical borders have indeed contributed to the global reduction in biodiversity (Tucker *et al.*, 2018: 466). We were thus interested in understanding effect of physical structures built for political purposes on biodiversity in Palestine. Israel's annexation and segregation wall built in the occupied Palestinian territories began in the 1990s in Gaza and in 2003 in the West Bank. It did have a negative impact on human and environmental health (EQA, 2010: 1; OCHA, 2022). Anecdotal data also suggest it has an impact on biodiversity (Abdallah & Swaileh, 2011: 543). Data on biodiversity shows a decline in the

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West Bank caused by colonial activities (including walls) as well as other human activities (Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2014: 101, and 2016: 6; Saeed and Qumsiyeh, 2020: 69; Salman *et al.*, 2014: 86; Handal *et al.*, 2020: 20; Amr *et al.*, 2016: 75).

Methodology

This work is meta-analysis dependent on: **a)** literature review, **b)** author's own observations, **c)** the eight year experience of the Palestine Institute for Biodiversity and Sustainability at Bethlehem University (PIBS-BU see Palestinenature.org especially annual reports and section on conservation and research) in examining biodiversity in Palestine in areas of the wall completed or partially completed. Our own studies at PIBS-BU accumulated mostly short-term observations and data on things like fauna and flora which were reported on in alpha level studies (e.g. PMNH, 2018; Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2016: 6; Al-Sheikh and Qumsiyeh, 2021: 1).

The Israeli Segregation and Annexation Wall

From its foundation as a Jewish state in a land that was multiethnic, multicultural and multireligious, Israeli policy makers believed in segregation and in the removal of natives enclosing them behind borders and walls. But walls were also used as a system of pressure to force the natives to leave. For example after the ethnic cleansing of 1948-1949, the nascent state of Israel wanted to remove the last remaining Palestinians in some areas. The villages of Faluja and Iraq Al-Manshiya were actually populated after the war and the withdrawal of Israeli army was predicated on allowing the natives to continue living there. But Israeli planners wanted them out so after setting the villagers in bordered villages (large prisons), they pressured them economically to finally “volunteer to leave”. Martial law was declared to other villages in the Galilee and the Negev (Qumsiyeh, 2004: 41).

Walls were set up around inhabitants of Gaza started in 1967 and accelerated as colonies were established in the Gaza strip. The Israeli partial withdrawal from the strip in 2005 eliminated some walls and added others. The Israeli planners hoped to get rid of the burden of internal policing of Gaza's population replacing it by external policing. At the same time, the plan was to intensify colonization in the West Bank. The plans for walls and fences in the West Bank started in 1993-1994 by the time the Oslo accords where Israel were supposed to give limited autonomy in Palestinians in urban areas (designated area A in the parlance of Oslo). Meanwhile there was an increasing colonization throughout the West Bank. Settler population mushroomed from in 1993 to over 600,000 by the year 2000 when all the delusions of Oslo “peace” accords evaporated (Qumsiyeh, 2004: 133).

The Outbreak of another uprising in 2000 gave the Israeli state the excuse to make more collective punishment and restrictions in both the West Bank and Gaza. The isolation of Jerusalem from its Palestinian suburbs intensified and the siege and blockade on Gaza became a hermetic seal that ensured impoverishment of nearly 2 million Palestinians. Having completed the wall around Gaza (with the aid of Egypt's dictatorships, in 2002, the Israeli government formalized its policy of segregation in the West Bank by starting massive building projects of segregation walls and barriers in the northern parts of the West Bank. The walls were billed “security barriers” in projections to Western Media but were not related to security. Evidence for this is very clear: **a)** there were Palestinians on

both sides of the wall (e.g. 250,000 Palestinians in Jerusalem on the “Israeli” side of the wall), **b)** there are Israelis on both sides of the wall with dozens of colonial Jewish settlements on the so called “Palestinian” side of the wall, **c)** suicide bombings had started in 1994 after the attack by a Jewish settler in the Ibrahimi mosque. The uprising and militant attacks ended in late 2005 when Hamas was convinced to enter elections. At that time the segregation walls were less than 30 % completed and yet continued while a public relations effort was built claiming the wall was meant for ending “terrorist attacks” (Qumsiyeh, 2012: 107).

The Wall cuts through the western part of the West Bank with a 721 km length, and a height of 8-12 meters - twice the height of the Berlin Wall. The Wall is composed of vehicle-barrier trenches, exclusion zones, electric fences and thick concrete slabs (ARIJ, 2015: 1). Most of the wall build is inside the West Bank well away from the green line and it is cutting more than 150 Palestinian communities from their lands and taking about 1/10th of the land mass of the West Bank to potentially annex it to Israel (part of it in Jerusalem was already annexed, EQA, 2010: 1; B'Tselem, 2017: 1). (Ilustração 01).



Ilustração 01 – Map of the Israeli segregation and annexation wall (Courtesy of Environment Quality Authority).



Ilustração 02 – A section of the wall (Creative Commons).

Impact of the wall on the environment and biodiversity

The impact on biodiversity and the environment includes:

1. Restriction on movement of land mammals. Our own studies on distribution of land mammals like the hyena (Handal *et al.*, 2020: 20) and gazelles (PIBS unpublished data) show a large reduction in population of these species (see also ecological data in Qumsiyeh 1996).
2. Land and soil degradation due to altered geophysical features (EQA, 2010: 1). Our own observations in areas like Wadi Zarqa (PMNH, 2018: 1) and Wadi Al-Makhrou (Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2022) shows altered water courses which affect on natural habitats.
3. Habitat destruction and fragmentation. Already over 2 million trees were uprooted to build the wall, fences, associated roads and buffer zones (see stopthewall.org). The wall caused a fragmentation of the farms, forests, grasslands and water resources preventing access and use of lands and natural resources (ARIJ, 2015: 1; EQA, 2019: 1). Forests, Protected Areas and nature reserves were also disrupted by the wall construction. Almost 42 000 dunums of forests area were included in the wall area in addition to the annexation of forests and protected areas with high ecological value in west of the wall such as Umm Al Rayhan forest (EQA, 2010: 1).
4. Restructuring socioeconomics in environmentally damaging ways: farms segregated from land owners decreased local food production and added to unsustainable practices of consumption. The loss of lands and uprooting of many plants is damaging and endangering agro-biodiversity with high ecological and socio-economical value (ARIJ, 2005: 1). Many vegetables and crops are threatened to disappear especially the ones cultivated in plains and less rainfall areas (EQA, 2010: 1).

5. Overgrazing is a consequence of smaller areas allowed for people to access, which is causing depletion of plants and soil erosion (Abdallah & Swaileh, 2011: 543).
6. Impact on invasiveness and other species population changes: the wall likely explains local changes such as increased invasiveness of certain species and expansion of populations of animals like wild boars and hyrax while it decreases others like the gazelles (due to habitat changes). For large mammals like Hyenas, the wall impedes their movements in ways that reduces availability of food because they have large foraging areas (Handal *et al.*, 2020: 20). Spread of some invasive species that are not restricted by walls is noticeable such as the Indian myna bird (Handal and Qumsiyeh 2021: 129). A survey of areas around walls in Bethlehem Governorates showed many invasive species proliferating including *Ricinus communis*, *Ailanthus altissima*, *Nicotiana glauca*, and *Ambrosia confertiflora*.
7. The walls and the siphoning of spring water in many areas including those in this area has already produced a decline in Amphibian populations (Salman *et al.*, 2014: 86) and freshwater snails and plants (see also Al-Shaikh and Qumsiyeh, 2021: 6).
8. The restrictions on movement imposed on the Palestinian population via the walls and plant checkpoints impedes access of conservation crews (Amr *et al.*, 2016: 75; Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2016: 6) and the imbalance of power endangers conservation efforts (Qumsiyeh and Albardeiya, 2022).

Loss of biodiversity can be attributed partly to these issues (Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2014: 101, 2016: 6; Saeed and Qumsiyeh 2020: 69; Salman *et al.*, 2014: 86; Handal *et al.*, 2020: 20; Amr *et al.*, 2016: 75). Saeed and Qumsiyeh (2020: 69) also showed that going back to old travelers' books like those of Tristram can show significant negative changes in fauna like birds. A good example of a bird that was impacted by human activity is the Eagle Owl whose diet has significantly deteriorated from a very rich diet including hedgehogs, various birds and lizards to be dominated mostly by house rats (Amr *et al.*, 2016: 75). We did notice that climate change coupled with colonial activities do impact sensitive invertebrate species like land snails (Amr *et al.*, 2018: 25).

The actual damage to the environment goes beyond the construction aspect of the wall. Technically, in most of the areas except in the middle of urban areas like Eizariya in Jerusalem, the barrier is much more than simply a wall or a fence. It includes clearing large swaths of land around it in the form of "buffer zones".

Discussion

Stonewalls used in agriculture can have a positive impact on biodiversity by supporting endemic flora and fauna, including providing refuge for seeds, for soil preservation, and for easy access to habitats (Collier, 2012: 141; Manenti, 2014: 1879; Assandri, 2018: 200). By contrast, socio-political barriers have a negative impact on biodiversity. This study and others (e.g. Fowler *et al.*, 2018: 137; Ogden, 2017: 498) demonstrate that border walls and other socio-political physical barriers do impact biodiversity and should be taken into account in planning conservation strategies (Dallimer and Strange, 2015: 132). Walls and barriers are not new in the world but the effect of barriers is now more visible because its extension and because it is also related to new phenomena like climate change. The border wall build between the USA and Mexico is similar to the separation wall inside the West Bank and clearly showed a impact for wildlife and people along the border (Best,

2021: 255; Fowler *et al.*, 2018: 137; Gladstone *et al.*, 2021: 18). By contrast, the Berlin wall (smaller in length and height) was in the middle of the city of Berlin and therefore did not impact so much the biodiversity. The impact on Palestine of such barriers is even worse due to its smaller geographical extension and to the much more convoluted route of the barriers in an area with diverse topography and five phytogeographic zones (see above). Conversely, removing borders and fences had shown positive impact on the ecosystems. In Europe: see for instance what happened after the removal of the European borders and the restoration of an open landscape had helped biodiversity (Ogden, 2017: 498). The importance of open landscapes in natural resources management and conservation cannot be overstated.

The colonial Zionist project to this day refuses to define the borders of its ambitions or even its state. Its ambitions can range from the area of the “Nile to the Euphrates” to the southern Levant plans proposed at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference (that includes Palestine, Jordan, and parts of Syria and Lebanon), to the area west of the rift valley plus the Golan Heights (annexed Syrian territory). But the physical alteration of the landscape here has been clearly devastating to the environment. For the native Palestinians, challenging walls as forms of oppression joins the struggles of oppressed communities and is critical to sustainability in a healthy environment (Harsha 2012; Quintanilla and Moganam, 2015: 1039; Salem, 2019: 149; Masri, 2021: 85).

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The exploitation of natural resources in Area C of the West Bank as indicator of annexation

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pp. 27-47

According to the international community, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) refers to the territories occupied by Israel as of 1967, i.e. the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, two non-contiguous areas but considered as one territorial unit under Israeli occupation (see Ilustração 01) (Power, 2015: 8).



Ilustração 01 – Occupied Palestinian Territory.
Source: OCHA, 2022.

The Oslo Accords concluded between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization between 1993 and 1995 divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, shown on the map below (Ilustração 02). The first area refers to the parts under Palestinian civil and security

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control, where Palestinian authorities uphold *the powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order*, and are also in charge of civilian matters, like health, education, policing, and other city services. In Area B, Palestinian authorities are in charge of civil control, while security control is shared between Israeli and Palestinian authorities. Area C, on the other hand, is under complete Israeli rule (Power, 2015: 8).




Ilustração 02 – Map of Area C in the West Bank. Source: OCHA, 2022.

Based on the Accords, intended as an interim arrangement, Israel continues to maintain authority over matters like land registration, planning, building, and land use designation in Area C. Exercising its civil and military authority in this area, which encloses more than 61 percent of the West Bank and contains the most significant source of natural resources in Palestine (Power, 2015: 8), Israel has exploited these resources, as will be explained hereunder. This paper examines how Israel's exploitation of natural resources in Area C -intended to be part of the nascent Palestinian State- serves as an indicator that the occupation has crossed the line into *de facto* annexation of this area.

Natural resources and their exploitation in Area C of the West Bank

a. Water

The United Nations acknowledges access to water as both a fundamental human right in itself and an integral component for the enjoyment of all other human rights (UNGA, 2010, Res 64/292). Access to this resource must be *equitable and non-discriminatory*, both *within societies and among States* (UNGA, 2019, Res 40/73; General Comment N.º 15: The Right to Water, 2003).

The OPT's water resources (Ilustração 03) include: **a)** the Jordan River Basin, consisting of surface-water which also runs through Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, with the Golan Heights as the basin that sheds the river and principal source of water for Lake Tiberius, along with being the single largest source for Israel's National Water Carrier; **b)** the Mountain Aquifer, which extends under both sides of the Green Line -also called the 1949 Armistice Line, internationally accepted boundary between Israel and the OPT-, and is divided in Western Aquifer Basin (WAB), North-Eastern Aquifer Basin (NEAB) and Eastern Aquifer Basin (EAB); and **c)** the Coastal Aquifer, beneath Gaza and Israel's coastal plain (UNGA, 2019, Res 40/73). The first two sources will be examined in more detail, as they form part of Area C.




Ilustração 03 – Water sources in the region. Source: Al-Haq, 2013.

Since the occupation in 1967, all water resources are controlled by the Israeli military, and Palestinians need its permission to construct new water infrastructure or maintain the existing ones, according to military orders N.º 92 and N.º 158, both of 1967. In 1982, the water supply system in the West Bank was integrated into the Israeli system, and the Israeli government transferred its ownership to Mekorot, the Israeli national water company. Through it, Israel maintains control of how much water is sold to Palestinians (Amnesty International, 2009: 15).

By the time the Oslo Accords were signed, Israel was already in control of more than 60 percent of the West Bank's total land, including its water resources (UNCTAD, 2019: 8), keeping in force the abovementioned military orders for Palestinians (not Israeli settlers, who are governed by Israeli law) (Amnesty International, 2009: 15). Additionally, the Accords established an Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee, consisting of water officials from Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), to regulate water and sanitation in the West Bank, with a mandate to grant permits, drill wells and extract water, for instance. As

the Committee's decisions were taken by consensus, this resulted in Israel effectively vetoing any proposal made by the PA. In contrast, Palestinians have not enjoyed similar veto power on Israel's side of the Green Line, even if it relates to joint water resources (Koek, 2013: 40-41). The procedure was modified in 2017 and Palestinians can lay water pipes and network without the Committee's approval, but Israel can also develop its separate water system for settlements without PA approval, resulting in widening inequalities as Israel controls the water supplies. As water expert Jan Selby has put it, *though Palestinians will now have autonomy to lay pipelines, what they won't have is any additional water to go in them -except with Israeli consent* (UNGA, 2019, Res 40/73).

Regarding the Jordan River, considered the eastern border of the West Bank, Israel has diverted its waters through its National Water Carrier, to supply water for its coastal and desert regions. This has resulted in Israel exploiting 50 percent of this shared resource -even though only 37 percent of the surface catchment area of the Jordan River Basin is located in its territory-, supplying for one-third of Israel's total water needs, while Palestinians are deprived of their 'equitable and reasonable share' and the ecosystem is being seriously altered (Koek, 2013: 24-5). Moreover, Israel has prohibited the Palestinians from drawing water from the Jordan River, on the one hand, by the declaration of its riverbanks as a closed military zone and, on the other hand, by the destruction of Palestinian pumps and irrigation ditches (Koek, 2013: 34).

For its part, the Mountain Aquifer constitutes the primary water source in the region and delivers groundwater of high quality. The WAB, which constitutes the largest aquifer, is mostly located in Israel, as can be seen on Ilustração 04, but refills in approximately 80 percent from water coming from the West Bank. On the other hand, the NEAB and the EAB are located almost entirely in the West Bank. As the recharge areas of the Mountain Aquifer are inside the West Bank, Israel has been keen to maintain control over these areas, diverting the water flows into Israel, and its resources are currently under almost exclusive use of Israeli wells and Jordan Valley settler wells (Koek, 2013: 25, 27).




Ilustração 04 – Mountain Aquifer. Source: Al-Haq, 2013.

Israeli settlements have been strategically located over key water sources to control them, as in the cases of the settlements of Ariel and Emmanuel, which the Israeli government has expressed its intention to annex, and are located over the Western Aquifer. Likewise, the construction of the Wall in the West Bank has contributed to annexing water resources, as the 'seam zone' between the Wall and the Green Line, shown on Ilustração 05, constitutes a critical recharge area for the Western Mountain Aquifer (HSRC, 2009: 145-146). Meanwhile, some Palestinian communities are still not connected to water networks (How dispossession happens, OCHA, 2012).




Ilustração 05 – 'Seam zone', area between the Barrier and the Armistice Green Line. Source: OCHA, 2022.

Besides the appropriation of Palestinian water sources, Palestinian water infrastructure has been deliberately damaged by Israeli military, with approximately 137 communities in Palestine suffering damage to their water networks and sources between 2000 and 2004, according to the Palestinian Hydrology Group, in addition to damage inflicted by settlers, as occurred with Palestinian springs near Yanun and Madama (Zeitoun, 2007: 109).

Moreover, water is hardly reused in agriculture, given that building or repairing any type of water infrastructure is extremely difficult as Israel refuses permits to Palestinians and demolishes facilities built without them (Agha, 2019: 5).

All of this has resulted in increasing inequality in access to water between Israelis and Palestinians, and Palestinians having to purchase their water from Israel, as Israel extracts significantly more than its population share. While Israel enjoys a share of 80 percent of the total aquifer according to the Oslo Accords, Palestinians are only able to extract about 75 percent of their established share, added to the fact that the Palestinian population has almost doubled in the West Bank since 1995 (UNGA, 2019, Res 40/73, B'Tselem, 2017).

Consequently, Israelis (including Israeli settlers) consume approximately three times more water per person per day than West Bank Palestinians (250 versus 84 litres respectively) (Lazarou, 2016), while Palestinians in the OPT have the lowest access to freshwater resources by regional standards (World Bank, 2009: 13).

b. Agricultural land and products

Agriculture is deeply rooted in the Palestinian identity, and more than half of Palestinians in the West Bank live in 500 rural villages. Agriculture represents 11.5 percent of employment and 21 percent of exports, covering around 85 percent of the land in the West Bank. Olives and their derivatives (food, soap, fuel and crafts) are essential in Palestinian homes, in addition to the olive sector being responsible for 15 percent of the agricultural income (Agha, 2019: 6).

As most of the West Bank's natural resources, the best agricultural land is located in the Jordan Valley (see Ilustração 06). While Israel has built settlements and cultivated the land in strategic locations of the valley, under its control as part of Area C, Palestinian access to these lands has been hindered by more than 400 checkpoints or roadblocks, combined with a complicated permit system and a dividing Wall (Agha, 2019: 6). Human Rights Watch has pointed out that *the Israeli military requires many Palestinians to obtain military "coordination" in order to access their olive groves and other agricultural lands where those lands are located near settlements* (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 5). This 'prior coordination' regime created for Palestinians to access their land was expanded by the Israeli High Court in 2006 with the *Rashad Murad* case, which has resulted in the restricted access of Palestinian farmers to any land close to the 55 existing Israeli settlements, jeopardising the livelihoods of farmers from around 90 Palestinian communities, as at 2012 (Movement and access report OCHA, 2012: 27; Algasis and Al Azza, 2013: 74).




Ilustração 06 – Jordan Valley area. Source: Al-Haq, 2018.

In this context, Israel has also designed a 'special security area', which entailed Israel surrounding 12 colonies east of the Wall with perimeters of land closed to Palestinian entry. For Palestinians to access these lands, they must meet a number of requirements, such as recognition of ownership and date to entry granted by the Civil Administration, besides the consent of the settlers (Algasis and Al Azza, 2013: 69).

To legitimise Israel's policies of confiscation of land and other resources, the Israeli High Court has also extended the concept of 'security needs' through its rulings. In the *Beth El* case, the Court held a broad interpretation of 'security needs', concluding that the military commander can order the requisition of immovable property to ensure public order and safety. Therefore, the establishment of a settlement in a strategic position can be considered within the definition of military need and justify the requisition of land for the defence of the area (Kretzmer, 2012: 217).

Besides claiming security needs, Israel has appropriated land in the OPT by classifying the lands as 'closed military areas' or 'natural reserves', expropriating it for public purposes, or considering it as abandoned property (Nicoletti, 2012: 14). As at 2013, Israel had declared 114 areas as 'natural reserves' or 'national parks' inside the OPT (Algasis and Al Azza, 2013: 70).

Furthermore, after the *Elon Moreh* case of 1979, where the Israeli High Court concluded that the Israeli government was not allowed to seize private Palestinian land alleging military needs to establish settlements, Israeli authorities started declaring Palestinian land as 'State land' before establishing settlements. This has been the main tactic pursued by Israel to appropriate land in the Dead Sea area (part of Area C) (Nicoletti, 2012: 15).

According to the United Nations, as at 2016, Israel had already taken around 70 percent of Area C for its exclusive use (UNEP, 2020: 46-7). Along the same lines, the World Bank noted that *agricultural labor productivity in the West Bank is in significant decline* due to the restrictions for Palestinian to access and invest in their land and water resources, especially in Area C, constraining Palestinian development (World Bank, 2014: 18-20). The potential of this land is reflected on the fact that the settlements provide Europe and the Russian Federation of several agricultural products, such as pomegranates, almonds and olives, among others (World Bank, 2014: 21), contrasting with the OPT's low overall yield (less than half of neighbouring Jordan) (Agha, 2019: 6).

In addition to land confiscation and access restrictions, key Palestinian products have been politicised, such as za'atar, sometimes confiscated at checkpoints, allegedly to preserve their ecological health, and thyme, which is no longer allowed for Palestinian collection in the wild, after Israel declared it a protected plant. Milk has also been a victim of politics, after Israeli Forces apprehended cows in the town of Beit Sahour during the First Intifada -1987-, making the West Bank reliant on Israeli milk (Abdelnour *et al.*, 2012: 2).

Furthermore, in the middle of the olive harvest, Israeli settlers (under the watch of Israeli soldiers) have burnt or damaged olive trees and stolen the produce, besides assaulting Palestinian farmers and damaging their equipment and work tools (B'Tselem, 2020; OCHA, 2020).

c. Quarries

The West Bank is a rich source of high-quality stone, contained in 222 to 255 quarries, most of them around Hebron and Bethlehem. These resources make the OPT the 12th biggest stone producer globally, accounting for 4 percent of the world production, and resulting in an annual revenue of around \$450 million dollars, coming from exports to Israel (65 percent) and international markets (6 percent) as at 2005 (ARIJ, 2007: 8).

However, very few quarries are still operating in Area C under Palestinian control, and even fewer operate legally and without interruptions, i.e. with Israeli permit and with no restrictions imposed (World Bank, 2013: 13, 38). Conversely, Israel has granted mining concessions to 10 Israeli companies to operate quarries in Area C of the West Bank, with an increasing volume of activity in recent years, resulting in the production of 17 million tons in 2015 (Kanonich, 2017: 7). The quarries controlled by Israel make a profit for Israeli and multinational corporations while supporting the Israeli construction market (World Bank, 2013: 14-15). Around 94 percent of the production of stone, gravel and gypsum is sent to Israel for construction, while the rest is destined for what Israel considers the 'local market', this is, its settlements and government in the West Bank and the Palestinian construction sector (Kanonich, 2017: 7).

These operations in the West Bank cover between 20 and 30 percent of the annual quarrying requirements of Israel, with the respective royalties paid to Israel, which results in a significant dependency on production from Israeli owned quarries in the West Bank, particularly in the Jerusalem area and in central and southern Israel, according to the committee appointed by the Israel Land Commission on 2015, to review land policies affecting quarrying. Additionally, the Commission stated that the delivery of these goods is

extremely significant for regular and sufficient supply capable of meeting the demands of the construction and infrastructure industries, and that if it were not for quarrying activity in the Judea and Samaria area, the sector would have entered a supply crisis years ago, which would have serious effects that go beyond rising costs (Kanonich, 2017: 8).

This explains why only few Palestinian companies operate in Area C and why Israel does not grant them or renew their permits to operate (Who Profits, 2016).

An example of Israel's exploitation in Area C is Nahal Raba quarry (see Ilustração 07). This land was confiscated from Palestinians and is now exploited by Israeli and multinational corporations, such as HeidelbergCement and its subsidiary Hanson Israel, operating under Israeli law. While Palestinians have been restricted from accessing this area, the stone extracted from this quarry has contributed to the construction of illegal Israeli settlements, in addition to Palestinians having to buy from these operators (Abdallah and De Leeuw, 2020: 9-10).



Ilustração 07 – Nahal Raba Quarry area, in proximity to Al-Zawiya and Rafat villages and surrounding Israeli settlements. Source: Al-Haq, 2020.

The legality of quarrying activities conducted by Israel in the OPT was challenged in 2011 before the Israeli High Court by Yesh Din, an Israeli non-governmental organisation. In this case -hereinafter *Quarries case*-, the petitioner disputed the legality of military authorities granting licenses to Israeli companies to open and operate stone quarries in the West Bank, arguing that this was beyond Israel's power to manage public property in usufruct, and the product of these operations were to benefit Israel and not the local population, as required by Article 55 of the Hague Regulations.

In this case, the Court considered usufruct as the

right to use and enjoy the fruits of another's property for a period without damaging or diminishing it, although the property might naturally deteriorate over time, and consequently the occupier shall not be entitled to sell the asset or to use it in a way that shall result in its depletion or exhaustion (Quarries case [7]).

However, it also considered that the 'usufruct rule' remains disputed among scholars (*Quarries case* [7]), and examined, firstly, the scope of the quarrying allow - if the occupying power can open new mines -, and secondly, the use of the product such operations allow - if the interests of the local population are being cared for (Azarova, 2019: 4).

In relation to the extent of the exploitation, the Court only considered the occupying power's obligation to reassure that the natural resources are not exhausted, concluding that new quarries can be established by the occupying power (*Quarries case* [8, 13]), disregarding statements from the Israeli military government which indicated that, at the current mining rate, all quarries in Area C would be depleted in 38 years (Yesh Din (2164/09, 2011; Azarova, 2019: 5).

Regarding the use of the product of exploitation, the Court considered that occupation law requires adjustment, given the prolonged duration of the occupation, *to ensure the development and growth of the area in numerous and various fields, including the fields of economic infrastructure and its development (Quarries case [10])*. The Court affirms that the potential closure of the quarries *might cause harm to existing infrastructures and a shut-down of the industry, which might consequently harm, of all things, the wellbeing of the local population (Quarries case [13])*. Moreover, following its previous jurisprudence, the Court included the Israeli settler population in the concept of 'local population', and concluded that, as the quarries' products will be marketed for Palestinians and Israeli settlers (although in a different rate), the quarrying would benefit the local population (*Quarries case* [12]; Azarova, 2019: 7).

Based on these various arguments, the Court dismissed the petition, without distinguishing the interests of the protected population under occupation and the limitations on economic exploitation by the occupying power, but only focusing on the fact that the Hague Regulations contemplate economic development and normal life in the situation of occupation (UNGA, 2019, Res 40/73). The Court adjusts the law of occupation to the duration of the occupation and the reality on the ground, in order to ensure *the continuity of normal life in the Area and to the sustainability of economic relations between the two authorities -the occupier and the occupied (Quarries case [10])*, even though changing the scope of Article 55 due the fact that to the duration of the occupation is not allowed

under to international law (Koutroulis, 2012: 184). The Court's interpretation should have considered the main principles of the law of occupation, especially the limits imposed to the exploitation of natural resources in occupied territory, which indicate that the effects must not be permanent and must not harm the local population (Azarova, 2019: 4).

d. Dead Sea minerals

The Dead Sea is a significant source of natural and mineral wealth, used to make a variety of cosmetic and other products which, besides being marketed, are of essential importance for the multiple health resorts located on the western shore of the Dead Sea, area under Israeli control (ARIJ, 2007: 7). In spite of the temporary character of the Oslo Accords, the Dead Sea and its surroundings are still under Israeli military and administrative control, as part of Area C. Israel has appropriated large extensions of land around the Dead Sea and declared them 'closed military zones', however allowing the establishment of various settlements, such as Vered Yeriho, Beit Ha'arava, Almog, Kalia, Ovnat and Mitzpe Shalem, shown on Ilustração 08 (Nicoletti, 2012: 13).




Ilustração 08 – The occupied Dead Sea area. Source: Al-Haq, 2012.

Around 50 cosmetic factories operate in the western shore of the Dead Sea area, extracting mud and other materials to create products for domestic and external markets. Among these companies is Ahava Dead Sea Laboratories Ltd. This company, with an annual revenue of 142 million USD in 2007, is located in the settlement of Mitzpe Shalem (see Ilustração 08). Its revenue comes primarily from exports to Europe and the United States (60 percent) and from Israeli market and tourism industry in the Dead Sea (40

percent). Additionally, the company benefits from Israeli tax benefits, as it is located on a settlement (Nicoletti, 2012: 21-22). Meanwhile, Palestinians are not allowed to develop this area or profit from its natural resources. To build any kind of structure, they need authorisation from the Israeli Civil Administration (Nicoletti, 2012: 18), and sometimes they are even denied access to the area (Nicoletti, 2012: 13).

e. Oil and gas

The OPT contains essential oil and gas resources, which would make Palestine self-sustainable and not dependant on international aid if developed. In Area C, oil deposits have been found near the Armistice Line between the West Bank and Israel, along with prospects of natural gas and oil reserves around the Dead Sea (Power, 2015: 12-15). In 2003, Israel appropriated the Palestinian village of Rantis, first assigning it for military training zones and subsequently for the construction of the Wall. Besides trapping 2,688 villagers between the main and secondary depth walls and seriously restricting their freedom of movement, the Wall prevented Palestinian access to the oil field on the Palestinian side of the Green Line (Power, 2015: 83-84).

Under Israel's Petroleum Law 5712-1952, Israel transferred exploitation rights to Givot Olam to exploit the Meged-5 well, to be commercially exploited with revenues for the State of Israel, at the expense of Palestinians (Power, 2015: 80, 84; UNCTAD, 2019: 25). Israel extended the exploitation rights, initially conferred for the Israeli territory of Rosh Haayin, to the area of Rantis without the agreement of the PA, as required by the Oslo Accords (Power, 2015: 13-14).

Palestinian oil and gas dependency from Israel results in great benefit for the latter, as Palestinians import around 70 percent of its goods and services from Israel, including energy sources. In 2007, the cost of these energy supplies averaged 385 million euros for Palestine, as it imported 100 percent of its petroleum and 92 percent of electricity from Israel (Power, 2015: 18).

Concept of occupation and *de facto* annexation

By 'occupied territories', we understand that *a territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and that the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised*, in accordance to Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, a legal instrument recognised as constituting customary international law (ICJ Reports 2005), [case 172]).

Articles 42 to 56 of the Hague Regulations and Articles 27-34 and 47 to 78 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV), in addition to the applicable norms of customary law, constitute the so-called 'law of occupation' (ICRC, 2004).

The basic rule regarding the occupant's governmental authority is articulated in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, under which it *shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country*. Based on this rule, in the context of law of occupation, we can identify distinctive characteristics of the concept of occupation.

Firstly, an occupation is of temporary nature, i.e. it does not establish a permanent situation. As some scholars have pointed out, this principle is challenged by the absence

of time limit for this occupation (Ben-Naftali *et al.*, 2018: 17). Based on the challenges of applying the law of occupation to long-term situations, some have distinguished short-term occupation from prolonged occupation. Nevertheless, in the end they all agree that the law of occupation applies regardless of the duration of the occupation (ICRC, 2012: 13, 69-70, 72).

Secondly, the occupying power acts as *de facto* administrator of the occupied territory until conditions allow for the return of the territory to the sovereign (UNGA, 2017, Res 72/556). This limitation to the occupying power aims to safeguard the people of the occupied territory, in addition to its institutions and laws. The latter's transformation may worsen the position of the inhabitants, which is why changes are only allowed if they are necessary or constitute an improvement to the people under occupation (Pictet, 1958: 273-4).

Lastly, in view of the above, the occupying power has a duty of conservation, i.e. to preserve the *status quo* as much as possible. Under occupation law, the sovereign title relating to the occupied territory does not pass to the occupant, and therefore, it is not allowed to introduce long-term changes in the occupied territories. Under the so-called 'conservationist principle', the occupying power must respect, as far as possible, the existing laws and institutions of the occupied territory. It is however authorised to make changes where necessary to ensure its own security and to uphold its duties under occupation law, particularly the obligation to restore and maintain public order and safety and the obligation to ensure orderly government in the areas concerned (ICRC, 2012: 7).

Different from occupation, annexation entails that a territory integrates into another state, which considers it part of it (Wrange, 2015: 7). It can be defined as the unilateral act of a State through which it proclaims its sovereignty over the territory of another State. It usually involves the threat or use of force, as the annexing State usually occupies the territory in question in order to assert its sovereignty over it (ICRC Glossary).

We need to distinguish between *de jure* and *de facto* annexation. *De jure* annexation presupposes an official declaration from the occupying power expressly crystallising the intention to annex (or else integrate, merge or incorporate) the occupied territory (Abdallah and De Leeuw, 2020: 12). In this sense, annexation is the forcible seizure followed by unilateral assertion of title (Judge Lauterpacht, 1993). This was the case after Iraq invaded Kuwait, and declared that the latter was part of Iraq and that it would be returned to the whole and to the Iraq of its origins in a comprehensive and eternal merger (Greenwood, 1992: 155; Los Angeles Times, 1990). On the other hand, *de facto* annexation (also called 'creeping annexation') refers to the actions of a State in the process of consolidating -often through oblique and incremental measures- the legislative, political, institutional and demographic facts to establish a future claim of sovereignty over territory acquired through force of war, but without the formal declaration of annexation (UNGA, 2018, Res 73/447).

To assess whether a State engaging in occupation has crossed the line into annexation, one can identify two essential elements: *corpus* and *animus*, meaning the physical occupation and the intention to appropriate it permanently, respectively (Abdallah and De Leeuw, 2020: 11). This last element distinguishes annexation from occupation. Other assessments distinguish four elements: **a)** effective control of the territory that it acquired from another State by force; **b)** exercise of sovereignty, exerted through active measures which indicate the intention to retain all or part of the territory, or by imposing changes to local legislation, such as the application of its laws to the territory, demographic

changes or population transfer, the perpetuation of the occupation and the endowment of citizenship; **c)** expression of intent -as statements by political leaders or State institutions-; and **d)** refusal to apply international law or guidelines of the international community regarding the territorial situation (UNGA, 2018, Res 73/447). In this sense, an occupation regime can become unlawful and constitute annexation if it refuses to conduct negotiations to reach a peaceful solution of the conflict, and the occupant's conditions for a solution are not motivated by 'reasonable security interests', but actually intend to alter the *status quo* of the occupied area (Benvenisti, 2012: 245-6).

Annexation is not currently recognised by the international community, based on the prohibition of any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state established by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments, including the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States. Prominent scholars sustain this prohibition as a binding principle, regardless of the grounds for annexation (whether self-defence or war of aggression) (UNGA, 2017, Res 72/556).

The prohibition on annexation of territory coheres with core principles of international law, such as the principles of sovereign equality, self-determination, and non-intervention (Ben-Naftali *et al.*, 2018: 13). Consequently, the situation of occupation does not end with annexation (Pictet, 1958: 276), and the annexed territories are regarded as occupied under international law. Hence, the international law regime for occupation continues to apply to these territories (Wrange, 2015: 7).

In this context, the exploitation of natural resources by the occupier in the occupied territory will be examined next, to determine when the occupying power is acting as a sovereign while exploiting these resources.

Exploitation of natural resources as indicator of annexation

First of all, the exploitation of natural resources must be analysed in light of the principle of Permanent Sovereignty of Natural Resources (PSNR). This principle, introduced to endow the people from developing countries seeking independence the control over their natural resources (Subedi, 2018: 723; Schrijver, 1997: 260; Bungenberg and Hobe, 2015: 3-5), can be defined as the right of a State or a (colonial) people to dispose freely of its natural resources and wealth within the limits of national jurisdiction (Schrijver, 1997: 260).

The General Assembly enshrined the principle of PSNR under Resolution 1803 (XVII) from 1962, asserting that

the exploration, development and disposition of such resources (...) should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary with regard to the authorisation, restriction or prohibition of such activities, and nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognised as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign.

This resolution was accepted by the international community with little opposition (Subedi, 2018: 725). This way, the PSNR entails the right to prospect, explore, develop, and

market natural resources; the right to use them to promote national development; to conserve and manage them according to domestic environmental policies; to regulate foreign investment; and to an equitable share in transboundary resources (Schrijver, 1997: 264-278).

After 1962, the PSNR principle was referenced in the two Human Rights Covenants of 1966 -the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-, and has also been recognised in international commodity agreements and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This principle now constitutes customary international law, reflected in international arbitral and judicial decisions, such as the *Texaco v. Libya* arbitration case of 1977 and the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the ICJ Reports case of 2005 (Bungenberg and Hobe, 2015: 24-25).

Regarding the exploitation of natural resources in territories under occupation, the occupier must consider the PSNR principle and the law of occupation, under which it shall act as *de facto* administrator of these resources, while preserving the *status quo ante*, given that it does not gain sovereignty over the occupied territory.

Even though there might be privately owned natural resources, these are generally considered public property, consistently with the PSNR (Scobbie, 2011: 233). As public and immovable property, natural resources are regulated in Article 55 of the Hague Regulations, which reads:

The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.

Therefore, the first limitation for the occupying power regarding the natural resources of the occupied territory is to use them 'in accordance with the rules of usufruct'. Usufruct refers to *the right to enjoy and take the fruits of another's property, but not to destroy it or fundamentally alter its character* (Scobbie, 2011: 233). Under this rule, the occupier can *reap the fruits of the occupied territory's assets but must not deplete their 'capital' by harming the assets themselves* (Gross, 2017: 199). In consequence, the occupying power may *lease or use State buildings, sell or consume the crops grown on public land, fell and sell the timber of State forests*, but not exploit in a manner that amounts to the destruction of the property (Scobbie, 2011: 233). Regarding non-renewable resources, such as minerals and hydrocarbons, most scholars have interpreted that they cannot be considered as fruits of property, but should be considered as capital of immovable property, hence must not be *depleted, damaged or destroyed* by the occupier (Nicoletti, 2012: 28; Kretzmer, 2012: 222).

The second limiting principle concerns the purpose of the use. The occupant may use the natural resources in the occupied territory only to the extent needed to meet its security needs, administer the territory, and meet the population's essential needs (Institut de droit international, 2003: 4; Benvenisti, 2012: 82). Even though Article 55 of the Hague Regulations does not explicitly require it, it is generally accepted that the exploitation of natural resources is governed by the principle of trust underpinning occupation law and the beneficiaries of this trust are the 'protected persons' from the GCIV (Ben-Naftali *et al.*, 2018: 418-9). Therefore, *the occupant may not use them for its own domestic purposes* (Benvenisti, 2012: 82).

In the abovementioned *Armed Activities* case, the ICJ found that Uganda's officers and soldiers *were involved in the looting, plundering and exploiting* of natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) while occupying part of its territory, and that *the military authorities did not take any measures to put an end to these acts*, for which the Court concluded that Uganda was responsible, according to the PSNR and Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (ICJ Reports, 2005 [242, 244, 250]). However, the Court did not find evidence of a *governmental policy of Uganda directed at the exploitation of natural resources of the DRC or that Uganda's military intervention was carried out in order to obtain access to Congolese resources* (ICJ Reports, 2005 [242]).

For its part, the International Law Commission has prescribed that the occupying power must *respect and protect the environment of the occupied territory, and administer and use the natural resources in an occupied territory, for the benefit of the population of the occupied territory and for other lawful purposes under the law of armed conflict*, ensuring their sustainable use and minimising environmental harm (ILC, 2019 [19, 20]).

On another note, Article 49, paragraph 6, of the GCIV prohibits the occupying power from transferring its civilian population into the occupied territory, while Article 53 bans the destruction of property in the occupied territory, unless absolutely necessary for military operations. These provisions are relevant for the administration of natural resources, as civilians are sometimes transferred to the occupied territory and strategically located to illegally exploit these resources on behalf of the occupier, and the arbitrary destruction of natural resources and their infrastructure is forbidden (Agha, 2019: 3).

Therefore, the occupier does not have the right to freely dispose of the natural resources of the occupied territory, according to the PSNR principle and the law of occupation. As usufructuary of these resources, the occupier may enjoy the fruits of public property, without completely depleting it or alienating it, ensuring their sustainable use and minimising environmental harm, in benefit of the local population.

As observed in the *Armed Activities* case, the mere exploitation of these resources is not enough to constitute annexation, but it can be an indicator that the occupying power is attempting to permanently incorporate the occupied territory, if it demonstrates *an animus of 'owing' and using the sovereign resources of the occupied territory as its own* (Adballah and De Leeuw, 2020: 66). As it may be a sign that the occupation may be turning into annexation, it is necessary to examine the intent of the occupier to determine if annexation has occurred.

Israel's intent

Although Israel has not officially declared the annexation of Area C of the West Bank (and *no de jure* annexation has occurred), the intent to annex can be inferred from Israel's policies and statements made by Israeli officials. In 1977, the Ministry of Agriculture, together with the World Zionist Organization, drew up a settlement project designed *to achieve the incorporation (of the West Bank) into the (Israeli) national system* (Gross, 2017: 154). Since 2017 annexation policies have become even stronger, being discussed by Israel's government and Parliament, establishing the basis for formal annexation (UNGA, 2018, Res. 73/447). Between 31 March 2015 and 28 April 2019, sixty laws related to annexation were proposed in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament), and eight of these bills progressed (Yesh Din, 2019; Jaber, 2021: 6).

Israel's intention to annex became further clear in 2020 with the Peace to Prosperity Plan, or 'Deal of the Century', drafted by Israel and the United States, with no participation of Palestine, which enabled it to annex as much as 50 percent of Area C of the West Bank, including the fertile Jordan Valley and the northern Dead Sea area, rich in natural resources (ARDD, 2020: 1-2). However, Israel's plans for *de jure* annexation of the West Bank set for July 2020 were put on hold (UN press, 2020).

Israel's intent to annex has been noticed by the international community. Already in 2004, the ICJ warned against creeping annexation of the West Bank in its Advisory Opinion, expressing that *the construction of the wall and its associated regime create a 'fait accompli' on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterisation of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation*, constituting a violation of customary international law (ICJ, 2004 [121, 86]).

Additionally, the General Assembly has called upon Israel to comply with international obligations and cease all measures in the OPT *aimed at altering the character, status and demographic composition of the Territory, including the confiscation and de facto annexation of land* (UNGA, 2016, Res 71/23).

Furthermore, the Human Rights Council has recognised that Israel

exercises its military administrative powers in a sovereign-like fashion, with vastly discriminatory consequences for the 5 million Palestinians living under occupation, concerning the degradation and alienation of their water supply, the exploitation of their natural resources and the defacing of their environment and that, in this context, the Israeli occupation, with its appetite for territory and settlement implantation and its sequestration of natural resources, has become virtually indistinguishable from annexation (UNGA, 2019, Res 40/73).

This was also recognised by the General Assembly through the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the OPT (UNGA, 2019, Res 73/447).

Scholars have also acknowledged that Israel's regime -including the *de facto* incorporation of the West Bank- has transgressed the boundaries of occupation (Ben-Naftali *et al.*, 2018: 2), and speak now of creeping annexation (ARDD, 2020: 2). On a similar note, in 2021, Ireland was the first country to use the phrase *de facto* annexation of Palestinian land and publicly condemn this situation (The Guardian, 2021).

Conclusions

Firstly, this paper analysed Israel's exploitation of natural resources in Area C of the West Bank, including various examples such as: the water system of the West Bank, which remains under Israel's control, and imposes an intricate scheme for Palestinians to access water resources; the building of the Wall, which annexed water resources and agricultural land between the Wall and the Green Line; the declaration of territory in Area C as Israeli 'State land', later on used for agriculture and extraction of Dead Sea minerals; need of permits for Palestinians to access their agricultural land; granting of mining concessions to

Israeli companies for the exploitation of quarries in Area C; and Israeli cosmetic factories operating in the Dead Sea, among others. From these examples, one can observe how Israel's systematic policies attempt to create facts on the ground to justify the continuance of these policies, supported by the judiciary branch through its so-called 'dynamic' interpretations of the law, adjusting the law of occupation to the duration of the occupation and the 'reality on the ground' (*Quarries case* [10]).

This has not only prevented Palestinians from using their natural resources, violating the principle of PSNR, recognised as customary international law, but has also made them dependent on Israel, having to buy water, crops, stone and energy supplies from Israel, after the latter has taken them from the OPT, and makes profit out of them. In addition, Israel has strategically placed Jewish settlements to grab land rich in natural resources, and thus preventing Palestinians from their free use, even allowing or participating in the destruction of infrastructure built by Palestinians to exploit their resources, violating also the GCIV which prohibits the transfer of population and the destruction of property in the occupied territory.

As discussed above, occupation is meant to be a temporary situation, where the occupant should work towards the return of the territory to the sovereign as soon as reasonably possible, preserving the *status quo* and the rights of the people during this period, in contrast to annexation. Although forbidden by international law, annexation can be carried out through a declaration or by creating conditions on the ground without an express declaration, which is called *de facto* or creeping annexation. To assess whether annexation has occurred, one must identify if there is effective control over a territory and the intent to annex. Some have also distinguished the exercise of sovereignty and the refusal to apply international law or guidelines to the situation.

The exploitation of natural resources in Area C of the West Bank demonstrates that Israel does not consider the principle of PSNR or the limitations imposed by Article 55 of the Hague Regulations and the guiding principles of the law of occupation, as it does not administer the natural resources of the OPT according to the rules of usufruct, nor preserves the *status quo* or benefit the local population. This exploitation is coupled with the intent to annex, made manifest through Israel's policies, practices and official declarations.

In this sense, all the requirements for annexation are fulfilled: Israel has effective control of the territory, exploiting its natural resources as sovereign, along with expressions of intent from Israeli authorities, who refuse to apply the laws of occupation to the territory and the guidelines of the international community regarding the territorial situation.

In light of the above, one can conclude that Israel exploits the natural resources in Area C of the West Bank not as occupier, but as a sovereign power, with a clear intention to annex the territory, and consequently, Israel's exploitation of natural resources in Area C of the West Bank serves as an indicator to prove that the occupation has crossed the line into *de facto* annexation.

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Impact of COVID-19 pandemic on biodiversity conservation in the Israeli occupied West Bank, Palestine

Mazin B. Qumsiyeh* e Mohammad Abusarhan*

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1. Introduction

The recent pandemic of COVID-19 which is far worse than anything we humans dealt with since the 1917-1918 flu caused massive human suffering but presumably led to less human impact on the environment (Corlett *et al.*, 2020: 3; March *et al.*, 2021: 2; Pinder *et al.*, 2020: 1061; Sharma *et al.*, 2020: 1; Saadat *et al.*, 2020: 5). In fact, this is one of the largest involuntary human confinement in history with massive repercussions for biodiversity (Bates *et al.*, 2020: 4). The initial published data point to a mixed effect on environmental conservation. These recent studies were not focused on developing countries like Palestine. Herein we look at COVID-19 impact in Palestine (the geographic area which is now Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories). Another question to address is whether we are locally and globally learning from this pandemic to alter our destructive behavior that has been ongoing since the industrial revolution and that lead to climate change and massive destruction of biodiversity. Have we for example learned anything from the fact that high pollution rates makes the population more vulnerable to pandemics (Zheng *et al.*, 2020: 1) or that pandemics seem to arise more frequently due to human impact on the environment resulting in contact with wildlife and zoonotic diseases like COVID-19 (Everard *et al.*, 2020: 9; Khetan, 2020: 1; Shreedhar & Mourato, 2020: 963).

In some parts of the world, there were unexpected environmental impacts of the pandemic of COVID-19. For example, satellite imagery shows an increase in the Amazon forest fires after lockdown (Amador-Jiménez *et al.*, 2020: 1081). Other environmental challenges imposed by COVID-19 include the large-scale production of face masks (Fadare & Okoffo, 2020: 2) and the disruption of plastic reduction efforts (Silva *et al.*, 2020: 5). Another example is that increase in visitation to public parks and green spaces was noted to increase in some areas and decrease in others with differing effects on wildlife in those areas (Rutz *et al.*, 2020: 4). The consensus of the earlier studies show that pandemics and lockdowns have more complex relation to environmental conservation and that more data are needed especially with regard to charting post-pandemic societal responses. This

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initial study in Palestine is intended to be a first step in addressing some of these challenges in a developing country under colonial occupation.

The first COVID-19 local cases were reported in the Palestinian areas on March 4th 2020 (brought in by a group of tourists to Bethlehem). Lockdown was immediately announced locally but then expanded to all the West Bank and Gaza. Lockdown/shelter-in-place rules were relaxed briefly (2-4 weeks in May) to then see a new wave of infections and subsequent new lockdowns (Ilustração 01). We looked at impact on biodiversity over a five month period (March to August) by surveying the views of biodiversity experts (29 individuals) in the area (including from the Environment Quality Authority).




Ilustração 01 – Palestinian COVID-19 daily cases. Retrieved on 4 Feb 2022.¹

As a land considered holy by religions (Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Bahai), Palestine received nearly 2 million tourists in the first half of 2019 and was expected to increase significantly by 2020 (Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of tourism²). However, tourism came to a halt 4 March 2020 when the first COVID-19 cases were reported (from a tourist delegation) and the government ordered all tourism to be halted.

2. Methods

We sent a survey to 65 individuals who were selected because they directly work either in research or education about wildlife/biodiversity in our area and thus are expected to be familiar with the situation. Questions were asked about the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on unintended fires, overgrazing, illegal hunting of wildlife, cutting woods in forests and protected areas, dumping of solid and liquid wastes, non-renewable energy usage (fossil fuels, electricity from company), conservation efforts generally, and their own environmental activities. They were also asked if they have ideas going forward on how best we can protect the environment in a post COVID-19 world. We also initiated a survey of a particular popular ecotour path of Al-Makhrour Valley (Gola *et al.*, 2010:

62). This is an ecotourism path surrounded by the communities of Beit Jala, Battir, Husan, Al-Khader, and Al-Walaja. The area is a UNESCO world heritage site (MoTA, 2013). More than 12,000 visitors walked the path in 2019 (our own data). We have compared the amount of trash in the valley in April and May 2019 with that noticed in the same season 2020. We also looked at *atobservations.org* and *inaturalist.org* to assess any changes before and during the pandemic in Palestinian data entered at, posted in portals intended for amateur naturalists.

3. Results and Discussion

The results came back from 30 individuals who filled out the survey (Tabela 01).

Tabela 01 – Questionnaire data from 30 expert Palestinian respondents

Question	Increase	Decrease	No effect	Don't Know	Total
COVID-19 effect on unintended fires	16.7 %	33.3 %	23.3 %	26.7 %	100 %
COVID-19 effect on overgrazing	53.3 %	13.3 %	23.3 %	10 %	100 %
COVID-19 effect on illegal hunting of wildlife	63.3 %	20 %	6.7 %	10 %	100 %
COVID-19 effect on cutting woods in forests and protected areas	40 %	26.7 %	20 %	13.3 %	100 %
COVID-19 effect on non-renewable energy usage (fossil fuels, electricity from company) in Palestine	50 %	30 %	10 %	10 %	100 %
COVID-19 effect on dumping of solid wastes	53.3 %	33.3 %	3.3 %	10 %	100 %
COVID-19 effect on dumping of liquid waste (sewage)	46.7 %	16.7 %	26.7 %	10 %	100 %
COVID-19 effect on own conservation and environmental protection activities	43.3 %	46.7 %	3.3 %	6.7 %	100 %

¹ [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/>.

² [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx>.

COVID-19 effect on funding for projects related to biodiversity	20 %	63.3 %	10 %	6.7 %	100 %
COVID-19 effect on awareness of importance of mitigating of climate change	60 %	30 %	10 %		100 %
	Positive effect	Negative effect	No effect		
COVID-19 effect on your own projects this year	6.7 %	76.7 %	16.7 %		100 %

A set of questions produced no clear-cut answer on the impact of the pandemic while others clearly had a significant majority one way or the other. The ambivalent ones included pandemic's effect on unintended fires (16.7 % increase, 33.3 % decrease, 26.7 % don't know), logging in forests and protected areas (40 % increase, 26.7 % decrease, 13.3 % don't know). Answers that were more emphatic showed respondents felt COVID-19 pandemic increased dumping of solid waste (53.3 % vs 33.3 %), of liquid waste (46.7 %), overgrazing (53.3 %), hunting (63.3 %), non-renewable energy use (50 %), and awareness of issues around climate change (60 %). Some (43.3 %) believed the pandemic in our area increased conservation activities while 46.7 % thought it decreased it. 63.3 % thought this pandemic decreased funding for environmental work while only 20 % thought it increased it. The largest margin was obtained for the question on impact on their own work where 76.7 % said that it had a negative impact (decreasing their work for biodiversity). Further, it was noted that there is a significant increase in personal protective items like masks and gloves both in Palestine and elsewhere (Al-Talalifa & Al-Monawer, 2020: 1; Silva *et al.*, 2020: 5). These were not expected findings considering the projections of positive impact from reduced air travel and other travels (Cheval *et al.*, 2020: 18). Overall, if we can generalize from this survey is that in Palestine, the impact of the pandemic was not necessarily positive for biodiversity.

There was also one open-ended question: Do you have any ideas going forward on how best we can protect the environment in a post COVID-19 world? Some of the most relevant answers were:

- Raising the Awareness of the Public and the policy and decision maker about the important of Ecosystem services and protection of nature.
- More collaboration with local, regional, and international institutes and organizations.
- Local COVID-19 response plans should follow those made by FAO, WFP, UNEP, World Bank, WHO, OCHA, among others.
- More organic and eco-friendly local food production... this also helps increase human immunity...programs to promote home gardening.

Despite the lockdown, the amount of solid waste was higher (estimated this year at over 3 tons) compared to the similar period (March to June) last year. One possible explana-

tion is that while there was a significant decrease in organized tour groups, individuals from the nearby communities did a lot of recreation activities without the benefit of tour guides (who are trained to give instructions on trash issues).

According to *observation.org* in 2019 Palestine had 581 records while in 2020 only 204 records were incorporated in this database. By contrast *naturalist.org* data continued to grow from 218 in 2018 to 1127 in 2019 and to 1505 in 2020. For both websites, the data from other countries indicated a slowdown in growth rate of entries between 2018 to 2020. This indicated less people going out and recording species presence. Those individuals are usually ones interested in environmental conservation.

The Palestine Institute for Biodiversity and Sustainability at Bethlehem University is engaged in a number of conservation efforts (see palestinenature.org/conservation). It is the largest group engaged in biodiversity and conservation and was recently selected to produce the 6th National report for the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) updating the one produced in 1999. Since 4 March 2020, our institute has had to struggle to do its research, education and conservation efforts. Research efforts were hampered by movement restrictions that limited our ability to reach field locations (research output was maintained but was dependent on existing data). Reported to us through the survey was that the pandemic lockdown impacted negatively many of the NGOs working on environmental conservation. Indeed, our own educational efforts were heavily impacted as the pandemic halted the visits to the botanical garden and the Palestine Museum of Natural History. We adapted by creating virtual tours and posting material to social media. Conservation efforts (dependent on research and education) were also affected. For example, basic monitoring of environment changes were reduced due to reduced mobilities. In few instances we were able to go to protected areas despite mobility lockdowns in Palestinian cities and restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation forces. What we noted with these data gathering trips was disturbing in that solid and liquid waste disposal was the same as before the pandemic and in a couple of places (Al-Makhroul valley, Wadi Qana, and Wadi Zarqa Al-Ulwi) trash dumping has actually increased during lockdowns. The explanation from local stakeholders is that people can't get to their jobs so are more inclined to go to parks and protected areas. We may add that enforcement mechanisms became more lax.

A significant success in conservation efforts engaged in during the pandemic was increase in interest in local food production. In all communities, the lockdown allowed residents to plant things in their gardens and tend to existing plants in ways that increased their food production (in April alone we noted over 900 posts related to agriculture in the Facebook timeline connected to the museum compared to less than 50 in one month before the pandemic). In agricultural fields near people residences there was also an increase in food production. For example, we had a project funded by the Darwin Initiative to encourage eco-friendly agriculture in four marginalized communities (Al-Walaja, Battir, Husan, Beit Jala) that surround a biodiversity rich area (Al-Makhroul Valle, a UNESCO world Heritage Site). Over the past three years we worked with 80 farmers distributed among the four communities. We noted that interest actually expanded during the pandemic. We were able to maintain and even expand eco-friendly agricultural activities even in total lockdown by getting special permissions (Ilustração 02). If anything, the pandemic did highlight the importance of local food production.



Ilustração 02 – Farmers in Husan getting instructions in composting and enriching soils from the agricultural specialist of the Palestine Institute for Biodiversity and Sustainability.

The initial optimistic predictions were that the lockdowns associated with COVID-19 would reduce the human impact on the environment and give our planet time to recover for wildlife and may even help people reflect on the damage they inflict so that a post-pandemic caring world is produced. The findings reported herein correspond to other findings in showing that this scenario may have far too optimistic. The social upheaval resulting from the pandemic did not necessarily translate into clear positive outcomes in regards to environmental conservation (Corbera *et al.*, 2020: 1; Buckley, 2020: 194). A notable addition to the growing literature in this field of pandemic in connection to biodiversity is that our experts thought (and our field data confirm) that there was also increased solid and liquid waste produced by human communities in the periods of the lockdown associated with the pandemic. While reduction in human activities did decrease the demand and use of petrochemicals, it also increased poaching and other resource harvesting (due to economic depression such as decline in tourism) and decrease conservation efforts markedly as shown by our findings and of others (e.g. Buckley, 2020: 1).

Community mobility reports³ for our area (put under Israel to include the whole area) show an increase in mobility to parks (park visitation) by 32 % compared to baseline. The most comprehensive recent study of data on recreational activities showed that, while

there are still knowledge gaps, they have a negative impact on the environment (Larson *et al.*, 2016: 13). Even so ecotourism can have a negative impact on the environment (Shannon *et al.*, 2017: 42; and Stronza, 2019: 244). Our findings above (both the survey and the direct observation) do show an increase of damage due to an increase in visitation to green areas during lockdowns.

Initial work on impacts of COVID-19 on agriculture focused on supply-chain disruptions and the plunge in commodity prices (Siche, 2002: 3; Gray, 2020: 242). Our preliminary results regarding increase in eco-friendly agricultural activities during the pandemic in an area near Bethlehem adds another angle, which potentially could indeed point to a future direction of local food production to ensure sustainability. We thus initiated more programs to enhance permaculture in local marginalized communities. Ecosystem services become more important than ever in times of crisis and pandemics.

The American Institute of Biological Sciences (AIBS), Biodiversity Collections Network (BCoN), Natural Science Collections Alliance (NSC Alliance), and Society for the Preservation of Natural History Collections (SPNHC) surveyed individuals affiliated with US biodiversity science collections to better understand the effects of COVID-19 disruptions and closures on biodiversity research and education collections, and the people who use and care for these scientific resources in April 2020: 96 % of natural history collections were unavailable for use in April. More than 90 % of respondents were working from home, mostly on some aspect of data transcription based on specimen images captured prior to the shutdown. When asked about chief concerns arising from a 1-3 month closure: just under 64 % were worried about their ability to provide vital research resources; just under 49 % were worried about a loss of funding for collections care materials and supplies; just over 47 % were concerned about their ability to provide outreach opportunities for the public.⁴

Most authors do agree that we need more research in areas relating to biodiversity conservation and sustainability during pandemics but that we also need advocacy in ways that will change and challenge norms of societal behavior that led us to massive biodiversity loss and climate change (Corbera, 2020: 194; Rutz, 2020: 4; Turney, 2020: 996). There is increased awareness of effects of human activities like pollution on susceptibility to pandemics (Zheng, 2020: 541) or effect of these activities on increase of zoonotic disease (latest pandemic originated from a bat coronavirus). Yet this awareness directly relevant to human health needs to be translated to societal behavioral change that actually leads to conservation (Baudron & Liégeois, 2020: 1; Schwartz, 2020: 1).

As more data are gathered on animal movement and monitoring of effects on wildlife of human trends, we believe it becomes clearer that human activities, even the presumed benign one like ecotourism will be far better understood in terms of its impact on wildlife. In the interim we agree with the recommendations of Rutz *et al.* (2020) that: **a)** field biologists must be allowed to continue and even intensify data collection during pandemic lockdowns, **b)** that local field researchers collaborate with larger networks (e.g. <https://www.bio-logging.net/>) to develop standardization of data collection methodologies, and **c)** more funding is needed for measuring human impact in time and space. We should add that in transitioning to a post-COVID-19 world, all countries should not merely go “back” to the status ante but should seriously consider structural changes of a dramatic nature that reverses the human induced climate change that has such a devastating im-

³ [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/>.

⁴ [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://bcon.aibs.org/2020/05/19/covid-19-impacts-on-biodiversity-science-collections/>.

pact on wildlife. In Palestine, as elsewhere this means initiatives to work towards eliminating things like use of fossil fuels and plastics. But the most significant aspect we believe is to transition to a green economy with local eco-friendly food production in a post COVID-19 world (Altieri & Nicholls, 2020: 881).

4. Conclusion

A survey filled by 30 researchers and experts of biodiversity shows that initial expectations of COVID-19 effect on biodiversity were far too optimistic. The majority of our surveyed experts indicates that COVID-19 pandemic has decreased the funding for environmental work and increased human impacts on green areas like Wadi Al-Makhroul (e.g. trash dumping, hunting). We also noted a slowdown in growth (for iNaturalist.org) or some decline (for observatons.org) in use of portals to record field observations. The data and accumulating literature highlights the need for better biodiversity conservation and local food production in times of pandemics.

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*Way to resist: Palestinian Land
and People*



Land use changes into the Palestinian central mountains: Nablus Municipality, a case study

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pp. 63-77

Introduction

Nablus city has a special location in the center of Palestine, and was established on a long valley that lies between mountains of *Jerzim* (south), and *Ebal* (north). It is considered as a commercial and industrial center in the north of the West Bank (Nablus Municipality, 2011: 8). Nablus city's area in 1945 was 8,365 *dunum*¹ (Addabbagh, 1988: 183). In 1963-64, after a total land annexation done of five villages (*Âskar*, *Balata*, *Îraq et Tayih* to the east of the city, *Al Juneid*, and *Rafidiya* to the west) to Nablus Municipality its area reached 18,500 *dunum*. Then in 1986 Nablus Municipality, made partial annexation² of 10,000 *dunum* vacant lands from ten villages in all directions – west, east, north and south (*‘Azmut*, *Deir el Hatab*, *Beit Furik*, *Rujeib*, *‘Awarta*, *Beit Wazan*, *Kafr Qallil*, *Sarra*, *Zawata*, and *‘Asira esh Shamaliya*), and in 2001, another partial annexation was done of 400 *dunum* from one village (*Sarra*) to the west, and its total municipality's area approved reached nearly 29,000 *dunum*. Nablus Municipality also proposed to expand its future boundaries through annexing more lands from surrounding villages to the northeast, and southwest, (Ilustração 01).

A study on land use patterns in *Tubas* city found that the percentage of residential use reached 56.47 % of the total area of the city, the percentage of commercial use was less than 1.0 % of the urban space of the city, industrial use amounted to 0.48 % of the urban space, and agricultural use amounted to 8.3 % of urban use (Youssef, 2001: 67, 80, 81, 84). A study of the development land use patterns in *Tulkarm* city found that the residential use area amounted to 5,988 *dunum*, formed 58.0 % of the total area, while the area of commercial use amounted to 100 *dunum*, at a rate of 0.96 % from the total area, while the area of industrial use amounted to 263.3 *dunum*, at a rate of 2.55 % (Saidi, 2000: 105). A search about the changes in land cover patterns mentioned that the area of agricultural land in *Al-Muwaqar* District (Jordan) declined and the urban cover expanded at the expense of the agricultural cover. The area of agricultural land in *Al-Muwaqar* district decreased from 194.24 km² to 154.60 km², the urban area increased from 8.71 km² to 76.44 km² during the period 1989-2016 (Abdul Jawad and Al-Balbisi, 2019: 245).

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* Investment Promotion and Industrial Estate Agency.

1 1 *dunum* = 0.1 hectare, 10 *dunum* = 1 hectare.

2 Annexation is the process that transfers land from towns and villages to cities that have demanded the annexation of land (Nacker, 2005).

A paper indicated that the urban expansion of the Arab cities was at the expense of the agricultural land and towards the main streets as was the expansion of Amman, Irbid and Madaba. Where it was found that this expansion was directed near, and toward the main roads, but at the same time was at the expense of fertile agricultural area, and led to the decrease of green areas (Saleh and Al Rawashdeh, 2007: 51). A study on urban expansion and extension of major urban settlements that was made in *Diyala* Governorate (*Ba'quba*, *Al Khalis* and *Meqdadiyya*) in Iraq, indicates that the random expansion of these urban centers was at the expense of large areas of orchards and green belts that surrounded these centers and turned them into lands for residential or commercial use. The expansion and extension of the urban areas along with the main street axes and secondary roads are from the main urban cores in the province. This expansion was at the expense of land left for future urban expansion or prohibitions for high voltage electric lines or public roads or recreational areas (Al Shammari, 2006: 143).

A research about the impact of urban expansion on agricultural land in China found that urban expansion is associated with a decline in agricultural land-use intensity and a drop in the area of cultivated land per capita. It discovered that both the urban change of agricultural land and GDP in the industrial segment is deleteriously connected with agricultural land-use intensity. Moreover, it noticed that the expansion towards agricultural lands will continue, which will put pressure on the natural land resources of the country (Jiang *et al.*, 2013: 33, 38). A study regarding the impacts of urban expansion on local communities in Malaysia found out that the expansion of built-up areas has put pressure on lands and has produced a noteworthy loss of agricultural lands, which influenced the livelihood of farming communities at peri-urban areas. Furthermore, agriculture land size decreased and has become unprofitable obliging farmers to sell their lands to have quick earnings (Samat *et al.*, 2014: 349, 364). Another research conducted on the urban expansion and loss of agricultural land in an Indian city using GIS techniques found that a rapid changeover of agricultural areas to non-agricultural had taken place. A significant increase in the residential area to accommodate the rapidly growing population of the city followed but without many services and recreational facilities uses. This was because an urban expansion of the city (both built-up and non-built-up) has destroyed fertile agricultural land which can't be recovered. The study area was losing its agrarian characteristics, where nearly 1,683 hectares of fertile agricultural land between 1988 and 1998 has been lost (Fazal, 2000: 148).

The Study Problem and the Study Area

The study area witnessed a change in the land uses, especially agricultural lands during the period 1963-2016 for the lands and villages that were annexed to Nablus Municipality, resulting in a rapid growth in the area of urban lands at the expense of agricultural lands, resulting in the occurrence of many problems represented in the overlap between these patterns, the tyranny of some uses over others, the poor spatial distribution of these uses, and the clear deterioration of agricultural lands and the decline of their areas. So this has become one of the problems that the city's residents face.

The study area of this paper contains the annexed lands of fifteen villages to Nablus Municipality Boundaries. Five of them were totally annexed during the Jordanian period,

which are *Balata*, *'Askar*, *'Iraq et Tayih*, *Rafidiya*, *Al Juneid*. Another ten villages were partially annexed to Nablus Municipality Boundaries during the Israeli occupation period in 1986, which are *Azmut*, *Deir el Hatab*, *Beit Furik*, *Rujeib*, *'Awarta*, *Beit Wazan*, *Kafr Qallil*, *Sarra*, *Zawata*, and *'Asira esh Shamaliya*, and proposed to annex lands from the south-west, and northeast villages (Ilustração 01).

Methodology & Research Tools

More than one methodological approach was used in the research. First, an historical and descriptive approach, which was used to describe and explain the process of land use change. The second approach is the comparative approach, used to compare the land use of villages before and after being annexed to Nablus Municipality Boundaries. The third approach is the qualitative analytical, approach used to analyse the whole information obtained from different resources. The research method included reviewing relevant theoretical work and historical and contemporary resources. Geographical Information System (GIS) used to reflect all available information from numbers and images to readable maps on previous and current land-uses. All images and maps obtained from different resources were converted to ArcMap- ArcGIS program.

The previous and current land uses in the annexed villages was answered through different tools like diverse types of maps, many interviews with annexed villages' residents, and Addabagh Encyclopaedia. The interviews were conducted with the current and former heads of local villages' councils that had knowledge about annexing their villages' land to Nablus Municipality Boundaries. The previous land use in annexed villages were obtained from Russian maps for the year 1967³ which was taken from *Birzeit* University, as image, digitized and converted to GIS as ArcMap to be easily analysed and the current land uses also were attained from the approved Nablus Master Plan 2013.

These maps were AutoCAD and converted to ArcMap, to be analysed in order to obtain different areas for land uses easily. The analytical approach was used to analyse the different land uses in different periods. It used ArcMap, AutoCAD and other software to analyse the maps, and the comparative approach used in order to compare the land use before and after land annexation, and west and east villages land uses.

The Previous and the Current Land-Use in the Annexed Villages

The Previous Land-Use

The information about the previous land-uses of the annexed villages to Nablus Municipality Boundaries was obtained from the Russian maps for the year 1967, Addabagh encyclopaedia, and from the interviews with different residents of annexed villages. Through these resources of information, it could be noticed that the main previous land-uses of the annexed villages were of four types, which were: agricultural lands, plains, pastures⁴,

³ Russian Survey for Palestine in 1967.

⁴ The plain is a flat land, mostly treeless, cultivated by grains and vegetables. The agricultural land is: a contour land cultivated mainly with olive, fruits, and almond trees, and rain fed. The pastures are: vacant land with natural shrubs, and grass used for grazing castles.

and built-up area. Since the 1960s until this day, the land-uses of villages annexed to Nablus Municipality Boundaries are changing.

The total area of agricultural land was 3,000 *dunum*. Most of it (2,200 *dunum*) was located in the west annexed villages, while the fertile plains were 6,000 *dunum*, concentrated in the eastern annexed villages to Nablus Municipality Boundaries, like 'Askar, Balata, Rujeib, 'Azmot, Deir el Hatab and Beit Furik. The western villages were vacant of plains rich with pastures and had an area of 9,000 *dunum*. Furthermore, the built-up area was nearly 2,350 *dunum* and somehow dominated the scene of the east annexed villages more than the west because of the existence of the refugee camps of Balata and 'Askar since 1958, (Tabela 01 and Ilustração 02).

Tabela 01 – The previous land-uses in the annexed villages in 1967

Land use type	Area - <i>dunum</i>	% land use/total annexed*
Plains	6 000	29 %
Agricultural land	3 000	15 %
Built-up	2 350	12 %
Pastures	9 000	44 %
Total	20 350	100 %

*Total annexed land – nearly 21 000 *dunum*.

Moreover, the agricultural land of annexed villages was planted with various crops and fruit trees. For example the eastern villages like Balata, 'Askar, Deir el Hatab, Beit Furik, Rujeib, 'Awarta and 'Asira esh Shamaliya were planted with trees such as almonds, figs, olives, grapes, apricots, and apples. Additionally, they were planted with cereals, vegetables, cotton, grain, barley, lentils, carrots, beans, sesame, and corn. The total planted area reached nearly 16 000 *dunum*, and villages' residents were breeding sheep, cows, and cattle (Addabbagh, 1988: 275, 282, 284, 285, 292, 294, 299, 343, 425). In the western villages like Rafidiya, Beit Wazan, Sarra and Zawata lands were planted with olive trees, grapes, almonds, figs and others, and villages' residents planted cotton and few vegetables, besides raising sheep and domestic birds. The total planted area reached nearly 4 500 *dunum* (Addabbagh, 1988: 336, 339, 353, 390).

Through the interviews, it was noticed that some villages were planted with olive trees, "Al-Juneid's (west) livelihood was from the olive trees and there is nothing left of these trees" (interview with Al Juneidi, 2019). "The annexed land from Sarra (west) was agricultural, rainfed, and planted with olive trees" (interview with Turabi, 2017). "Most of the land annexed from Zawata (north-west) was planted with olives" (interview with 'Elewi, 2019). Some villages were planting olive and vegetables, and legumes, "Kafr Qallil (east) people were planting olives and wheat, barley, almonds and figs trees in annexed lands" (interview with Sayel, 2017). "Mostly, the annexed land from Beit Furik (south) was formed of agricultural areas planted with wheat, grain, beans and some olive trees" (interview with Hanani, 2019). "In Rafidiya (west) there were orchards, people were cultivating zucchini, tomatoes, cucumbers, fruit trees" (interview with Sa'adeh, 2017). "Rafidiya was cultivated

with all kinds of vegetables, eggplant, beans, potatoes, cauliflower, pomegranate and fig trees" (interview with Abu es Su'ud, 2019). "Rafidiya was dependent on agriculture and grazing, and most of the plantations were olive trees" (interview with Hassuneh, 2019). "Beit Wazan annexed land was agricultural planted with olives, grapes, and vegetables" (interview with Abu 'Eisheh, 2017).

Other villages were planted with vegetables and legumes. "In Balata (east), the land was cultivated with wheat, barley... etc." (interview with Salman, 2019). "The land annexed from Deir el Hatab (east) was cultivated with weath and grains" (interview with Husein, 2019). "Rujeib plain was cultivated with grains like wheat, barley, and other winter crops (interview with Dweikat, 2019). "Sahl 'Azmot (east) was cultivated with wheat, barley and vegetables" (interview with 'Amer, 2019). "Asira esh Shamaliya lands that were annexed were agricultural lands and pastures, planted with wheat and barley for the winter agriculture (interview with Jawabreh, 2019).

Briefly, the villages that were annexed totally or partially to Nablus Municipality Boundaries were considered as agricultural land in the first place, planted with olive trees, fruits, different grains and various vegetables as reported by al Addabbagh (1988: 275-430), and that was confirmed through the maps, and the interviews with the villages' residents. Generally speaking, the land-use of all the villages that were annexed totally or partially to Nablus Municipality Boundaries were classified as agricultural land, plains and pastures, and planted with olive trees, fruits, different kinds of grains and vegetables.

The Current Land-Use in the Annexed Villages

The current land uses were obtained mainly from the different types of maps collected from Nablus Municipality, and the interviews. It is noticed from the approved master plan 2013 of Nablus Municipality that, through time, nearly all the agricultural land, pastures and plains that were annexed to its boundaries changed to other uses and normally the built-up area increased as the population increased. It is observed that in the annexed villages totally or partially, in different historical periods, the dominant land-uses are residence A, B, C, and industrial use. In addition to other uses, such as stone quarry, water treatment plant, antiquities zone, camps, cemetery, commercial area, open space area, public garden, public parking, state land and public buildings. A look to Ilustração 03, Tabelas 02 and 03, reveals that residences B, C, industrial area and camps are the main land-uses in the east annexed villages, while the dominant land-uses in the western annexed villages are residential A, B, and C (Nablus Municipality approved master plan 2013). It is worth noting, that the eastern annexed land which was a highly valuable plain had been shifted to an industrial area, treatment plant, quarries, craft complex, slaughterhouse and landfill (Ilustração 04 and Tabela 02). While in the west annexed land, where the agricultural land, was now inhabited by the wealthy people and the dominant uses are the commercial ones with high-rise buildings (interview with Hassuneh, 2019). The fertile plains (6 000 *dunum*) which constituted 29 % of the total annexed land to Nablus Municipality Boundaries (21 000 *dunum*) disappeared, and the agricultural (3 000 *dunum*) area which formed 15 % of the total annexed land also disappeared (Ilustração 05 and Tabela 02).

5 Sahl means a plain.

Tabela 02 – The current land-use in the eastern annexed villages as approved in Nablus master plan in 2013

Village name	Residential use	Industrial use	Camps	Agricultural use	Cemetery	Quarry	Water treatment	Commercial use	Public building	State land
Nablus	1,600	480	193					90	56	346
Balata	942	560	163					64	81	
’Asira	900								18	60
’Azmut	200	71		270	200	75	60		99	
Rujeib	1,144	325						84	26	
Kafr Qallil	700		67					40	58	
’Awarta	154								4	
Beit Furik	270									
Deir el Hatab				300						
Total-dunum	5,910	1,436	423	570	200	75	60	278	342	406

So, it could be noticed from Tabela 02, that eastern annexed villages (like: ‘Azmut, Balata and ‘Askar) are the villages that contain variation most of the land-uses types such as treatment plant, cemetery, craft area, industry and quarry. As a result, the plains of Rujeib, Balata, Azmut and ‘Askar villages almost disappeared, where all the plains changed to industrial area, treatment plant, stone quarry and craft area. At the end, all the fertile plains in the eastern region totally disappeared (Ilustração 04).

In the western annexed villages, the current land-use is mainly for residential, commercial, and public buildings (Tabela 03 and Ilustração 05), which confirmed what was reported by the interviewees from the eastern villages that the western region has friendly

environmental uses, not like the eastern region where undesirable uses can be found, such as the treatment plant, the industrial area, camps and others. Moreover, in the western region the universities are located like *An Najah* University (Ilustração 07), and the governmental and private hospitals, like *Rafidiya* and *Al ‘Arabi* hospitals.

Tabela 03 – The current land-use in the western annexed villages as approved in the Nablus master plan in 2013

Village name	Residential	Commercial	Public building	State land
<i>Rafidiya</i>	1,853	45	58	108
<i>Al Juneid</i>	239		3	52
<i>Beit Wazan</i>	1,500	38	140	38
<i>Sarra</i>	700	14	13	
<i>Zawata</i>	300	9	10	83
’Asira esh Shamaliya	148			
Total - dunum	4,740	106	224	281

The interviewees pointed to a diverse current change of land uses in some villages, and to limit change in others, and to no change in land use in others. First, some eastern annexed villages had diverse current land uses like *Balata*, *Rujeib*, ‘Azmut, and ‘Askar villages. “The industrial zone, and the vegetable market were constructed on the best and most fertile land in *Balata*” (interview with Salman, 2019). “*Rujeib* lands were transformed from agricultural to industrial zone, most of them used for factories, warehouses, stores, commercial – industrial uses” (interview with Al Asmar, 2019). “In the eastern area, the municipality built the treatment plant, industrial area, slaughterhouse, craft complex, incinerator and the landfill where it was considered the landfill of the area, and the place where the garbage was thrown away” (interview with Dweikat, 2019). “*Sahl ‘Azmut* proposed for treatment plant a handicraft area” (interview with ‘Amer, 2019), and a proposed cemetery since 1962” (interview with ‘Abdallah, 2017). “‘Askar annexed land contained vegetable market, the slaughterhouse, 200 or 500 *dunum* as an industrial zone, the Thursday market (Halal market), the old incinerator, the vegetable oil factory since 1956” (interview with Helayel, 2016), “and about 300 *dunum* for the east Popular Housing Project (Ilustração 08) (interview with Saleh, 2019).

Some western villages are dominated by residence and education uses, like *Beit Wazan*, *Rafidiya* *Al Juneid*, *Sarra* villages. “Pastures of *Beit Wazan* were used for the *Al Namsawy* housing project, and the new campus of *An Najah* University, located on our land” (interview with Abu ‘Eisheh, 2017). “All the olive trees in *Al Juneid* have been removed through the construction of buildings and housing projects” (interview with Al Juneidi, 2019).

"*Rafidiya*, is the capital of Nablus, one of the most prestigious neighborhoods" (interview with Sa'adeh, 2017). "All the annexed lands of *Rafidiya* became residential compounds, like the western Popular Housing Project" (interview with Abu es Su'ud, 2019). "All the land annexed of *Sarra* was residential area such as the engineers housing project located in basin 1, houses and villas were constructed, including the engineers housing and associations of *An Najah* University (*Al 'Ameriya*) housing" (interview with Turabi, 2017). "All annexed land of *Kafr Qallil* was constructed with buildings" (interview with Sayel, 2017).

Other villages in east and west had no change to its land use because politically, the annexed land was classified C in Oslo Accords. "It was and still is an agricultural land because it is an area C according to Oslo, and also the presence of the Israeli barrier at the entrance of *Beit Furik* village prevented the development of the land that was annexed" (interview with Hanani, 2019). "The farmers didn't plant it, and it is prohibited from the occupation, because it is classified as area C, people can't reach it, unless they made coordination with the Israelis to plough or plant it, and if any security event happened people lose the crop. No one is able to plant, there is the *Elon Moreh* settlement, and the settlers burn the crop" (interview with Husein, 2019). "The annexed land of *Zawata* remained as agricultural land, because most of these lands were classified C according to Oslo" (interview with 'Eleiwi, 2019).

In fact, what was stated in the previous interviews about previous and current land uses is compatible with the approved 2013 master plan, the field visits and with what you can see on the ground in terms of the existence of the industrial zone, the treatment plant craft area and the slaughterhouse, located in the eastern villages of *Balata*, *Askar*, *Rujeib* and *Azmut* plain.

Discussion

The land-use of the totally, or partially annexed villages, has changed completely from agricultural use to other uses like residential, and industrial, etc. Before annexation the dependence of annexed villages' residents was on agriculture, as mentioned in section of previous land use (Ilustração 02). Nablus Municipality Boundaries expanded by annexing lands from the surrounding villages from all sides, east, west, north, south, and there is a proposal to annex new lands to the structural plan of the city, from villages towards the southwest and northwest (Ilustração 01). It can be said that the eastern villages are characterized by predominant industrial use, cemetery, water treatment plant, and a craft area, and that the plains and pastures disappeared (Ilustração 02 and Ilustração 04).

As for the western villages, the land uses were characterized by residential, educational, and public service buildings, and there were no longer any agricultural or pastures lands (Ilustração 02 and Ilustração 05).

Over 6 000 *dunum* of agricultural plains and 3 000 *dunum* of agricultural land were destroyed in the annexed villages, and the cultivation in these lands has almost vanished, which destroyed the agricultural sector completely in these villages. Nablus approved master plan had decreased the plains, and agricultural land from 9 000 *dunum* to 600 *dunum*. Deterioration of fertile agricultural lands also happened also in Jordan, Iraq, China, Malaysia, and India cities, as a result of the cities expansion (Saleh and Al Rawashdeh, 2007; Al Shammari, 2006; Jiang *et al.*, 2013; Samat *et al.*, 2014; Fazal, 2000). The west annexed villages were dominated by residential commercial use, while the east annexed villages were dominated by industrial camps in addition to residential uses. For example,

the industrial area in the approved master plan of Nablus 2013 is nearly 1 300 *dunum* and forms 6,5 % from the total annexed area (21 000 *dunum*). From *Askar* 480 *dunum*, 12 % of its total area. From *Balata* 560 *dunum* forming 19 % of its total area (2991 *dunum*), and from *Rujeib* 325 *dunum*, forming 16 % of its total annexed area (2087 *dunum*) (Tabela 01).

Some annexed land remained as agricultural land because first, these lands were classified as C in Oslo Accords, and were close to the Israeli settlements such as the lands that annexed from *Deir el Hatab*, *Beit Furik* and *Zawata* villages. Second, some land-uses were proposed on the master plan, but weren't implemented like "public gardens", (Ilustrações 03, 04 and 05), maybe because such parks and gardens require greater service costs from the municipality while providing very little to local profits (Wang, 2012: 9).

The current land-uses primarily benefited Nablus residents, who are industrialists and merchants, but the benefit of the villages' residents from the new land-uses was limited. Total population for the five villages that were totally annexed in 1963-64 didn't exceed 4 200 people in 1961, while the population of Nablus city for the same year was 45 773 people, which means that the total population of the villages constitutes nearly 9.2 % of the total population of Nablus city. Consequently annexed villages' residents didn't need the new land-uses as the residents of Nablus. The practice of land annexation by Nablus Municipality was similar to annexation- in one way or another- in San Antonio (Texas) which accelerated the tendency to move away expansion of population and investment from the centre. As a result, heavy decentralization resulted in the scattering of the industrial and residential programs away from the city centre and towards the suburban periphery (Caine *et al.*, 2017: 230, 236), (Ilustração 06).

Furthermore, Nablus residents invested in the industrial and the housing sectors, because of their availability of money and professionalism, while annexed villages' residents, were originally farmers, professionals in agriculture and weren't traders or investors or owners of capital as Nablus city's residents. So, announcing new type of land use on annexed villages' lands damaged the fertile plain of these villages in early time. For example, vegetable oil factories, vegetable market, the slaughterhouse and the incinerator which were located on *Balata* land, encouraged many residents to leave the work in agriculture, and animal husbandry, and work in the oil company, the Sulphur factory and other factories (Dweikat, 2014: 32). Nablus Municipality influenced directly or indirectly the residents of the villages' income sources through the change of land-use, and directed them to other income sources.

In summary, a big land-use change occurred in annexed villages' land especially in the agricultural land, and fertile plains. It has completely changed the annexed villages' agricultural land. The annexed villages' residents lost their agricultural lands, the source of income, and the stock of land for them, for the future generations, no longer have agricultural land reserves to compensate the lost ones. Also, Nablus Municipality had no roles, and no intention to protect and preserve the agricultural land and plains. Many housing and industrial projects were constructed, during the Jordanian period in the 1960s, as well as repeated in the Palestinian Authority period after 1994, without giving any attention to the importance of these agricultural lands.

Lastly, the change in land-use is a natural situation in many cities and villages in the West Bank due to the demand for land. The changes in land-uses in annexed villages occurred early as compared to other villages in Nablus governorate. This can be mainly credited

to the process of total annexation to Nablus Municipality Boundaries in the 1960s, and due to the proximity of its boundaries to Nablus city. There is a significant loss in the fertile agricultural land, which should be preserved, and took into account in the future expansion of Nablus Municipality Boundaries by planners, and influential persons who propose this expansion. Additionally, it is important to know that all the new land uses of annexed villages to Nablus Municipality Boundaries had been organized and approved by the competent authorities. So urban sprawl happened outside the municipality boundaries towards the land of southwest villages on land that haven't been organized until now (Ilustração 09), and this is the expansion direction that was proposed by Nablus Municipality to expand the municipal boundaries for the year 2016, and it hasn't been approved yet (Ilustração 01).

Results

The change in land-uses led to a decrease in agricultural lands in annexed villages, through proposing new land-uses in these villages in early times compared to other villages. Land annexation process had impacts on annexed villages' land where it hastened the change of land uses from agriculture land and pastures to residential, commercial, and industrial uses, etc.

It was found that the main previous land-uses were agricultural land, plains, pastures, and built-up areas, while the current land uses were dominated by the residential areas, A, B, and C (Ahmed, 2010: 2-3), industrial zone, the camps, craft complex, treatment plant, commercial areas, etc. The agricultural land was 3,000 *dunum* consisting of 10.4 % of the total area of the approved master plan 2013, the plains were 6,000 *dunum* consisting of 21 %, and the pastures consisted of 31 %. All these areas nearly disappeared by converting them to other new land-uses. The current land use of eastern land villages annexed to Nablus Municipality Boundaries have become industrial, with a slaughterhouse, treatment plant, craft area and other heavy environmental uses. As for the current land use of the western villages annexed. It is dominated by commercial, residential and public buildings.

May be six decades are a very natural time for justifying the land use changes that happened, as a result of many variations for the issues of geopolitical, economic, and social developments in Nablus. It overtime turned into a central city in the northern West Bank. However, the city needs more lands for educational, health, services, commercial and industrial uses to accommodate with these changes.

Recommendations

Involving local councils and annexed villages' residents in the master plan and its land uses.

Determining the priorities of Nablus Municipality concerning annexed villages, and the local councils, by holding discussion sessions to reach a shared vision in order to achieve the mutual benefit for both parties through a participatory planning tool to reach the comprehensive planning stage.

Involving the Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment Authority in the land annexation process will reduce the negative impacts on agricultural lands and residents.




Ilustração 01 – Nablus Municipality Boundaries expansion since 1963 until 2001, and the proposed expansion for 2016. Source: Nablus Municipality (2019), modified by researcher.




Ilustração 02 – The previous land – uses of the west and east annexed villages in 1967. Source: Nablus Municipality, and Birzeit University (2019), modified by researcher.




Ilustração 03 – The current land-use in the annexed villages in approved master plan 2013. Source: Nablus Municipality (2019), modified by researcher.




Ilustração 04 – The current land-uses in the eastern annexed villages in the approved master plan 2013. Source: Nablus Municipality (2019), modified by researcher.




Ilustração 05 – The current land – uses in the west annexed villages in the approved master plan 2013. Source: Nablus Municipality (2019), modified by researcher.




Ilustração 06 – The previous land – use of the different educational and housing projects in annexed villages. Source: Nablus Municipality and Birzeit University (2019), modified by researcher (Ilustração 07 e Ilustração 08).



Ilustração 07 – The eastern Popular Housing Project in annexed villages. Source: Ministry of Local Government (2018), modified by researcher.



Ilustração 08 – An Najah University in annexed villages. Source: Ministry of Local Government (2018), modified by researcher.




Ilustração 09 – Urban sprawl outside Nablus Municipality Boundaries. Source: Ministry of Local Government (2018), modified by researcher.

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Land use changes and spatial analysis of an urban development case study: Shu'fat camp area of Jerusalem [□]

Mohammad Muhsen*, Mustapha El Hannini** e Ahamd Abu Hammad***

pp. 79-90

Introduction

The last two decades have experienced a massive urban growth, indicating that the political factor has a tremendous influence on the urban patterns in the Palestinian territory and in the East Jerusalem periphery outside of the separation wall, as the cost of living in Shu'fat camp is much lower than in the camps inside it, such as Beit Hanina and Silwan. In addition there is the Israeli policy trying to evacuate Palestinians from areas inside the wall (Muhsen, 2017: 86, Hilal and El-Saka, 2015: 58, ARIJ, 2015: 87 and Shaheen, 2013: 644).

Several recent studies (Pullan, 2009: 43, IPPCJ, 2008: 49, Khamaisi, 2007: 9, and Owais, 2007: 8) considered that both the separation wall and the Israeli policies against the Palestinian Jerusalemites are responsible for the urban and socio-economic transformations, which had caused profound changes in the general situation of Jerusalem periphery. These studies and the current de facto indicated that the separation wall has adverse effects on the land-use and the natural landscape, such as the coniferous forest. Besides, B'Tselem, 2019 "The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories" statistics indicates that from 2005 to February 2019, Israeli authorities demolished 823 units in east Jerusalem. The aforementioned resulted in a rapid increase in urban surface to meet the dire needs of the newcomers (Jerusalemites – a local term for Jerusalem residents) to alternative areas within Jerusalem municipality borders.

However, due to the large scale of landscape and socio-economic transformation, the land-use of Shu'fat camp area and of other areas such as Qufur-Aqab has attracted the attention of several scholars such as: (Alkhalili, 2017: 3; Refai and Yasser, 2016: 14; Craig, 2014: 144; Danielle, 2012: 215; Bulle, 2010: 26; Khamaisi, 2010: 61; Nadav, 2010: 14 and Shabaneh, 2006: 9) which agree with the general idea of this study.

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The land-use of this area is a complicated process because of the political factor that is associated with other several socio-economic factors, geopolitical land classification, land prices, and building licenses. Furthermore, the absence of local authorities' power in monitoring and controlling the process of urban development has played a major role in the process of unplanned expansion in these areas.

B'tselm statistics revealed that the population number grew rapidly after the year 2000 becoming over 150,000 inhabitants. The influx of newcomers to these areas has led to a new pattern of the urban landscape, as the development and construction of multi-story buildings in the area gave an "urban look", taking into consideration that the forestland was fragmented due to this development.

The urban model of these areas is characterized by its intensity and unorganized spread within a specific area due to the existence of the separation wall that besieged and oriented the expansion of built-up area. The pace of urban agglomeration has been much faster in the period between 2005 and 2019. The rapid population growth has led to an increase in the number of buildings and led to the expansion of built-up area.

The study of this area has many challenges such as the poor demographic data since the area is located under Israeli jurisdiction. This makes an official Palestinian demographic survey impossible: the Israeli authorities refuse to give the real demographic statistics of the Jerusalem population due to political reasons (BADIL, 2006: 39 and De Jong, 2000: 47).

After 2005, the newcomers to the study area were considered as local movers within the Jerusalem municipality borders. They came from other Jerusalem suburban areas that were classified under the Jerusalem municipality jurisdiction or from West Bank areas such as Al-Ram and Qalandia communities. The study area has absorbed a considerable number of these newcomers after 2005 up today, because of the separation wall, hard Israeli limitations and restrictions towards the city of Jerusalem and its suburban areas.

Furthermore, the low prices of land have encouraged Jerusalemites to move and settle in this area and buy apartments for a maximum of 50,000 \$ against 300,000 \$ in the Jerusalem city inside the separation wall. At the same time they can maintain their Jerusalemite identity cards and civil rights within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem whereas they are classified as legal residents of Jerusalem, but live as enclaves separated from the Jerusalem city border.

Upon the Israeli laws, the Jerusalemites should pay an annual tax on their dwellings, causing them an economic problem for a long time, as well as, effectively forced them to leave their residency within Jerusalem city border, seeking a low-cost residential area. Therefore, a class of new local investors had appeared after 2005 to invest in cadastral schemes with low-price apartments to attract the Jerusalemites to settle in the area. Furthermore, they offered flexible contracts and easy payment methods (Kiswani, 2019 and Alqam, 2019: Interview).

Interestingly, the Israeli authorities did not interfere in the dire situation of the area and ignored the unlicensed building. The goal was to encourage these people to stay in these spaces far from the center of Jerusalem, to get rid of the potential threat of Palestinian demography. According to the Jerusalem Plan of 2020, 70 % will be Israelis and 30 % Palestinians (Salenson, 2005: 212).

After 1995, Israel implemented a racial policy against the Palestinian Jerusalemites to force them to move to another destination within the Jerusalem border or the West Bank.

According to Shabaneh (2006: 8) more than 5,000 Jerusalemites were expelled from Jerusalem by revoking residency during the period between 1995 and 2000, and more than 8,307 during 2000 and 2014 according to B'tselm reports, to ensure the majority of Jews within the Jerusalem municipality border. Furthermore, the high cost of services charges and home rentals within Jerusalem added a financial crisis for the Jerusalemites (UNCTAD, 2013: 10).

Due to the separation wall, the Jerusalem land-use changes have suffered harmful urban socio-economic and environmental consequences. It creates new urban areas in the Jerusalem periphery within its political borders, such as the expanding of Shu'fat camp and Kufur Aqab built-up areas. These areas are not performing well because of bad infrastructure, transport congestion, and high population density. This has led to further pressure over the time.

Despite the aforementioned population statistics, the sensitive political situation imposed an ambiguity on the real number of the study area population. According to the Popular Committee of Shu'fat Camp (2018) and UNRWA, more than 100,000 inhabitants live in the area, while the Israeli estimations acknowledge just 27,720 inhabitants out of the 320,300 Palestinians of Jerusalem (PCBS, 2015). The differentiation between the two statistics reflects the politic character of the population issue of Jerusalem, in which the Israelis account for about 531,900 (PCBS, 2015).

This data indicates that the Palestinian estimation is greater than that of the Israeli one. However, an examination of data by observation of local respondents since 2005 shows that there has been a rapid increase in the study area population. It is also associated with a high growth rate of the built-up area surface.

In fact, there are no real population statistics since the Israeli authorities do not give reliable statistics. It is a fact that the population rose rapidly since 2005, because Jerusalemites moved into it after the construction of the separation wall.

Objectives

The study has three main objectives. First, to determine land-use changes by comparing what happened between 1997 and 2019 in Shu'fat camp area (case study area). Second, to examine the main factors of land-use changes through a new urban model for the case study showing its importance within the Jerusalem periphery. Third, to investigate the possibility of producing a model to look into the near future.

Materials and Methods

The Study Area

The study area is a geographical space encompassing the Shu'fat refugees camp and a new Anata area which is a part of and the eastern slopes of the Palestinian central mountains located about four kilometers north-east of Jerusalem - to - standing about 750 m above sea level (Ilustração 01).

The study area is about 1 km² with more than 100,000 inhabitants making it the largest populated area within the Jerusalem municipality border, and the West Bank surrounding the area. Most of the inhabitants are classified as refugees, particularly those who are living in the original area of the Shu'fat camp. However, the rest of the inhabitants

are classified as Jerusalemites, who have come to the area after the construction of the separation wall in 2005.

In 1967, Shu'fat camp area had a population of about 3500 inhabitants, identified as refugees under the administration of United Nations Refugees Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA). In 2019, 23,000 were estimated to be living in the original area of the camp (UNRWA, 2019), whilst according to the Israeli census, the total number residents in the newly built-up area including the original area of the camp was estimated at 100,000 inhabitants, oppose to 27,000 residents in the original area (Tabela 01).




Ilustração 01 – Shu'fat Refugee Camp Area in Jerusalem (2019).

Tabela 01 – Population Statistics of the Study Area 2015

Year	Israeli Statistics	Palestinian Statistics
2015	1-27720 2-60000	3-100,000

1 – Israel Central Bureau of Statistics-2019; 2 – Gihon Water Company-2019; 3 – Popular Committee of Shu'fat Refugees Camp

Generally, the study area is characterized by a marginal area with a fragile ecosystem due to its transitional location between humid and arid climate. The average annual precipitation is between 450-500 mm reflecting the effects of eastern registers from Jordan Valley during the winter months, which it registers precipitation from October to sometimes

early April. Whereas, the greater rainfall period is between December and February, as the west southwest winds are saturated with moisture coming from Mediterranean Sea.

The temperature is generally moderate, with mean annual temperature about 18 C while maximum annual temperature about 22.5 C. Whereas, in winter, its minimum annual temperature is 14 C. However, in general, during summer time temperature averages remain similar to those of other West Bank cities.

The West Bank has a great variation in topography and altitude. It is in the main region central Palestinian mountain where most of Palestinian communes concentrate. The study area is situated in these topographic sections as a part of Jerusalem and Hebron plateau that mainly formed from calcite rocks. The mean elevation of the study area is approximately 750 above sea level.

The study area is also characterized with limestone rocks and calcite soil.

Intensive urban growth in the study area has seriously affected the environment situation, such as the deforestation of the area. Many decades ago, the study area was covered with forests and some parts of agricultural land; now, we can notice that the landscape of the area has been eliminated and changed as a result of urban and population growth. Briefly, inadequate and shortage of water supplies, water pollution, random scrap sites and air pollution (in part due to a prevalence of vehicles that produce high level of emissions) all together affected on the study area environment.

However, the main livelihood activity of the local population is commerce and the cadastral sectors. The labor force working in the Israeli labor market is estimated at 70 % (ARIJ, 2014: 44).

Methodology

The study of land-use change nowadays can be conducted using many methods and tools, as the analysis of aerial photos by the geographical information system (GIS) and remote sensing (RS). They allow us to compare the differences and changes during consecutive periods (1997-2019). These tools can be applied to several urban models to detect the land-use changes and landscape model.

The analysis of this paper mainly depends on two aerial photos for the study area that were acquired in 1997 and 2019. We also rely on fieldwork for primary data. Due to the absence of vegetation cover, these aerial photos with a 20 years' time difference were used to evaluate the significant change in land-use and to dynamically detect the pace of the urban development without any phrenological difference.

In addition, the analysis of this data depended on the direct interpretation by digitizing the completely targeted area for three classes of land-use: built-up area, bare land, and forest. The result of this analysis was quantitative spatial data. The information provided by the photos (ArcMap 10.5) of GIS conducted the analysis and visualization. Diverse other sources such as media, statistics, and reports were also used in order to achieve the objectives of the study.

The study-adopted two aerial photos (Ilustração 02) to compute the urban area that had increased during 1997 and 2019, by digitizing the urban surface in 1997 and 2019 which now includes the main urban surface that has been classified for residential use only. The remaining asphalted and concrete areas have been excluded. The study used geographic

information system (GIS-Arc map 10.5) tool to detect urban changes that have occurred over the time and to produce maps for the present urban pattern of the study area.



Ilustração 02 – Aerial Photos of the Study Area between 1997 and 2019.

Moreover, a number of field visits were done to ensure accuracy of the process of land-use analysis, and to obtain more data. Additional data was used for the spatial pattern analysis and to produce several maps. The Geography Department at Birzeit University has provided the researcher with the two aerial photos.

Results

As regards the three different land-use classes the 1997 and 2019 photos can be summarized as in figure 1: dense built-up area represents the original camp area of 350 000 m² in 1997, the coniferous forest of 140 000 m² (it shows clearly as the dominant area of the downhill area alongside to the local valley, and bare land 740 000 m². In 2019, the analysis shows that changes were mainly the transfer from bare land and forestland to the contested built-up land area (Ilustração 03 e Ilustração 04).




Ilustração 03 – Land-use Changes Between 1997 and 2019 (Meters Squares m²).

Thus bare land of 740000 m² has decreased about 334000 m², while 185000 m² of land was converted into a built-up area which became the dominant land-use that mostly extended further to the east and south directions towards Anata city. In the remaining area, about 1490 000 m² of bare land and 71000 m² of forestland were confiscated by the Israelis to construct the separation wall and checkpoints with total area about 220000 m². However, by this action, the Israelis restricted any Palestinian expansion towards the west and north directions due to the existence of Pizgat Ze'ev colony and the military checkpoints to the north within a besieged area by the separation wall, as shown in Ilustração 02.

The total new built-up areas during the period of the study are about 535 000 m² taking into account the 185 000 m² of bare land and 71 000 m² of forestland use. Palestinians took 20 000 m² of forestland and the Israelis took no less than 210 000, which they confiscated for the separation wall. However, 72.6 % of built-up area surface have increased between 1997 and 2019.

It is noticeable through aerial photos and fieldwork that the area has taken the infilling urban landscape model in 1997 and edge-expansion in 2019 according to Landscape Expansion Index (Schroder and Seppelt, 2006). At the same time, the urban sprawl model lays within an area of one km². Insofar, the area has a high population density of more than 1000 inhabitants/km², which is considered as the highest density amongst the Palestinian communities of the West Bank, which has an average of 500 inhabitant/1 km².




Ilustração 04 – Land-use Distribution 1997 and 2019.

It is worth noting that due to the Palestinian construction process most of the forestland has been converted into a built-up area (about 19000 m²). The remaining 520 000 m² had been confiscated for the construction of the separation wall and at the same time, approximately 50 % had been deforested for security reasons. The separation wall brought serious harm to the Palestinians; however, the most significant consequences of this wall are on one hand restricting the Palestinian urban expansion, and on other hand, the deforestation of the area along the Israeli side of the separation wall (Ilustração 04).

Roughly, land ownership is considered as a factor of urban expansion taking into account the forestland use. Hence, the ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs (Waqf) owns the forest area. After 2005, the value of land in the area increased. Therefore, the local inhabitants, particularly the privileged classes have owned the forestland without any charges in the absence of the implementation of the land law (Helweh, 2019: Interview). Thus, the forestland has been converted into the built-up area, accelerating the process of house commercialization to fulfill domestic demand.

Similarly, in Ras-Shehada hill several hectares have been taken by force and coercion from their owners (Shehada, 2019: Interview). A neighboring area enlarged by conversion of bare land into the built-up is considered an endowment, which has been rented for the local residents at a very low price by the ministry of Awqaf.

Presently the study area has more than 400 commercial stores alongside the main road, which is considered an important economic consequence of land-use changes, accompanied by the agglomeration of urban development. Population and households' numbers both have increased between 1997 and 2019. More than 300 buildings, with more than 10 floors each taking a vertical model, have expanded over the area with about 12 hectares.

The Israeli authorities, from 2005 till today, ignored the rapid acceleration of urban expansion. Today Israel wants to implement the policy of the "fait accompli", where the entire area will be under Jerusalem municipality although it is out of the separation wall. This means that the inhabitants of the area will to pay all taxes of services to the Israeli municipality, whereas all the social and environmental problems have remained.

Israel's main goal is the demographic balance. Its aim is to keep the Palestinians in this area out of the Jerusalem municipality border rather than inside the separation wall, including Palestinian suburban residents such as Shu'fat, Beit Hanina, and Mount of Olives etc. Thus, the population of the study area shot up to be more than 100,000 inhabitants, taking into accounts the decrease of Palestinian numbers in the Jerusalem city.

The analysis of this study coincides with Hamayel (2018), Hilal and El-Sakka (2015) studies. These authors had similar conclusions that the overall newcomers had come to a similar geopolitical area (Kafar Aqab) to retain their Jerusalemite ID. (After 1967, The Palestinians living in the West Bank hold a Green Colored ID while Palestinians living within the Jerusalem Municipal Border hold Blue colored ID which prevents them to live within West Bank territories and will lose their ID and civil rights if they chose to do so). These studies show that the political factor is the main cause of these changes in the area, as it is characterized to have low residential costs as well. Furthermore, because of the separation wall and the military checkpoints on the northern side of the study area, the area has witnessed a loss and decrease of surface land in favor of the wall construction (Asaf, 2018: 75).

There was a high rate increase in population growth between 1997 and 2019, where there was a sharp decrease in land area. This indicated that something important made this area populous and dense in the past two decades with an average density of is 1000 inhabitant/1 km². This poses more and more challenges for services and amenities, particularly when there is not space between neighborhoods, which adversely affected the socio-economic situation and social cohesion.

There is also environmental problem of bad sanitation services. Another important consequence of the urban sprawl was the loss of biodiversity. The separation wall played a role in the degradation of forest, as well as adversely affecting the environmental situation.

However, a significant increase of built-up areas alongside the main artery of network transportation was a consequence for an increase of the traffic jam within the area. Because of that in 20th November 2018 the Jerusalem municipality workers, under protection of Israeli police force, demolished a number of built-up areas classified as commercial shops, in order to expand the road width to cope with the high transportation circulation.

The area is growing towards Anata, as the analysis revealed. Further, the area is in urgent need for the improvement of the public services, water supply, solid waste management, transportation congestion, and management of urban growth orientation. However, the current situation is leading towards uneven distribution of services and amenities. According to the respondents, there is a sudden shortage of water and electricity supplies due to the high density of the population associated with high dwelling numbers. The expansion of the built-up area is expected to continue vertically due to the scarcity of lands in the upcoming future, as it de facto shows.

This study area is different from any area in Palestine under the term of Israeli occupation. It is characterized by an urban sprawl model in all directions, despite the separation wall that besieged it as isolated or as enclave. The rapid trend of urban agglomeration is associated with a better level of life. As the average monthly income salary in the Israeli labor market is about 1200 \$ per month oppose to 400\$ in parts of Palestinian areas, this made most local residents from the surrounding areas of east Jerusalem to work in the Israeli market making it as their main source of income.

Furthermore, investment in the cadastral sector increased and spurred agglomeration of the local trade sector, mainly in small-scale economic systems with high purchase power. The area is closely connected economically with Jerusalem as part of the Israeli economic dependency. Thus, its socio-economic pattern is more complex than in any Palestinian area.

According to the spatial current situation, finding lands to expand further is a challenge. The Israeli policies towards Jerusalem, such as sovereignty and demographic balance, have been successful in minimizing the Jerusalemites rate inside Jerusalem municipality border, particularly within the area inside the separation wall. However, these policies adversely affected the study area spatially and demographically, and it affected the socio-economic and environmental situation.

Thus, the number of Israelis in Jerusalem reaches more than 500,000 inhabitants inside the municipality border of Jerusalem, against the 300,000 Palestinians. Those Israeli policies will likely put more pressure to restrict any Palestinian natural increase to ensure the Israeli demographic balance.

Conclusion

Since 2005, the Shu'fat camp area has experienced significant land-use changes and socio-economic transformations within a complex geopolitical situation. The study area is an important place because of the unique value within the Jerusalem and became a symbolic area of Jerusalem with particular changes.

According to the analysis between 1997 and 2019, urban built-up areas increased tremendously, which means that there was an increase of 72.6 % in urban development within the past 22 years.

The study area is the second area in the Jerusalem district with an exceptional political case, in which the geopolitical factor has shaped a new de facto (Leuenberger, 2016: 93) transforming the topological and socio-economic situation.

The aerial photos (1997-2019) have revealed an additional building with an average of 10 floors each; most of these buildings appeared after 2005 a result of high of urban expansion. This increase was due to the low prices of land and cheaper cost of living, that it is

considered a stimulus for the Jerusalemites to settle in to protect their residency status within the city boundaries. The Israeli policies, according to Yazid and Yasser (2016: 39), have led to the isolation of these areas from Jerusalem geographically.

The rapid growth in urban areas has changed the landscape of the study area; the aerial photos show an increase in the built-up area surface, which has expanded dramatically since 2002. Since the Israelis have begun building the separation wall during the second Intifada, changes in the structure and the dynamic process of urban became more intensive. This issue has completely disarrayed the local livelihood.

Nowadays, the pace of urban growth begins to slow down due to the scarcity of lands in the area and the saturation in the number of buildings. In addition, broad policies and regulations needed to be formulated and implemented as strategies in the long run to improve of the study area, particularly improving the livelihood of the area inhabitants.

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Urban self-development of a Palestinian refugee camp in Jerusalem

Halima Abu Haneya*

pp. 91-107

1. Introduction

Palestinian refugee camps were established as temporary spaces until the Palestinian refugee problem is resolved. However, the protracted situation of the refugee camps encouraged an urbanization process at different socio-economic levels (Bshara, 2014: 14). The Shu'fat Refugee Camp in Jerusalem witnessed a continual process of urbanization accompanied by socio-economic differentiation since its establishment in 1965. As of 1995, this transformation in the Shu'fat Camp began moving at a fast pace.

With settler colonialism as a general frame, I also build on the analysis of Lila Abu-Lughod (1990) in agreement with Michel Foucault (1978) that resistance should not be viewed as an expression of power, but rather as a diagnostic of power, especially in "particular situations" (Abu-Lughod, 1990: 42). Abu-Lughod stated that "where there is resistance, there is power" (Abu-Lughod, 1990: 42). This is a suitable way to study the power of the marginalized or what we may call power from below that is expressed through resistance: the resistance that is performed as a reaction to certain situations; it does not follow a particular ideology; and it is not meant to overthrow the authority, but rather it is a means to overcome precariousness and marginalization.

In our case, it is the Shu'fat refugees' resistance against their precariousness, domination and encampment in deteriorating conditions, as well as their status as displaced people relying on humanitarian aid. Their main goal is to improve their conditions and meet the growing needs of their families without considering national liberation or ending the occupation through their practices and actions. This research has traced the workings of the socio-economic power of the Shu'fat Camp refugees through their urban actions and practices that are seen as forms of unorganized collective resistance. Abu-Lughod's work is important in helping us to present "unlikely forms of resistance" (Abu-Lughod, 1990: 42). Studying Bedouin women's forms of resistance, Abu Lughod diagnoses forms of authoritarian power imposed on women. However, in this research, I will be diagnosing forms of power from below of the marginalized through their unlikely forms of resistance. These are revealed in the unorganized collective resistance of the Shu'fat Camp residents.

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In order to extend the understanding of the unorganized collective resistance, I draw on Asef Bayat's concept of collective action¹ and social non-movements (Bayat, 2013) to explain the different intertwined situations in this study. Although Bayat did not actually define his concept of "social non-movements", the description that Bayat provided for his concept confirms that ordinary people are not passive. In his book *Life as Politics: How ordinary people changed the Middle East*, Bayat introduced the concept of social non-movements, which

refers to the collective actions of non-collective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations (Bayat, 2013: 15).

Bayat defined the ordinary people in his book to include urban poor, women, and youth who struggle to survive, ensure a living space, and improve their living situation.

Shu'fat Camp residents represent an example of these social non-movements in their actions to ensure a dignified life. Considering their collective actions as a form of resistance, we can diagnose sources of power that pushed the camp residents to act, defy and resist the settler colonial regime that left them in marginalization and precariousness. Thus Bayat's concept of "social non-movements" can be an important analytical framework for exploring the collective action of the Shu'fat Camp residents, whether refugees or non-refugees, within a settler colonial context.

2. Brief background and general context

Shu'fat Refugee Camp is located about 4 kilometers northeast of the Old City of Jerusalem. It was established in 1965 by the Jordanian government to absorb the 1948 refugees, who were gathered in the Old City of Jerusalem after the *Nakba*.

In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including East-Jerusalem and with it Shu'fat Camp (plus a number of villages north of Jerusalem), and made it part of the Israeli municipality. Residents of the city, including Shu'fat Camp refugees, were granted special identity cards, distinguishing them from the rest of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territory.

Since 1967, Israel has imposed a discriminatory planning policy against the Palestinians in the eastern part of the city.² This policy created a deep housing crisis, forcing tens of thousands of Jerusalemites to seek better housing outside the city boundaries in the seventies and eighties (Karmi, 2005; Shargai, 2010).

¹ Asef Bayat was not the first to use the concept of collective action. In his *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Mancur Olson (1965/1971) used the concept to develop a theory of political sciences and economics, arguing that "groups of individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those common interests" (Olson, 1971: 1). I am not in a position to discuss Olson's theory but I rather build on Bayat's use of the concept as connected with other concepts of concern in this thesis, such as social non-movements.

² More details on Israel's discriminatory planning policies in Jerusalem are available in section 4.2 of this paper.

In 1995, Israel started implementation of the "center of life policy" against the Palestinian Jerusalemites, which stipulates that the Palestinians should prove that Jerusalem is the center of their life in order to maintain their residency status in it.

This policy forced the Jerusalemites, who had already established their lives outside the city boundaries, to return to live within the city's municipal boundaries. The Shu'fat Refugee Camp became an affordable destination for those returnees, who could not afford to live in the more expensive neighbourhoods of Jerusalem. This influx into the camp encouraged a group of the camp refugees to embark on the construction of commercial high rise buildings to provide housing for these returnees, while at the same time benefiting financially. This led to the current socio-economic transformations in the camp and the associated developments.

3. Data and Methods

This paper draws on fieldwork in Shu'fat Refugee Camp in Jerusalem that was conducted on intervals between June 2018 and June 2019. In order to understand the dynamics of the urban self development of Shu'fat Camp, I followed an inductive approach, collecting data, based on personal observations and engagement in a significant number of informal discussions. I spent three months of participant observation at the Women's Center – Shu'fat Camp during the period between October and December 2018. My aim was to better understand the urban and socio-economic developments in Shu'fat Camp on one hand and on the other hand to get closer to the camp residents and earn their trust before I began any interviews. I was aware of the sensitivity of the situation of the Palestinian Jerusalemites, and their mistrust of outsiders; they are often worried that any word they say might be used against them. During fieldwork, I made thirty nine semi-structured interviews with camp refugees, non-refugee residents, officials of the camp institutions, and refugee construction developers. Mostly, interviews were conducted at the Women's Center and many others took place at the homes of the interviewees or the camp institutions. In the interviews with the camp refugees, I focused on life stories. I established a series of open questions to allow the interviewees to bring as much information as possible. I recorded many of the interviews after obtaining the permission of the interviewees. However, some of them refused the recording and I then resorted to taking notes of their narrative. I made transcriptions of the interviews, partly based on records and partly on my own account. In order to protect the interviewees and upon their request, I will be using the data they provided me with anonymously.

4. Construction development in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp

Through fieldwork, it was revealed that the Shu'fat Refugee Camp witnessed two main phases of construction boom since its establishment in the mid-sixties. The first phase took place mainly inside the original UNRWA camp boundaries as of the late seventies and extended through the eighties and into the nineties. This phase was first distinguished by horizontal construction and then a shift to verticalization due to the growing number of camp refugees and lack of horizontal space.³ This phase also witnessed the first initiative to expand the camp's boundaries towards the east in the late eighties

³ Interview with Head of Popular Committee in Shufat Camp on March 27, 2019.

and early nineties. However, the significant expansion of the camp boundaries took place during the second phase of construction from the early 2000s onward. This phase took the form of commercial high rise buildings to meet the increasing demand for affordable housing. This demand was caused by the Jerusalemites, who had been living outside the Jerusalem municipality borders and were forced by the “center of life policy” to return to live in the city to protect their residency status.

4.1. First phase of construction boom in Shu’fat Camp: 1970s-1990s

According to the contacted refugees, before the 1967 war, all camp refugees had similar living standards with no significant differences as all of them lived on UNRWA rations. After losing their land in the wake of the 1948 war, all the refugees received humanitarian assistance and they were obliged to conduct any work that was available to them. UNRWA employed many of them at its facilities but this was not enough to overcome the high level of unemployment amongst them. “*We all were the same.*” This is a sentence spoken by nearly all the interviewees. However, signs of slight socio-economic differentiation could be traced through their narratives as some of them were able to renovate their houses in the camp or build simple walls around them during the sixties, whilst others could not afford this action. This meant that some refugees were capable of investing some money in improving their conditions at early stages of the camp life. Refugees capable of doing that included people who already had employment in the Old City of Jerusalem and maintained that work after they were moved to Shu’fat in the mid-sixties in addition to shop owners in the camp. The refugees who turned parts of their houses in the Old City of Jerusalem into small shops and consequently lost them upon their movement to Shu’fat camp were provided with new shops that UNRWA built for them in the camp as compensation.⁴ These were amongst the privileged in the camp to have a source of income at that time. However, the most privileged were the refugees, whom UNRWA employed in its facilities.⁵ Employment at UNRWA facilities helped many of the camp refugees improve their economic conditions as confirmed by the refugees themselves. For example, a woman refugee said:

*After we moved to Shu’fat, my husband worked for the agency (UNRWA) as a gardener and he was getting JD 75 per month which was considered a large amount at that time, improving our financial situation.*⁶

The post-1967 era in the Shu’fat Camp was characterized by a relative improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the camp refugees. The illegal incorporation of Jerusalem, including the camp into the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, granted the camp refugees a new status, allowing them access to work in Israel and to receive certain social benefits in addition to health services (Hawker, 2013: 11; Karmi, 2005: 7). Access to the Israeli labour market opened new work opportunities for them, while at the same time making

them dependent on the Israeli economy. Like most of the Jerusalem and West Bank workers in Israel, the camp refugees worked mostly in blue-collar fields that do not require an academic education, such as construction, cleaning, and car repair (Klein, 2001: 24). The elderly, who could not work and were above retirement age, received a monthly allowance. The wages of the Jerusalem and West Bank workers in Israel were lower than those of Israeli citizens; however, they were considered quite good for those that were unemployed (Ellman and Laacher, 2003: 10).

The refugees’ narratives revealed the emergence of a real estate market in the camp after 1967. The refugees were renting and selling their houses. The houses were sold or rented mainly to displaced Palestinians in the wake of the 1967 war, particularly inhabitants of the Moroccan Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem and the destroyed villages of Imwas and Yalo, as they became homeless after Israel destroyed their living places. In the late sixties and early seventies, UNRWA houses were sold for JD 50-70 and leased for about JD 15 a year. As the cost of living spiked and the houses were renovated and improved by the refugees in the late seventies, the prices of UNRWA houses in the camp increased to reach about JD 1000 in the late seventies and early eighties⁷. All this happened without UNRWA’s interference. This kind of real estate sector in the camp was limited to some of the camp refugees, who were fortunate enough to be able to buy land or houses in other Jerusalem neighbourhoods, seeking better conditions and bigger houses. But these refugees who were able to find a living outside the camp were in fact rare⁸. The overwhelming majority of the refugees never left the camp.

According to camp residents, in the late seventies and early eighties more refugees were able to save some money to invest in renovating their houses or constructing additional rooms, wherever space was available around their original UNRWA houses. This was done in order to meet the natural increase in family members. Any additional construction would have needed written authorization from UNRWA (Bocco, 2010: 248). However, not all refugees abided by this requirement. When asked about UNRWA’s response to the expansion of the camp houses, one of the camp refugees said:

*Whether the agency (UNRWA) knew about it or not (the new construction), people did not care and the agency always avoided any confrontation with the refugees.*⁹

Seeking UNRWA’s explanation, UNRWA Director in the camp said that

*UNRWA is not mandated to interfere in the actions and practices of the refugees. UNRWA’s main role is the administration of services.*¹⁰

4 Author’s interview with refugee woman, 85, on January 31, 2019.

5 Upon an agreement that was reached between UNRWA and Jordan and signed on March 14, 1951, UNRWA was to prioritize the employment of Palestinian refugees when employing personnel to provide services in the refugee camps (UNTS N.º 394: 1951). This agreement applied to UNRWA works in the Shu’fat Refugee Camp when it was established in 1965.

6 Author’s interview with refugee woman, 84, on December 26, 2018.

7 The above data and numbers are based on narratives of the camp residents.

8 There is no exact number of the refugees, who were able to purchase land or house in Jerusalem outside Shu’fat Camp in the eighties. During fieldwork, I met two people, who said their families left the camp for a better living in Semiramis and Beit Hanina. However, with the growing number of their families, some of the family members returned to live in their UNRWA house in Shu’fat Camp as they could not purchase or rent a house in Jerusalem due to the deepening housing crisis in the city.

9 Interview with refugee, 67, in 2019.

10 Interview with UNRWA Director in Shu’fat Camp in 2019.

Whether UNRWA avoided confrontation with the camp refugees, or lost control of them, the refugees acted as if they owned their UNRWA houses¹¹.

What power do indigenous people possess to enable them to make changes in their lives? Sociologists agree that there should be resources of power in the hands of marginalized people, enabling them to get over regulations imposed on them (Piven, 2008: 3). So, what are the resources in the hands of Shu'fat refugees? We can diagnose this source of power when we consider that the simple real estate market that emerged in the camp was a form of resistance. I consider this failure to adhere to UNRWA's regulations as one step towards further such forms of resistance by camp refugees. The refugees' action and form of resistance are not directed against UNRWA *per se* as much as it is directed against their own precarious situation that they want to overcome. At the same time, resisting their precariousness is resisting the colonial power that caused it.

I may attribute this development in Shu'fat camp to two factors. The first is the increasing politicization of the camp refugees, especially during the First *Intifada* of 1987-1993, which made them feel that they possessed the power to master their lives and space. As well as the rest of the Palestinian camps, villages and cities all over the Palestinian Territory, a strong local leadership was formed in the camp, representing all the PLO factions, particularly the Fatah Movement under the umbrella of the Unified Leadership of the Palestinian Intifada (Abu Afifa, 2004: 24). The strong presence and influence of the *Intifada* leadership was able to transform the camp into a politically active space¹².

The second factor, which is the most compelling, is the failure of both UNRWA and the Jerusalem municipality to take into consideration the refugees' growing needs of housing as their families are naturally increasing. Asked about the reasons behind the absence of any UNRWA plans to meet the growing housing needs of the camp refugees, the UNRWA Director confirmed that it is a political issue that he has no answer for¹³. These two factors, along with the diminishing hope of return, made the refugees work on proving themselves as people capable of resisting their situations, fending for themselves, fulfilling their growing needs, and getting over the hardships they experienced in their lives.

4.2. Second phase of construction boom in Shu'fat refugee camp – 2000s



Ilustração 01 – Overview of Shufat Refugee Camp. Source: The author - 6 August 2019.

¹¹ Similar developments and changes were witnessed in other Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East during the same period of time. Despite the fact that refugees do not officially own their houses or the land where their houses are built, informal economies and governance have emerged in the Palestinian refugee camps as refugees sell and rent houses that officially they do not and cannot own (see for example Dorai's, 2011) work on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and their urban development; see also Martin, 2015).

¹² Interview with one of the First Intifada activists in the Jerusalem area in 2019.

¹³ Interview with UNRWA Director, Ibid.

The second phase of the construction boom in the surrounding area of the Shu'fat Camp began in the early 2000s. It took the form of a surge in high rise buildings for commercial purposes that are built on Shu'fat *mushaa* land¹⁴ in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills, northwest and south of the camp respectively. This new construction was meant to absorb Jerusalemites, seeking an address within the Jerusalem boundaries (Graff, 2014: 20-21, see also Alkhalili, 2017). According to Mohammed Muhsen (2019), between 2005 and 2018, more than 200 high-rise commercial buildings were built in the two areas of expansion in the camp. Each building consisted of no less than eight storeys, including about 32 apartments each.

Our argument here is that this second phase of the construction boom in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada was a direct result of the Israeli discriminatory policies in Jerusalem, specifically the "center of life policy." In the following section, I will focus on these policies that are driven by Israel's settler colonial logic and demographic plans of ensuring a Jewish majority in the city (Bimkom, 2014: 83).

The following aerial maps show the expansion of Shu'fat refugee camp between 1985 and 2018.



Ilustração 02 – Map 1: The Shu'fat Refugee Camp, 1985. Source: Popular Committee in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp.

¹⁴ *Mushaa* land is the Arabic word for "common" land. *Mushaa* land was a system of land tenure in the Levant since the Ottoman period.



Ilustração 03 – Map 2: The Shu'fat Refugee Camp, 2018. Source: Maps Department – Orient House.

According to the above maps, in 1985, construction in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp was nearly exclusive to the original UNRWA boundaries of the camp with the exception of several scattered houses in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills to the south and northwest of the camp, respectively (Ilustração 01). In 2018, we rarely saw any empty space without construction in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills (Ilustração 02).

4.2.1 Israel's discriminatory policies in Jerusalem since 1967

Since 1967, Israel has been implementing discriminatory planning policies against the Palestinians in Jerusalem. Several characteristics distinguish these policies. First, Israel is interested in isolating Jerusalem from the rest of the Palestinian areas for political reasons. According to Nadav Shargai (2010: 6), "*Linking the built-up Palestinian areas within Jerusalem to the built-up Palestinian areas outside of it can only reinforce the Palestinian demand to recognize the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem as a single political entity,*" which Israel is trying to prevent. Second, the eastern part of Jerusalem was left without a master plan with tight restrictions on issuing construction licenses that are costing highly and difficult to obtain; Israel thereby left a large part of Palestinian construction in the city including the Shu'fat Camp area, illegal and subject to demolition (see El-Atrash, 2016, for further details). With this Israel gave itself the right to decide what is legal and what is not in the city according to its goals and interests. This in turn led to an increase in the cost of land, licensed construction, and rentals in Jerusalem thereby causing a deep housing crisis in the city. This situation negatively impacted Palestinian residents, who were obliged to look for alternative ways to meet their own housing needs. As of the

eighties, tens of thousands of Jerusalemites sought better construction and living conditions outside the city's municipal boundaries, where rentals are cheaper and there is more freedom to build without paying high licensing fees (Badawy *et al.*, 2015: 5).

Israel's settler colonial measures and policies in Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular never stopped. On the contrary, they continued and assumed different dimensions over time. In the wake of the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO in 1993, Israel escalated its oppressive measures against Jerusalemites. The goal was to prevent any possible settlement with the Palestinians regarding the city, and instead pushed towards promoting its demographic plans in favour of the Jewish majority (Shargai, 2010: 6).

4.2.2 "Center of life policy"

One of Israel's means to achieve its demographic plans in Jerusalem was the so called "center of life policy"¹⁵ that Israel began implementing in 1995, thereby forcing tens of thousands of Jerusalemites already living outside the city's boundaries to return to live in the city.

The "center of life policy" does not apply to Jews (BADIL, 2006: 30). It was first adopted upon a high court ruling in 1988, during deliberations of the case of Mubarak Awad, who left Jerusalem in 1970 for the USA for education and returned in the eighties, using his US passport. When Awad applied to renew his Jerusalem identity card in 1987, the Ministry of Interior rejected his application on claims that Awad was no longer a resident of Jerusalem¹⁶.

Again, the Israeli Ministry of Interior started implementing the so called "center of life policy" in 1995 with the goal of revoking the residency status of Jerusalemites living outside of the city as part of its demographic plans in Jerusalem (Jefferis, 2012: 94-96). However, the "center of life policy" proved counterproductive to Israel's plans. Instead of resigning to their fate, the Jerusalemites returned to the city *en masse*. These Jerusalemites did not want to lose the privileges their identity cards granted them, including social benefits and access to work opportunities in Israel. Thus, the Shu'fat Refugee Camp became an affordable option for them (Karmi, 2005: 11) despite its miserable conditions including chaos, crowdedness and lack of services. Thousands of these Jerusalemites could not afford to live in expensive Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Beit Hanina, Shu'fat and Sheikh Jarrah. In addition, the housing crisis in Jerusalem was still serious and there weren't enough empty apartments to absorb all returning Jerusalemites. The housing crisis in Jerusalem is manufactured to suit the Zionist settler colonial project and its plans for demographic change in Jerusalem with the goal of getting Palestinians out of the city and tightening Jewish control. Forcing Palestinians out of their city and displacing them is one manifestation of the logic of elimination and exclusion on which settler colonialism is grounded. Israel tries to achieve this goal with its discriminatory planning policies in Jerusalem. Israel's Master Plan for the city, called "Jerusalem 2020" which was published in 2004 ensures this vision by enhancing Jewish settlement construction and expansion, whilst limiting Palestinian housing construction. However, the determination of Jerusalemites to return to live within the city boundaries posed a real challenge to

¹⁵ HCJ 282/88: Mubarak 'Awad vs 1. Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, and Police Minister, May 9, 1988-June 5, 1988. [Online]. Available at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2010/1430_eng.pdf.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Israel's plans for demographic change. As a result, the Israeli planning institutions were obliged to change the population target in 2020 to 60 percent Jews and 40 percent Arabs instead of 70 percent Jews and 30 percent Arabs as was planned during the seventies and eighties (Shargai, 2010: 5).

This systematic attempt to displace Palestinian Jerusalemites from their city is situated perfectly within the context of Israel's settler colonial project, which aims to evacuate Jerusalem of its Palestinian inhabitants. It is part of Israel's systematic exclusion policy to get rid of the Palestinians of the city, which is represented clearly in the "center of life policy." Although their Jerusalemite identity cards allow them access and free movement in Jerusalem and Israel, Jerusalemites are actually restricted in their movement and have limited options as to where they can live in their city. Israel's colonial policies since 1967 forced Jerusalemites to gather in spaces that Israel is no longer interested in, away from spaces that are intended for Jews. Despite all these restrictions and pressure, Palestinian Jerusalemites were able to resist Israel's colonialist policies to displace them from their city. They proved that they possess agency and power to protect their existence in their city. This was revealed when they took advantage of the legal status granted to them by the Israeli regime itself to return to live within the drawn boundaries of their city. Their action can best be understood as a collective unorganized action to return massively to live in the city, foiling the colonial plans to displace them. This form of resistance is another diagnosis of power that indigenous people possess. It is the power of survival.

Anita Vitullo (1998: 10-11) called the "center of life policy" one of Israel's "social policies" that actually impacted the daily lives of Palestinian Jerusalemites as it was Israel's "means of economic and political control over" the Jerusalemites, along with the Arnona and insurance policies. Meanwhile, Graham Usher (1998: 21) considered the "center of life policy" a reinterpretation by the Israeli Interior Ministry of the law governing residency rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites. He wrote:

In the past, East Jerusalem's Palestinians could lose their residency status if they lived outside the city for seven or more years or took a foreign passport. Under the new interpretation, residency can be revoked if Palestinians fail to produce evidence that "their center of life" is within Jerusalem's municipal borders.

Focusing on Israel's policies of revocation of Jerusalemites' residency status, whilst examining the Israeli municipal policies in East Jerusalem, Ardi Imseis, describing the "center of life policy", stated that this policy is especially harsh because it "applies retroactively and irrespective of the present residency situation of the individual in question" (Imseis, 1999: 1061).

Living in Jerusalem in the past does not grant a Jerusalemite, currently living outside of it, the right of residency; meanwhile, current living in the city also does not grant right of residency for a Jerusalemite, who in the past lived outside it. Moreover, Israel continues to apply tough procedures to make it hard for Jerusalemites to prove that Jerusalem is their center of life with the goal to strip them their right to live in the city. (Ibid: 1061-1062).

In order to prove to the Israeli Ministry of Interior that their center of life is Jerusalem and avoid residency status revocations, Jerusalemites must abide by a list of requirements. According to Nazmi Jubeh (2015: 17), when Jerusalemites needed to register a newborn, apply to obtain an identity card, make changes on the details of identity cards, or apply for health insurance, social security, or pension, they were obliged to present to the Israeli Ministry of Interior a long list of official documents, proving that Jerusalem is their center of life. These documents, according to Karmi (2005: 10) and Badil (2006: 30), included receipts, proving they have paid the *arnona* tax on property, paid telephone and electricity bills and other documents, proving locations of work and schools of children. If anyone failed to present any of these documents, he would be subject to the revocation of his residency status in the city.

The so called "center of life policy" represented a turning point in the life of Shu'fat Refugee Camp. The influx of returning Jerusalemites into the camp significantly impacted the urban and socio-economic situation in the camp and its surroundings.

Jeannie O'Donnell (1999: 44) wrote that the direct impact of this law on the residents of the Shu'fat Camp is that they no longer seek better housing outside the camp and insist on staying there despite its dire conditions. She said that the residents of the camp, in both their status as refugees and Jerusalemites, struggle to achieve a normal life under Israel's discriminatory colonial policies in Jerusalem. As refugees that were expelled from their towns and villages by a settler colonial regime, Shu'fat camp residents do not relinquish their right of return, which Israel has always denied. As Jerusalemites, Shu'fat refugees suffer under Israel's discriminatory policies against the Palestinian presence in the city, which Israel considers as defying its demographic plans in the city.

Omar Karmi (2005: 7) estimated that approximately 25,000-30,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites, living outside Jerusalem, were forced to return to live in the city in the nineties as a result of the implementation of this policy. The movement of the returning Jerusalemites into the Jerusalem municipal boundaries was first witnessed in the late nineties in the area of Kufr Aqab, north of Jerusalem, (see for example Khamaysi, 2013; Dajani *et al.*, 2013; and Saqqa, 2015). The influx of these Jerusalemites into the Shu'fat Refugee Camp started several years later around the year 2000.

5. Discussion and Results

Resistance of the marginalized Shu'fat refugees is not meant to challenge and fight the official authorities, but rather to empower oneself, survive, and secure a dignified life. It is a case of power from below. Marginalized refugees were able to develop bottom up strategies to overcome economic hardships and challenge formal regulations that sabotaged their development. The research highlighted several resources of power that the Shu'fat Camp residents mobilized in order to overcome their precariousness.

The activities and practices of the Shu'fat residents, including construction activities, acquisition of land and mass return of Jerusalemites to live within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, constitute forms of resistance that diagnose tools of power from below in the hand of the marginalized groups. These are unlikely forms of resistance that are meant to overcome marginalization and precariousness that is imposed on them from above.

Unorganized collective action appeared amongst the Shu'fat residents during the phases of construction boom. It was witnessed during the first phase of construction boom at the camp level after they had entered labour market in Israel and their economic conditions

were improved. The feverish expansion of houses both horizontally and vertically was not conducted upon a specific ideology, but rather to meet the growing natural needs. Commenting on the increased construction inside the camp horizontally and vertically, the Head of the Popular Committee in the camp said that the camp's population is increasing rapidly and the small UNRWA houses are no longer suitable for accommodating large families.

The people want a dignified living for them and their children. That is the minimum of the needs of the human being.¹⁷

The second phase of construction boom, which shapes the Shu'fat Refugee Camp today, presented different and more developed types of resistance, power and economic practices, all of which are unorganized collective actions at the level of various groups of the camp residents. The most prominent groups that were able to change their lives and leave significant prints on themselves, at the camp level and at the Jerusalem level were the refugee construction developers, and the returning Jerusalemites that became camp residents.

Approximately eighty percent of the constructed buildings in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada were built between 2000 and 2010,

explained Head of the Popular Committee in Shu'fat camp¹⁸. Commenting on the record speed with which all these commercial buildings appeared, a construction developer from the camp explained:

Generally Israel demolishes homes when they are separate and isolated, but when it finds a number of homes, close to each other are newly built, it gets hesitant in conducting mass demolitions, as this will evoke tension and lead to fierce confrontations in the camp. They (Israeli authorities) send demolition notifications, but the demolition itself is postponed and mostly ignored in this case. In order to achieve this result, we (construction developers) try to finish the construction as quickly as possible. This is why all these buildings appeared during the same period of time, and today, after more than ten years, they remain standing un-demolished.¹⁹

His words reveal that the work tactic, based on speed, synergy and density of construction, is used by the camp refugees as a source of power, enabling them to defy Israel's regulations on construction. Here also, the empowerment of construction developers is due to Israel placing them in a tough situation where they need to fend for themselves to overcome the hardships Israel is creating in the way of their development.

The unorganized collective action of construction developers led to several significant results. They became rich whilst the camp expanded and became a central space for those

seeking affordable housing inside Jerusalem. The influx of the Jerusalemites into the camp area to occupy the hundreds of commercial high rise buildings is also a manifestation of the unorganized collective action. They formed another social non-movement, resisting the Israeli plans against them and countering Israel's "center of life policy". Here we distinguish the encounter of two social non-movements that led to the same end, although each had different goals. Construction developers sought financial profits, whilst the returning Jerusalemites sought an affordable living place. The actions of both these parties thwarted Israel's demographic policies in Jerusalem.

These actions are seen as mobilizing others outside the spectrum of the group that initiated them. This is revealed when professional non-refugee Jerusalemite construction developers followed the steps of their refugee counterparts in acquiring land in Shu'fat for the goal of constructing commercial residential buildings. Perhaps they would not have dared to act had they not seen first-hand the success of the refugees in this business and the benefits they accrued without the Israeli authority interference to stop them. This indicates that these "illegal – unlicensed – informal" actions are threatened and can be sabotaged from above at any time. The success of these actions lies actually in "the power of big numbers, that is, the consequential effect on norms and rules ... of many people simultaneously doing similar, through contentious, things" (Bayat, 2013: 21, *emphasis in original*). Applying this to the case of refugee construction developers, whose number is quite small, here again arises the encounter of the two different groups – construction developers and returning Jerusalemites and the strength they provide each other. The mass presence of the returnees strengthens the action of the construction developers that could not have initiated and continued with their work without the high demand from returnees for affordable housing that they offered. Together, their actions were seen as subverting Israel's settler colonial policies. Israel did not consider meeting the housing needs of Palestinian Jerusalemites with the goal of pressuring them to leave the city. At the same time, if refugee construction developers apply for construction licenses, their applications will automatically be turned down. Consequently, they have to act to fulfill their needs. The action oftentimes is not without cost; however, sometimes action is less costly than inaction. For refugee construction developers, inaction means they remain in precariousness and poverty. Meanwhile, for the returning Jerusalemites, it is a matter of calculating gains and losses.

Fieldwork revealed that although they live within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries in the camp area, they prefer to maintain their original address in Jerusalem neighbourhoods, such as the Old City, Beit Hanina, Silwan and Thouri for their legal documents out of fear that the area could be excluded from Jerusalem as Israeli officials threaten, leading them to lose their residency status. This indicates that people feel insecure in their living situation and might be subject to another wave of mobility towards the inner spaces of the city if Israel further tightens its measures against them. Jerusalemite residents of Shu'fat Camp did not hide their fears. In an interview in 2019 with one of the camp residents, he said:

The situation is getting worse every day. Who knows what the situation will be tomorrow if Israel decides to get the camp and its residents out of the jurisdiction of Jerusalem? Where will we go? At least now we are still considered living in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem that they (Israel) decided is for us. If things get worse, I am afraid we will end up living in tents inside Jerusalem.

¹⁷ Interview with Head of the Popular Committee in 2019.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Interview with refugee construction developer in 2019.

I attribute people's fears to several reasons. The first reason might be referred to the semi-legal method in which the land was purchased by construction developers. The land is not formally registered and the construction itself is illegal. Moreover, the method of purchasing the apartments is also semi-legal. Like the process of purchasing land, the purchase of the apartments takes place upon an irrevocable power of attorney, which is legal but temporary and the purchase needs to be registered in the official institutions within fifteen years of the duration of the power of attorney. But since the construction itself is illegal, this registration never takes place. At the same time, the land on which the building is constructed is not officially registered²⁰. This situation keeps the buildings, in which they live, under constant threat of evacuation and demolition any time Israel decides to implement such a decision as part of its oppressive colonial policies in Jerusalem. The second reason is their fear of the Israeli official threats to relinquish areas that remain on the West Bank side of the separation wall. This is understandable. In 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his intention to withdraw the "blue" Jerusalem identity cards from Jerusalemites living in areas behind the separation wall. Such a decision could affect more than 100,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, Kufr Aqab and Sawahreh²¹. Although Israeli officials are no longer talking about this, Palestinian Jerusalemites do not forget this as they are aware of the fact that Israel, as a colonial entity, can implement whatever plan it wishes at any time to oust them from their city.

Nonetheless, they have no other choice. They were obliged to accept this semi-legal situation and got used to it as a solution for their original and larger fear of losing their residency rights in the city. For them the cost of losing their residency rights is much higher. When calculating gains and losses, their action to live in these threatened areas is a form of unorganized collective resistance against Israel's oppressive threats. They challenge, assuming that their inaction would bring them higher losses than taking such a risky action. Thus, resistance occurs when the cost of inaction is higher than the cost of action (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001: 183). Moreover, when fear is collective, its effect diminishes and encourages people to work hard to survive without allowing this fear to dominate them, particularly as they are now used to this situation that is also shared by other Jerusalemites, living in other areas that are left behind the wall. This sort of collectivism is an important element in the collective resistance of indigenous people, revealing the power to challenge and struggle for their collective right to live in their city.

Conclusion

There is a tendency in academic work on refugees to regard them as victims and passive recipients of policies imposed on them from above. In this paper, Palestinian refugees of Shu'fat Camp in Jerusalem are viewed as active people of agency, who try to resist their marginalization and make changes in their lives. It was very revealing to trace the urban development of Shu'fat Refugee Camp. The changes that the camp experienced from small and narrow UNRWA houses to the current dense and highly congested urban space provide an extensive picture of the ongoing socio-economic changes that took place in

the lives of the camp refugees since their expulsion from their towns and villages in 1948. After it was a living space for displaced refugees, it became an affordable destination for non-refugees as well.

This paper has shown how urban construction can be viewed as a source of resistance and power at the hands of the indigenous people to overcome the marginalization, imposed on them by a hegemonic settler colonial regime.

In summary, this research diagnosed several forms of power in the hands of the Shu'fat Camp residents, refugees and non-refugees, that served in the achievement of the current transformations in the camp area. These forms of power can be described as the power of seizing the right opportunity at the right time, the power of tactic, the power of big numbers, the power of collectivism, the power of breaking the fear barrier, the power of resilience and the power of persistent existence and survival within a discriminatory and exploitative settler colonial context that is targeting their existence in their homeland.

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²⁰ Author's interview in 2019 with a lawyer from Jerusalem who asked not to be identified.

²¹ Al Jazeera website. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/alquds/2015/11/1>.

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8



9

Environmental education and climate change in a colonial context

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Introduction

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was negotiated at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to address the threat to human life and life on Earth caused by climate change. The convention entered into force on 21st March 1994. The 1977 Tbilisi Intergovernmental Conference on Environmental Education identified key objectives that allow learning for behavioral change and rejected the older model that presumes that increasing awareness of environmental issues (knowledge transfer) leads to behavioral change (Hungerford & Volk, 1990: 8). UNESCO suggested methods for integrating environmental education in schools via project-based approaches and student-centered learning techniques as well as civic engagement (Corraliza & Berenguer, 2000: 832; Fauville *et al.* 2014: 248).

Article 6 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) proposes educational programs for training and public awareness on climate change and its effects. The years 2005-2014 marked the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (DESD) and climate change was one of the most essential topics covered globally. Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) aims to empower the public to change the way of their thinking towards sustainable future (Anderson, 2012: 191; Mochizuki and Bryan 2015: 4). Yet, education must also lead to behavioral change among students (Karpudewan *et al.* 2017: 207) and it should engage people at the level of personal responsibility (Leal Filho, 2009: 6). UNFCCC set some guidelines regarding those¹. Earlier studies demonstrate the values of well-structured programs for awareness leading to behavioral change especially in young people (see for example meta-analysis in Zelezny, 2010: 5). The national strategy for the State of Palestine also emphasized the need to develop environmental awareness and education to deal with the significant challenges facing the Palestinian environment especially Climate Change (EQA 2016; MOEHE, 2017).

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^{***} Zoë Environment Network, Geneva, Switzerland.

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As environmental education should follow the mantra of “thinking globally and acting locally” (Gough 2002: 1217), we must develop locally sensitive “climate change” educational material not influenced by orientalism or educational modules that would work in more economically advanced societies. European and U.S. colonialism left a legacy that is rather negative for both colonized and colonizing people (Anderson 2006: 116). Paul Gilroy’s *Black Atlantic* (1993) points to forms of ‘cultural insiderism’ that highlight the lasting links between crude colonial racism, ethnic differentiation, and Eurocentric cosmologies, which many higher education (HE) curricula play a part in perpetuating today. The British HE system is only just beginning to get to grips with the differential black and minority ethnic student attainment resulting from this. Shilliam (2015: 149) promoted the need to think outside Eurocentric, ethno-nationalist worldviews in order to treat the wounds of colonialism. The Western conceptual framework for many subjects thus would not be appropriate in a developing decolonized country. Western societies do have materials and ideas to contribute but will be successful only if paired with partners in these developing countries that actually create most of the content in a locally sensitive way. This is precisely what we tried to do in this project. The project adopts a view of knowing as ‘collective, situated and tentative’ rather than fixed (Blacker, 1995: 1035; see also Wenger, 1998; Trowler 2008). This has implications for understanding how academics learn to become effective teachers and supporters of learning in HE. As knowledge evolves through a process of reflection on socially situated practices and contexts, academic identities will change.

Palestine enjoys rich biodiversity compared to other countries in the region due to its distinctive location as well as its special topography and history, despite its small geographical area. It contains four biogeographical zones (Mediterranean, Irano-Turanian, Saharo-Arabian, Sudanese-Ethiopian) and numerous climatic and geographic features (Central Highlands - Semi-Coastal Region - Eastern Slopes - Jordan Rift Valley - Coastal region). Thirteen sites were identified as key biodiversity areas (KBAs) by the Palestinian Environment Quality Authority (EQA). The EQA submitted to UNFCCC on 11th November 2016 the Initial National Communication Report (INCR) and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP). In August 2017 it submitted the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) which represents the national climate agenda (EQA, 2017). The Palestinian Government established a National Committee for Climate Change, and EQA establishment a unit for climate change within EQA in 2010. These documents and the earlier one, National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (UNDP 2010) highlighted the need for research into the impact of climate change in Palestine and for programs of Environmental Awareness and Education. Very few published articles for example addressed how biodiversity loss may be related to CC in Palestine (Qumsiyeh and Amr, 2020: 29; Saeed and Qumsiyeh, 2020: 69).

The Palestine Museum of Natural History (PMNH) and the Palestine Institute of Biodiversity and Sustainability (PIBS) at Bethlehem University (BU) work in the areas of research, education, and conservation (of our natural & culture heritage) with the idea of sustainability (Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2017: 340). The educational project addressed in this paper fits within other educational projects initiated that more broadly address habitat destruction and human impact on the environment. It was initiated in a close cooperation and dialogue between PIBS-BU, Zoï Environment Network, and the Palestine EQA to specifically focus on educational modules for climate change. In this paper, we explain how and why we developed environmental education modules on climate change that are culturally sensitive to Palestine, a state underdeveloped and suffering from foreign colonial occupation for decades. The paper presents lessons learned from this pilot in the future for the development of new and additional educational and awareness materials in the field of CC that targeting Palestinian youth.

Methods

PIBS/PMNH founded in 2014 used largely volunteer efforts and local donations and opened to the public in 2017 to serve Palestinian society through applied research, education, and conservation (Qumsiyeh *et al.*, 2017: 340). Zoï Environment Network and PIBS identified the need for this CC project to focus on education based on earlier work of general environmental work. PIBS had already developed programs that benefitted thousands of school and university students. For example, agricultural engineers from Gaza learned how to use aquaponic systems, farmers in marginalized villages learned permaculture, and students worked to reduce their carbon footprint. This project aimed at researching, developing, and implementing tools and techniques for raising awareness of youth on climate change leading to behavioral changes. Certain modules of environmental education were used and updated at PMNH and its botanical and agricultural gardens. The strategy of working between PIBS/PMNH, Zoï Environment Network, and the EQA (Ilustração 01) started with assessing local needs via focus group meetings resulting in conceptual and empirical data and designs relating to UN SDGs 3, 10, and 13. Outputs were validated and rechecked with partners (EQA, Zoi, PIBS) and beneficiaries (school teachers and students) and refined until all felt comfortable with output.




Ilustração 01 – The strategy for working between Zoi Environment Network and the Partner (PIBS).

The project focused on mitigation and adaptation to climate change. To do this, six key stages (translating to activities) were constructed, refined, and then implemented:

1. Researching and production of educational panels

The first part of this was a desktop study to understand the situation of the Palestinian environment and how others had developed culturally sensitive climate change power-point presentations. The teams from Switzerland and Palestine worked together to share experiences and skills. Complementation was noted as for example when the Palestinian team (PIBS) had experiences in environmental threats in Palestine while the Swiss team had experience working on climate change in other countries including African countries. We also accumulated relevant local data such as potential audience, approached the Ministry of Education and got approval to get into schools etc. At each stage of data gathering, we consulted with stakeholders, partners, and educators (school teachers and supervisors from ministry of education).

2. Arabic translation and adaptation

Educational modules were initially designed in English so as to facilitate co-development between Zoi and PIBS. PIBS team then translated to Arabic and shared with locals and stakeholders for feedback. Translations were not literal translations since the text had to be much more amenable to use by Arabic reading people.

3. Training in information production and visual communication

The developed material already included teacher and Ministry of Education input (step 1 above). In this third stage, training the trainers (TOT) sessions were held and included the team involved in educational material design training two university students and >20 teachers via informative interactions (both focus groups and one-on-one) to agree on content and presentation.

4. Building local relationships and conducting workshops in local schools (including media work)

The main target audience are schools, two environmental education experts from PIBS worked with 14 schools in south of the West Bank and the target group were ninth and tenth grades students (due to syllabus considerations).. During and after the workshops (which used poiwerpoints and interactive setting), evaluation was made via questions asked to students (see also conceptual aspects of evaluation methodology in Lombardi *et al.*, 2016: 1392).

5. Local schools visits to PMNH/PIBS

In this stage, students visited to observe and learn more about sustainable and interactive educational modules (e.g. aquaponis, eco-agriculture, composting, and recycling).

6. Scaling-Up and Communication

This involved printing more materials, reviewing success, reporting, continuing discussions to expand project with stakeholders, and visitation by two team members to Geneva and starting discussion of project expansions and research publications.

The six stages were implemented over the total project period of six months but with flexibility based on need. For example, translation was sometimes done for one educational module before other modules were ready for translation. Finally, six beautiful educational modules were created which deal with six topics related to Palestine and its climate; agriculture, biodiversity, geography energy and transportation, Waste and chemicals and climate change in both Arabic and English. The material was produced to applied to posters and flyers for the purpose of availability to the public schools, universities and also policy makers and politicians.

Results

We worked diligently to create culturally sensitive posters that result in behavioral change. Key elements of these modules included: **a)** listing problems and identifying solutions, **b)** be accurate/factual yet carry simplified messages/memes, **c)** have simple catchy diagrams. In the end, six modules were settled on that covered the following themes. Here are brief descriptions and links to modules:

1. Climate change: in addition to focus on the Palestinian context data on the global scope of climate change, global agreements, Palestinian situation and need to reverse negative trends.²
2. Biodiversity: Create pride in the rich biodiversity of Palestine. Identify challenges caused by humans (including apartheid wall, colonies, use of pesticides etc). Focus on solutions of what everyone can do to conserve biodiversity from showing respect for nature, keeping bees, insect motels, planting trees etc³. (Ilustração 02 as a sample poster, English version)
3. Geography: geographical dimensions of climate change in the Mediterranean region and issues of changing climate in Palestine in global and regional context⁴.
4. Energy and transportation: focuses on main sources of air pollution and greenhouse gasses and how we can act to reduce and even eliminate fossil fuel use and improve our environment including air quality. Simple procedures to reduce use of energy and promote alternative green energy are also given⁵.
5. Agriculture: covered problems like soil erosion and use of chemicals and offered solutions about traditional and eco-friendly agriculture practices to ensure both healthy and sustainable food security while conserving ecosystems and natural resources⁶.

2 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.palestinature.org/education/Climate-Change-eng.pdf>.

3 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.palestinature.org/education/Biodiversity-eng.pdf>.

4 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.palestinature.org/education/Geography-eng.pdf>.

5 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.palestinature.org/education/EnergyandTransport-eng.pdf>.

6 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.palestinature.org/education/EnergyandTransport-eng.pdf>.

6. Waste and chemicals: Covers problems like with solid and liquid waste, pesticides/ insecticides, and plastics. It suggests solutions like biogas, reducing and recycling⁷.



Ilustração 02 – Sample poster/brochure (this one on biodiversity): Note design is as a foldout here cut into two sides. Note images taken from existing sites (locations) and activities that students visiting PMNH/PIBS would be engaged in.

Simplified animated videos suitable for children were produced on the six topics⁸. 14 local schools were introduced to the six educational modules. More than 700 school students (50 % female: 50 % male) directly benefited from workshops held in schools as evident by positive feedback received at end of workshops and that 10 of the 14 schools developed environmental clubs. Usually the workshops started by explaining who we are (and suggesting they can later visit the museum of natural history and the botanic gardens associated with it). To get them thinking about man’s impact on the environment, we showed them a video of 3.5 minutes about man’s impact on the environment (this video⁹ already has 41 million viewers). This was followed by discussion to see how many problems the video covered and if there are other problems. The students now more aware of the main problems were exposed to the educational modules, which while briefly covering problems, focus on solutions. A quick post-workshop survey showed that the presentation quality rated excellent while many students already had background information on the subjects covered (see Tabela 02). Many students beyond the participants benefited indirectly via creation of environmental clubs at schools that spread knowledge to other students (ripple effect).

To follow up with the students, they were invited to visit the museum and its nascent botanical garden to learn more about sustainable ecofriendly modules and encouraged to create environmental clubs that spread knowledge to other students. 370 students visited PMNH/PIBS for follow-up from these 14 schools. More than 90 % of those appreciated the visit and said that it was very productive especially since it covered practical modules on the ground at the museum and gardens. Students particularly appreciated seeing and touching items they only heard about before green walls, aquaponics, biogas, animals

being rehabilitated for release, and the aquatic ecosystem (over 80 % positive feedback on each of these five items from visiting school classes). They had many questions about the exhibits indoors and impact of humans on wildlife.

The educational materials are also aimed at a more general public, including politicians. Many thousands visiting the museum and botanical gardens appreciated the connection of all our indoor and outdoor exhibits to issues of climate change and “thinking globally and acting locally”. The EQA presented the material during the Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) workshop¹⁰. Zoi and EQA presented the modules in Madrid during COP25 of UNFCCC in the Palestine exhibition (December 2019).

Tabela 01 – Answer to two questions asked to students in five schools (of 14 where workshops were held) as representative of collected data

	School 1	School 2	School 3	School 4	School 5	All five schools
Q1 New Information was presented (1-10)	5.38	4.9	4.42	5.47	5.88	5.21
Q2 Presentation Quality (1-10)	9.47	8.38	9.61	9.17	9.83	9.29

N.B. On a scale of 1-10 students rated the presentation highly (over 9) but it was obvious that students had some level of climate change information. The five schools selected here are the ones with the highest number of students attending and a minimum 25 participating questionnaires.



Ilustração 03 – Workshop on Climate Change in Palestine in a Bethlehem school.

7 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.palestinature.org/education/Waste-and-Chemicals-eng.pdf>.
8 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.palestinature.org/education/Waste-and-Chemicals-eng.pdf>.
9 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://youtu.be/WfGMYdaICIU>.

10 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://www.palestinature.org/education/Waste-and-Chemicals-eng.pdf>.



Ilustração 04 – Students visit PIBS and its garden with education on permaculture and climate change.

A workshop was held 14th November 2018 in Bethlehem University with members of Zoi and EQA and in presence of policy makers, stakeholders and more than 30 students. The event included a ceremony to close the project and to launch the designed modules to a wider audience. The audience appreciated the cooperative work to achieve the project activities and its goals, also to develop strategies to spread awareness and bring actions about the climate change in Palestine on a wider scale with policy makers and stakeholders. All agreed on the need to implement in more schools and the representatives of the Ministry of Education supported this initiative. When the project ended, other projects followed. For example, as students showed interest in agriculture and local production of food, we started a new project creating a community garden at PMNH/PIBS and also home gardens and this benefitted 30 families anchored by the students. The latter project was partially funded by the Rotary Club of Bethlehem. These two projects led to further work for sustainability in line with SDGs. Hence a ripple effect was produced from a rather small project of climate change educational module development.

Discussion

Today many people realize that there are major threats facing us as a species from climate change, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, and much more. These global challenges require global responses. The current systems based on consumerism and capitalism cannot “fix” a problem they created. Thus, it is the people who need to make the change. Accurately diagnosing the problems we face based on good reading of social and human history is essential. This must be followed by offering therapy based on logic and ensuring a relatively good prognosis for us and our planet. Education is critical to address global problems. Education must be learner-centered and focus on creating environments where students develop their critical thinking. The role of those engaged in education is facilitation and providing tools and a good environment for this process. Yet, education is constrained when the work must be done under colonization. Colonizers are interested in creating new realities, in our case creating a supposed “*land without a people for a people*

without a land”. This means that even after the ethnic cleansing of most Palestinians during the formation of the state of Israel in 1948-1949 and its subsequent expansion in 1967, there was a need to make life very difficult for remaining Palestinians. Every aspect of the life is controlled and managed in an apartheid system (labeled as such by human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, B’Tselem, and Yesh Din). This includes areas like education, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, and access to natural resources.

Climate Change is the top challenge facing humanity over the next decade.¹¹ The latest COP26 in Glasgow was disappointing to activists because the governments failed to take the drastic challenge seriously (Tobin & Barritt, 2021: 4). Climate change in countries like Palestine will also exacerbate conflicts over resources and will affect sustainability (Brown and Crawford, 2009; Elasha, 2010; Feitelson *et al.*, 2012; Mimi *et al.*, 2010; Mulligan *et al.*, 2017). There is an urgency to include climate change adaptation and mitigation plans in Palestine because Palestine is getting hotter and dryer and this is already having an impact. The updated nationally determined contributions (NDC) to the UNFCCC confirmed worrying global trends globally and locally.¹² Yet this paper is about managing to do things even in difficult circumstances.

The paper summarizing results on a short term project showed that it is possible to leverage collaboration and varied expertise to produce educational modules on climate change that encourage behavioral change (reduce, reuse, recycle, repair). Leveraging the posters and brochures and school workshops with practical models of things like composting and recycling showed that students indeed developed behavioral changes (see results). Paris (2012: 93) showed that there is a great need for change in our education (pedagogy) to become culturally sensitive. Since people’s values differ in different areas, we certainly cannot speak of climate change in the same way to different people (O’Brien and Wolf, 2010: 232). Hodson (2003: 645) argued for emphasis on education leading to activism. After we worked on this project with the Ministry of Education in 14 local schools, the ministry proceeded to encourage us to expand to other schools and also asked for our support in revising the middle school science curriculum using the same principles advanced here. This is also in line with the national strategies, which advocate awareness and action on Climate Change (MOPAD, 2014; MOEHE, 2017).

The impact of climate change will not be even across the world since vulnerability of exposed communities differs largely depending on their exposure and adaptive capacities. Even when effects are similar in neighboring areas, the joint statement by world science academics warns that

*developing nations that lack the infrastructure or resources to respond to the impacts of climate change will be particularly affected. It is clear that many of the world’s poorest people are likely to suffer the most from climate change. Long-term global efforts to create a more healthy, prosperous and sustainable world may be severely hindered by changes in the climate.*¹³

11 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1088812>.

12 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/news/updated-ndc-synthesis-report-worrying-trends-confirmed>.

13 [Online]. [Consult. 21.March.2022]. Available at: <http://nationalacademies.org/onpi/o6072005.pdf>.

Many biodiversity conservation challenges in Palestine affect the whole region. Habitat destruction comes from a broad range of sources, including unplanned urban expansion, overgrazing, over-exploitation, deforestation, land degradation, unplanned forestry activities, desertification and drought, invasive alien species, and pollution from different contaminants. The fact that Palestinian areas have been under a brutal military occupation since 1967 significantly impacts not only the environment including the knowledge and ability to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

The outcome of this study expands and strengthens existing literature, concluding that environmental education and awareness must be done in scientific/systematic methods (Lefkaditou *et al.*, 2014: 523) and this would directly result in conservation and behavioral change (Boyes & Stanisstreet, 2012: 1591; Halady and Rao, 2010: 6). Our results further demonstrated the importance of working together with experts (global and local) and with non-experts (local) to create environmentally and culturally sensitive modules and implement them in schools and for extracurricular activities (like visiting museums and botanic gardens). These are the principles that guided our successful model outlined above. We are expanding based on our experiences for example the very positive reaction to animated video cited above about human impact on the environment gave us the idea to now animate the six educational modules developed. We also developed animated videos (see results) suitable to younger students (elementary schools). That we are able to succeed in introducing Palestinian students and others to climate change and other issues affecting ecosystems in an effective way (leading to behavior change) is also a source of hope for a brighter, more sustainable, and more peaceful future for all living in this land.

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
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
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Entrevista

Issa Musa Adwan

The diversion of water from the Jordan Basin has resulted in the shrinkage of the Dead Sea - which could fully disappear by 2045!



Issa Musa Adwan

The diversion of water from the Jordan Basin has resulted in the shrinkage of the Dead Sea - which could fully disappear by 2045!

Interview conducted by **Mohammad Najajrah**

Bethlehem, Palestine Institute for Biodiversity and Sustainability, January 2022

Dr. Issa Musa Adwan Albaradeiya is the General Director of Environmental Resources at the Environmental Quality Authority, in Palestine, since 2010. He holds a PhD in Civil Engineering with a specialization in Environment, a Masters in Genetics, and a Bachelors in Agricultural Engineering. Since 1990, he held several positions, including acting head of the Environmental Quality Authority in the Northern governorates and in the General Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs.

Mohammad Najajrah (MN): What is the state of the environment in Palestine especially in Gaza?

Issa Musa Adwan (IMA): The environmental situation in Palestine is difficult as in other countries, but it is also affected greatly and mainly by the Israeli occupation.

The Gaza Strip area is a closed area that essentially constitutes a large open-air prison with many types of environmental challenges. It was occupied in 1967 and subjected to increasing levels of isolation and siege. Challenges include the pollution and increased salinity of the aquifer which is now unfit for drinking, wastewater discharge into the Mediterranean Sea, and successive wars that led to the destruction of most components of the ecosystem and agricultural and vital lands. The catastrophic situation is compounded by the limited areas in the Gaza Strip, the high population density (>2 million in 365 square kilometers - 2/3rd refugees), and the imposed Israeli siege. Urban expansion in the Strip happens at the expense of agricultural and natural lands. Therefore, the Gaza Strip constitutes an environmental

disaster unparalleled in the world. More than 2 million people try to survive on a mere 370 square kilometers under blockade since 2007. Equipment, machinery, technology, spare parts and materials that help in managing and protecting natural areas, environmental and health facilities such as wastewater recycling stations are not allowed to enter.

MN: And what about the West Bank?

IMA: As for the areas of the West Bank, a big part of it including Jerusalem and its vicinity was illegally annexed by Israel and separated from the West Bank. The rest of the area is divided into areas A, B, and C in what was supposed to be a five year agreement that ends in 1999 but is continuing today. We do not have control over Areas C in which most of the areas and natural reserves are located.

The pressure on areas A and B increased due to inaccessibility of the open and agricultural lands in area C (which is 60 % of the areas) and the presence of refugee camps in those two areas adding to stress on the land. Proper management of natural areas and resources is almost impos-

sible since the Israeli authorities maintain control of those. Israel has stolen Palestinian natural resources such as water, which has repercussions on the health of the population and the environment (e.g. not allowing the natural flow of water from many springs has an impact on the ecosystem). The occupation authorities are also building industrial colonies that destroy the environment in the Palestinian areas.

The Israeli occupation's control of natural resources exacerbates the environmental crisis in the West Bank. The occupation measures also include building a destructive racist infrastructure, such as segregated roads and the Annexation and Expansion Wall. The latter cuts off large areas of Palestinian lands and annexes them, in addition to its negative impact on the areas it passes through and the movement of living land animals. It is done at the expense of some natural reserves and at the expense of areas important for biodiversity and agricultural lands.

MN: What those political “natural” reserves?

IMA: New nature reserves are announced by the Israeli occupation army and its so called “Civil Administration in the West Bank” as a ruse and not on scientific grounds. Usually they are intended just to control natural resources, including groundwater and agricultural lands. This is notable for example in the Jordan Valley area, which constitutes the Palestinian food basket. The reserve and is designed to prevent Palestinians from benefiting from these areas. We are also deprived of benefiting from the Dead Sea, which includes ecotourism and mineral values. The diversion of water from the Jordan Basin has resulted in the shrinkage of the Dead Sea - which could fully disappear by 2045!

To solve the waste problem, almost our policies require by the approval of the Israeli authorities.

MN: How do you see the current environmental policies?

IMA: As a Palestinian state, we have many institutions that work in the field of environment, but the space available to us to work in is limited as mentioned earlier. We have a lot of capabilities and educational institutions that produce graduates who have environmental interests.

The Environmental Quality Authority also includes geographic information, environmental education, climate change and biodiversity, and trained cadres in the field of environmental monitoring and inspection. Funding from external institutions does not constitute a problem. But as mentioned earlier the political situation in Palestine being under the Israeli occupation and colonization is catastrophic to the environment. For example, to solve the waste problem, we are governed by the approval of the Israeli authorities on the areas of landfills.

Within the strategic plan for solid waste management, three major landfills were proposed for more than 20 years. The Zahret al-Finjan landfill was established in the north and the Minya landfill in the south, but the middle landfill has been held for 20 years pending Israeli approval for its construction because it is located in Area C. The waste problem poses a real danger and has a significant impact on the safety of the environment, human safety and biodiversity. We have national capabilities and strategies prepared based on international standards, but they clash with the reality in which we live by the Israeli occupation. If the situation continues as it is, the deterioration in the environment will increase, ability to deal with climate change will diminish further,

and there will be increasing pressure on natural resources. It will surely lead to the deterioration the health, economic and social situation of the Palestinian people.

MN: What about long term forecasts?

IMA: We, in the Environmental Quality Authority and all the ministries and local institutions, aspire to strengthen our capabilities to build a society living

in harmony with nature and to fulfil the UN sustainable development goals. We are now developing updated strategies and action plans taking into account all scenarios. These include the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan for 2030 and 2050. We consider our serious environmental work as a kind of resistance to colonialism and we look forward to freedom and to peace for ourselves and our environment.



Entrevista

Kamal Abdulfattah

The main characteristic of the Palestinian cultural landscape: its special constancy



Kamal Abdulfattah

The main characteristic of the Palestinian cultural landscape: its special constancy

Entrevista conduzida por Ahmad Abu Hammad

Jenin, Palestine, January 2021

Graduated in Erlangen University in Germany, Dr. Kamal Abdulfattah is a well-known Professor in Cultural and Human Geography at Birzeit University. In an interview conducted by Dr. Ahmad Abu Hammad, he summarised his general view about the changes in the Palestine landscape implemented during the last decades.

Ahmad Abu Hammad (AAH): What are the main characteristics of the Palestinian landscape?

Kamal Abdulfattah (KA): Detailed knowledge from the numerous valuable archaeological and historical-geographical works in these territories enable us to definitely speak about the main characteristic of the Palestinian cultural landscape: its special constancy. The great volume of reliable archaeological and historical knowledge as regards the Palestinian landscape does reflect it. Constancy here includes both the landscape locations and, in most cases, their names. This constancy dates from long ago. Most of the towns and villages in this study area had been in their exact places since they were built in the Canaanite period (2000BC-4000BC) and before.

AAH: Is there any special characters of the names and identity of the landscape?

KA: In many cases they still have names of Arameic and Canaanite roots: Jericho, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jenin, Birzeit, Al-Bireh, ar-Ram, Anabta, Mikhmas, Samu', Yattah, Jaba', and Rammun are but few examples. In addition, most of the agricultural terraces and field stone hedges are

also in their exact positions, on the slopes, since they were built. Plus, they are functioning in the same way, as they used to be since thousands of years ago.

AAH: Is there a variety of landscape types?

KA: Another important feature of the cultural landscapes in the Central Palestinian Mountains is the variety of its types: clustered villages, scattered hamlets and sometimes scattered individual dwellings including manor houses, stone huts and caves. Hilltop villages, slope located and valley bottom located villages. Different types of water installations and water works, from simple water cisterns into water aqueducts of tens of kilometers long. Narrow agricultural terraces on steep slopes of Western Ramallah areas. Wider terraces on the gentle slopes and wide valley bottoms of the Nablus-Tulkarm-Jenin areas. Long rectangular agricultural tracts in the intermountainous plains of Arraba-Qabatiya, Zababida, Beit Dajan, Huwwara, Lubban, Turmus'ayya and other smaller plains. Irregular orchards and agricultural tracts with stone hedges and borders in the plateau land around Silwad, Ar-Ram, Dura, Beit Ummar and other plateau areas. The goat and sheep grazing grounds of the eastern slopes.

AAH: What can you say about the Palestinian landscape under occupation?

KA: The decline of the agricultural terraces and the deterioration of the scenic views of the landscape can be greatly attributed to the actions of the occupation. For example, think about the negative effect of the Israeli colonies and of the settlements expansion on forested and scenic views of the landscape. Sometimes almost all of the natural and agricultural elements have been destroyed to allow for the expansion of such colonies on it. Think also about the negative effect of the Israeli policy to change and destroy such scenic landscape elements as archeological and cultural sites of great importance to the history of Palestinians, either by urban expansion or by changing the old and Palestinian rights connected to these elements. Briefly, the situation of the wars over and the occupation of Palestine during the past century (1918 to present time) resulted in a radical transformation of the Palestinian society. The old balances of agricultural productivity have broken down because of the physically and socially destructive Israeli ways of land occupation.

AAH: What can Palestinian geographers do to highlight this change?

KA: Geographers can be functional on both the academic and the practical aspects of landscape conservation. The participation of geographers is crucial by alerting to maintain biodiversity, the preservation of local and regional landscape characters and the recognition of cultural landscape sites. This can be achieved by preparing a spatiotemporal database of historical and cultural landscapes, using local and regional studies and improved methodologies. These kind

of studies will certainly include senior and junior students and so this will raise their degree of awareness and prepare them for future and effective landscape plans and conservation. The inclusion of the students can also be done by field missions and local and regional surveys of landscape sites. The role of geographers could also be extended to actively participate in the process of decision making to conserve and manage the important landscape elements of Palestine.

AAH: What effects are being produced by the Palestinian urbanization?

KA: Urbanization constitutes a great conservation challenge, which result in the following effects on landscape:

- it replaces the native species with widespread “weedy” nonnative species. This replacement constitutes a process of biotic homogenization which threatens to reduce the biological uniqueness of local Palestinian ecosystems.
- it destroys the traditional and old terraces. Urban settlements expand over the terraces which are one of the Palestinian traditional agriculture. Sometimes, the destruction of old cultural and historical sites is achieved by Palestinian themselves, when they use these sites for new and modern buildings. This is especially sad when it happens at well-known historical sites protected by law, which should prevent destroying them or building on its location.

For all of the above mentioned characters, and because we cannot preserve all of these cultural landscape elements, we should carefully sort out different cultural elements according to its importance and keep the most important ones as models for future generation and for preservation of historical evidence.





África em debate

Poderes e identidades

Integração tripartida entre SADC-EAC-COMESA: perspectivas e implicações para SADC

André Luiz Reis da Silva* e Vasco Alberto Banze**

PP. 137-154

Introdução

A Integração Tripartida entre a SADC-EAC-COMESA é uma iniciativa em que chefes de Estado e de Governo tiveram de integrar seus separados programas numa única área de livre comércio tripartida, no âmbito do cumprimento plasmado no Plano de Acção de Lagos de 1980 e do Tratado de Abuja de 1991, que consideram as Comunidades Económicas Regionais (CERs) pilares para a criação da Comunidade Económica Africana (CEA). Em 2008, os chefes de Estado e de Governo das três CERs reuniram-se, em Kampala, Uganda, para refletir sobre este processo. Na Cimeira de Kampala estabeleceu-se uma agenda das negociações, que culminou com a assinatura do Tratado Tripartido, no Egito em 2015.

As três CERs em processo de “fusão” apresentam perfis e *background* diferentes do ponto de vista da génese da sua formação, localização geográfica, ideologia política, estágios de integração regional, dinâmicas intraregionais e do desenvolvimento sócioeconómico dos seus Estados-membros, sendo, para alguns analistas, um erro epistemológico tratá-las de forma homogênea. No entanto, aquilo que as três CERs têm em comum transcende as suas diferenças. Há um conjunto de elementos convergentes nos processos de integração regional em África. As três CERs em análise enfrentam desafios e expectativas comuns, pois almejam alcançar o desenvolvimento económico sustentável a partir de mecanismos de cooperação e integração regionais, bem como reduzir a sua dependência em relação ao mercado externo.

Tal como referido, entretanto, este trio difere em muitos aspectos. O COMESA¹ tem uma dimensão continental, abarcando todas as regiões do continente africano, com um total de 19 Estados-membros com um Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) de US\$ 1.081 biliões. A SADC, com um total de 15 membros, é uma organização regional de âmbito subcontinental, integrando maioritariamente Estados da África Meridio-

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1 A COMESA é composta por África Ocidental (Líbia); África Setentrional (Egito, Mauritânia e Sudão); África Central (Burundi, República Democrática do Congo, Ruanda); África Oriental (Comores, Djibuti, Eritreia, Etiópia, Madagascar, Quênia, Seychelles, Uganda); África Meridional (Malawi, ESuatini, Zâmbia, Zimbabwe).



nal e da África Oriental², com um PIB de US\$ 1.476 bilhões. Finalmente, a EAC é também maioritariamente constituída por membros da mesma região da África Oriental e da África Central³, com um PIB de US\$ 448 bilhões (Index Mundi, 2018).

A área de livre comércio tripartida estender-se-á do Cabo ao Cairo, integrando três CERs com composição diferente em termos de Estados-membros, localização geográfica, extensão territorial, desenvolvimento económico e ao nível do aprofundamento regional. Para além das especificidades socioculturais, que os países africanos apresentam, há também diferenças substanciais em relação aos regimes políticos vigentes em África. Alguns Estados estão organizados em regimes autoritários e outros em regimes da democracia pluralista, bem como em variadas formas intermediárias. Todavia, os interesses económicos e comerciais procuram superar quaisquer barreiras de natureza política, étnica, ideológica e cultural.

Assim, o mercado configura a principal variável, que está no epicentro da iniciativa da criação da área de livre comércio tripartida ao serviço do capitalismo global. Segundo Faria (2003), a integração económica é uma manifestação da tendência à expansão territorial das economias de mercado em direção à formação de uma nova unidade em escala superior. Nesta perspetiva, a constante procura do mercado é a premissa que justifica a pretensa fusão das três CERs; aliás, a escola cepalina entende que a expansão do capitalismo é o único processo histórico que teve alcance verdadeiramente global mas, ainda assim, incompleto (cepal, 2002).

Nesta perspetiva do capitalismo global, os autores mobilizados para análise, neste texto, revelam que a participação das três CERs na formação da área de livre comércio tripartida poderá produzir dois efeitos: o primeiro seria o retrocesso dos projetos intrarregionais em curso nas três CERs. Ao nível da SADC, por exemplo, o efeito seria desviar a concentração dos atores ativos no processo intrarregional para uma agenda mais alargada, em detrimento do aprofundamento do projeto da integração regional. Das três CERs, a SADC é a única ainda em fase embrionária, como uma zona de livre comércio. Por isso, a sua deslocação para uma eventual área de livre comércio tripartida não só colocaria em causa o ritmo da sua agenda de integração regional, mas também as dinâmicas comerciais intrarregionais.

Enquanto o primeiro efeito revela-se negativo, o segundo mostra-se positivo, na medida em que o alargamento do mercado pode catapultar as economias de escala, cujas vantagens são o aproveitamento da mão-de-obra especializada e surgimento de empresas nacionais, que antes não tinham surgido dada a limitada dimensão do mercado regional. Mantendo todas as variáveis constantes da análise do mercado, um mercado mais vasto permite atingir uma produtividade mais elevada na indústria (Krugman, 2006).

Teoricamente, a participação das três CERs na empreitada tripartida melhoraria as perspetivas de crescimento dos países participantes, sobretudo aqueles que apresentam nos seus respetivos blocos económicos regionais franco desenvolvimento industrial, a África do Sul na SADC, o Quênia na EAC e Egito no COMESA. A análise destes dois efeitos, positivos e negativos, baseia-se respetivamente em pressupostos neoliberal e neorrealista. Segundo a tese neoliberal, a integração regional produz ganhos absolutos, na perspetiva de que todos os participantes têm ganhos. Entretanto, para os neorrealistas a integração regional produz ganhos relativos, pois existem participantes que extraem mais vantagens do que os outros (Baylis *et al*, 2011).

2 África Meridional (África do Sul, Angola, Botswana, Lesoto, Malawi, Moçambique, Namíbia, Eswatini, Zâmbia e Zimbabwe), África Oriental (Tanzânia, Seychelles, Madagáscar, Maurícias) e África Central (R. D. Congo).

3 África Oriental (Quênia, Tanzânia e Uganda) e África Central (Burundi e Ruanda).

Do ponto de vista metodológico, o artigo baseia-se na abordagem qualitativa com recurso aos métodos comparativo e histórico e às técnicas documental e bibliográfica. O método comparativo procura verificar semelhanças e explicar diferenças em grupos sociais existentes no passado e no presente, bem como entre sociedades em iguais ou diferentes estágios de desenvolvimento, o que Lundin (2016) aproxima ao método histórico. Para o uso deste método, estabeleceram-se parâmetros de comparação. Assim, considera-se comparável o estágio do aprofundamento regional entre as três CERs partindo do modelo catalogado por Balassa (1973) de cinco estágios de integração regional, designadamente área de livre comércio, união aduaneira, mercado comum, união monetária e união económica.

O método histórico é aplicado com a premissa básica de que as instituições alcançaram sua forma atual através de alterações das suas partes componentes, o que teve lugar ao longo do tempo (Lundin, 2016). O estudo mobilizou o método histórico para explicar as transformações económicas, políticas e sociais que ocorreram ao longo da construção das três CERs, nomeadamente a transformação da SADCC em SADC, a reestruturação da Alta Comissão da Comunidade da África Oriental (EAHC) em Organização dos Serviços Comuns da África Oriental (EASCSO) e a ruptura da EASCSO para dar lugar à criação da EAC; bem como a transformação da Área de Comércio Preferencial em Mercado Comum da África Oriental e Austral – COMESA. O método permitiu perceber até que ponto essas transformações influenciaram a arquitetura das organizações de integração regional em África.

Em combinação com os métodos acima expostos, o artigo aplicou as técnicas documental e bibliográfica. Segundo Lakatos (2012), a técnica documental trata de fontes primárias que são usadas como suporte para a pesquisa. A partir desta técnica, recorreu-se aos arquivos públicos, tratados, protocolos, memorandos, convenções, discursos oficiais, entre outras fontes, que versam sobre a problemática da integração em África. Já a técnica bibliográfica usa as fontes secundárias, isto é, as que já receberam um tratamento analítico. Assim, recorreu-se aos trabalhos elaborados por outros autores publicados em forma de livros, periódicos, etc.

O artigo está dividido em três secções. A primeira apresenta o contexto do qual emerge a iniciativa da integração tripartida; a segunda secção analisa as perspetivas da integração tripartida entre SADC-EAC-COMESA do ponto de vista do custo-benefício; e a última secção avalia as implicações da integração tripartida para SADC.

1. Enquadramento contextual da integração tripartida

Em África, os processos de cooperação e integração regionais emergem nos anos 1960 como política anticolonialista em forma de discurso institucional da Organização da Unidade Africana (OUA) e/ou nacional dos seus respectivos líderes políticos (Saraiva, 2015; Ferreira, 2005; Fonseca, 2015; Uneca, 2001; De Lombaerde, 2013; Visentini, 2012; Kanter, 2015; Schutz, 2014; Makandi, 2013; Manuel, 2012; Amann, 2016; Santos, 2014). Nos textos de cada um desses autores está patente que as origens do regionalismo africano foram mais políticas do que económicas e motivadas pela determinação da descolonização do continente sob dominação colonial e neocolonial. Suas primeiras manifestações podem ser atribuídas ao período pré-independência, quando o impulso regionalista encontrou expressão no Pan-Africanismo. O Pan-Africanismo serviu de dupla estratégia, como mecanismo da descolonização do continente africano e como vetor da sua regionalização.

O desiderato pela unicidade de África foi, pela primeira vez, manifestado pelo Kwame Nkrumah, na década de 1960, na sua utopia de criação de Estados Unidos de África (EUA), numa perspectiva de que uma África unida iria agir numa única voz e, por conseguinte conseguiria mais dividendos da política internacional. Entretanto, este projeto não reuniu consensos entre Estados nacionais; o que na verdade reinava era o pensamento nacionalista alicerçado na firmação e consolidação de novos governos africanos, em detrimento do pensamento krumanista. O anti-krumanismo foi manifestado por duas visões opostas em relação à natureza da dinâmica de integração: o gradualismo representado pelo grupo de Monróvia e o imediatismo representado pelo grupo de Casablanca. O Grupo de Monróvia⁴ defendia um modelo de integração gradual, que permitisse o aprofundamento da convivência entre Estados plenamente independentes e soberanos. Nesta lógica, a integração continental resultaria, necessariamente, da fusão gradual dos blocos económicos regionais; facto que se ensaia com a integração tripartida entre a SADC-EAC-COMESA. Entretanto, muitos académicos, nomeadamente Fonseca (2015), apelidaram esta visão neocolonialista, uma vez que beliscava uma possível coabitação entre novos governos africanos e ex-governos coloniais. O grupo de Casablanca⁵, apologista de uma integração imediata, defendia a criação de uma entidade política supra estatal. Este posicionamento não reuniu simpatias, pois ameaçava a consolidação de novos governos de Estado recém independentes, que tinham claras ambições em exhibir sua certidão de soberania; mas não só, também ameaçava o exercício da influência externa, pois Kwame Nkrumah pretendia o corte imediato de relações com as ex-potências coloniais.

Os debates pragmáticos sobre o processo da integração em África foram assumidos dentro da visão gradualista defendida pelo grupo de Monróvia. Assim, em 1980 foi realizada a 1.^a Cimeira Económica Extraordinária da OUA em Nigéria, que culminou com a aprovação do Plano de Acção de Lagos, que afirmou a criação até 2000 de uma Comunidade Económica Africana (CEA) a partir das CERs existentes ou a criar (Ferreira, 2005). Mas, as contradições se aprofundaram e sobremaneira condicionaram a concretização do projeto de Lagos. Depois de uma década de “silêncios”, os debates viriam a ser retomados em 1991, durante a 28.^a Cimeira realizada em Abuja. Nesta Cimeira, os Estados reafirmaram a realização do projeto da CEA, através do Tratado de Abuja.

O Tratado tinha como objetivo criar uma comunidade continental no período de 34 anos, depois de cumprir as seguintes etapas: (i) reforçar as comunidades económicas regionais e criar outras quando necessário (5 anos, isto é, até 1999); (ii) estabilizar as tarifas e outras barreiras ao comércio regional e reforçar a integração sectorial, ao nível do comércio, agricultura, finanças, transportes e comunicações, indústria e energia, bem como coordenar e harmonizar as atividades das comunidades regionais (8 anos, até 2007); (iii) estabelecer uma área de comércio livre e uniões aduaneiras em cada uma das comunidades regionais (10 anos, até 2017); (iv) coordenar e harmonizar o sistema tarifário e não tarifário entre as comunidades regionais, com vista ao estabelecimento de uma União Aduaneira Continental (2 anos, até 2019); (v) estabelecer um Mercado Comum Africano e adotar políticas comuns (4 anos, até 2023); (vi) integrar todos os setores, estabelecer um banco central e uma moeda única africana, edificando uma União Económica e Monetária Africana e criando e elegendo o primeiro Parlamento Pan-Africano (5 anos, até 2028) (Tratado de Abuja, 1991).

4 Constituído pela Libéria, Serra Leoa, Nigéria, Togo, Somália, Tunísia, Etiópia e Líbia.

5 Constituído pelo Gana, Guiné Conacri, Mali, Marrocos, Egito e Argélia.

Inspirados nesses dois instrumentos, o Plano de Acção de Lagos, e o Tratado de Abuja, os chefes de Estados e de Governo tomaram a iniciativa de integrar a SADC-EAC-COMESA numa única Área de Livre Comércio Tripartida. Esta iniciativa foi decidida na Cimeira de Kampala, em Uganda, realizada em 2008, cuja declaração oficial das negociações foi lançada em Johannesburg, África do Sul, em 2009, e assinada em 2015, no Egito (Tratado Tripartido, 2015). Desde modo, percebe-se que a integração Tripartida entre SADC-EAC-COMESA enquadra-se no contexto do processo do regionalismo africano, que começou na década de 1960, com a vaga das independências dos Estados africanos.

Todo o esforço da análise dos processos de integração regional, em África baseia-se nas perspetivas construídas a partir do Ocidente, sobretudo das experiências da integração da União Europeia. Evidentemente, as três CERs, Clara Outeirinho Pelaez que se pretendem fundir estruturaram-se, com base no modelo de Bela Balassa. A pesquisa não encontrou correntes africanas que abordam a problemática dos processos de integração inacabada de África, mas sim correntes ocidentais que estudam os problemas africanos. As próximas pesquisas devem concentrar-se na construção de um arcabouço teórico africano para analisar problemas africanos e aplicar soluções africanas para os africanos.

Tal como se referiu, todas as CERs se estruturam com base em modelos importados do ocidente. Ao nível da SADC, foram adoptados dois instrumentos estratégicos para a operacionalização do processo da integração regional: o Protocolo Comercial da SADC e o Plano Estratégico Indicativo para o Desenvolvimento Regional (RISDP). O Protocolo Comercial da SADC, adoptado em 1996, visa a liberalização comercial e integração gradual dos mercados de Estados membros e o RISDP, adoptado em 2003, estabelece o calendário e metas para a integração efectiva da SADC: Área de Livre Comércio (2008), criação do Mercado Comum (2015), criação da União Aduaneira (2016) e da União Monetária (2018), (RISDP, 2003). Entretanto, a SADC encontra-se estagnada na Área de Livre Comércio desde 2008 e os seus Estados-membros ainda utilizam Barreiras Tarifárias (BTs) e Não Tarifárias (BNTs) nas suas relações comerciais.

Ao nível do Mercado Comum da África Oriental e Austral, o cenário é idêntico. O COMESA estruturou-se dentro dos pressupostos de uma integração regional, na perspectiva do modelo balassiano, tendo estabelecido a Zona de Comércio Preferencial (1984), Área de Livre Comércio (2000), União Aduaneira (2009), Mercado Comum (2015), União Monetária (2018) e Comunidade Económica (2025); entretanto apenas a união aduaneira entrou em vigor. A Comunidade da África Oriental estruturou, também, o seu calendário de integração com base no mesmo modelo, tendo estabelecido a Área de Livre Comércio (2005), União Aduaneira (2005), Mercado Comum (2010), União Monetária (2013) e Federação Política (2015). A EAC encontra-se no mercado comum desde 2010 (De Melo e Tsikata, 2015).

Para além do não cumprimento das metas preestabelecidas, as três CERs enfrentam problemas relacionados com (i) elevada dependência face aos países doadores; (ii) receio de distribuição desigual dos benefícios e instabilidade política; (iii) sobreposição de organizações regionais e a pertença simultânea a várias delas por parte da maioria dos Estados Africanos; (iv) forte dependência das receitas aduaneiras no orçamento de Estado; (v) existência de um fraco sector económico privado e (vi) fraca participação da sociedade civil (Comissão da União Africana, 2011). Entretanto, ao invés de se criarem mecanismos e sinergias para a superação destes constrangimentos e impasses, que dificultam o aprofundamento da agenda da integração, Chefes de Estados e de Governos dos respetivos membros das três CERs tomaram a iniciativa de integrar os seus separados programas de integração numa única Área de Livre Comércio.

As três CERs em processo de “fusão” não estão ao mesmo nível de integração. A SADC é uma área de livre comércio, a EAC é um mercado comum, e o COMESA é uma união aduaneira. O Tratado de Abuja visa o estabelecimento de uma União Aduaneira Continental e não uma área de Livre Comércio Continental, tal como o projeto de integração tripartida sugere. Ademais, ainda há prevalência de desafios e constrangimentos de cooperação e integração no interior de cada CER. Face a estas constatações, questiona-se: por quê avançar com a integração Tripartida se as CERs ainda não estão resolvidas?

2. Perspetivas da integração tripartida entre SADC-EAC-COMESA

As perspetivas da integração tripartida entre as três CERs são analisadas em termos de *cons e pros*. Segundo Aniche (2015), a maior expectativa da criação da área de livre comércio tripartida é para resolver um conjunto de desafios que constituem embaraço para o aprofundamento das CERs, incluindo a multiplicação e participação de Estados membros em mais de uma CER e a contínua utilização de BTs BNTs por Estados membros. Entretanto, os autores mobilizados para esta análise não têm a mesma visão em relação à criação de área de livre comércio tripartida. Esses autores podem ser agrupados em duas visões, a otimista e a pragmática.

Para a visão otimista, assente nos pressupostos neoliberais alicerçados nos “apetites inabastados” do capitalismo global, a integração tripartida terá efeito positivo e resolverá os problemas da multiplicação de esquemas de agrupamentos de Estados e participação dos membros em mais de uma organização de integração, problemas de infraestruturas e harmonização e uniformização de regras de origem. Segundo esta visão, a estruturação da integração tripartida em três pilares (i) Integração de Mercados (ii) Desenvolvimento de Infraestruturas e (iii) Desenvolvimento industrial responde positivamente aos desafios colocados por CERs. O primeiro pilar pressupõe a liberalização tarifária e a uniformização de regras de origem, o segundo visa desenvolver a rede de infraestrutura regional e inter-regional e o terceiro pilar foca-se na industrialização dos países tripartidos (Hartzenberg, 2012).

Os pragmáticos apresentam uma visão cética em relação aos benefícios decorrentes da integração tripartida. Para esta visão, o Acordo Tripartido gera mais desafios do que benefícios (Bienen, 2010). O desafio da Integração Tripartida começa com o número dos Estados membros que a constituem. São 26 Estados que passarão a negociar e tomar decisões numa única mesa. Casos análogos mostram que, quanto maior for o número dos membros, o processo de tomada de decisão move-se no “ritmo de um caracol” prejudicando, sobremaneira, a flexibilidade dos projetos integracionistas. A lógica deste comportamento encontra o seu fundamento no programa de pesquisa neorrealista. Para os neorealistas, os Estados são racionais e comportam-se de forma a pensar nos seus interesses nacionais, mesmo que isso prejudique a ação coletiva. Nesta perspetiva, o desafio que a quantidade de atores envolvidos na área de livre comércio apresenta reside em como forjar consensos, sobretudo em questões substantivas da integração tripartida, tendo em conta que Estados membros com maior capacidade de mobilização de recursos têm maior poder de decisão em detrimento dos outros membros, fracos. A arquitetura e a estrutura dos órgãos da Integração Tripartida geram também mais desafios do que, necessariamente, benefícios para os seus membros. Trata-se de uma estrutura complexa, cujo funcionamento suscita recursos financeiros e humanos avultados.

Doravante, a análise das perspetivas da Integração Tripartida baseia-se nessas duas visões, não necessariamente contraditórias, mas divergentes nas suas abordagens em rela-

ção ao custo-benefício decorrente da formação da área de livre comércio tripartida. Reconhecendo que ainda não existe na história do continente africano uma iniciativa idêntica, onde comunidades económicas regionais diferentes juntam-se para formar uma nova entidade regional, os autores deste artigo buscam compreender e ponderar as perspetivas de cada visão.

A visão otimista entende que o estabelecimento de um mercado tripartido poderá resolver os problemas de fragmentação de mercados nacionais de Estados membros e incrementar-se-á o investimento direto estrangeiro (Chiundira, 2016). No mesmo diapasão, Mutambara e Bhebhe (2019) defendem que, através do efeito dinâmico, a Integração Tripartida criará um ambiente mais competitivo e garantirá alocação de recursos eficientes através da realização de economias de escala, com livre circulação de bens e serviços. Segundo os autores, a economia de escala resultará de dois fatores: primeiro, será incrementada por um processo da industrialização no interior das CERs como consequência da sua participação no mercado tripartido; e o segundo resultará de redução de custos de insumos provocada pela especialização das economias. À medida que a Integração Tripartida continuará a liberalizar e criar mais oportunidades para a economia de escala, o desempenho da indústria melhoraria e criaria vantagens comparativas e dinâmicas, enquanto as indústrias nascentes amadureceriam e se tornariam empresas competitivas. Desde modo, a Integração Tripartida iria industrializar as CERs, a partir da mobilização e alocação dos seus recursos no único mercado, o mercado tripartido. Os investimentos provirão tanto de Estados membros quanto do investimento estrangeiro, uma vez que o mercado será aberto para economias de escala.

Os capitais estrangeiros poderão provocar dois efeitos: criação e desvio de investimentos. A criação de investimento é o aumento do volume de capital directo estrangeiro por Estados não membros motivados pela expectativa de redução de custos de produção, crescimento do mercado regional e redução de restrições ao mercado. Enquanto o desvio de investimento é o fluxo de capital directo estrangeiro dentro dos blocos económicos regionais em resposta do efeito da criação de comércio (Mutambara e Bhebhe, 2019). Todavia, tanto a criação como o desvio de investimentos concorrem para a viabilidade do projeto da integração tripartida, uma vez que todo o investimento estrangeiro desviado para os blocos económicos regionais será indirectamente transferido para o mercado tripartido pelos respetivos blocos económicos.

Na mesma compreensão, Hailu (2014) argumenta que o fluxo comercial entre os países envolvidos poderá trazer o desvio de comércio do resto do mundo para a criação do comércio da área intra-tripartida, gerando por via disso, ganhos para os consumidores, que passarão a ter acesso a produtos mais baratos. Os investimentos provenientes do resto do mundo poderão aumentar a produção industrial, utilização da tecnologia de ponta, maior liberalização tarifária e maior mobilização de recursos financeiros. Os optimistas argumentam também que a criação do único secretariado tripartido eliminará a multiplicação de esquemas de integração e participação de Estados membros em mais de uma organização de integração (Bienen, 2010), na base do entendimento de que a integração tripartida resultará da fusão das três CERs numa única entidade regional, conforme estipulado no primeiro Draft do Acordo Tripartido. Em suma, a visão otimista apresenta um conjunto de “planos ambiciosos” com a convicção de que todos os membros sairão a ganhar na eventual empreitada tripartida.

Os pragmáticos entendem que os benefícios da economia de escala poderão ser polarizados por países industrializados e, ao mesmo tempo, desindustrializar os países periféri-

cos. Os países industrializados possuem capital humano altamente qualificado e tecnologicamente competitivo, razão pela qual estão em melhor posição de explorar os ganhos do mercado tripartido (Hailu, 2014). Ao nível das três CERs, os potenciais ganhadores dos benefícios de mercado tripartido são aqueles países que apresentam maior valor acrescentado nos produtos manufaturados, nomeadamente a África do Sul na SADC, o Quênia na EAC e o Egito no COMESA. Estes países poderão polarizar os benefícios da integração tripartida, em virtude de exportar produtos com valor adicionado, já que os produtos manufaturados têm maior valor comercial do que produtos primários. Segundo dados da Pretoria University (2015), a África do Sul e o Egito representam 2/3 do valor acrescentado aos produtos manufaturados no continente africano, com 37 % e 28 %, respetivamente.




Ilustração 01 – Valor Acrescentado nas Manufaturas. Fonte: Adoptado pelos autores com dados da Pretoria University, 2015.

Os pragmáticos encaram ainda os desafios da Integração Tripartida a partir da sua estruturação, funcionamento e os princípios que a norteiam. O artigo 6.º do Acordo Tripartido estabelece os princípios de (i) geometria variável, (ii) princípio da Nação Mais Favorecida (MNF) e (iii) regras de origem e (iv) tomada de decisões por consenso (Acordo Tripartido, 2015). Com o princípio de geometria variável, a integração tripartida pretende abordar os diferentes níveis de desenvolvimento entre Estados tripartidos, permitindo-lhes a progressão entre eles em vários esquemas de acordos preferenciais, bem como acomodar diferentes velocidades de liberalização tarifária, com vista a garantir que os Estados tripartidos possam ir além de compromissos formais-tripartido sem termos de espaço e tempo. Com base neste princípio, a probabilidade de existência de agrupamentos de Estados no interior da área de livre comércio tripartida, em função de semelhanças e diferenças que os Estados membros apresentam, é inevitável. Neste contexto, quatro cenários parecem plausíveis: o grupo constituído por Estados do COMESA e da SADC, por apresentar o menor grau de liberalização tarifária; o segundo grupo composto por Estados da EAC e

SACU, por serem mais avançados em termos de liberalização tarifária; o terceiro grupo pode ser constituído por Estados do COMESA e EAC, por apresentar a mesma base de regras de origem; e o quarto grupo poderá ser constituído por pólos regionais, constituído pela África do Sul, Egito e Quênia. Um provável cenário desta natureza tornará a integração tripartida diluída e desconfigurada.

A interpretação de Hailu (2014) também indica que o princípio da geometria variável pode fragmentar a organização, na medida em que cria possibilidades de emergência e multiplicação de novos acordos comerciais, concorrendo no mesmo espaço e tempo. O princípio dá margem de manobra para os Estados tripartidos estabelecerem acordos bilaterais estratégicos, em prejuízo do multilateralismo regional. A articulação entre o princípio de geometria variável e o processo de tomada de decisão por consenso gera uma certa ambiguidade, pois, por um lado, o princípio de geometria variável permite aos países avançar iniciativas de interesses particulares e, por outro lado, através do processo de tomada de decisão por consenso, os países que não estiverem prontos para avançar podem impedir os outros, criando um “caranguerismo tripartido”. Nestes termos, o princípio de geometria variável é potencialmente gerador de novos esquemas de agrupamentos de Estados dentro da área de livre comércio tripartida, uma verdadeira reedição dos problemas que as CERs apresentam.

O princípio da MNF também representa um desafio para a integração tripartida. A MNF é um princípio consagrado na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), que cria obrigação de não discriminação entre os membros da mesma organização. Por esta cláusula, qualquer benefício concedido por um membro da OMC a qualquer país deve ser imediata e incondicionalmente estendido a todos os membros da organização (OMC, 1995). O Acordo Tripartido obriga os Estados membros a adotar o princípio da MNF em que qualquer vantagem que o Estado membro tripartido ofereça a países terceiros, deverá ser estendida para outros membros tripartidos. A introdução da MNF visa garantir que os Estados membros estimulem-se entre eles e não com os Estados não membros. Entretanto, na percepção de Hailu (2014) a aplicação de regra MNF no Acordo Tripartido cria dificuldades administrativas. Por um lado, a MNF exige que os Estados membros tripartidos façam concessões mútuas. Entretanto, por outro lado, permite o princípio de geometria variável, que estabelece novos acordos preferenciais, no mesmo espaço e tempo.

No quadro das negociações da integração tripartida, as regras de origem constituem mais um desafio do que um benefício. As três CERs apresentam uma abordagem totalmente diferente no âmbito da aplicação das regras de origem. O COMESA apresenta uma abordagem genérica, liberal e simplificada, mais próxima do sector produtivo. A abordagem das regras de origem do COMESA consiste em cinco regras gerais a seguir esquematizadas.




Ilustração 02 – Regras de Origem. Fonte: Elaboração dos autores a partir dos dados da ECONSTOR, 2016.

Segundo a abordagem holística e liberal adoptada por COMESA na questão de aplicação de regras de origem, os bens totalmente produzidos não devem exceder 60 % do valor das matérias não originárias ou importadas dos países terceiros. Sobre o valor agregado, o COMESA requer que o valor adicionado da produção seja pelo menos de 35 % do custo dos fatores de produção importados. No entanto, o modelo aplicável no COMESA permite derrogar a regra de valor agregado para uma categoria de produtos considerados importantes para o desenvolvimento económico dos Estados membros em cerca de 25 %. Existem similaridades de regras de origem entre EAC e COMESA. Tal como o COMESA, a EAC aplica uma abordagem também genérica. A única diferença entre as duas CERs está ao nível da concessão de bens de particular importância económica, que não existe nas regras de origem da EAC (Draper *et al.*, 2016).

Diferentemente da abordagem genérica aplicada por COMESA e EAC, a SADC aplica a regra de produto específico. Esta regra é baseada na chamada abordagem por lista, uma experiência importada do modelo da união europeia. A regra de lista baseia-se em três critérios, nomeadamente, a regra do valor agregado, a regra de CTH⁶ e a regra de processo específico (Hartzenberg, 2012). O principal objetivo desta abordagem é dificultar a deflação comercial, permitindo o acesso às preferências conferidas pela área de livre comércio aos produtos efetivamente localizados na região. As negociações são conduzidas por setor e por produto específico. O valor agregado difere em cada produto específico, e autores como Qoto (2018) consideram este modelo bastante moroso, facto que justifica o processo inacabado da negociação de regras de origem na SADC.

Como se nota, há uma diferença substancial na aplicação de regras de origem entre as três CERs. A SADC aplica regras mais complexas e restritivas, quando comparado com as regras aplicadas por COMESA e EAC. Por sua vez, as regras aplicadas por COMESA são consideradas por alguns autores brandas e sem rigor. A falta de uniformidade nos regimes de regras de origem aplicável nas três CERs cria mais dificuldades para situações de membros que pertencem tanto ao COMESA como à SADC. Estas questões suscitam a necessidade da uniformização de regras de origem num único *framework* que possa proteger os interesses tanto dos consumidores como dos produtores e exportadores e que operem dentro da área de livre comércio tripartida.

Quanto ao aparato ideológico, o Acordo Tripartido estabelece uma estrutura do funcionamento, que consiste em Cúpula de Chefes de Estados e de Governos representados por respectivos Estados membros, que terão ratificado o acordo; Conselho de Ministros; Comité Tripartido de Ministros de Comércio, Finanças, Autoridades Tributárias e Ministros de Relações Exteriores; e Comité de Assuntos Legais. O Acordo estabelece, igualmente, um Secretariado Tripartido composto por três CERs. Esta estrutura é semelhante àquela que vigora na SADC-EAC-COMESA.

Face a essas semelhanças, levanta-se uma dúvida em torno do futuro das três CERs: se elas continuarão a ter personalidade jurídica própria sobre o Acordo Tripartido ou serão absorvidas. Nesta questão, dois cenários são possíveis: a absorção das CERs e a existência paralela com o Acordo Tripartido. As CERs têm o mandato mais amplo do que o Acordo Tripartido. Nesta base, elas continuarão lidando com questões de paz e segurança e desenvolvimento de infra-estruturas, enquanto o Acordo Tripartido empenhar-se-ia com as questões cobertas pela área de livre comércio (Saurombe, 2010). Esta perspetiva parece mais próxima da realidade do futuro das três CERs.

6 CTH: Critério da mudança na posição tarifária. Este critério determina que para a mercadoria ser considerada originária “nacional” deve estar em uma classificação tarifária distinta daquelas dos insumos NÃO originários (insumos importados de Estados terceiros não participantes do acordo) (SECEX, 2017).

Com base ainda nos argumentos de Saurombe (2010), a área de livre comércio tripartida não é uma tentativa de fusão das três CERs, mas sim da fusão das suas áreas de livre comércio existentes na SADC-COMESA-EAC, no contexto da liberalização intrarregional, razão pela qual o processo de ratificação envolve Estados membros como territórios aduaneiros dentro das CERs. Na base desta compreensão, as três CERs continuarão existindo não apenas para administrar questões que estão fora do âmbito do Acordo Tripartido, mas também para gerir suas agendas de integração. Deste modo, a Integração Tripartida não está em posição de resolver os problemas da sobreposição e nem de multiplicação de esquemas de integração; pelo contrário, o seu aparato ideológico configura-se como mais uma CER a concorrer no mesmo espaço e tempo com as CERs existentes.

A integração tripartida depara-se ainda com a concorrência paralela do projeto da Área de Livre Comércio Continental (ALCC). A ALCC é uma iniciativa continental adotada na 18.ª sessão ordinária em 2012, durante a Assembleia Geral, onde Chefes de Estados e de Governos acordaram estabelecer uma área de livre de comércio continental a partir de 2017. Com atraso de um ano, o Acordo foi estabelecido em 2018 e assinado por 44 Chefes de Estados e de Governos da União Africana, em Kigali, Ruanda. Curiosamente, os países que apresentam maiores economias de África, nomeadamente África do Sul e Nigéria, ainda não assinaram o Tratado. Ao nível da SADC, Namíbia, Lesoto, Zâmbia, Botswana e Tanzânia também ainda não o assinaram. Contudo, o processo de ratificação é bastante flexível, e 25 Estados membros já o ratificaram, contra 1 ratificação da área de livre comércio tripartida.

A ALCC tem como objetivo criar uma área de livre comércio, união aduaneira e mercado comum continentais através da eliminação de tarifas até 90 % e o banimento das BNTs. O Acordo foi estruturado em seis Protocolos e demais anexos, cujas negociações foram divididas em duas fases: a primeira incluiu o Protocolo de Comércio de Bens, o Protocolo de Serviços e o Protocolo de Resolução de Disputas. A segunda fase incluiu o Protocolo sobre Investimentos; o Protocolo sobre Políticas de Concorrência; e o Protocolo da Propriedade Intelectual. As negociações incluem o tratamento de regras de origem, facilitação do comércio, anti-dumping, bem como cooperação aduaneira (Taye, 2019).

A pesquisadora da TRALAC (Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa) denomina este fenómeno como um novo paradigma de integração em África. Um paradigma caracterizado por planos ambiciosos, inconsistentes, confusos e de difícil implementação (Hartzenberg, 2012). As ilações que se podem tirar a partir desses dois planos é que a integração tripartida já é uma letra morta. O Acordo da criação da área de livre comércio tripartida foi assinado no Egito, em 2015, no entanto, apenas um país, nomeadamente o anfitrião, ratificou o Acordo. O Acordo da criação da área de livre comércio continental foi assinado em 2018, mas mais do que a metade dos países africanos já o ratificou, o que revela um cometimento dos seus signatários.

O Tratado de Abuja recomenda a criação de uma união aduaneira continental, depois de as CERs estabelecerem uniões aduaneiras, e não a área de livre comércio continental. O Tratado recomenda ainda o estabelecimento da integração continental a partir das CERs, razão pela qual as considerou pilares para construção da comunidade económica continental, e não a partir de Estados soberanos. Portanto, tanto a iniciativa da integração tripartida como da área de livre comércio continental não obedecem a constituição do Tratado de Abuja. As iniciativas sub-regional e continental começam da estrutura inferior do processo da integração regional, a área de livre comércio, o mesmo processo que ocorre dentro das CERs.




Ilustração 03 – Novo Paradigma de Integração Regional em África. Fonte: Elaboração dos autores.

Tal como a figura mostra, são três áreas de livre comércio sobrepostas, nomeadamente área de livre comércio continental, subcontinental e regional. A área de livre comércio continental encontra-se na fase avançada em termos de cometimento dos Estados membros, expresso por 25 ratificações, número suficiente para que a área de livre comércio continental entre em vigor. A área de livre comércio tripartida reúne apenas 1 ratificação dos 26 Estados membros. Para que a área de livre comércio tripartida entre em vigor são necessárias 14 ratificações. Nesta base, a área de livre comércio continental está em melhor posição para ser implementada do que a área de livre comércio tripartida. Todavia, tanto a entrada em vigor da integração tripartida como da integração continental terá implicações no aprofundamento e nos avanços já conseguidos por CERs no âmbito do Tratado de Abuja, incluindo a SADC.

3. Implicações da integração tripartida para SADC

Reconhecendo que a SADC é a CER mais atrasada, quando comparada com o COMESA e a EAC, esta secção procura explorar as possíveis implicações decorrentes da sua deslocação para a área de livre comércio tripartida. O Tratado de Abuja recomenda a criação de uma comunidade económica continental a partir das uniões aduaneiras das CERs. O COMESA e a EAC atingiram o estágio de uniões aduaneiras, mas a SADC ainda não preenche o pressuposto, sendo que seu alargamento poderá complicar ainda mais o seu aprofundamento, do ponto de vista da operacionalização do RISDP. Como se referiu anteriormente, a SADC continua estagnada no primeiro estágio, portanto o alargamento implica dispersão dos seus recursos financeiros e humanos para uma agenda paralela e concorrente.

O quadro institucional da Integração Tripartida apresenta uma estrutura semelhante das três CERs, cujo funcionamento dos órgãos, conforme estabelece o artigo 34.º, dependerá de recursos financeiros e humanos, resultantes de contribuições dos respectivos Estados membros e dos parceiros internacionais. Todavia, os Estados membros da SADC quei-

xam-se de falta de recursos financeiros para garantir o pleno funcionamento dos órgãos da SADC. A emergência da integração tripartida como uma “nova instituição” só irá agravar a situação de Estados que já sofrem de hiper inflação, balança comercial negativa, forte dependência da ajuda externa, mercados desintegrados e deterioração de termos de trocas.

Evidentemente, o funcionamento das CERs, incluindo a SADC e os seus respectivos Estados membros, depende de financiamentos de parceiros internacionais. O que significa que a Integração Tripartida não será apenas uma “fatura” a ser paga por Estados membros, mas também por doadores internacionais. Em 2016, o COMESA aprovou US\$ 64.4 milhões para o seu funcionamento e projetos de investimentos e as contribuições desse valor vieram dos seus Estados membros e de parceiros internacionais. No mesmo ano, a EAC planificou US\$ 110.66 milhões, que também contou com a participação de doadores internacionais. Em 2016 a SADC aprovou US\$ 88.334 milhões, mas 61 % desse orçamento veio de parceiros de cooperação internacional (Chiundira, 2016).

Este panorama mostra a dependência das CERs africanas em termos de recursos financeiros, com contrapartidas inevitáveis. Seria ingênuo supor que a ajuda externa é fornecida em uma base puramente altruísta. Nenhum doador vem à África apenas para fazer caridade. A ajuda externa está sempre relacionada a outros interesses, sejam eles económicos, políticos, estratégicos, comerciais ou diplomáticos. Viver de doações criou um ciclo vicioso em África. A sobrevivência de Estados membros das CERs depende substancialmente de doadores internacionais e as organizações criadas na África reproduzem esta dependência. Foi nesta indignação que Dambisa Moyo (2009) fez uma campanha contra a “ajuda externa”, através do seu livro intitulado *“Dead Aid”*, alegando que a ajuda torna as coisas piores em África.

Segundo Moyo (2009), os líderes africanos recebem ajuda junto dos países ricos, desde suas independências, que datam desde 1960, mas não desenvolvem. A ajuda acomoda os líderes africanos. Estes encontram na ajuda o conforto para seus programas de governação, subaproveitando as iniciativas endógenas de desenvolvimento dos países africanos e dos seus povos. Nenhum manual, modelo ou teoria de desenvolvimento explica a ajuda externa ou doações como fundamento para a acumulação da riqueza de uma nação. Os países ricos atingiram o estágio que atingiram com base na acumulação de capital baseada no “comércio de pilhagem” e industrialização.

Para além do custo financeiro, a integração tripartida terá custos em termos de recursos humanos. A composição de órgãos da SADC demanda uma mobilização de recursos humanos e participação de Chefes de Estado e de Governos em cimeiras, bem como outras atividades e demandas. Uma vez que a integração tripartida apresenta uma estrutura similar das CERs, os Chefes de Estado e do Governo da SADC terão a missão de participar nos órgãos da integração tripartida para tratar, às vezes, sobre os mesmos assuntos. Neste contexto, a participação de membros do governo em vários conselhos tem implicações na qualidade do nível de preparação e nas decisões tomadas por eles. Os governantes estão sempre a tomar decisões sobre os processos de integração; entretanto, de tanto trefados, não há acompanhamento ao nível da implementação. As decisões que carecem da ratificação e internalização doméstica por parte dos Estados membros continuam em *standby* por falta de acompanhamento ou de recursos de natureza financeira.

A entrada em vigor da Integração Tripartida também terá implicações para a receita governamental. O artigo 6.º do Protocolo Comercial da SADC estipula que os Estados membros devem, a) adoptar políticas e implementar medidas com vista a eliminar todas as

formas existentes de BNTs e **b)** abster-se de impor quaisquer novas BNTs, que incluem procedimentos alfandegários, taxas de importação, restrições e interdições de importação, encargos de inspeção, pré-embarques, entraves técnicos ao comércio e medidas fitossanitárias (Relatório da Primeira Reunião conjunta entre COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2009).

Nestes termos, os países mais pobres da SADC, em que a maior parte da receita vem das tarifas aduaneiras, serão gravemente afectados. Os estudos mostram que as tarifas contribuem com 30 % da receita do governo na Tanzânia e Zimbabwe; e 40 % nas Comores, Maurícias e Zâmbia; e 50 % na RDC, Lesoto, Malawi, Moçambique e Eswatini (Mutambara, Bhebhe 2019). A avaliação quantitativa revela que, com a liberalização tarifária, a SADC poderá perder 663,5 milhões de US\$, cerca de 39 % da receita aduaneira. Assim, os países que dependem fortemente de receitas tarifárias serão obrigados a intensificar os serviços de ajuda externa para garantir a provisão de serviços básicos, tais como educação, saúde e saneamento para os seus provos.

As implicações da Integração Tripartida incidem também sobre a agenda da SADC. Dos quinze Estados membros da SADC, oito pertencem ao COMESA, cinco à SACU⁷ e um à EAC (Tanzânia). Estas organizações de integração encontram-se em estágios diferentes. O COMESA e a SACU são uniões aduaneiras, a EAC é um mercado comum e a SADC é uma zona de livre comércio. Assim, os oito Estados membros da SADC já beneficiam da união aduaneira do COMESA; os quatro Estados da SADC que não pertencem ao COMESA têm benefícios na SACU (África do Sul, Lesoto, Namíbia e Botswana) e na EAC (Tanzânia), restando Moçambique, o único membro da SADC que não pertence aos outros esquemas de integração.

Este cenário compromete a agenda da SADC de se tornar uma união aduaneira, um mercado comum e união monetária, porque os seus membros já se envolveram noutras CERs de são membros. De acordo com a constatação de Mengistu (2015), quando a integração é “oca”, abre espaço para que qualquer membro assine acordos bilaterais ou multilaterais com outros organismos extra-regionais, mas quando é profunda como união aduaneira, mercado comum, ou união monetária, é limitante e os Estados membros são obrigados a escolher um só acordo ou negociar coletivamente. Sendo a SADC uma área de livre comércio, não tem capacidade legal de impedir que seus membros possam participar em outros organismos. Se os Estados da SADC mostravam-se diluídos e divididos entre SACU e COMESA, a emergência da Integração Tripartida vai tornar a SADC mais diluída e desencontrada, o que poderá acarretar o seu desaparecimento funcional.

A eventual deslocação da SADC para a área de livre comércio tripartida deixa ainda algumas zonas de penumbra. A primeira tem a ver com as contribuições da SADC, que dependem do nível do desenvolvimento de cada Estado membro em função do seu PIB. A África do Sul apresenta o maior PIB da região senão de África e, em virtude disso, é a maior contribuinte da SADC, em cerca de 20 % do *budget* anual (Saurombe, 2010). A segunda

penumbra é que não está claro se na área de livre comércio tripartida as contribuições respeitarão o princípio de maior PIB ou serão por igual, mas mais do que isso, o receio é saber se a África do Sul continuará como a maior contribuinte da SADC ou vai redimensionar as suas contribuições. Uma possível diminuição da contribuição da África do Sul complicará cada vez mais o funcionamento de certos órgãos da SADC.

Considerações finais

As perspetivas da integração tripartida foram analisadas em duas visões, nomeadamente a otimista e a pragmática. A visão otimista tem um entendimento de que a criação da área de livre comércio tripartida poderá resolver os problemas enfrentados por CERs, tais como a desintegração dos mercados nacionais, sobreposição de esquemas de integração e pertença de Estados membros em vários esquemas de integração, através da criação de economia de escala. No entanto, a visão pragmática não comunga do mesmo entendimento. Para esta visão, a criação da área de livre comércio é uma clara manifestação do capitalismo global à busca de mercados. Esta visão considera que a integração tripartida é uma nova entidade regional a nascer no quadro do regionalismo africano, pois a sua criação não significa necessariamente o desaparecimento da SADC-COMESA-EAC.

A emergência da área de livre comércio continental, em processo avançado de ratificação, apresenta-se como desafio para a materialização do projeto da integração tripartida. A área de livre comércio continental já acumulou 25 ratificações dos 44 Estados signatários do Acordo contra 1 ratificação dos 26 Estados das três CERs. A existência paralela das duas áreas de livre comércio, nomeadamente subcontinental e continental, representa o auge do fenómeno da sobreposição de esquemas de integração em África. O Tratado de Abuja recomenda a criação da comunidade económica continental a partir das uniões aduaneiras e não das áreas de livre comércio e a partir das CERs e não dos Estados soberanos. Entretanto, a realidade revela-se contrária. Face a esta concorrência, a possibilidade da implementação da área de livre comércio tripartida torna-se irrealista e cada vez mais distante de se concretizar, pois depende de muitos condicionalismos, um dos quais a vontade dos Estados membros.

A nova entidade de integração regional apresenta uma estrutura funcional semelhante, com as estruturas em vigor nas três CERs. Esta estrutura suscita recursos humanos e materiais para o seu funcionamento, cuja principal fonte são Estados membros que *a priori* queixam-se de insuficiência de recursos para garantir o funcionamento das suas respectivas CERs, sujeitando-as, desse modo, à dependência de financiamentos externos, com todas as contrapartidas que esses financiamentos representam em África. Assim, a emergência de uma nova entidade regional com estrutura complexa exige dos Estados membros e dos doadores internacionais mais capacidades de mobilização de recursos para garantir o funcionamento de uma nova instituição de integração subcontinental.

Para além de custos financeiros e humanos, a possível implementação da área de livre comércio tripartida terá implicações para Estados membros, que têm como principal fonte as receitas aduaneiras, uma vez que o mercado tripartido requer a liberalização total das tarifas. A integração tripartida significa a ampliação do mercado, onde operarão economias de escala. Estas economias normalmente exigem que os países apresentem um desenvolvimento industrial com capacidade de produzir bens acabados ou semi-acabados, com um valor acrescentado especificado nas regras de origem. Entretanto, sucede que apenas três Estados, nomeadamente África do Sul, Quênia e Egito, apresentam este per-

7 A SACU é a mais antiga união aduaneira do mundo, integrando a África do Sul mais os BNLS (Botswana, Namíbia, Lesoto e Eswatini). A coexistência da SADC e SACU do ponto de vista geográfico e de objetivos concorrentes não só inviabiliza a agenda da SADC, mas também degenera em conflitos de interesses. Uma possível fusão entre SADC e SACU em uma nova entidade regional diferente das duas seria uma solução viável para flexibilizar o processo de integração na África Austral. Contudo, as narrativas detrás da formação das duas organizações dificultam iniciativas do género. A construção ideológica das duas organizações ainda gera estereótipos e desconfortos políticos. A SACU é produto do *Apartheid* e a SADC resultou das epopeias do Pan-Africanismo, em outras palavras a coexistência da SADC e SACU no mesmo espaço é uma clara “continuidade da Guerra Fria”. Este distanciamento ideológico constitui o principal entrave para o cometimento dos Estados membros no cumprimento da agenda da SADC.

fil. Os membros restantes possuem mercados desintegrados, um nível de industrialização baixo e exportam maioritariamente produtos sem quaisquer modificações agregadas. Este cenário mostra a existência de potenciais ganhadores e perdedores dos dividendos do mercado tripartido.

As implicações de uma possível implementação da integração tripartida também far-se-ão sentir ao nível da SADC. Conforme mencionado, a SADC apresenta um nível baixo do aprofundamento da sua agenda de integração regional, quando comparado com as duas CERs. Portanto, a sua deslocação para área de livre comércio tripartida não só representará um retrocesso para o aprofundamento da SADC, mas também poderá desviar os interesses da África do Sul como actor estruturante da região, ressaltando que atualmente a África do Sul contribui com 20 % do orçamento da SADC. Em segundo lugar, a África do Sul apresenta o maior mercado de exportação e importação da região e, com a emergência do mercado tripartido, a potência regional poderá se interessar pela economia mais alargada, dispersando seus recursos ao invés de concentrá-los na região. Em suma, a prevalência da vontade dos Estados membros sobre processos de integração regional, bem como a falta de articulação de projetos de integração subcontinental e continental em plena concorrência, gera dúvidas e incertezas quanto a uma eventual implementação da área de livre comércio tripartida.

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Notas de leitura

L'adieu aux (l)armes

René Pélissier

pp. 159-161

De qui et de quoi s'agit-il? Pas évidemment de l'écrivain Ernest Hemingway, mais bien de l'auteur – deux fois par an depuis une bonne décennie – d'une chronique bibliographique dans *Africana Studia*, un historien tropicaliste souhaitant prendre congé de ses lecteurs et de sa rédaction car cet exercice devient, à son âge, de plus en plus difficile et incompatible avec sa santé. La décrépitude intellectuelle se double de circonstances extérieures néfastes.

Dans un contexte inconfortable, nous citerons ici la raréfaction chez les éditeurs des livres concernant les territoires couverts par la revue (essentiellement les anciennes possessions coloniales du Portugal et de l'Espagne en Afrique, en Insulinde et en Océanie). Il est loin le temps où entre l'impression de deux chroniques on pouvait obtenir une soixantaine de textes à présenter. Dans certains pays les éditeurs professionnels ont calculé que l'augmentation des tarifs postaux pour envoyer leur production à l'étranger rend antiéconomique la poursuite de leurs activités dans les branches de la non-fiction. Même en obligeant les nouveaux auteurs à participer aux frais de fabrication d'un livre, le rendement d'un service de presse devient indéfendable sur le plan commercial. Le problème de la prépondérance de la langue anglaise dans les achats des bibliothèques universitaires de plusieurs pays a aussi eu pour effet de chasser du périmètre des acquisitions des sources ou des travaux rédigés en langue portugaise, espagnole, française, etc. Les germanophones étaient les plus conscients dans leurs milieux scientifiques de devoir multiplier les incursions dans des idiomes de petite diffusion. Même eux, maintenant, imitent les Pays-Bas où une seule bibliothèque spécialisée centralise les textes étrangers non anglophones sur l'Afrique. Une nouvelle mode favorise également l'hypocrisie éditoriale: on vend cher les versions sur papier et on adresse aux critiques les versions numériques «Internet», tout en sachant que pratiquement personne ne va s'astreindre à lire 4-500 pages compliquées sur un écran. On se «contentera» d'éloges imprimés, soutirés à un ami de l'auteur qui sur la quatrième page de la couverture chante les louanges du texte mis en vente. A cela s'ajoute l'imprévisible. En Grande-Bretagne et aux USA, principales sources de nouveautés sur l'Afrique, on a enregistré la faillite de quelques presses même solides, en raison de la pandémie de coronavirus 19 qui a ralenti l'apparition des nouveaux titres que les auteurs n'ont pu livrer aux dates contractuelles.

Bref, un critique «compétent» ou réputé sérieux n'est plus le personnage indispensable qu'il était il y a encore à peine quarante ans. C'est devenu un quémendeur qui perd son temps à essayer de convaincre que tel ou tel traité est important car il est original dans son choix du thème abordé.

Une micro-chronique à deux têtes

Que les causes en soient imputables à la sénilité du critique ou à des facteurs extérieurs à sa personne, il reste qu'une chronique réduite à l'«analyse» de seulement deux livres

constitue un recul et une perte de temps et d'efforts de la part du bibliographe. Heureusement que, sans liens avec cet échec, l'Université classique de Lisbonne a été unanime pour nous honorer en mars 2022 en nous conférant le grade prestigieux de Docteur *Honoris causa* pour service rendu à l'histoire ultramarine du Portugal. Comme nous avions mis dix ans à préparer notre doctorat d'Etat ès lettres – le premier à la Sorbonne en ce temps-là (1975) – nous avons apprécié à sa juste valeur l'importance de la patience chez les historiens. Et le hasard voulut que les deux volumes de la présente chronique parlent des troupes auxiliaires au Sud-Angola et en Namibie. Avouons que nous avons inclus le premier des deux ouvrages ci-après, pour répondre à une règle qui devrait être répandue parmi les critiques de monographies dans les revues scientifiques africanistes: tout livre demandé à un service de presse et reçu devrait faire l'objet d'un compte rendu, même si le contenu est médiocre, voire franchement mauvais. Pour nous, il n'y a pas de livres totalement inutiles et il est normal que l'éditeur qui a payé les coûts d'impression obtienne la preuve tangible et imprimée que son titre fait parler de lui. En bien si possible! Les tirages souvent diminuent et les prix unitaires augmentent. Les invendus aussi. Certaines maisons d'édition travaillant surtout avec les bibliothèques universitaires n'hésitent pas à produire des livres solides (reliés) car ils seront empruntés. Ils peuvent atteindre, selon les thèmes et le nombre de pages, 150 à 350 €. Si le critique ne publie rien, son manège de filou ne durera pas longtemps et il peut être inscrit sur une liste noire.

Dans **Apartheid's Black Soldiers**, le lecteur ne trouvera pas de morceaux de bravoure sur l'origine et le rôle des non-blancs enrôlés dans l'armée sud-africaine, comme l'ont fait en leur temps la quasi-totalité des officiers et/ou des journalistes ayant publié sur l'efficacité des Bantous incorporés. Ces «Black soldiers» laissent de côté les Bushmen enrégimentés mais méprisés. Restent avant tout les Angolais du Nord-Ouest et du Centre et les Namibiens combattant du côté des Afrikaners contre le MPLA, les Cubains et la SWAPO. L'auteur cherche à comprendre les motivations et le sort des supplétifs ou auxiliaires de Pretoria, notamment le fameux Bataillon 32, ainsi que les hommes disséminés dans la Koevoet, la South West African Territory Force et même les services spéciaux.

Le commandement sud-africain plaçait ces «harkis» à la pointe des combats les plus dangereux, car leurs morts tombés dans les opérations délicates ne suscitaient aucun émoi dans la population civile blanche. Les pages consacrées à ces démobilisés en Namibie après l'indépendance sont les plus originales. Certains sont rentrés en Angola dans les rangs de l'UNITA. Le bilan est probablement incomplet, mais on peut en déduire que ces semi-mercenaires ont été les «victimes» de la paix.

Blanche ou noire, la famine se joue des couleurs, la soif aussi

Etrange autant que rare, pour clore nos activités de bibliographe, nous devons signaler une bienheureuse coïncidence entre l'étude de Bolliger et celle du grand spécialiste des Boers d'Angola qu'est Nicol Stassen² lequel a fait sa thèse de doctorat sur cette branche «péripatéticienne» de la communauté néerlandophone d'Afrique du Sud. Professionnellement, Stassen est un éditeur et un auteur auto-édité de fictions pour la jeunesse afrikaner, depuis son entreprise installée à Pretoria. Sans regarder à la dépense, il ne conçoit pas l'érudition la plus austère sans une débauche d'illustrations, si possible en couleur, et une

surabondance de cartes géographiques, à cheval sur la frontière entre l'Angola et le Sud-Ouest africain. Mais en quoi consiste la coïncidence entre un texte de sciences politiques des années 1960-1980 et une œuvre d'art livresque fondée sur l'épopée des Boers d'Angola, trois, quatre (?) générations avant? Dans les deux cas, il s'agit de «mercenaires en famille» soldés par les Portugais pour les plus anciens et d'Africains par les généraux de l'apartheid pour nos contemporains.

Pour des raisons que nous ignorons, Stassen évoque à peine le rôle militaire bien connu des bœufs, des chariots et des fusils des Boers dans la conquête coloniale portugaise au Sud et au Centre-Angola. Humpata dans la Huíla était leur point de départ vers le Nord, jusqu'au Bié.

Nous pensons qu'Afrikaner bon teint, Stassen raconte et illustre l'incroyable résistance de quelques dizaines, voire plus, de familles blanches pendant la traversée de l'une des parties les plus hostiles d'Afrique australe. Ce n'est pas un hasard s'il a choisi deux toponymes (Humpata en Angola à l'arrivée puis au départ vers le Sud-Ouest africain) afin d'y créer à Upingtonia une république autocéphale au sud de l'Etocha, avant que les Allemands n'interviennent à leur tour. Cette tentative d'affirmer son esprit d'indépendance fut donc de courte durée (1885-1890).

Nous souhaitons qu'avec sa méticulosité habituelle Stassen aille maintenant braquer la lumière sur le rôle magistral des Boers dans la conquête portugaise du Sud et du Centre-Angola. Dès à présent, son ouvrage réunit une galerie de portraits de ces solides gaillards qui préféraient leur liberté, et même leur pauvreté, à toute sujétion à un pouvoir européen ou africain. Si on voulait leur appui, eux voulaient qu'on les paie à leur juste prix en tant que spécialistes des combats. A voir les photographies de ces géants, si frustes étaient-ils, ces survivants à la longue barbe connaissaient l'usage familial des appareils photographiques à l'ombre des chariots.

Espérons que nos successeurs finiront par apprendre l'afrikaans mieux que nous et pourront le développer dans les futures chroniques de la revue.

¹ Bolliger, Lennart (2022), **Apartheid's Black Soldiers. Un-National Wars and Militaries in Southern Africa**. Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, pp XVII-169, photographies noir et blanc.

² Stassen, Nicol (2022), **Van Humpata tot Upingtonia**, Pretoria, Protea Boekhuis, pp. 322, photographies, peintures, couleur et noir et blanc.

Resumos

Abstracts

Resumés

ملخصات

Política, poderes e ambiente na Palestina

Mazin B. Qumsiyeh e Issa Musa Albaradeiya

O ambiente palestino sofre a perda de recursos naturais, os danos causados pelas políticas de ocupação, a poluição e esgotamento de recursos hídricos e outros impactos humanos que levam ao declínio da biodiversidade. A ocupação israelita acrescenta continuamente desafios ao ambiente palestino. Após os Acordos de Oslo de 1993-1994, a recém-criada Autoridade Nacional Palestina (um suposto Estado em construção) tentou lidar com os problemas ambientais. A autoridade limitada que lhe foi permitida não podia proteger adequadamente a natureza, apesar da disponibilidade de instrumentos das convenções internacionais assinadas. Concluímos que não se podem alcançar grandes realizações em matéria de conservação ambiental sem alterar a dinâmica do poder. No entanto, mudanças estruturais de menor escala, tais como transparência, consciência ambiental, e melhor alinhamento da política científica podem e ajudaram efetivamente o ambiente.

Palavras-chave: Conservação, biodiversidade, colonialismo, governação.

Politics, powers, and the environment in Palestine

The Palestinian environment is suffering from loss of natural resources, neglect of the environment, damage by occupation policies, environmental pollution, low water quality, depletion of water sources, and other human impacts leading to habitat loss and decline in biodiversity. The Israeli occupation makes these issues more and more difficult and continuously adds new challenges to the Palestinian environment. After the Oslo Agreements 1993-1994, the newly established Palestinian National Authority (a supposed state in the making) attempted to deal with the environmental problems. The limited authority given to the Palestinian “authority” does not allow for proper nature protection despite availability of instruments of signed inter-

national conventions. We conclude that major achievements in environmental conservation cannot be attained without changing the power dynamics. Yet, smaller scale structural changes such as transparency, environmental awareness, and better alignment of science-policy can and did help the environment.

Keywords: Conservation, Biodiversity, colonialism, governance.

Politique, pouvoirs et environnement en Palestine

L'environnement palestinien souffre la perte de ressources naturelles, les dommages causés par les politiques d'occupation, la pollution et l'épuisement des sources d'eau et d'autres impacts humains entraînant la perte d'habitat et le déclin de la biodiversité. L'occupation israélienne a rendu la résolution de ces problèmes plus difficile et ajoute toujours de nouveaux défis à l'environnement palestinien. Après les accords d'Oslo de 1993-1994, l'Autorité nationale palestinienne nouvellement créée (un supposé État en devenir) a tenté de s'attaquer aux problèmes environnementaux. L'autorité limitée qui lui a été accordée ne pouvait protéger la nature malgré la disponibilité d'instruments de conventions internationales signées. Nous concluons que des réalisations majeures en matière de conservation de l'environnement ne peuvent être atteintes sans un changement de la dynamique du pouvoir. Cependant, des changements structurels à plus petite échelle, tels que la transparence, la sensibilisation à l'environnement et un meilleur alignement de la science et de la politique, peuvent aider et ont aidé l'environnement.

Mots-clés: Conservation, Biodiversité, colonialisme, gouvernance.

السياسة السلطة ، والبيئة في فلسطين
مازن قمصية وعيسى موسى البرادعية

ت تعاني البيئة الفلسطينية من ضياع الموارد الطبيعية، وإهمال، وأضرار الناجمة عن سياسات الاحتلال، والتلوث ، وتدني جودة المياه ، واستنزاف مصادر المياه، وغيرها من الآثار البشرية التي تؤدي إلى فقدان

الموائل وتدهور التنوع البيولوجي. وجعل الاحتلال الإسرائيلي معالجة هذه القضايا أكثر صعوبة وأضاف المزيد من التحديات إلى البيئة الفلسطينية. بعد اتفاقيات أوسلو 1993-1994 ، حاولت السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية المنشأة حديثاً (وهي دولة مقترضة في طور التكوين) التعامل مع المشاكل البيئية. السلطة المحدودة الممنوحة "للسلطة" الفلسطينية لا تسمح بحماية الطبيعة. على الرغم من توفر موانئ الاتفاقيات الدولية الموقعة. نستنتج أن الإنجازات الكبرى في الحفاظ على البيئة لا يمكن تحقيقها دون تغيير ديناميكيات القوة. ومع ذلك فإن تغييرات هيكلية على نطاق أصغر مثل الشفافية والوعي البيئي وتحسين الموازنة بين العلوم والسياسات يمكن أن تساعد البيئة بالفعل ونعطي أمثلة لذلك

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحفاظ على البيئة ، التنوع البيولوجي ، الاستعمار ، الحكم

Impacto do muro israelita de segregação e anexação na biodiversidade palestina

Duaa Husein e Mazin B. Qumsiyeh

O objetivo da colonização sionista na Palestina é transformá-la de um país multiétnico, multicultural, multilingue e multirreligioso numa sociedade monolítica que reflita visões importadas do estrangeiro. Assim, implicou a construção de colonatos enquanto se alterava o carácter da terra e a relação dos povos indígenas (incluindo a criação de refugiados e a destruição de aldeias). Mesmo os terraços que salvaram a paisagem e impediram a erosão foram destruídos. No local, o “desenvolvimento ocidental foi feito”. Aqui concentramo-nos no impacto de um desse “desenvolvimento”: muros de anexação e segregação (apartheid) utilizados como instrumentos para isolar os remanescentes povos indígenas das suas terras e dos seus recursos naturais, que produziram danos significativos para as pessoas e a natureza. Este trabalho é uma meta-análise dependente da revisão bibliográfica, das observações dos próprios autores, e da experiência de oito anos no Instituto Palestino para a Biodiversidade e Sustentabilidade, examinando a biodiversidade em áreas do Muro total ou parcialmente concluídas. Dados sobre

o seu impacto a curto prazo na biodiversidade local mostram como foram afetados os comportamentos de mamíferos selvagens, os fluxos de água e a distribuição de plantas. Contudo, os dados mostram também a necessidade de mais estudos a longo prazo.

Palavras-chave: Conservação, colonialismo, ecossistema, Muro Israelita.

Impact of the Israeli segregation and annexation Wall on Palestinian biodiversity

The aim of the Zionist colonization in Palestine is to transform it from a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-religious country into a monolithic society reflecting visions imported from abroad. By definition this entailed building colonial settlements while changing the character of the land and the relation of indigenous people (including creating refugees and destroying villages). Terraces that saved landscape and prevented erosions were even destroyed. In place, western “development was done”. Here we focus on the impact of such a “development”: annexation and segregation (apartheid) walls used as tools to isolate remaining indigenous people from their lands and from their natural resources have produced significant damage to people and nature. This work is a meta-analysis dependent on literature review, the authors’ own observations, and the eight-year experience of the Palestine Institute for Biodiversity and Sustainability, examining biodiversity in Palestine in areas in which the Wall was fully or partially completed. Data on the short-term impact of Wall on the local biodiversity show how wild mammal behaviour, water flows and plant distributions were affected. However, the data also shows need for more long-run studies.

Keywords: Conservation, colonialism, ecosystem, Israeli Wall.

Impact du mur de ségrégation et d’annexion israélien sur la biodiversité palestinienne

L’objectif de la colonisation sioniste en Palestine est de transformer un pays multiethnique,

multiculturel, multilingue et multireligieux en une société monolithique reflétant des visions importées de l’étranger. Par définition, cela impliquait la construction de colonies tout en modifiant le caractère de la terre et son rapport avec les populations autochtones (y compris la création de réfugiés et la destruction de villages). Même les terrasses qui sauvegardaient le paysage et empêchaient les érosions ont été détruites. À place, un “développement occidental s’est fait”. Nous nous concentrons ici sur l’impact de l’un de ces “développements”: les murs d’annexion et la ségrégation (apartheid) utilisés comme outils pour isoler ce qui en reste des populations autochtones de leurs terres et de leurs ressources naturelles.

Ce travail est une méta-analyse dépendant d’une revue de la littérature, des observations des auteurs et de l’expérience de huit ans de l’Institut Palestinien pour la Biodiversité et la Durabilité, en examinant la biodiversité en Palestine dans les zones du Mur total ou partiellement achevées. Les données relatives à l’impact du Mur sur la biodiversité locale montrent comment le comportement des mammifères sauvages, les flux d’eau et la répartition des plantes ont été affectés. Cependant, les données montrent également la nécessité de plus d’études en longue durée.

Mots-clés: Conservation, colonialisme, écosystème, Mur d’Israël.

تأثير جدار الفصل الإسرائيلي على التنوع البيولوجي الفلسطيني

دعاء حسين ومazin قمصية

الهدف من الاستعمار الصهيوني لفلسطين هو تحويلها من دولة متعددة الأعراق والثقافات واللغات والأديان إلى مجتمع موحد يعكس رؤية مستوردة ومهيمنة. الاستعمار يهدف إلى تحويل علاقات استمرت لأجيال بين السكان الأصليين والأرض ويهدف إلى خلق واقع جديد يسود فيه المستعمرون على الأرض. هدم الاستعمار الأشجار والقرى وحتى السناسل التي تحمي المناطق الجبلية من انجرافات التربة. هنا نركز على جدار الضم و الفصل العنصري وهو أداة لعزل السكان الأصليين المتبقين عن أراضيهم وعن مواردهم الطبيعية. هذا البحث مبني على مراجعة للأبحاث المتوفرة وملاحظات ميدانية منذ 8 سنوات حول تأثير الجدران الاصطناعية والحواجز في فلسطين التاريخية

على حياة الإنسان والحيوانات والنباتات. ومع أن النتيجة أن هنالك تأثير سلبي مثلاً على تحركات الثدييات ومجري المياه وتوزيع النباتات. لكن يجب عمل المزيد من الدراسات وخاصة طويلة المدى.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحفاظ على البيئة ، الاستعمار ، النظام البيئي ، جدار الفصل الإسرائيلي

A exploração dos recursos naturais na Área C da Cisjordânia como indicador de anexação

María Fernanda Cáceres Sánchez

Este artigo examina a exploração israelita dos recursos naturais palestinos, particularmente na Área C da Cisjordânia, a fim de determinar se é um indicador de que a ocupação atravessou a linha de anexação *de facto* da área. Para o efeito, examinaremos a forma como a exploração é levada a cabo em relação aos vários recursos naturais. Posteriormente, será analisado o conceito de ocupação, incluindo a lei de ocupação em relação à exploração dos recursos naturais, com base no artigo 55.º do Regulamento de Haia, e o princípio da Soberania Permanente sobre os Recursos Naturais. Além disso, será examinado o conceito de anexação, bem como as condições necessárias para que uma situação constitua uma anexação, sendo a intenção de anexar o elemento distintivo. Da análise, a conclusão a tirar é que Israel explora os recursos naturais da Área C da Cisjordânia, não como ocupante, mas como potência soberana, com uma intenção clara de anexar o território. Por conseguinte, esta exploração leva à conclusão geral de que a ocupação atravessou a linha da anexação *de facto*.

Palavras-chave: Israel, Cisjordânia, recursos naturais, anexação.

The exploitation of natural resources in area C of the West Bank as indicator of annexation

This paper will review whether Israel’s exploitation of Palestinian natural resources, specific-

ly in Area C of the West Bank, serves as an indicator that the occupation has crossed the line into *de facto* annexation of this area. For this purpose, it will examine how the exploitation is conducted in respect of various natural resources. It will subsequently analyse the concept of occupation, particularly the law of occupation in relation to the exploitation of natural resources, based on Article 55 of the Hague Regulations, and the principle of Permanent Sovereignty of Natural Resources. It will then examine the concept of annexation, and the requirements for a situation to constitute annexation, being the intent to annex the distinctive element. From the analysis, the conclusion will be drawn that Israel exploits the natural resources in Area C of the West Bank not as occupier, but as a sovereign power, with a clear intention to annex the territory, and consequently, this exploitation serves as an indicator to prove that the occupation has crossed the line into *de facto* annexation.

Keywords: Israel, West Bank, natural resources, annexation.

L'exploitation des ressources naturelles dans la zone C de la Cisjordanie comme indicateur que l'occupation israélienne a franchi la ligne de l'annexion *de facto*

Cet article examine l'exploitation par Israël des ressources naturelles palestiniennes, en particulier dans la Zone C de la Cisjordanie, afin de déterminer si celle-ci est un indicateur que l'occupation a franchi la limite de l'annexion *de facto* de cette zone. À cette fin, nous examinerons comment l'exploitation est menée en ce qui concerne les diverses ressources naturelles. Par la suite, le concept d'occupation sera analysé, notamment le droit de l'occupation en matière d'exploitation des ressources naturelles, fondé sur l'article 55 du Règlement de La Haye, et le principe de Souveraineté Permanente sur les Ressources Naturelles. A continuation, le concept d'annexion sera examiné ainsi que les conditions requises pour qu'une situation constitue une annexion, étant l'intention d'annexer l'élément distinctif. De l'analyse, la

conclusion qui sera tirée est qu'Israël exploite les ressources naturelles de la Zone C de la Cisjordanie, non pas en tant qu'occupant mais en tant que puissance souveraine, avec une intention claire d'annexer le territoire. Par conséquent, cette exploitation aboutit à la conclusion générale que l'occupation a franchi la ligne de l'annexion *de facto*.

Mot-clés: Israël, Cisjordanie, ressources naturelles, annexion.

استغلال الموارد الطبيعية في المنطقة (ج) بالضفة الغربية كمؤشر على أن الاحتلال الإسرائيلي قد تجاوز كل الحدود

ماريا فرناندا كاسيريس سانشيز

تتناول هذه المقالة الاستغلال الإسرائيلي للموارد الطبيعية الفلسطينية، لا سيما في المنطقة (ج) من الضفة الغربية، من أجل تحديد ما إذا كان هذا مؤشراً على أن الاحتلال قد تجاوز خط الضم الفعلي للمنطقة. تحقيقاً لهذه الغاية، سوف ندرس الطريقة التي يتم بها الاستكشاف فيما يتعلق بالموارد الطبيعية المختلفة. بعد ذلك، سيتم تحليل مفهوم الاحتلال، بما في ذلك قانون الاحتلال فيما يتعلق باستغلال الموارد الطبيعية، على أساس المادة 55 من لائحة لاهاي، ومبدأ السيادة الدائمة على الموارد الطبيعية. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، سيتم فحص مفهوم الضم، وكذلك الشروط اللازمة لتشكيل حالة ما ضمّاً، كونها نية ضم العنصر المميز. من التحليل، الاستنتاج الذي يجب استخلاصه هو أن إسرائيل تستغل الموارد الطبيعية للمنطقة ج في الضفة الغربية، ليس كقوة محتلة، ولكن كقوة ذات سيادة، بنية واضحة لضم المنطقة. لذلك، يقود هذا الاستكشاف إلى الاستنتاج العام بأن الاحتلال تجاوز خط الضم الفعلي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: إسرائيل، الضفة الغربية، الموارد الطبيعية، الضم

Impacto da Pandemia da COVID-19 na conservação da biodiversidade na Cisjordânia ocupada por Israel, Palestina

Mazin B. Qumsiyeh e Mohammed Abu-sarhan

O impacto da redução da mobilidade humana e de outras atividades provocadas pela COVID-19

sobre a biodiversidade a nível mundial foi acolhido com um interesse significativo. Os estudos iniciais mostraram resultados mistos, tais como a redução na utilização de veículos motorizados e aviões com um impacto positivo nas emissões de gases com efeito de estufa, ao mesmo tempo que o crescimento do afluxo a parques públicos e áreas verdes aumentou, causando um impacto negativo na vida selvagem local. Fazemos uma primeira avaliação do impacto da COVID-19 na Palestina através de observações diretas e de um inquérito a 29 peritos em biodiversidade. As nossas conclusões nesta área mostraram que a economia dependente do turismo sofreu mas que o aumento dos usos das áreas verdes e de atividades prejudiciais como a caça e o despejo de resíduos sólidos e líquidos, aumentou. Por outro lado, aumentou a produção local de alimentos, amiga do ambiente.

Palavras-chave: Conservação do ambiente, COVID-19, sustentabilidade, turismo.

Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Biodiversity Conservation in the Israeli Occupied West Bank, Palestine

The impact of COVID-19 induced a reduction on human mobility and other activities on biodiversity which has received significant interest. The initial studies showed a mixed bag, such as reductions in the use of motor vehicles and airplanes, with a positive impact on greenhouse gas emissions while the increased flocking of populations to public parks and green areas had a negative impact on resident wildlife. We provide a first assessment of COVID-19 impact in Palestine through direct observations and a survey of 29 biodiversity experts. Our findings in this area showed that the tourism-dependent economy suffered but there was an increase in the use of green areas with damaging effects such as hunting and dumping of solid and liquid wastes. On the other hand, there was an increase in local food production efforts, which are environmentally friendly.

Keywords: Environment conservation, COVID-19, sustainability, tourism.

Impact de la pandémie de COVID-19 sur la conservation de la biodiversité en Cisjordanie occupée par Israël, Palestine

L'impact de la réduction de la mobilité humaine et d'autres activités induites par le COVID-19 sur la biodiversité dans le monde a suscité un intérêt considérable. Les premières études ont montré des résultats mitigés: la réduction de l'utilisation des véhicules à moteur et des avions a eu un impact positif sur les émissions de gaz à effet de serre, tandis que l'afflux accru de populations dans les parcs publics et les espaces verts a eu un impact négatif sur la faune et la flore locales.

Nous présentons une première évaluation de l'impact de COVID-19 en Palestine à travers des observations directes et une enquête auprès de 29 experts en biodiversité. Nos résultats dans ce domaine montrent que l'économie dépendante du tourisme a souffert mais qu'il y a eu une augmentation de la fréquentation des espaces verts avec une augmentation des activités nuisibles comme la chasse et le déversement de déchets solides et liquides. D'autre part, la production locale d'aliments, amie de l'environnement, a grandi.

Mots-clés: Conservation de l'environnement, COVID-19, durabilité, tourisme.

تأثير جائحة كوفيد-19 على حفظ التنوع البيولوجي في الضفة الغربية المحتلة، فلسطين

مازن قمصية ومحمد أبو سرحان

حظي تأثير كوفيد 19 (COVID 19) على تنقل البشر والتنوع البيولوجي على مستوى العالم باهتمام كبير. أنتجت الدراسات الأولية معلومات مختلطة مثل أن الحد من استخدام السيارات والطائرات كان لها تأثير إيجابي على انبعاثات غازات الاحتباس الحراري، وأن زيادة تدفق السكان إلى الحدائق العامة والمناطق الخضراء لها تأثير سلبي على الحياة البرية. نحن نقدم أول تقييم لتأثير كوفيد 19 (COVID-19) في فلسطين من خلال الملاحظات المباشرة واستطلاع آراء 29 خبيراً في التنوع البيولوجي. أظهرت النتائج التي توصلنا إليها أن الاقتصاد المعتمد على السياحة تأثر سلباً وأن هناك زيادة في الزيارات إلى المناطق الخضراء يصاحبها زيادة الأنشطة الضارة مثل الصيد وإلقاء النفايات

الصلبة والسائلة ومع ذلك انخفضت جهود الحفاظ على التنوع البيولوجي. من ناحية أخرى، كانت هناك زيادة في جهود إنتاج الغذاء المحلي بطرق صديقة للبيئة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحفاظ على البيئة ، كوفيد-19 ، الاستدامة ، السياحة

Mudanças no Uso da Terra nas Montanhas Centrais da Palestina: O Município de Nablus, um estudo de caso.

Sana Khalid Hasan Ghazal

Durante as últimas seis décadas, as aldeias que foram anexadas ao Município de Nablus perderam uma área de cerca de 18.000 *dunum* de terras agrícolas, pastagens e planícies. Este estudo examina as alterações de uso do solo das aldeias anexas a este Município, comparando as transformações no uso dos solos de 15 aldeias entre 1963 e 2016. O estudo conclui que se passou da agricultura, pastagens e planícies para usos industriais e de serviços. Em 1963 as terras agrícolas ocupavam 3.000 *dunum*, as planícies 6.000 *dunum* e as pastagens 9.000 *dunum*. Praticamente toda esta área tem agora uso não agrícola.

Palavras-chave: Uso do solo, anexação de terras, Limites Municipais de Nablus.

Land use changes into the Palestinian Central Mountains: Nablus Municipality, a case study

Over the past six decades, the villages that were annexed to Nablus Municipality Boundaries have lost their agricultural, pastures and plains lands which were estimated by 18,000 *dunum*. This study examines the land use changes of villages' annexed land to Nablus Municipality Boundaries, especially how the land use of 15 villages annexed have changed since 1963-2016. The study concludes that the changes in land-uses occurred from agricultural, pastures and plains to industrial, residential and service uses. In 1963 the agricultural land had an area

of 3,000 *dunum*, the plains of 6,000 *dunum* and the pastures of 9,000 *dunum*. Almost all these areas were converted to non-agricultural land-uses.

Keywords: Land use, land annexation, Nablus Municipality Boundaries.

Changements d'utilisation des terres dans les montagnes centrales palestiniennes: Municipality de Naplouse, une étude de cas

Au cours des six dernières décennies, les villages qui ont été annexés aux limites de la municipalité de Naplouse ont perdu leurs terres agricoles, leurs pâturages et leurs plaines, estimés à 18 000 *dunum*. Cette étude examine les changements d'utilisation des terres de 15 villages annexés à cette ville entre 1963 et 2016.

L'étude montre un changement dans l'utilisation des terres passant de l'agriculture, des pâturages et des plaines à des utilisations industrielles, résidentielles et de services, etc. En 1963 les terres agricoles étaient de 3 000 *dunum*, les plaines de 6 000 *dunum* et les pâturages de 9 000 *dunum*. Presque toute cette surface est maintenant affectée à de nouvelles utilisations non-agricoles.

Mots-clés: Utilisation des terres, annexion des terres, limites de la municipalité de Naplouse.

التغيرات في استخدامات الأراضي في الجبال الفلسطينية الوسطى: بلدية نابلس أنموذجاً

سناء خالد وحسن غزال

على مدى ستة عقود سابقة فقدت القرى التي تم ضمها إلى حدود بلدية نابلس مناطق زراعية، ومراعي، وسهول تقدر بنحو 18000 دونم. وقد تناولت هذه الدراسة التغيرات الحاصلة في استخدامات أراضي القرى التي تم ضمها لحدود بلدية نابلس. ووجدت الدراسة أن استخدامات الأراضي في 15 قرية تم ضمها لحدود بلدية نابلس تغيرت منذ 1963-2016. وخلصت الدراسة إلى حدوث تغير في استخدامات الأراضي من أراضي زراعية، مراعي وسهول إلى استخدامات جديدة صناعية، سكنية، تجارية ... إلخ. وتبين أن مساحة

الأرض الزراعية كانت عام 1963، 3000 دونم، ومساحة السهول 6000 دونم ، والمراعي 9000 دونم، وإن جميع هذه المساحات قد اختفت تقريباً وتم تحويلها إلى استخدامات أراضي جديدة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: استعمالات الأراضي ، ضم الأراضي ، حدود بلدية نابلس

Estudo de Caso de Mudanças no Uso do Solo e Análise Espacial do Desenvolvimento Urbano: Campo de Shu'fat Zona de Jerusalém

Mohammad Muhsen, Mustapha El Hannini e Ahamd Abu Hammad

Este estudo analisa as mudanças ocorridas entre 1997 e 2019 no uso dos solos na área de refúgios de Shu'fat, a nordeste de Jerusalém, uma das mais populosas e densas a viver um complexo dilema geopolítico.

O objetivo é identificar as principais transformações demográficas e que acompanharam o processo de desenvolvimento urbano em Shu'fat. O método de análise baseia-se em duas fotografias aéreas, 1997 e 2019, que utilizando o SIG (software Arc map 10.5), permitem detetar alterações do uso do solo e no desenvolvimento urbano .

Os resultados revelam que depois de 2005 a área sofreu um intenso desenvolvimento urbano devido ao elevado crescimento populacional, o que está fortemente ligado à construção do Muro de separação pelos israelitas. Daqui resultou um elevado ritmo anual de desenvolvimento urbano de cerca de 72,6 %, aumentando a superfície da área construída de terra sem culturas. Outro resultado significativo foi a alteração das características da paisagem natural, nomeadamente das áreas florestais. São evidentes as importantes transformações socioeconómicas, da paisagem rural para áreas urbanas condensadas.

Palavras-chave: Uso do solo, desenvolvimento urbano, paisagem natural.

Land use changes and spatial analysis of an urban development case study: Shu'fat camp area of Jerusalem

This study discusses the changes on land-use between 1997 and 2019 in the Shu'fat refugee camp area, one of the most populous and dense areas under a complex geopolitical dilemma in northeast Jerusalem. This paper aims to find the main demographic and spatiotemporal transformations that accompanied the process of urban development in the Shu'fat refugees camp area. The analysis method is based on two aerial photos - 1997 and 2019 - which using GIS (Arc map 10.5 software) detect land-use changes and the urban development of the area .

The study area experienced an intense urban sprawl due to the high population growth after 2005, which is strongly connected to the building of the separation Wall by the Israelis. This resulted in a yearly pace of urban development of about 72.6 % by increasing the built-up area surface of bare land. Furthermore, the change of the characteristics of the natural landscape, such as forest area, is another significant result. Important socioeconomic transformations from rural landscapes to condensed urban-look are evident.

Keywords: Land use, urban development, natural landscape, Shu'fat Camp.

Étude de cas des changements d'utilisation des sols et analyse spatiale du développement urbain: Le quartier du camp de Shu'fat à Jérusalem

Cette étude traite des changements qui ont eu lieu dans l'utilisation des terres dans la zone du camp de réfugiés de Shu'fat, l'une des zones les plus peuplées et les plus denses sous un dilemme géopolitique complexe au nord-est de Jérusalem, au cours de la période entre 1997 et 2019. Cet article vise à trouver les principales transformations démographiques et spatio-temporelles qui ont accompagné le processus de développement urbain dans la zone du

camp de réfugiés de Shu'fat. La méthode d'analyse est basée sur deux photos aériennes, 1997 et 2019 qui permettent détecter les changements d'utilisation du sol et le développement urbain de la zone en utilisant le SIG (logiciel Arc map 10.5) durant cette période.

Les résultats ont révélé que la zone d'étude a connu un développement urbain intense en raison de la forte croissance démographique après 2005, qui est fortement liée à la construction du mur de séparation par les Israéliens. Cela a entraîné un rythme élevé de développement urbain d'environ 72,6 % en augmentant la surface construite de terres non cultivées. En outre, le changement des caractéristiques du paysage naturel, comme les forêts, est un autre résultat significatif. En outre, d'importantes transformations socio-économiques, du milieu rural à l'aspect urbain condensé, sont évidentes.

Mots-clés: Utilisation des terres, développement urbain, paysage naturel, Camp de Shu'fat.

النمو العمراني وتحليل استخدامات الأراضي في حاضرة مدينة القدس: مخيم شعفاط كحالة دراسية

محمد محسن، مصطفى الهيني وأحمد أبو حماد

تناقش هذه الورقة دراسة الحيز المكاني في منطقة مخيم شعفاط الواقع في حاضرة مدينة القدس وضمن حدود بلدية القدس من حيث التصنيف الإداري ما بعد عام 2005، والتي تزامنت مع بناء جدار الفصل العنصري من قبل سلطات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي. وتهدف الورقة إلى دراسة مجموعة التحولات الحيزية المكانية والاجتماعية وما يرتبط بها من آثار سلبية انعكست على طبيعة المشهد الحضري والاجتماعي في منطقة الدراسة ضمن منطقة تتميز بارتفاع نسبة الكثافة السكانية مقارنة مع باقي التجمعات الفلسطينية. وقد اعتمدت الدراسة على التحليل المراقب في دراسة التغيرات الحيزية المكانية لاستخدامات الأراضي من خلال صور جوية للفترة ما بين 1997-2019 بواسطة استخدام برامج نظم المعلومات الجغرافية.

تجدر الإشارة إلى أن الدراسة خلصت بنتائج أهمها ارتفاع وتيرة النمو العمراني بشكل متسارع ما بعد عام 2005 حيث وصلت نسبة الزيادة في المساحة المبنية ما يقارب 72.6% خلال فترة الدراسة، حيث اتسم هذا النمو بالعشوائية والفوضوية بالتخطيط مما نتج عنه

مشهد عمراني مكتظ غير منظم، ارتبط معه مجموعة من الآثار الاجتماعية والاقتصادية كالتباين في تركيب الطبقة الاجتماعية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: استخدامات الأراضي - التطوير العمراني - المناظر الطبيعية - مخيم شعفاط

Autodesenvolvimento Urbano de um Campo de Refugiados Palestinos em Jerusalém

Halima Abu Haneya

Este documento analisa a forma como os povos indígenas se autodesenvolvem e como reproduzem o espaço para superar a sua precariedade. Centra-se nos refugiados do Campo Shu'fat em Jerusalém, que conseguiram satisfazer a sua crescente necessidade de alojamento, para si e para outros Jerusalemitas, procurando manter o estatuto de residência na sua cidade. Isto faz-se através do rastreio das práticas auto-urbanas dos refugiados do Campo de Shu'fat, isto é, como formas de ação coletiva não organizada. Esta investigação pesquisa estratégias dos povos indígenas para controlar as mudanças nas suas vidas.

Os dados deste trabalho baseiam-se em dezenas de entrevistas semiestruturadas na Área dos campos de refugiados. A investigação utiliza o conceito de colonialismo de povoamento como quadro analítico geral; baseia-se na análise de poder e resistência de Lila Abu Lughod (1990) e no conceito de “não-movimentos sociais” de Asef Bayat (2013). A investigação enfatiza os residentes de Shu'fat como agentes activos e não apenas como vítimas ou destinatários passivos das políticas e medidas impostas por Israel.

Palavras-chave: Colonialismo de colonos, auto desenvolvimento urbano, campo de refugiados Shu'fat, não-movimentos sociais.

Urban self-development of a Palestinian refugee camp in Jerusalem

This paper examines how indigenous people are self-developed and how they reproduce

their space to overcome their precariousness. It focuses on the refugees of Shu'fat Camp in Jerusalem, who were able to fulfil their growing need for housing and provide accommodation for other Jerusalemites, seeking affordable housing to maintain their residency status in their city. This is done by tracing the self-urban practices of the Shu'fat Camp refugees as forms of unorganized collective action. Specifically, this research investigates the power strategies of the indigenous people in order to control changes in their own lives.

The data in this paper comes from dozens of semi-structured interviews in the camp. The research uses settler colonialism as a general analytical framework and relies on Lila Abu Lughod's (1990) analysis of power and resistance and Asef Bayat's (2013) concept of “social non-movements.” The research emphasizes Shu'fat residents as active people of agency and not only victims or passive recipients of Israel's policies and measures imposed on them.

Keywords: Settler colonialism, urban self-developments, Shu'fat refugee camp, social non-movements.

Autodéveloppement urbain d'un camp de réfugiés palestiniens à Jérusalem

Cet article examine comment les autochtones s'auto-développent et comment ils reproduisent leur espace pour surmonter leur précarité. Il se concentre sur les réfugiés du camp de Shu'fat à Jérusalem, qui ont répondu à leur besoin croissant de logement et ont fourni un hébergement à d'autres habitants de Jérusalem, en essayant de maintenir un statut de résidents dans leur ville. Ainsi, nous retraçons les pratiques d'auto-urbanisation des réfugiés du camp de Shu'fat, qui sont considérées comme des formes d'action collective non organisée. Plus précisément, cette recherche étudie les stratégies des autochtones pour contrôler les changements dans leur vie.

Les données de cet article sont basées sur des dizaines d'entretiens semi-structurés dans le camp. La recherche utilise le concept de colonialisme de peuplement comme cadre ana-

lytique général; elle s'appuie sur l'analyse du pouvoir et de la résistance de Lila Abu Lughod (1990) et sur le concept de “non-mouvements sociaux” d'Asef Bayat (2013). La recherche met l'accent sur les résidents de Shu'fat en tant qu'agents actifs et non seulement comme victimes ou destinataires passifs des politiques et mesures israéliennes qui leur sont imposées.

Mots-clés: Colonialisme des colons, auto-développements urbains, camp de réfugiés de Shu'fat, non-mouvements sociaux.

التطوير الذاتي الحضري لمخيم للاجئين الفلسطينيين في القدس
حليمة أبو هنية

تبحث هذه الورقة في كيفية تطوير السكان الأصليين لأنفسهم وإعادة انتاج فضائهم بهدف التغلب على هشاشة أوضاعهم. وتركز الورقة على لاجئي مخيم شعفاط في القدس، والذين تمكنوا من تلبية احتياجاتهم المتزايدة للسكن وتوفير السكن لغيرهم من المقدسيين الباحثين عن سكن بتكلفة معقولة بهدف الحفاظ على إقامتهم في مدينتهم. يتم ذلك من خلال تتبع القوى الاقتصادية الاجتماعية بين سكان المخيم وممارساتهم الذاتية الحضرية التي ينظر إليها كشكل من أشكال العمل الجماعي غير المنظم. تحديدا تبحث هذه الورقة في أشكال القوة التي يمتلكها السكان الأصليون لتمكينهم من إحداث التغيير في حياتهم. تستند البيانات الواردة في هذه الورقة على عشرات المقابلات شبه المنظمة في المخيم. يستخدم البحث الاستعمار الاستيطاني كإطار عام، ويعتمد على تحليل ليلي أبو لغد (1990) للسلطة والمقاومة ومفهوم أصف بيات (2013) حول “اللاحركات الاجتماعية”. يؤكد البحث على أن لاجئي مخيم شعفاط هم أشخاص فاعلون يمتلكون القوة للتغيير وليسوا فقط ضحايا أو متلقين سلبيين للسياسات والإجراءات الإسرائيلية المفروضة عليهم.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الاستعمار الاستيطاني، التطورات الذاتية الحضرية، مخيم شعفاط للاجئين، اللاحركات الاجتماعية

Educação ambiental e mudanças climáticas em um contexto colonial

Mazin B. Qumsiyeh, Reena Saeed, Mohammad Najajrah, Nedat Katbeh-Badr, Hadeel Ikhamais, Otto Simonett, Alex Mackey e Maria E. Libert

O desenvolvimento e a utilização eficaz de módulos educativos práticos para a adaptação e mitigação das alterações climáticas de formas localmente sensíveis são fundamentais para a sustentabilidade. Um projeto deste tipo foi implementado em escolas na Palestina em estreita cooperação e diálogo entre o meio académico e uma ONG ambiental em parceria com as autoridades nacionais. Painéis, cartazes, apresentações em *powerpoint* e vídeos (em árabe e inglês) foram produzidos através de consultas alargadas, participação de peritos, e reuniões de grupos focais.

Seis dimensões (culturalmente sensíveis, localmente relevantes) da nossa área foram constituídos de modo a promover a sustentabilidade: Agricultura, Biodiversidade, Geografia, Energia e Transportes, Alterações Climáticas, e Resíduos e Produtos Químicos. Inicialmente os pacotes educacionais foram utilizados e divulgados a educadores e estudantes de 14 escolas médias da Cisjordânia, e depois amplamente partilhados noutras escolas quando estas realizaram visitas ao museu. O material educativo foi também partilhado a nível regional (Jordânia, EAU, etc.) e global (inclusive exibido na COP25). O material sobre alterações climáticas foi implementado no Instituto Palestino para a Biodiversidade e Sustentabilidade em muitas exposições e módulos educativos, beneficiando milhares mesmo sob as difíceis condições da ocupação israelita.

Palavras-chave: Mudança de comportamento, Palestina, Estudantes do ensino médio, Utilização de museus.

Environmental education and climate change in a colonial context

Developing and effectively using practical educational modules for adaptation to and mitigation of climate change in locally sensitive ways is critical for sustainability. Such a project was implemented in schools in Palestine in close cooperation and dialogue between academia and an environmental NGO in partnership with national authorities. Panels, posters, power point presentations, and videos (in Arabic and Eng-

lish) were produced via extensive consultation, expert engagements, and focus group meetings. Six field areas region (culturally sensitive, locally relevant) were specifically “packaged” within our region in ways to promote sustainability: Agriculture, Biodiversity, Geography, Energy and Transportation, Climate Change, and Waste and Chemicals. The educational packages were then used and disseminated to educators and students at 14 middle schools in the West Bank initially and shared widely in others schools when they conducted visits to the museum. The educational material were also shared regionally (Jordan, UAE etc.) and globally (including shown at COP25). Climate change material was implemented in the Palestine Institute for Biodiversity and Sustainability in many exhibits and educational modules benefitting thousands even under the difficult conditions of Israeli occupation.

Keywords: Behavioral change, Palestine, Middle School Students, museum usage.

Éducation environnementale et changement climatique dans un contexte colonial

L'élaboration et l'utilisation efficace de modules éducatifs pratiques pour l'adaptation au changement climatique et l'atténuation de ses effets de manière sensible au niveau local sont essentielles pour la durabilité. Un tel projet a été mis en œuvre dans des écoles en Palestine en étroite coopération et en dialogue entre le monde universitaire et une ONG environnementale en partenariat avec les autorités nationales. Des panneaux, des affiches, des présentations PowerPoint et des vidéos (en arabe et en anglais) ont été produits à l'issue de consultations approfondies, d'engagements d'experts et de réunions de groupes de discussion. Six domaines ont été spécifiquement “emballés” en rapport avec notre région (culturellement sensibles, localement pertinents) de manière à promouvoir la durabilité: l'agriculture, la biodiversité, la géographie, l'énergie et le transport, le changement climatique, les déchets et les produits chimiques. Les kits pédagogiques ont

ensuite été utilisés et diffusés auprès des éducateurs et des élèves de 14 collèges de Cisjordanie dans un premier temps, puis largement partagés dans d'autres écoles lors des visites du musée. Le matériel éducatif a également été diffusé au niveau régional (Jordanie, EAU, etc.) et mondial (notamment lors de la COP25). Le matériel sur le changement climatique a été mis en œuvre à l'Institut Palestinien pour la Biodiversité et la Durabilité dans de nombreuses expositions et modules éducatifs dont des milliers de personnes ont bénéficié, même dans les conditions difficiles de l'occupation israélienne.

Mots-clés: Changement de comportement, Palestine, élèves du secondaire, utilisation des musées.

التربية البيئية وتغير المناخ في سياق استعماري
مازن قمصية، رينا سعيد، محمد ناجرة، نضال
كاتبة بدر، هديل اخميس، أوتو سيمونيت، أليكس
ماكاي ماريا ليبيرت

يعد تطوير الوحدات التعليمية العملية واستخدامها بشكل فعال للتكيف مع تغير المناخ والتخفيف من حدته بطرق فاعلة محلياً أمراً بالغ الأهمية لتحقيق الاستدامة. تم تنفيذ هذا المشروع في المدارس في فلسطين بالتعاون الوثيق والحوار بين الأوساط الأكاديمية ومنظمة غير حكومية ببنية بالشراكة مع السلطات الوطنية. تم إنتاج اللوحات والملصقات وعروض ومقاطع الفيديو (باللغتين العربية والإنجليزية) من خلال مشاورات مكثفة ومشاركات الخبراء. شمل العمل ستة مجالات على وجه التحديد تتعلق بمنطقتنا (حساسية ثقافياً وذات صلة محلياً) بطرق لتعزيز الاستدامة: الزراعة، والتنوع البيولوجي، والجغرافيا، والطاقة والنقل، وتغير المناخ، والنفايات والمواد الكيميائية. تم بعد ذلك استخدام الحزم التعليمية وتوزيعها على المعلمين والطلاب في 14 مدرسة متوسطة في الضفة الغربية في البداية وتم مشاركتها على نطاق واسع في مدارس أخرى عندما قاموا بزيارات إلى المتحف. كما تمت مشاركة المواد التعليمية إقليمياً وعالمياً بما في ذلك عرض في اجتماعات الأطراف الموقعة. تم الاستفادة من المواد أيضاً في معهد فلسطين للتنوع البيولوجي والاستدامة في العديد من المعارض والوحدات التعليمية التي استفاد منها الآلاف حتى في ظل ظروف الاحتلال الإسرائيلي الصعبة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: التغيير السلوكي، فلسطين، طلاب المدارس المتوسطة، استخدام المتاحف

Integração Tripartida da SADC-EAC-COMESA: perspectivas e implicações para a SADC

André Luiz Reis da Silva e Vasco Alberto Banze

A Integração Tripartida entre a Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADC), Comunidade da África Oriental (EAC) e Mercado Comum da África Oriental e Austral (COMESA) é uma iniciativa na qual chefes de Estado e de Governo tiveram de integrar as suas políticas numa única área de livre comércio. O principal objetivo do artigo foi analisar as perspectivas e as possíveis implicações da integração tripartida para SADC. Com base na abordagem qualitativa coadjuvada com as técnicas documental e bibliográfica, constatou-se a existência de duas visões, uma optimista e uma pragmática, que divergem em relação ao custo-benefício da integração tripartida. A visão optimista prevê benefícios enquanto os pragmáticos calculam custos. A pesquisa constatou ainda mais fatores de fraqueza do que de força para uma eventual implementação da integração tripartida, pelo facto de concorrer no mesmo espaço e tempo com a Área de Livre Comércio Continental (ALCC). Assim, tanto a entrada em vigor da Integração Tripartida, como da ALCC terão implicações negativas para a SADC, em custos financeiros e humanos, na redução da receita aduaneira, na base do orçamento do plano económico e social dos seus Estados membros e no retrocesso, mais um, da sua agenda de integração regional.

Palavras-chave: Integração Africana, Integração Tripartida, SADC, COMESA, EAC.

The Triple Integration of SADC-EAC-COMESA: Perspectives and Implications for SADC

The Tripartite Integration among the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is an initiative of Heads of State and Government of the three Regional

Economic Communities (RECs) to integrate their separated programs into a single free trade area. Based on qualitative research supported by documentary and bibliographic techniques, this article analyses the perspectives and implications of tripartite integration on SADC. It shows the existence of two views - an optimistic and a pragmatic one - with different perspectives as regards to the cost and benefit of tripartite integration. The optimistic view expects benefits from tripartite integration while the pragmatic understanding counts its costs. The study found out that the eventual implementation of tripartite integration will have negative impact on SADC, in terms of financial and human resources costs, reduction of governmental customs revenue and the setback of its regional integration agenda.

Keywords: African Integration, Tripartite Integration, SADC, EAC, COMESA.

Le Triple Integration de la SADC-EAC-COMESA: perspectives et Implications pour la SADC

L'intégration tripartite entre la Communauté de Développement de l'Afrique Australe (SADC), la Communauté d'Afrique de l'Est (CAE) et le Marché Commun de l'Afrique Orientale et Australe (COMESA) est une initiative des chefs d'État et de gouvernement des trois communautés économiques régionales (CER) visant à intégrer leurs programmes séparés dans une zone de libre-échange unique. Basé sur une recherche qualitative soutenue par des techniques documentaires et bibliographiques, l'article analyse les perspectives et les implications de l'intégration tripartite sur la SADC. Le travail révèle l'existence de points de vue optimistes et pragmatiques avec des perspectives différentes, concernant le coût et les avantages de l'intégration tripartite. Le point de vue optimiste attend des avantages de l'intégration tripartite, tandis que le point de vue pragmatique compte les coûts. L'étude a révélé que la mise en œuvre éventuelle

de l'intégration tripartite aura un impact négatif sur la SADC, en termes de coûts financiers et de ressources humaines, de réduction des recettes douanières gouvernementales et de recul de son programme d'intégration régionale.

Mots-clés: Intégration africaine, Intégration tripartite, SADC, EAC, COMESA.

التكامل الثلاثي لمجموعة SADC-EAC-COMESA: وجهات النظر ولإ انعكاسات على مجموعة التنمية للجنوب الأفريقي

أندريه لويس ريس دا سيلفا

فاسكو ألبرتو بانزي

التكامل الثلاثي للسوق المشتركة لشرق و جنوب أفريقيا، مجموعة شرق أفريقيا و المجموعة الإنمائية للجنوب الأفريقي: الآثار والنسبة للمجموعة الإنمائية للجنوب الأفريقي .

يعتبر التكامل الثلاثي بين الجماعة الإنمائية للجنوب الأفريقي، جماعة شرق إفريقيا والسوق المشتركة لشرق وجنوب إفريقيا مبادرة كان على رؤساء الدول والحكومات دمج سياساتهم في منطقة تجارة حرة واحدة. كان الهدف الرئيسي من هذا المقال هو تحليل وجهات النظر والآثار المحتملة للتكامل الثلاثي الأطراف بالنسبة للجماعة الإنمائية للجنوب الأفريقي. بناءً على النهج النوعي المدعوم بالتقنيات الوثائقية والبليوغرافية، وجد أن هناك رأيين، أحدهما متفائل والآخر عملي، يختلفان فيما يتعلق بالتكلفة والعائد للتكامل الثلاثي. تتنبأ النظرة المتفائلة بالفوائد بينما يحسب البراغمتيون التكاليف. وجد الاستطلاع عوامل ضعف أكثر من قوة التنفيذ النهائي للتكامل الثلاثي، بسبب حقيقة أنه يتنافس في نفس المكان والزمان مع منطقة التجارة الحرة القارية. وبالتالي، فإن دخول التكامل الثلاثي ومنطقة التجارة الحرة القارية حيز التنفيذ سيكون له آثار سلبية على الجماعة الإنمائية للجنوب الأفريقي، من حيث التكاليف المالية والبشرية، في خفض الإيرادات الجمركية، على أساس ميزانية الخطة الاقتصادية و من الدول الأعضاء وفي انتكاسة أخرى لأجندة التكامل الإقليمي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: التكامل الأفريقي؛ تكامل ثلاثي، السوق المشتركة لشرق وجنوب أفريقيا ، جماعة شرق أفريقيا الأفريقية ، الجماعة الإنمائية للجنوب الأفريقي

Legenda das ilustrações

1. A peculiarity of the Palesitinan urban landscape is the multitude of black plastic-made or metallic water cisterns on the roofs of buildings and houses. They result from the Israeli policy of rationing water to the Palestinian population (these cisterns are absent from the Israeli Settlements in the same environment). August 2014. Photo: Carmo Matos.
2. Hisham Palace Mosaic: peace and harmony on one side and killing on other. Jericho, Palestine, 2021. Photo: PMNH.
3. Vaccination procedures at Bir-Zeit University. Birzeit, Palestine, July 2021. Photo: Lama Qundah.
4. A Jerusalem dweller (Ahmad Kiswani) taking the COVID-19 vaccine. Jerusalem, 2019. Photo: Private collection.
5. Grafitti in Ramalah. August 2014. Photo: Carmo Matos.
6. Traditional agriculture near Bethlehem. August 2014. Photo: Carmo Matos.
7. Palestinian urban landscape on the road Bethlehem-Jericho. August 2014. Photo: Carmo Matos.
8. Palestinian youth learning about environmental stewardship in a field trip near Bethlehem, 2019. Photo: Palestine Institute for Biodiversity and Sustainability.
9. Paintings of destroyed Palestinian villages in a Bethlehem Wall. August 2014. Photo: Carmo Matos.
10. Jordan banks near Jericho. August 2014. Photo: Carmo Matos.
11. Issa Musa Adwan. Bethlehem, Palestine Institute for Biodiversity and Sustainability, January 2022. Photo: Mohammad Najajrah.
12. "In Palestine nature is simple but beautiful" (Mahmoud Darwich). Olive trees in Ramalah Eastern Highlands. January 2018. Photo: Mustapha El Hannani.
13. Kamal Abdulfattah at home. Birzeit, West Bank, Palestine. 7th November 2021. Photo: Ahmad Abu Hammad.
14. View of the outskirts of historic Jerusalem. August 2014. Photo: Carmo Matos.
15. Main building of the Mongua Comuna (Parish). Kunene, Angola. August 2011. Photo: Maciel Santos.
16. Building permit. Ondjiva, Kunene, Angola. August 2011. Photo: Maciel Santos.

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 - Articles/chapters in collective books: Matos, A. (2002), “Os novos políticos africanos”, in, Rodrigues, Carlos, Matos, A. e Silva, António (orgs.), *Os novos poderes em África*, Porto: Campo das Letras.
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