ÁFRICA E OS ODS: OBJETIVOS COM FUTURO?

PVP 10€

ISSN 0874-2375

CENTRO DE ESTUDOS AFRICANOS
UNIVERSIDADE DO PORTO

FCT
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia

Africana Studia

38

ÁFRICA E OS ODS: OBJETIVOS COM FUTURO?

Africana Studia

Africana Studia

REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE ESTUDOS AFRICANOS
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES
Revista Semestral – 2.º Semestre 2022

38

ÁFRICA E OS ODS: OBJETIVOS COM FUTURO?

Centro de Estudos Africanos
Universidade do Porto

Whither Diversion or Broadening the Bargaining Space: Why Africa Needs New Non-traditional Partners in Development Cooperation

Armstrong Mudzengerere*

pp. 143-152

1. Introduction

The field of development cooperation has become a function of complex geopolitical and geoeconomic changes driven by numerous crises. Global development now inculcates a multitude of processes, actors and epistemologies and this is transversal to all countries (Chakrabarti & Chaturvedi, 2021). The cessation of the traditional hegemonic centers of legitimacy and the proliferation of new actors in development cooperation represents the multiplex nature of the world order. This presents a new context of the fragmentation of practices and actors in development cooperation (Klingebiel *et al.*, 2016). Within that scope, South-South Development Cooperation (DC) has garnered much attention in recent times among states, policymakers, academics and its scope has encompassed largely economic cooperation, vaccine diplomacy, health, education, research, and development initiatives. Chaturvedi *et al.* (2021) argues that coalition magnets in South-South development cooperation should strengthen the solidary endeavors between developing countries based on horizontality, non-interventionist and creating mutual benefits for cooperating partners focusing on knowledge exchange. In hindsight anecdotes have been risen on whether the ethos of the coalition magnets are still intact or have long pronged.

The dynamism and number of platforms for DC in the trendy Africa+1 summits create a romanticism binge of an endearment to a continent taking center stage but at what cost to economic sovereignty and the unparalleled growth of African markets? The study questions the incipient largesse of certain countries within the South-South DC as the conditionalities and the demand driven aspect of concession loans do not represent mutuality but lofty primitive accumulation initiatives. Gelpern *et al.* (2021) argues that Chinese lenders show considerable ingenuity in adopting, expanding standard contract tools to maximize their repayment prospects and lender controlled revenue accounts to protect Chinese interest in borrowing countries. This is corroborated by Ndii (n.d.) who argues that an inordinate burden has been replicated in the incipient concession loans from South-South Development Cooperation with partners like China which are demand driven and serve investment

https://doi.org/10.21747/0874-2375/afr38a8

* **European Interdisciplinary Master African Studies**.

interests. In what the study terms Africa's basket strategy in DC, the study argues that it important to examine how the decoupling of South-South DC norms changes the dimensions of development cooperation. Succinctly the reality is that African priorities are not on the agenda of the purported summits as the motives and strategies of African governments are not aligned to interest and priorities of summit agendas. The incompatibility of the incentives of aid and concessions loans with development priorities in Africa have been depicted by Africa's failure to converge with the rest of world due to a lackluster in terms of economic growth.

Howbeit the novel contribution of this paper suggests a diversion to direct sector-based cooperation with new non-conventional actors to promote agriculture transformation, digitalization and intra Africa trade as priority frontiers that transmute and accrete development. The UAE and Vietnam as embryonic models of development are offering an opportunity for shared learning and growth, technology transfer, information sharing preceded by "learning by doing together". The learning involves investing in the basics and development being localized with regions focusing on their strengths rather than following a centralized development structure. For the UAE and Vietnam investment in building a robust human capital base and prioritizing agriculture as a means of addressing food-security with rice being the foundation of agriculture production formed the base of spur in economic growth respectively. Cooperation should be based on identified mutual benefits and clearly defined responsibilities in the cooperation arrangement (Buba, 2022). Part of what the UAE and Vietnam are putting on the table for Africa are complementarities in formal partnership based on sector-based development which surmounts government-to-government relations and inculcates business-to-business actors.

In proposing this avenue of thought for new nontraditional partners, the paper seeks to recenter the discourse on the specific investment needs of Africa, "putting money where Africa needs the money" to be able to position itself on a trajectory towards sustainable development. As countries that have successfully benefited from accelerated capital investment from multinational companies, the paper highlights how the UAE and Vietnam are exporting the same model and ideas for serious investments in agriculture and digital technologies for intra Africa trade.

2. Objectives

– Examine how non-conventional partners proffer better complementarities for direct cooperation that supports and is aligned to African priorities.
– Analyze the implications of diversion to evolving non-conventional partners in intra-African trade and agricultural productivity to support structural transformation.

3. Africa's Plurilateral Platforms: Why the Shifting perspective?

This segment of the paper depicts an analysis of the asymmetric complex nature of China-Africa, European Union-Africa, United States-Africa relations. In proffering this assessment the study employed a contextual approach by Tull (2006) which incorporates the need to "avoid falling prey to the caricature, crude stereotyping or a trap of moral relativism where the EU is held on one standard and China on another standard" (Tull, 2006). Under the auspices of such a caveat the study aimed to provide a balanced account of the salient features of the Africa-EU and Africa-China relations. This will assess to what extent Africa's engagement in DC structures, summits are effective and benefits the continent's economic priorities. Soulé (2020) argues that African countries are seeking to attract foreign investment, partner diversification and showcase themselves as safe havens for investment in Africa+1 Summits. However, this promotes a frantic race to the bottom amongst African states. Succinctly it's time for Africa to stop presenting itself as a cheap geopolitical date for external powers seeking to gratify their economic interests.

3.1. "Have the Rules of the game changed" Contextualizing South-South DC

The study uses the example of China as a prime example due to its dominant activities in Africa. In hindsight the paper questions whether China still resembled the principles of South-South development cooperation based on the language of horizontality, reciprocity and relationality. The motives of the "gift that keeps giving camouflage" is the scope of this prognosis. China is viewed as a benign force offering solidarity and needed economic support with limited political conditionality. Mthembu & Mabera (2020a) claims that China has engendered win-win relations with Africa countries, ensured the principle on non-interference in domestic affairs, mutual interests and the respect of the principle of state sovereignty. For the past decade this has somewhat stained the gaze of the EU and the USA and positioned China as the premium preferable alternative for African countries in their engagements with external powers. Bordered and embedded into economic, military, foreign policy and geopolitical strategies, China's comprehensive strategy is now being fronted by the *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI) as the centerpiece of China's foreign policy (Ohashi, 2018). The BRI is a transcontinental plan which aims to create a network that links Africa, Central Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

However, the ascendance of China in Africa has been met by an increased number of literatures which has accused China of buttressing corruption in state linked companies in Angola, Chinese massive telecommunication companies like Huawei have also been accused of aiding governments like Zambia and Uganda in censorship, spying on activists, political opponents which aids authoritarian regimes. The Armed Conflicts and Data Project argues that in countries where Chinese aid is increasing there is a corresponding increase in political violence which involves state forces (Munday, 2021). The study suggests that there is need to question the protrusion of such conundrums as the expansion of China in Africa echoes how China views Africa as playing ground where it can make mistakes and nobody is going to take note of it.

In addition, Chellaney (2021) argues that African countries have fallen prey to the debt trap diplomacy as China is weaponizing debt to expand its economic, military and political foothold in Africa. It can be argued whether China took a note from the European playbook and it is using debt as an enslavement tool mimicking a colonial era practise. This raises questions of a growing hidden debt problem in Africa. Chellaney (2021) concurs that the "debt for equity swaps" which is a resource-based lending practice evident in countries like Angola, Sudan and Congo show the pervasive, exploitative nature of Chinese lending with a hidden agenda of ceding strategic resources. However, the Perspective (2022) terms this a misplaced hysteria on the alleged debt trap diplomacy, he posits that the biggest challenge for African countries arising from China's commercial forays in the region is the apparent proliferation of unsuccessful mega projects, nonchalance about rank bureaucratic incompetence and debilitating corruption.

Were (2018) says that economically China seeks to assert a dominant investment presence and secure Africa's natural resources for its domestic growth. In light of this China's economic engagements with Africa are almost entirely on its terms. In addition, (Sun, 2014) points out that habitually Chinese loans are backed by African natural resources yet infrastructural development aid is typically tied to service contracts with 70 % of such contracts allotted to Chinese companies. Therefore, China's investments in Africa mainly create businesses for Chinese companies and jobs for Chinese people. This raises questions on whether the investments in Africa involve skill or technology transfers. Hsu (2014) states that on labour relations African workers hired by Chinese companies are paid "extremely low wages" and "frequently suffer verbal and physical abuse from Chinese managers and are treated as inferiors". However, Rudyak (2022) argues that China is shifting priorities from a infrastructure centric, loan heavy approach to a greater emphasis on trade promotion and facilitation its "we help them, they help us" which symbolically affords the recipient status in the continuous gift cycle initiated in Bandung unlike Northern which aid does not.

3.2. Contextualizing EU- Africa, USA-Africa Cooperation

"Seeing a speck in a friend's eye and missing the log in oneself" skepticism should not only be leveled against China as some countries in the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) have also been complicit primed by their double standards in terms of the promotion of democracy in Africa. Inherent, genuine skepticism and venerable tensions have always surrounded the sincerity of the support of democracy, stability by the EU for example the France has been accused of being in complicity to destabilize, create an ecosystem of violence in Western Africa to maintain a grip on Francophone through engineering conflicts, stoking political crises, marking the assassination of leaders and supporting coups. The capture of a former French mercenary guised as a journalist in Bangui in the capital city of the Central African Republic whilst trafficking arms to train the Seleka rebels show how EU countries are culpable in aiding terrorism and authoritarian regimes (Anadolu Agency, 2021).

The EU has for long viewed Africa through the lens of official development assistance which characterizes donor recipient relations (Mthembu & Mabera, 2020b). Britain though a former member has also been accused of funding repressive regimes across the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. The fissure between rhetoric in terms of human rights, democracy and the opposite actions which cause destabilization has given rise to accusations of hypocrisy which to a greater degree is counterproductive to homegrown prodemocratic efforts in Africa. Therefore, it can be argued that the West has no moral authority to lecture democracy as their moralizing attitude is hypocritical as evidenced by how they also support authoritarian governments in Rwanda, Cameroon and Tanzania depicting how they advance their self-interest. It can be argued that the EU divides the authoritarian regimes into good and bad regimes depending on how they are in good terms or whether they proffer something. The EU's global *Gateway* and *Build Back Better* presents its new strategies towards Africa. The complex analysis of Africa as an embattled continent renders the constellation of a caveat that shows that both China and the EU have skeletons within their closets as asymmetrical, lopsided relations with Africa are evident in all the spheres. Wekesa (2021) argues that the prevalent literature and narratives always show Africa at the receiving end of policies, depicting how external powers in their engagements with Africa always have a policy framework with a detailed, tangible analysis on how to implement it yet Africa remains clouded in ambiguity.

4. African Priorities: Africa is a business case not a humanitarian case

African countries need to model their own development trajectory based on African priorities and factor endowments like vast arable land for agriculture which means trawling back to the basics. The view that Africa is not economically sovereign is not a new conception.

Amin (1987) has already stated that the world system historically thrives on constraining the economic sovereignty of the periphery. Therefore, the question is in the trendy summit diplomacy era (Africa+1 Summits) what is stopping them from using the same formula? Simply put, the gatekeepers of the global financial institutions and capitalism cannot support the push for sovereign economic policies because profit accumulation is based on global extractivism from the periphery, labour exploitation and dispossession (Rodney, 2018). With the current geopolitical system reinforcing asymmetries Africa needs to assert its position and priorities. Editeur (2019: 9) states that "make your diagnosis on your own terms." This depicts that the lack of the continent's own priority diagnosis has been the underlying cause of exploitation and failure of development policies through lack of appropriation. This idea is tied with one of the cardinal philosophical foundations of martial arts which is "When the student is ready, the master appears." Therefore, Africa needs to asserts its priorities to usher a development trajectory.

The study submits Intra Africa trade and increase in agricultural productivity as priorities for the renaissance of Africa. Intra Africa trade has never crossed the 20 % threshold as in 2020-2021 it stood at 17.93 % highlighting the lack of regional integration (Amusan, 2022). This view is corroborated by Samy (2022) who argues that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the least integrated region with low share of international trade. To engender a vantage standpoint, Africa needs an economic policy. Therefore, the operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which was established with the objective of engendering a single African market for goods and services, with free movement of persons and investments presents a huge untapped remedy to the throes of global trade imbalances (UNDP & AfCFTA, n.d.). Likewise, by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers the AfCFTA will facilitate intra trade in food products and will facilitate a possibly cheaper trade of agricultural produce within the continent (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2022). However, the stunted growth of Africa intra trade also emanates from the poor's digital economy underscored by the lack of telecommunication, internet access, digitalization, smart cities and AI technologies. Oloruntoba & Falola (2021) attest that weak e–commerce, digital transactions, currencies disappointingly affect digital economies inversely limiting cross-border trade. Digitalization is imperative to transform intra Africa trade and regional value chains as the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic buttressed the importance of e-commerce. In relation to agriculture production, it is argued that in digital innovation there is huge knowledge gap in Africa on the deployment uptake and continued use of digital application and platforms aimed at small scale agriculture innovation systems (Hodder, 2022). Investment in low-cost mobile digital solutions meant for agricultural development is necessary for African countries as they have the lowest productive agricultural sectors in the world mostly due to lack of investment in infrastructure, inputs and extension services. Low agricultural productivity is a colossal stumbling block to the region's industrialization and growth in in intra trade. Ndii (n.d.) argues that the binding constrain to Africa's economic growth is the low agricultural productivity. African countries can make great relative abundance sustainable economic gains by focusing on improving agricultural productivity with relative low-cost improvement. However African countries lack the requisite public goods, services, research extension, knowledge to turbocharge this drive. Agricultural productivity and focus on intra African trade by moving from extractive and natural resource extraction-based economies is paramount. In hindsight relative comparative advantage highlights that African countries export proportionally more primary products than most regions (Oloruntoba & Falola, 2021). The consequence of this is that African countries do not enjoy the benefits of value addition.

This prognosis accords that focus on intra Africa trade and agricultural productivity can be a priority to chart a development model that can lead African countries towards development trajectory. This sets in motion the development cooperation with nontraditional partners as important to support the African priorities.

5. Role of non-conventional partners in Development Cooperation

The study trains the spotlight to new actors within a multiplex world order and focuses on the role on non-traditional partners in DC. In the past few years, the UAE and Vietnam's have ascended to global primacy in agriculture, trade and investment. This has endeared African leaders because they see similarities and opportunities to emulate the UAE and Vietnam ese to make it Vietnamese model. Likewise, with an ambition to attain a high-income, trade and new market frontiers and production bases the UAE and Vietnam have cherished how Africa has become the novel frontier for investment. Kpakaf (2022) states that although an extremely export oriented economy, with export value accounting for 93.29 % of GDP, Vietnam's trade with Africa is limited. If strategically planned, African nations could gain a lot from Vietnam's expertise in agriculture. Equally, the Dubai expo 2020 allowed the expression of African cultural vibrancy, diversity as countries on their pavilions hoisted investment events tailored for their domestic markets contextually useful information for investors business markets which helped to promote positive narratives about Africa. This underscores the desire by African states to broaden international engagement beyond China, USA, EU. Ògúnmọ́dẹdé (2022a) states that the goals, intricacies of the $500 million *Consortium for Africa* fore fronted the role of the UAE as a strategic non-conventional partner to African countries as it is closes linked on the AfCFTA, agricultural productivity, youth unemployment and the digital economy. This aligns the UAE, its private sector directly to the priorities and commitments of African states. It is noteworthy that, the UAE has become the leading trading partner with Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and Zimbabwe. The global development cooperation paradigm is changing, and Africa needs non-traditional partners to learn from and grow with. Current trends show how the UAE and Vietnam are such partners. In analyzing the ascendance of the UAE and Vietnam in Africa the concept of attractiveness and smart power emanates. Souza (2013) states that the extendibility of the "Development Compact" concept in the Africa relations is crucial as it grants the private sector a position in international development cooperation. Africa needs non-conventional partners like the UAE and Vietnam as they promote the involvement of the private sectors to deliberate on issues around trade, investment, agriculture, technology, skills upgrade, lines of credit and grants. Global development is increasingly being seen as a being reliant on the private sector both for its financing and project implementation (Pérez-Pineda & Wehrmann, 2021). His view is substantiated by Horner (2021) who noted that the globalization of production networks and value chains has strengthened the role of the private sector. On the brighter side the involvement of the private sectors supports African priorities in agriculture and intra Africa as a necessary lever for an intervention scale and impact on national agencies. Mawdsley (2015) argues that given the centralization of power in African countries the private sectors is an *idyllic* partner for development cooperation.

Food security remains a major concern for the region. Against this dire canvass African countries with vast arable lands can double the cereal. Ndii (n.d.) argues that world cereal goods have increased nearly threefold since 1960 but Africa has only managed to increase its yield by 10 %. The African continent is the only region where population growth has outpaced cereal productivity. Africa ranks lowest globally in virtually every agriculturally indicator much more than the non-farm economies. In light of the above, Vietnam does not seek to imitate China to become another source of financial aid or loans for African governments. Coordination mechanism for new market opportunities for Vietnam and African countries and the sharing of information, technical advice and technology transfer agriculture is driving the transformation. In essence, the model being proposed for engagement is to learn together with Vietnam. This is why Africa needs these non-conventional partners. Vietnam clearly understands the middle-income trap, as it is diversifying its economy and export options to Africa (Kpaka, 2022). As the country profoundly invested in adopting new technologies, focused on rice research it transmuted itself from being an importer of rice to being the second-largest rice exporter in the world today. With Africa ‘s susceptibility is hinged on high food import dependency. “If Vietnam did it, Africa can do it also” under the right leadership. Vietnam is ready to share its technologies from the agriculture sector to spur Africa improve production (Sani, 2022).

The Sierra Leon case bodes well for this study. The 600-hectare mechanized fish farm, 95 per cent of rice cultivation in the Mekong Delta being mechanized to produce average rice yields 6 to 8 metric tons per hectare in which 50 per cent of the rice consumed in the country and more than 90 per cent of that is exported. Sani (2022) states that president Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone, is the latest African leader to seek cooperation with Vietnam. Seeing that Vietnam transformed itself from a net rice importer to the second largest rice exporter in the world. The study observed that sector-based development cooperation by President Bio who made agriculture the main pillar of collaboration between Vietnam and Sierra Leone depicts why Africa needs this type of direct cooperation. Private sector in Sierra Leone learns from their counterparts in Vietnam, especially in the rice value chain and aquaculture. The pre-eminence of Sierra Leone’s priorities to being food self-sufficient through agriculture and aquaculture undergirded the basis of this cooperation. Sani, 2022 also states that Vietnam will share germplasm and provide experts to boost rice productivity. In addition, private sector companies signed agreement to facilitate export-import of various commodities.

The UAE has shown interest in investing in banking and service sectors. In the Horn of Africa, the huge surge in investment in e-commerce is driven by the increased demand of mobile money circulation and increased foreign direct investment (Ògúnmọ́dẹdé, 2022b). Etisalat from the UAE is now the 15th largest mobile network in the world operates in Benin, Burkina Faso, Central Africa Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Ivory Coast Niger, Nigeria (Guéraiche, 2022). This underscores how Dubai is serving as a strategic partner is driving Africa’s digital transformation through fintech companies. Low-cost digitalization can benefit Africa countries to a greater degree. This bodes well for ecommerce for intra Africa trade, digital currencies and block chain technologies. Fafunwa & Odufuwa (2022) argue that micro, small and medium enterprises in Africa need to digitally transform to benefit from the AfCFTA. Presently there is no single platform, whither physical or digital that caters for the 1.2 billion Africans through which African buyers can purchase goods or services from African sellers as e-commerce is limited. The AfCFTA depends on digitalization of the private and public sectors for crosscutting support of value chains and critical areas of the economy like Agriculture. With the youngest, fastest-growing continent, brimming with promise African countries have become amenable to innovative technologies in the financial sector, embracing blockchain technology and fintech services. will help reduce the cost of capital, which in turn will drive economic growth on the continent. The Dubai Expo 2020 strengthened Dubai’s position as a strategic partner in Africa’s digital transformation with fintech companies, in the finance industry.

The Smart Africa-UAE dialogue to promote Smart cities, through an alliance of 32 African countries, global private actors has been promoting digital transformation in Africa (Ògúnmọ́dẹdé, 2022b). This initiative is ushering the knowledge economy through affordable access to broadband and the use of ICT to support a single digital market by 2030. The Smart Africa Alliance has created a huge platform to accelerate digitization. Cabral (2022) states that Mulki International is set to develop a $300 million hi-tech park and cyber city in Zimbabwe. To offer multifold economic benefits to commercial enterprises hi-tech facilities, block chain technologies, digital assets integration of Zimbabwe into block chain and crypto technology. In addition, the UAE has always been keen on investing in Africa in the maritime and logistical sectors in the region.

However, the exportation of Gulf rivalries to Africa by the UAE in its military adventurism has destabilizing consequences that can wane latent bilateral relations. Therefore, to modify its presence in Africa the UAE needs to scale down its involvement as a destabilizing factor in African countries like Ethiopia and Sudan (Samaan, n.d.). In addition, approximately US$210 million worth of gold is smuggled out of Zimbabwe to Dubai with no official paper work of the gold exports (Maverick Citizen Report, 2021). In this interregnum it is no longer a "black cat or white cat" as long as the cat can kill mice. African countries need to invest in permuting these dimensions as the shadow side and high risk of defaults impedes benefits of cooperation. Ògúnmọ́dẹdé (2022b) argues that allegations of labour abuse, racially motivated human rights abuses of black migrants and labour issues in the country have also soiled the intentions and mantra of promoting Africa as the market of tomorrow. Therefore, zooming from a geopolitical specter, the study comes out with more questions than answers on whether it is a matter of jostling geopolitical dates for Africa? Is there an elixir for African agency in development cooperation?

6. Conclusion

In summation the study observed that there is a great potential in enhancing direct cooperation with non-traditional partners like Vietnam and the UAE to promote agricultural productivity, sustainable development and intra Africa trade. In symbolic ways, a cursory glance at the selective delinking attests that African states are no longer uniformly geopolitically naïve as the bargaining space has widened. The new dimension can proffer relative autonomy in development priorities for African countries. The study argues that African countries should vastly invest in understanding the policy motivations of Africa's potential partners and how the same partners can be leveraged to strengthen bargaining positions. As autarky is impossible a geopolitical awakening make sense for African countries with an emphasis on Africa's foreign policy and intra Africa cooperation like the old butter trade systems as investment in the basics. This is important to engender agency for a continent viewed as geopolitically weak. In summation direct cooperation with Vietnam and the UAE African countries can promote maximum policy autonomy to engender compatible win-win partnerships.

Bibliographic references

Amin, S. (1987), A Note on the Concept of Delinking. *Review Fernand Braudel Center*, 10(3), pp. 435-444.

Amusan, T. (2022), Sub-Saharan Africa in the International Trading System: Understanding the Recent Trends. In S. O. Oloruntoba & T. Falola (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Africa and the Changing Global Order*, pp. 367-392. Springer International Publishing. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77481-3_18.

Buba, M. (2022), "Look East" and Look Back: Lessons for Africa in the Changing Global Order. In S. O. Oloruntoba & T. Falola (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Africa and the Changing Global Order*, pp. 673-688. Springer International Publishing. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77481-3_32.

Cabral, A. R. (2022), UAE's Mulk International starts construction of $500m tech park in Zimbabwe. The National. [Online]. [Consult. july.2021]. Available at: https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/2022/07/21/uaes-mulk-international-starts-construction-of-500m-tech-park-in-zimbabwe/.

Chakrabarti, M. & Chaturvedi, S. (2021), An Evolving Shared Concept of Development Cooperation: Perspectives on the 2030 Agenda. In S. Chaturvedi, H. Janus, S. Klingebiel, X. Li, A. de Mello e Souza, E. Sidiropoulos, & D. Wehrmann (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda: Contested Collaboration, pp. 91-112. Springer International Publishing. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57938-8_5.

Chaturvedi, S., Janus, H., Klingebiel, S., Li, X., Mello e Souza, A. de, Sidiropoulos, E. & Wehrmann, D. (2021), Development Cooperation in the Context of Contested Global Governance. In S. Chaturvedi, H. Janus, S. Klingebiel, X. Li, A. de Mello e Souza, E. Sidiropoulos, & D. Wehrmann (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda: Contested Collaboration, pp. 1-21. Springer International Publishing. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57938-8_1.

Chellaney (2021), Colonization by other means: China's debt-trap diplomacy. Stagecraft and Statecraft. May 15. [Online]. Available at: https://chellaney.net/2021/05/15/colonization-by-other-means-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/.

Editeur, D. (Ed.) (2019), A Call for a Pan-African Roadmap. Routledge. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429055072.

Fafunwa, T. & Odufuwa, F. (2022), African Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Need to Digitally Transform to Benefit from the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), pp. 66-82. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003274322-5.

Gelpern, A., Horn, S., Morris, S., Parks, B. & Trebesch, C. (2021), How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments (SSRN Scholarly Paper N.º 3840991). [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3840991.

Guéraiche, W. (2022), Between Foreign Policy and Development Assistance: The UAE International Cooperation in Africa. Forum for Development Studies, 49(2), pp. 211-232. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2022.2080763.

Hodder, Gareth (2022), Africa and the Gulf States herald a new era in trade and investment relations. White & Case LLP. (n.d.). [Online]. [Consult. 9.Jan.2023]. Available at: https://www.whitecase.com/insight-our-thinking/africa-focus-winter-2022-africa-and-gulf-states.

Horner, R. (2021), Gereffi G, Global Value Chains and Development: Redefining the Contours of 21st Century Capitalism (2018). Competition & Change, 25(1), pp. 124-126. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529420929980.

Hsu, S. (2014), China's Model for Africa. *The Diplomat.* [Online]. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/chinas-model-for-africa/.

Klingebiel, S., Mahn, T. & Negre, M. (2016), Fragmentation: A Key Concept for Development Cooperation. In S. Klingebiel, T. Mahn, & M. Negre (Eds.), The Fragmentation of Aid: Concepts, Measurements and Implications for Development Cooperation, pp. 1-18. Palgrave Macmillan UK. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55357-7_1.

Kpaka, Musa (2022), Why Africa needs non-traditional partners like Vietnam. April 18. [Online]. Available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/195211/why-africa-needs-non-traditional-partners-like-vietnam/.

Mawdsley, E. (2015), DFID, the Private Sector and the Re-centring of an Economic Growth Agenda in International Development. Global Society, 29, pp. 1-20. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2015.103109.2.

Maverick Citizen Report (2021), Zimbabwe: Explosive cartel report uncovers the anatomy of a captured state. *Daily Maverick.* [Online]. Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-02-09-zimbabwe-explosive-cartel-report-uncovers-the-anatomy-of-a-captured-state/.

Mthembu, P. & Mabera, F. (Eds.) (2020a), Africa-China Cooperation: Towards an African Policy on China? (1st ed. 2021 edition). Palgrave Macmillan.

——— (2020b), Africa-China Cooperation: Towards an African Policy on China? Springer International Publishing.

Munday, D. (2021), Africa-China Cooperation: Towards an African Policy on China. South African Journal of International Affairs, 28(3), pp. 488-491. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2021.1954548.

Ndii, D. (n.d.), Africa's Infrastructure-Led Growth Experiment Is Faltering. It Is Time to Focus on Agriculture. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. [Online]. [Consult. 9.Jan.2023]. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/20/africa-s-infrastructure-led-growth-experiment-is--faltering.-it-is-time-to-focus-on-agriculture-pub-88662.

Ògúnmọ́dẹdé, C. O. (2022a), The UAE's Africa Policy Is Full of Contradictions. World Politics Review. April 18. [Online]. Available at: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/the-2020-dubai-expo-raises-questions-for-uae-ambitions-in-africa/.

——— (2022b), The UAE's Africa Policy Is Full of Contradictions. World Politics Review. April 18. [Online]. Available at: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/the-2020-dubai-expo-raises-questions-for-uae-ambitions-in-africa/.

Ohashi, H. (2018), The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the context of China's opening-up policy. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 7(2), pp. 85-103. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2018.1564615.

Oloruntoba, S. O. & Falola, T. (Eds.) (2021), The Palgrave Handbook of Africa and the Changing Global Order (1st ed. 2022 edition). Palgrave Macmillan.

Parakh, T. (2018), IB 2018/23 Chinese Concessional Loans Part 1—Perceptions and Misperceptions [Text]. Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs; The Australian National University. November 8. [Online]. Available at: https://bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/6525/ib-201823-chinese-concessional-loans-part-1-perceptions-and.

Pérez-Pineda, J. A. & Wehrmann, D. (2021), Partnerships with the Private Sector: Success Factors and Levels of Engagement in Development Cooperation. pp. 649-670. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57938-8_30.

Perspective, A. A. (2022), African Foreign Policy in a Multipolar Age [Substack newsletter]. An Africanist Perspective. December 22. [Online]. Available at: https://kenopalo.substack.com/p/african-foreign-policy-in-a-multipolar.

Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2022), AfCFTA's potential solutions to Africa's trade obstacles. Lessons and Opportunities. PwC. December. [Online]. Available at: https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/publications/afcfta-potential-solutions-to-africa-trade-obstacles.pdf.

Rodney, W. (2018), How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Verso Books.

Rudyak, M. (2022), 'We help them, and they help us': Reciprocity and relationality in Chinese aid to Africa. Journal of International Development. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3699.

Samaan, Jean-Loup (2021), Les Émirats arabes unis en Afrique: Les ambitions parfois contrariées d'un nouvel acteur régional. [Online]. [Consult. 9.Jan.2023]. Available at: https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/notes-de-lifri/emirats-arabes-unis-afrique-ambitions-parfois-contrariees-dun-nouvel.

Samy, Y. (2022), Africa in Global Trade. In S. O. Oloruntoba & T. Falola (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Africa and the Changing Global Order, pp. 393-408. Springer International Publishing. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77481-3_19.

Sani, A. H. (2022), Sierra Leone: What Sierra Leone Stands to Gain From Bio's Visit to Vietnam? Concord Times. March 29. [Online]. Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/202203290116.html.

Soulé, F. (2020). 'Africa+1' summit diplomacy and the 'new scramble' narrative: Recentering African agency. African Affairs, 119(477), pp. 633-646. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adaa015.

Souza, André de Mello e (2013), Brazil's Development Cooperation in Africa: A New Model?, in Papers of the Fifth Brics Academic Forum Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation, pp. 96-107. [Online]. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/34524163/fifth_brics_academic_forum_plenary_session_3_co_operation_on_africa_brasil_development_cooperation_in_africa_a_new_model.

Sun, Y. (2014), Africa in China's Foreign Policy. November 30. Brookings. [Online]. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/africa-in-chinas-foreign-policy/.

Tull, D. M. (2006), China's engagement in Africa: Scope, significance and consequences. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(3), pp. 459-479. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X06001856.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Futures Report: Which Value Chains for a Made in Africa Revolution. [Online]. Available at: https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/futures-report-2021.

Wekesa, B. (2021), A Call for an African Policy Framework Towards China, pp. 11-29. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_2.

Were, A. (2018), Debt Trap? Chinese Loans and Africa's Development Options. Africa Portal; South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). August 31. [Online]. Available at: https://www.africaportal.org/publications/debt-trap-chinese-loans-and-africas-development-options/.