ANDREA ZOPPIS[1]

GILBERT SIMONDON AND THE IMAGINAL DIMENSION OF TECHNICAL OBJECTS: TOWARDS AN INVENTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY

Abstract
This article proposes to outline the inventive structure of phenomenology through a reinterpretation of Gilbert Simondon's philosophy, particularly drawing on Simondon's lecture series *Imagination and Invention* and integrating perspectives from Mikel Dufrenne and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. After contextualizing the present operation, the first section explores invention as a relational process between the organism and its associated milieu, emphasizing its ontogenetic and symbolic grounding. The second reconstructs the same ontogenetic features of images in *Imagination and Invention*, showing how they function as quasi-organic mediators between perception, action, and memory, as well as between subjects and the world. The third section examines the imaginal overabundance of being in technical objects, demonstrating how technicity and sacrality must be understood isomorphically. The final section proposes a reevaluation of phenomenology as an inventive, embodied, and symbolic gesture grounded technically and aesthetically in experience. In doing so, the paper aims to reconceive the phenomenological gesture as a dynamic and inventive response to the transformations brought about by technical innovation.
Keywords: imaginary, technical object, phenomenology, invention, gesture.

[1] University degli Studi di Ferrara

Gilbert Simondon e a dimensão imaginária dos objetos técnicos: rumo a uma fenomenologia inventiva

Resumo

Este artigo propõe fazer um esquisso da estrutura inventiva da fenomenologia através da re-interpretação da filosofia de Gilbert Simondon, sobretudo a partir da série de aulas *Imagination et Invention* e integrando perspectivas de Mikel Dufrenne e de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Depois de contextualizar a presente operação, a primeira secção explora a invenção como um processo relacional entre o organismo e o seu meio associado, dando ênfase ao seu enraizamento simbólico. O segundo reconstrói os mesmos elementos ontogenéticos da imagem em *Invention et Imagination,* mostrando a forma como eles funcionam como mediadores quase-orgânicos entre percepção, acção e memória, tanto quanto entre sujeitos e o mundo. A terceira secção examina a sobre-abundância do ser nos objectos técnicos, demonstrando a forma como a tecnicidade e a sacralidade devem ser entendidas de forma isomórfica. A secção final propões reavaliar a fenomologia como um gesto inventivo, encarnado e simbólico tecnicamente e esteticamente enraizado na experiência. Dessa forma, o trabalho tem por fito voltar a conceber o gesto fenomenológico como uma resposta dinâmica e inventiva às transformações acarretadas pela inovação técnica.

Palavras-chave: imaginário, objecto técnico, fenomenologia, invenção, gesto.

La manière dont on imagine est souvent
plus instructive que ce qu'on imagine
Bachelard, *La psychanalyse du feu*

Although new technologies have long sought to meet the vital, psychic, and collective needs of human beings—improving individual well-being and social coexistence, and helping to shape what may be called the human «techno-system»[2]—cultures are not always prepared to embrace them without resistance. This is one of Gilbert Simondon's key insights in *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*[3], where he critiques modern culture's failure to integrate technical objects into its symbolic and conceptual frameworks. Unlike aesthetic objects, which are theorised and celebrated, technical objects are relegated to the margins of cultural life and excluded from serious philosophical reflection[4].

This marginalisation produces a broader alienation, extending from technical objects to the subjects who use them and operatively inhabit their techno-geographical

[2] D. Ihde, *Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington–Indianapolis 1990, p. 3.

[3] «Culture has constituted itself as a defense system against technics […] [it] must incorporate technical beings in the form of knowledge and in the form of a sense of values», G. Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects* [MEOT], trans. C. Malaspina and J. Rogove, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2017, p. 15.

[4] As Stiegler points out, «philosophy has repressed technics as an object of thought. Technics is the unthought» (*Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. R. Beardsworth and G. Collins, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1998, p. ix). In this sense, his project deeply resonates with Simondon's attempt to reinsert technical objects into cultural and symbolic life.

milieux[5]. While Simondon's critique was directed at his own time, it remains relevant today in subtler forms. Contemporary technical objects are increasingly «aestheticized», their technicity obscured by consumer rituals and social-symbolic overdeterminations[6]. As Yuk Hui observes, this corresponds to a process of «desymbolization», in which «the symbols of rituals and the cosmos are replaced by new types of symbols in consumerist society»[7]—a dynamic that amplifies the alienation Simondon had already identified.

To address this theme, I propose to reconsider the phenomenological method, especially insofar as Simondon's reflections can enrich it. Far from being a fixed doctrine, phenomenology continually reinvents itself in response to historical contingencies—an invariant unfolding and modifying its status through its historical variations. As Husserl writes: «We have an open infinity of universal world truths before us. […] No individual determination can be final […] to improve human organisation through technical means and thereby uncover a new, wider world»[8]. This openness, rather than weakening phenomenology, defines its variational essence as a discipline responsive to transformations of experience.

As Don Ihde has argued, Husserl opened the notion that instruments and technical objects mediate meaning structures[9]. Yet he did not address the ontogenesis of technical objects, namely, the multilayered inventive processes that institute them. From our perspective, this limitation does not require abandoning phenomenology in favour of post-phenomenology, instead reorienting it ontogenetically[10]. As Carlo Sini

[5] «The workers alienation is translated by the break between technical knowledge and the exercise of the conditions of use», *MEOT*, p. 255. For a detailed discussion on the techno-geographical nature of the associated milieu of technical object, see S. Lindberg, «Being with Technique – Technique as Being-With: The Technological Communities of Gilbert Simondon», *Continental Philosophy Review*, 52 (2019) 195–211.

[6] «Such *technophanies*, once recognized and culturalized, are the way through which the technical object regains a place within a culture that ostracizes it: the object reenters the citadel of culture by means of a *ritualization*, rich in images and symbols», (Simondon, G., *Sur la technique*, Éditions PUF, Paris 2014, p. 39. All translations of quotations from texts not available in English are provided by the author). For a deep study on the Simondonian notion of *technophany*, see Y. Hui, «Apropos Technophany», *Technophany: A Journal for Philosophy and Technology*, 1 (2024) 1-13.

[7] Y. Hui, «On a Possible Passing from the Digital to the Symbolic», in *2 or 3 Tigers Exhibition Publication*, ed. A. Franke – H. Kim, Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin 2017, p. 3. «Desymbolization in this case means detachment of technological activities from the cosmos, the figure from the ground», p. 5. As Mircea Eliade emphasizes in one of the texts recommended by Simondon to the participants of the course *Imagination and Invention*: «the life of modern man is swarming with half-forgotten myths, decaying hierophanies and secularised symbols» (*Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism*, trans. P. Mairet, Sheed and Ward, New York 1969, p. 22).

[8] E. Husserl, *Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937)*, ed. R. Sowa, Husserliana 39, Springer, Dordrecht 2008, B I 14/21, quoted in D. Ihde, *Husserl's Missing Technologies*, Fordham University Press, New York 2016, p. 32, trans. F. Bottenberg.

[9] See D. Ihde, *Husserl's Missing Technologies*, op. cit., p. 54. The perspective of an inventive phenomenology differs from post-phenomenology insofar as it grounds technicity not only in mediation but in the imaginal and ontogenetic dynamics of invention. While post-phenomenology emphasizes the analysis of mediation, Simondon's framework reconfigures the transcendental through invention and individuation, situating the subject within a broader genetic process that exceeds instrumentality.

[10] Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify our positioning with respect to Heidegger's philosophy of technology. As Ihde notes, for Heidegger: «Technology […] is a metaphysical perspective. It is a paradigmatic view of the whole of nature that determines the essence of Technology» (*Heidegger's Technologies*, Fordham University Press, New York 2010, p. 18); «in its mode of disclosure, technologies […] are subsumed under the same analysis» (p. 21). Technology thus appears as a mode of disclosure of Being, tied to truth as *alētheia*. While Simondon also adopts

notes, phenomenology cannot be conceived in a purely static guise: Husserl himself recognised the insufficiency of a description that «assumes the phenomenon directly, describing its givenness as it gives itself»[11]. Phenomenology must continually reopen itself in its genetic dimension, since «its beginning is never simply given, but always in the course of genetic constitution»[12]. From this perspective, invention offers a privileged lens for rethinking phenomenology in its radical contingency and universality.

In this light, the aim of this article is not merely to reconstruct Simondon's account of imagination and invention, but to use it as a lens to rethink phenomenology itself. The choice of phenomenology as the backbone of this investigation is justified not only by Simondon's proximity to this tradition—*Individuation* was dedicated to the memory of Merleau-Ponty, while Mikel Dufrenne was a close colleague and was the subject of a friendly acknowledgment at the beginning of *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*—but also by thematic and methodological continuity. Together, these philosophers articulate what has been described as a «difficult humanism»[13], distinct from both classical transcendentalism and the structuralist turn toward anti-humanism[14]. In this light, reading Simondon phenomenologically highlights the irreducibility of the human subject: no longer a transcendental ego nor merely a product of subjectivation, but always «more than an individual»[15], retaining a dimension of excess relative to its individuated form.

As Barthélémy has argued, Simondon's thought invites us to consider the transcendental in a «problematic» sense[16]. Ontogenesis does not abolish the transcendental horizon, but somewhat complicates it, situating it in the dynamic tension between the subject and the world. In this sense, Simondon prolongs phenomenology

---

a metaphysical stance, his approach diverges mainly on two points: (1) technicity is systematically and genetically related to religion, aesthetics, science, and ethics, and cannot be reduced to a univocal horizon; (2) technical objects are treated as concretizations of technical essences, endowed with a transcendental function retroacting upon subjectivity. Heidegger's analysis, essentially *epochal*, offers few tools for a «phenomenology of the technical object» (*MEOT*, p. 250). By contrast, here I examine human–technical relations through processes of inventive insertion, without presupposing a fixed technological epoch.

[11] C. Sini, *Prefazione* to *Metodo fenomenologico statico e genetico*, ed. M. Vergani, Il Saggiatore, Milan 2003, p. 12.

[12] *Ibid*, p. 13.

[13] J.-H. Barthélemy, *Penser l'individuation. Simondon et la philosophie de la nature*, L'Harmattan, Paris 2005, p. 226. On the relation between Simondon and Dufrenne see G. Carrozzini, *Gilbert Simondon filosofo della mentalité technique*, Mimesis, Milano-Udine 2011, pp. 215–265. For studies on Merleau-Ponty's influence on Simondon, see X. Guchet, «Théorie du lien social, technologie et philosophie : Simondon lecteur de Merleau-Ponty», *Les Études philosophiques*, 57 (2) (2001), 219–237; D. Viana, «On Gilbert Simondon's Inheritance from Merleau-Ponty», *Epoché*, 27 (2) (2023), 247–271.

[14] An illuminating text for this humanist critique of the structuralist and anti-humanist drift of the Sixties and Seventies is Mikel Dufrenne's preface *Pour une philosophie non théologique* to the second edition of *Le poétique* (PUF, Paris 1973, pp. 7–57).

[15] G. Simondon, *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information*, trans. T. Adkins, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2020, p. 344.

[16] See J.-H. Barthélémy, *Penser l'individuation*, op. cit., pp. 48–59. Andrea Bardin critiques Barthélémy's phenomenological reading, arguing that «ontogenesis cannot be considered a phenomenology», while nonetheless noting its proximity to Merleau-Ponty's courses on Nature (*Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon*, Springer, 2015, p. 48). In our view, Merleau-Ponty's notion of institution (*Stiftung*) offers a better key for reading *Individuation* in the light of an inventive phenomenology, capturing phenomenology's unfinished character as a constant «new beginning» (*Institution and Passivity*, Northwestern University Press, 2010). A fuller confrontation should be reserved for future work.

precisely where it *betrays* its canonical and historicized structure, radicalising the correlation of subject and object as a process of individuation and invention.

Following Husserl's call to return «to the things themselves» (*zu den Sachen selbst*)[17], I propose a phenomenological reflection on technical objects beginning with the process of invention—a phenomenology rooted in the comprehension of the imaginal dimension of technical objects as described by Simondon. Through a focused reading of Simondon's *Imagination and Invention* introduction, I argue that imagination and the imaginary play a generative role in the invention of technical objects, constituting a key axis for a phenomenological understanding of technically mediated experience. Simondon's account thus enables a rethinking of the transcendental in genetic terms, laying the groundwork for what can be called an *inventive phenomenology*: not a contemplative description of essences, but the developing of a predisposition to *feel*, through a bodily *sense-awareness*, our sensible, imaginal, and affective involvement—and so the genesis of images and symbols—within technical operations. In this sense, phenomenology itself must be conceived in its *technicity* and operationality, embodied in the organism–milieu relation, or—as Merleau-Ponty would say—as a «technique of the body»[18].

To pursue this perspective, the first section examines Simondon's reflections on invention, especially the dynamic between organism and environment. The second focuses on mental images, understood as core operators of invention and mediators between subject and object, perception and invention. The third turns to the objective dimension of images, drawing on Simondon's notion of an «overabundance of being» to highlight the ontogenetic excess of technical objects. The conclusion outlines the features of an inventive phenomenology, conceived not as a mere contemplative attitude but as the subjects' corporeal resonance with the affective genesis of symbols within technical operations.

1. Invention as Imaginal Mediation Between Organism and Its Milieu

As an entry point to the course I mainly examine in this article, it is useful to briefly revisit some of Simondon's reflections in his complementary thesis, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*. In particular, it helps to situate the notion of mental images—discussed in section two—within the broader context of Simondon's philosophical engagement with invention. Since the elaboration of his complementary

[17] E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. F. Kersten, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1983, p. 35. Simondon explicitly recommended *Ideen I* for his 1964–1965 course *Imagination and Invention*. My reading follows Mikel Dufrenne's interpretation: «We understand phenomenology in the sense in which Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have acclimated this term in France» (*The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, trans. E. S. Casey, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973, p. xlviii). In this regard, Merleau-Ponty's «ontological rehabilitation of the sensible» («The Philosopher and His Shadow», in *Signs*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1964, p. 167) is particularly significant, since it considers the subject–object relation from the standpoint of the ontological irreducibility of the sensible, and thus of the imaginative element.

[18] M. Merleau-Ponty, «Eye and Mind», in *The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting*, ed. G. A. Johnson, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1993, p. 129.

thesis, invention has remained a central concern in his thinking[19]. In one key section, *Technical Invention: Ground and Form in the Living and Inventive Thought*, Simondon presents a gestalt-oriented reading of invention, rooted in the dynamic relationship between the living organism and its associated milieu.

The technical object, as the outcome of invention, is conceived as *analogous* to a living organism—characterised by a gestalt relationship between figure and ground that determines both its genesis and structural coherence. As Simondon writes, «the dynamism of thought is the same as that of technical objects; mental schemas react upon each other during invention in the same way the diverse dynamisms of the technical object will react upon each other in their material functioning»[20]. As Yuk Hui points out, Simondon's writings consistently portray technical objects «not [as] dead labour but rather […] like *living beings*», requiring a relation of maintenance and attention that recalls «taking care of a soul»[21]. Just as a living organism is genetically structured as an individual that carries its associated milieu within its life, so too do technical objects give rise to a technical and natural milieu which, through a process of recurring causality, both conditions and is conditioned by them.

Therefore, the principle of technical invention lies in the organism's very capacity for self-conditioning: «The reason the living being can invent is because it is an individual being that carries its associated milieu with it; this capacity for conditioning itself lies at the root of the capacity to produce objects that condition themselves»[22]. As Emanuele Clarizio notes, inventors possess a capacity for technical schematisation precisely insofar as they are living beings—since life itself demands that they modulate their biological normativity in response to environmental constraints and needs. In this regard, recalling how Kant's notion of genius is grounded in nature, one might say that «technical schematism is a true biological function»[23].

In this respect, being rooted in a ground [*fond*] of virtualities situated between life and conscious thought, technical invention unfolds *temporally* according to a logic of circular causality and directing the activity of the organism: it is «a conditioning of the present by the future, by that which is not yet»:

> Such a futural function is only rarely the work of chance; it requires putting into play a capacity to organize the elements according to certain requirements which act as an ensemble, as a directive value, and play the role of symbols representing the future ensemble that does not yet exist. The unity of the future associated milieu, within which the causal relations will be deployed that will enable the functioning of the new technical object, is *represented*, it is *played* or acted out as much as a role can be played in the absence of the true character, by

[19] The courses collected in G. Simondon, *L'invention dans les techniques. Cours et conférences*, Seuil, Paris 2005, are also fundamental. For this introductory discussion of mental images and invention, however, references to *MEOT* seemed sufficient.

[20] *MEOT*, op.cit, p. 60.

[21] Y. Hui, «On the Soul of Technical Objects: Commentary on Simondon's «Technics and Eschatology»», *Theory, Culture & Society*, 35 (7–8) (2018), pp. 4-5.

[22] *Ibid*.

[23] E. Clarizio, *La vita tecnica. Una filosofia biologica della tecnica*, Mimesis Edizioni, Milano-Udine 2024, p. 151.

way of the schemes of the creative imagination[24].

In technical invention—as in biological evolution—imaginative and partially directed processes unfold according to what Simondon calls «limited finalities»[25], that is, a form of germinal and situated teleology. This teleology is not determined in advance nor fixed at the moment of the technical object's concretisation. Instead, it emerges locally through the *virtualities* implicit in the concrete and material relation between subject, object, and milieu. In this respect, imagination becomes crucial to the inventive process, necessitating a careful understanding of its functioning to comprehend the nature of the invention process.

Furthermore, in this text, Simondon critiques Gestalt psychology, particularly regarding the reduction of the function of totality to the force of forms and patterns alone, in their isolation, and neglecting the role of the dynamic *ground* on which those forms combine and come into play. As he writes: «a deeper analysis of the inventive process would no doubt show that what is determinant and plays an energetic role are not forms but that which carries the forms, which is to say their ground, [...] the system of all forms or rather the common reservoir of the forms' tendencies»[26]. Images are linked to their ground through a relationship that transcends their punctual and isolated appearance. This figure–ground relation enables us to comprehend the imaginative genetic structure of invention beyond its *present* manifestation—revealing a specific influence of the future on the present, of the virtual on the actual.

As Simondon explains:

> Invention is the taking charge of the system of actuality through the system of virtualities, the creation of a unique system on the basis of these two systems. Forms are passive in so far as they represent actuality; they become active when they organize in relation to this ground, thereby bringing prior virtualities into actuality[27].

It becomes clear that imagination structures the inventive process by stretching forms toward possible futures, activating the present through their insertion into an indeterminate ground of virtualities—always on the threshold of attention. Thus, imagination, far from being conceived in the Sartrian sense as «the great 'irrealizing' function of consciousness»[28], is understood by Simondon as primordially embedded in the perceptual fabric of experience, closer to the Merleau-Pontian and Dufrennian

[24] *MEOT*, op.cit., p. 60.

[25] *MEOT*, op.cit., p. 169.

[26] *MEOT*, pp. 60-61. For further reading on Simondon's rethinking of the notion of form in light of the notion of information, see A. Bardin, «Reforming the Concepts of Form and Information», in *Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon*, Springer, Dordrecht 2015, pp. 21–34; and G. Menegalle, «Simondon's Heterodox Naturalism: Form, Information and Self-Organization in Imagination and Invention», *Paragraph*, 47 (3) (2024) 341–358.

[27] *MEOT*, op.cit, p. 61.

[28] Sartre, J.-P., *The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination*, Routledge, London–New York 2004, p. 3.

understanding of imagination[29]. It operates at the intersection between the organism and its associated milieu, and likewise between their respective actualities and virtualities: «The capacity to perceive is not far removed from the power of imagination [...]. The image is, first and foremost, the vivid detail that brings together the whole of the perceptual picture. Images exist in perceived reality; they constitute an 'epiphany' of implicit meanings»[30]. «An image by itself is as obscure as a perception lacking the support of the image»[31].

Imagination, as an operative force within the futural function of invention, plays a structural and central role in the production of technical objects, as well as in the more general operations of technicity. In this sense, and in resonance with the conceptions of imagination of Merleau-Ponty and Dufrenne, imagination is understood as the counterpart of perception—fundamentally co-implicated with it—and as a mediator between organism and environment. Images must therefore be grasped in their sensible density [*prégnance sensible*], that is, through their insertion into the concreteness of perceptual and embodied experience.

2. The Ontogenetic Structure of Images

Let us now turn to the introduction of the course *Imagination and Invention*. As previously noted, this article does not aim to provide an exhaustive account of the text's structure and internal articulations. Rather, by focusing on key elements from the opening section of *Imagination and Invention*, I seek to show how Simondon's concept of the image can inform a renewed reflection on the status of phenomenology today. As Simondon writes: «consciousness is not enough since organisms do not only have a knowable structure, they have tendencies and develop. It is a philosophical, psychological and social task to *save the phenomena* by re-installing them in becoming, relocating them in inventions, by deepening the images they harbor»[32]. Images, as an intermediate reality between subject and object, irreducible to fixed categories, call for an analysis that is properly «phenomenological» since, as Simondon notes, «this type of reality has the aim of manifesting itself and imposing its image character»[33]. It is therefore essential to consider how these images—structuring the inventive process—can be grasped in their complete genesis, allowing us to perceive their *organismicity* and recover the correlative imaginal fullness embedded in invented objects. However, it is crucial to recall, as Andrea Bardin notes, that by defining such an approach

[29] Mikel Dufrenne's *Le Poétique* is cited in the bibliography of Simondon's lecture series *Imagination and Invention*. As for Merleau-Ponty, though not expressly mentioned, strong affinities can be traced—especially if we recall his view that «perception and imagination go hand in hand and the challenge is to think their intertwining along with the latter's radical ontological nature [...] without erasing the phenomenological difference between perception and imagination as two fundamental types of experience» (A. Dufourcq, *Merleau-Ponty: An Ontology of the Imaginary*, trans. B. Smyth, Springer, Cham 2024, p. vi).

[30] G.Simondon, *Cours sur la perception (1964–1965)*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2013, p. 229.

[31] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, trans. J. Hughes e C. Wall-Romana, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2023, p. 79.

[32] G. Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit., p. 14.

[33] G. Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit. p. 15.

'phenomenological', Simondon neither intends to refer to any consciousness nor to an original intersubjective cogito, he «is simply pursuing the mixed study of structures and operations seemingly authorised by the form Merleau-Ponty's thought had assumed since *La structure du comportement* (1942)»[34].

In this respect, to grasp the phenomenological scope of this lecture series, it is necessary to first consider key passages from the dense preamble to the text. What Simondon is introducing is properly a theory in which «the aspects of the mental image […] do not correspond to different types of reality, but to different stages of a single activity undergoing a developmental process»[35]—a «local endogenous activity» that operates as *perception* in the presence of the object, as *anticipation* before experience, and as *memory-symbol* after it. Mental images are thus structured according to a cyclical, genetic process, in which conscious experience is merely «an almost exceptional surfacing connected to a continuous framework».

To clarify the integral structure of the genetic cycle of images outlined by Simondon, it is worth quoting a key passage from the preamble that summarises it:

> A mental image is a relatively independent subset within the living being qua subject [*être vivant sujet*]; at its birth, an image is a sheaf of motor tendencies, a long-term anticipation of the experience of an object; during the interaction between the organism and its milieu, it becomes a receptor system for incoming signals, and it allows the perceptual-motor activity to exercise itself in a progressive mode. Finally, when the subject is again separated from the object, the image—enhanced by cognitive contributions and integrating the affective-emotional resonance of the experience—becomes a symbol. From the internally organized universe of symbols, which tends towards saturation, there may then spring an invention, which consists in putting into motion a more powerful, dimensional system capable of integrating more complete images according to a mode of synergetic compatibility. After invention— the fourth phase in the becoming of images—the cycle starts again with a new anticipation of the encounter with the object—which may well be its production[36].

This cyclical model aims, on the one hand, to describe the embodied and biological dimension of invention as a continuation and concretisation of the imaginative process. On the other hand, it offers a comprehensive conception of mental images, which—depending on the phase in which they emerge (as symbol, perception, or desire)—take on distinct characteristics. Crucially, however, a continuous framework specific to the image persists across all these phases, and it is precisely this aspect I wish to emphasise here.

A Primordial Exteriority Within the Subject

In this respect, it is essential to recognise that mental images are not merely «internal» to the subject—as if they were byproducts of an imaging consciousness, in

[34] A. Bardin, *Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert* Simondon, op. cit., p. 148.
[35] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*,op.cit. , p. 3.
[36] *Ibid.*

line with the Sartrean model mentioned earlier. As Daniela Voss remarks, «Sartre denies the existence of an unconscious», and treats the image solely as «the consciousness of the subject's relation to an object»[37]. In Simondon, by contrast, images emerge from a more complex ontogenetic logic and function as pre-subjective, quasi-organic structures. In this respect, Simondon invites us to consider «the hypothesis of a primordial exteriority of images in relation to the subject»[38]. For our purpose, it is essential to note that this idea echoes Mikel Dufrenne's claim that imagination, considered as an «internal» human function, must be distinguished from a more originary «imagination of Nature» that primitively inspires poetic creation and fundamentally conditions human imagination[39]. Neither strictly subjective nor objective, images constitute a «third reality» between the poles of experience, providing Simondon's theory of imagination with an epistemological grounding in the dynamic relationship between organism and associated milieu.

Because of this in-between status, mental images are conceived as «quasi-organisms» almost independent from the subject: «Displaying, to a degree, will, appetite and motion, images almost seem to be secondary organisms within the thinking being»[40]. As Cécile Malaspina observes, mental images function as structural and functional subsets of psychic activity, whose genesis follows stages of growth «analogous to that of organs»[41]. They inhabit the organism, lodge within it like parasites or surplus energies, and sometimes even detach and develop elsewhere. For this reason, they cannot be understood according to the clear and distinct model of concepts: «they do not follow the mind's activity with the same flexibility; they can only be governed indirectly; they maintain a certain opacity, like a foreign population in the midst of an orderly state»[42]. Conceived in this simultaneously subjective and objective character, images bear witness to a latent and trans-subjective form of sociality already active within the organism's latent structures and operations.

The Force and Weight of Images

Unlike concepts or simple perceptions, images possess a specific force and efficacy, stemming from their hybrid nature as mediators between abstraction and concreteness. Their semi-concrete character reflects their origin as partial samples of life—fragments that remain abstract precisely because of their fragmentary and selective nature. As Simondon puts it, «the image, as an intermediary between the concrete and the abstract, synthetizes, in a few features, motor, cognitive, and affective charges; this is why it allows for a choice, because each image has a *weight*, a certain *force*—and we can weigh and compare images, not concepts or perceptions»[43].

[37] D. Voss, «A New Notion of the Image: Gilbert Simondon, Imagination and Invention», *Parrhesia*, 39 (2024) p. 157.

[38] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit., p. 7.

[39] See M. Dufrenne, *Le Poétique*, op. cit., p. 194.

[40] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit., p. 9.

[41] C. Malaspina, «Invention and Metamorphosis: Intelligence, Automated Optimization (AO) and the Prospect of Synthetic Intelligence with Simondon and Denizhan», *I castelli di Yale online. Annali di filosofia*, XII (2) (2024), p. 99.

[42] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit., p. 9.

[43] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit., p. 10, my italics.

In this respect, images possess a kind of expressive intensity that is irreducible to conceptual or perceptual schemas. Their signifying power arises not from pre-existing structures, but from their ambiguous and emergent position within psychic and affective life. As Dufrenne observes in his reflections on the poetic image, images are endowed with a «silent force, […] their word is their appearance»[44].

In this respect, only the image performs a genuinely regulatory function within experience. Abstract thought, on the one hand, acts as a braking mechanism: it introduces complexity, forecasts, and possible consequences. Perception, on the other hand, is absorbed entirely by the immediacy of the present. The image, by virtue of its ambiguous status, mediates between these extremes—enabling a pre- and trans-cognitive orientation in both space and time. As Simondon writes, «only the image is truly regulative, for it is sufficiently abstract to disengage the subject from intense [*prégnantes*] situations, yet concrete enough to provide a sample likely to reflect them»[45]. The image thus opens up a lived distance, allowing subjects to navigate their relationship within the world without being overwhelmed by it. This imaginal third reality, rooted in the organism's perceptual, motor and affective experience, serves as the locus through which subjects orient themselves within the world—both spatially and temporally.

However, because of its intermediary status, images are clearly not confined to the interiority of subjects: they also take shape in exterior forms, materialising in produced objects. This dynamic explains why Simondon approaches invention through the cycle of imagination. Inventive processes—and the objects they generate—are always already saturated with images. As I will explore more fully in the next section, «the image as an intermediary reality between abstract and concrete, between self and world, is not merely mental: it materializes to become an institution, a product, wealth»[46]. The image thus acts as a bridge, enabling silent yet efficient communication between subjects and objects, between the individual's interior life and the shared collective world. Its materialisation in concrete objects highlights the image's social and quasi-organismic function—making visible, and therefore participable, the ontogenetic role of the imaginary at the heart of every social structure.

As a third reality, images operate in both directions of the subject-world relation. On the one hand, they become embedded in objects of use—both technical and artistic. On the other hand, they address subjects, inhabiting them anonymously and functioning as agents of social and cultural transformation. As Simondon writes: «the image is a resultant, but it is also a seed: it can become the trigger for concepts and doctrines. The circular causality that goes from the mind to objective reality through social processes of cumulative causality also goes from objective reality to the mind»[47]. In this sense, any produced, represented, or conceptualised object may become an image-object: a bearer of latent meanings that are not only cognitive, but also conative and affective. In this surplus—this overabundance of meaning and autonomy—the social and germinal dimension of images is revealed. As Simondon adds, images are

[44] M. Dufrenne, *Le Poétique*, op. cit., p. 236.
[45] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit., p. 10.
[46] *Ibid*., p. 13.
[47] *Idem*.

«seeds capable of being reborn and developing in the subject. Even outside of the subject, they multiply through group exchanges and activities»[48].

In this sense, the images on which the technical structure of a society is based influence the mental and emotional structures of human subjects as surreptitiously as they do intensely. This makes it crucial, from our perspective, to develop a phenomenology that takes into account the impact of technology and invention on individuals through images.

Temporality and Rationalisation

Before turning, in the following paragraph, to the notion of an «overabundance of being» proper to object-images, it is useful—especially for clarifying the historical stakes of an inventive phenomenology—to briefly consider a final pair of temporal categories that shape the status of the image: past and future. As already shown, images are neither reducible to perception nor fully conceptualizable; they possess a temporal structure expressed through the different directions they embody. According to their genetic cycle, images function as anticipatory agents, as mediators of perceptual engagement in the present, and as vehicles of memory and recollection. Imagination, in this sense, possesses a dynamic and genetic structure that accounts for the orienting function of images with respect to both concepts and perceptions, also in their temporal articulation. It is thanks to their participation in an imaginal structure that concepts and perceptions retain their own temporality. As Simondon suggests in *MEOT*, images occupy an intermediary position between past and future, and through their quasi-autonomy, they shape present experience as a dynamic field of transformation. It is precisely this temporal plasticity that renders them constitutive elements of the inventive process.

Attending to the temporal dimension of images becomes even more crucial in light of a modern tendency described by Simondon:

> The necessities of long-term forecasts [*prévision*] for action have introduced rationalisation into the dimension of the future and have driven out mythical thinking. [...] Time begins to be organised like space; the future is annexed to knowledge and no longer the privileged field of the optative, of desire, or of volition[49].

Echoing Henry Bergson, Simondon describes how time becomes spatialised, reduced to a domain of calculation and control. He also resonates with Mircea Eliade's critique of modernity, according to which: «The progressive de-sacralisation of modern man has altered the content of his spiritual life without breaking the matrices of his imagination: a quantity of mythological litter still lingers in the ill-controlled zones of the mind»[50]. These rationalisations, Simondon warns, should not be mistaken for

[48] *Ibid*.

[49] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit. , p. 17.

[50] M. Eliade, *Images and Symbols*, op. cit., p. 18. Later he writes: «To have imagination is to be able to see the world in its totality, for the power and the mission of the Images is to show all that remains refractory to the concept: hence the disfavour and failure of the man «without imagination»; he is cut off from the deeper reality of life and

true inventions. They are rather extrapolations from a deeper, irreducible imaginal-temporal flow. For this reason, an inventive phenomenology must seek to recover the complex and originary role of the image in the experience of time. Precisely because images cannot be entirely rationalised, they preserve a «density and force which carries it towards the anticipation of the collective future, beside and beyond the prospective rationalisations»[51].

In this view, the capacity to genuinely predict is not reducible to scientific modelling or observation; it is a form of living and inventing. As Simondon insists, genuine foresight is *praxis*—taking root in the continuity of an action already in progress, in which we are involved. And once again, it is the image that ensures this continuity, operating as a unifying and transductive force. Thanks to their intrinsic volitional, affective, and motivational dimensions, images inject a proactive tension into our relation to the future.

Conceiving the image in its genesis and therefore, phenomenologically, in its own expressive power and conceptual irreducibility, thus becomes a fundamental task in reactivating the profound meaning of invention. It is precisely this regulatory and temporal status of images—their capacity to orient perception, sustain anticipation, and project the subject toward possible futures—that provides the ground for an inventive phenomenology. Images, in their hybrid and quasi-organismic nature, do not only mediate between subject and object; they also disclose the very conditions under which phenomenological inquiry must reinvent itself. In this sense, the imaginal dimension is not a secondary theme but the constitutive basis of phenomenology understood as an inventive practice.

3. The «Overabundance of Being» in Produced Objects

Now, before outlining the main features of an inventive phenomenology, it is necessary to consider the objective dimension of images briefly. As Dufrenne remarks—commenting on key passages of the Simondonian course—«do not think that reality will contradict this [subjective] imaginary; the real too contains an imaginary, insofar as it appears charged with the possible, which gives it meaning—at least as long as objectifying thought does not reduce it to being merely what it is»[52]. In this light, invented, created, or manufactured objects cannot be reduced to mere subjective representations or conceptual descriptions. They carry within themselves a specific imaginal charge: their concrete actuality remains imbued with the virtual dimension of the images that inhabit them. As Simondon puts it succinctly: «an object is clothed in images»[53].

---

from his own soul» (p. 20). The influence of Eliade on Simondon remains a topic for future research.

[51] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit. , p. 17.

[52] M. Dufrenne, *L'inventaire des a priori. Recherche de l'originaire*, Presses universitaires de Caen, Caen 2021, p. 257. In his works on the notion of the *a priori*, Dufrenne develops a reconceptualization of the transcendental from the standpoint of the object, through what he calls an «empiricism of the transcendental» (*The Notion of A Priori*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1966, p. 46).This rethinking of the mode of existence of objects constitutes a crucial point of convergence between Dufrenne's phenomenological project and the Simondonian approach.

[53] G. Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit. , p. 12.

Given their imaginal *halo*, technical objects possess a certain expressive autonomy, grounded in their genetic scope. In this respect, a genuinely invented object is marked by a *functional surplus*: a plurivocity and plurifunctionality proper to its images that resonates with the sacred dimension of experience—that indeterminate depth of the *ground* against which every formal and inventive act takes shape. As Simondon writes: «The resolution of the problem through formalisation creates an artificial object endowed with properties that exceed the problem. Genuine invention transcends its own end»[54]. Through the study of image-objects, the aesthetic and symbolic insertion of technical objects into the world can be grasped—an insertion that reveals their reticular affinity with the sacred and cosmic dimensions of experience:

> In order to be fully organized, the created object must be more complex and polyvalent than the strict project of problem resolution presupposed; it then displays new properties enabling it to solve, through an overabundance of being [*surabondance d'être*], other problems. […] This increase is comparable to a *functional surplus-value* caused by the work of natural realities incorporated in the created object so that it can be entirely compatible with itself[55].

Understood in their imaginal virtuality—or better, in their structural overabundance of being—technical objects incorporate ever more «wild» effects. They gain a relative autonomy from their inventor, initiating what Simondon calls «a free adventure, involving as many chances of survival and transmission through the ages as dangers of reduction to slavery»[56]. This free adventure exposes the object to the contingencies of life, and calls for a phenomenology capable of attending to its ontological overabundance—its unpredictable symbolic resonance and expressive density. As inserted into the lifeworld, the invented object remains open to continually integrating images and meanings that surpass any strictly representational framework.

As Simondon further suggests, the essence of technical objects—their *technicity*—must be investigated through their isomorphic relationship with the symbolic dimension of the sacred:

> Beyond the usefulness that would make these objects utensils […], beyond an easy and superficial symbolism of belonging to a caste or a place, we must strive to discover a sense of technicity, just as Mircea Eliade seeks to discover, beneath images and symbols, a sense of sacredness[57].

Technicity and sacredness are both irreducible to univocal and definitive meanings. As well as the images with which they are imbued, they are structured by a plurivocal logic that resists any merely representational reduction. In this respect, following Dufrenne's phenomenology, since technical objects are inherently imbued with images, they must be conceived as *quasi-subjects*, endowed with a peculiar expressive and pervasive force,

[54] *Idem*, p. 172.
[55] G. Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit. ,, p. 174.
[56] G. Simondon, *Sur la technique*, op. cit., p. 13.
[57] Ivi, p. 31. The work Simondon refers to here is M. Eliade's *Images and Symbols*, op. cit.

as well as with a certain autonomy in their capacity to generate a world[58]. As Simondon further notes: «An image or symbol that is reduced to a single objective meaning is desacralised. Similarly, an *abstract* technical object, a materialised concept, is not a true technical object, but only an educational or scientific montage»[59]. This means that technical objects cannot be fully understood in terms of function or utility alone. Their depth requires a supplementary form of knowledge—one attuned to their symbolic, imaginative, and aesthetic dimensions. Reducing them to functional schemas erases their social and cosmological meaning, obscuring the nature of the inventive process that presides over their concretization. For this reason, following Simondon's theory of imagination and invention, it becomes necessary to *save the phenomenon* at the core of technical invention, and to develop a phenomenology capable of doing justice to this generative imaginative process as well as to the complete status of technical objects—beyond the static and dogmatic confines of traditional subject–object correlation.

4. Towards an Inventive Phenomenology

The study of invention and the ontogenetic status of images presented in this article leads to a reevaluation of the role of the imaginary in social and personal experience, as well as to a reexamination of phenomenological methods in an inventive key. Such a perspective does not involve a juxtaposition between a subjective philosophical gesture and an already given technical object, as in the post-phenomenological framework. Instead, it challenges the dichotomy between subject and object, revealing the expressive and imaginal agency inherent to technical objects – traditionally considered the passive side of the correlation[60].

By *inventive phenomenology*, I do not mean a «new phenomenology» in a doctrinal sense. Instead, it points to the phenomenology's constitutive *inventivity*: its rethinking of experience, always begun anew in relation to the techno-imaginal contexts in which it is inserted. In this respect, a presumed *pure phenomenology* can be only an historical regulative ideal; what really distinguishes it from other philosophical practices are its imaginal-inventive operations, allowing it to interrogate subject–object and subject–world relations as structures to be discovered through ever-changing contingent variations. Simondon's reflections on the genetic status of images thus enrich this task, not as a simple rupture but as a *problematic* inheritance, *betraying* and continuing the phenomenological tradition, which—as Sini reminds us—can only ever begin anew[61].

[58] See M. Dufrenne, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, op. cit., p. 229: «Space and time are so well integrated into the aesthetic object that they seem to proceed from it. Spatiality and temporality become the dimensions of the world internal to the object, the forms which the object, far from receiving, invents for its own world». For a reflection on Dufrenne's notion of quasi-subject applied to screens as technical objects, see: Carbone, M., *Philosophy-Screens: From Cinema to the Digital Revolution*, trans. M. Nijhuis, State University of New York Press, Albany 2019, pp. 81-86.

[59] G. Simondon, *Sur la technique*, op. cit., p. 32.

[60] See M. Carbone – G. Lingua, *Toward an Anthropology of Screens: Showing and Hiding, Exposing and Protecting*, Palgrave Macmillan / Springer Nature, Cham–New York 2023, p. 143.

[61] Simondon, in developing his philosophy of individuation, thus seems to respond to a crystallization of the phenomenological school. As Merleau-Ponty remarks, «establishing a tradition means forgetting its origins, the

Phenomenological inventivity is thus grounded in the body-organism as a system of action, namely, in its genetic relation with the milieu, the living matrix from which invention itself emerges. The organism's behavioral schemas define its fundamental mode of existence: «these are sequences whose program a living being possesses in itself the way it possesses its own body»[62]. The body schema, inseparable from motor anticipations, provides the primordial source of the organism *a priori*, orienting perception and irradiating motor images that anticipate possible actions. As Simondon remarks, «[t]o have a concrete intuition of an object's movement means, to some extent, putting oneself in its place and situation, as if our body were that very object»[63]. Here lies the corporeal root of inventive phenomenology: its power does not derive from abstract formalisation but from the imaginal capacity of the body to project and select gestures of invention. As Merleau-Ponty reminds us, there is no *kosmotheoros*[64], no pure observer outside the world: even the most rigorous thought begins from its corporeal and affective bond with the milieu.

This corporeal grounding also distinct inventive phenomenology from post-phenomenology. Thinkers such as Don Ihde have shown how technics mediate human–world relations and how artifacts embody normative dimensions. However, post-phenomenology often restricts itself to empirical analysis, avoiding transcendental questions[65]. Inventive phenomenology, by contrast, emphasizes the ontogenetic dimension: the role of images, motor anticipations, and corporeal schemas in generating both technical inventions and symbolic meanings. In this way, it complements post-phenomenology while extending phenomenology beyond its historicised limits.

To imagine phenomenology in this inventive mode is thus to leave open the space of the virtual and the potential, of action and technicity, within philosophical method itself. It is to develop a form of thought, an attitude capable of responding to the mythological and imaginal phenomena that arise in the wake of ongoing technical transformations—phenomena too often rendered invisible by dogmatic rationalizing modern perspectives, yet increasingly active even within established cultural institutions. What has been outlined here is the sketch of such an interpretation: one that entails a dynamic, critical, and symbolic rearticulation of phenomenology's very foundations as both a technical and aesthetic mode of access to experience. Here, this

---

aging Husserl used to say» («The Philosopher and His Shadow», op. cit., 159).

[62] G.Simondon, *Imagination and Invention*, op.cit. , p. 32.

[63] *II*, p. 40. Simondon's account of intuition clarifies this corporeal rooting as an expression of «transduction» (*Individuation*, p. 15). Intuition is not a punctual perception but a progressive multisensory integration: «a mode of multisensorial compatibility» (*Invention and Imagination*, op. cit., p. 146), containing «a reserve of solutions for concrete invention, in the same way a roadmap is an always-ready reserve of itineraries» (*Idem*). Intuition thus operates as the corporeal schema's active dimension, irradiating motor anticipations that ground inventive action. Broader implications of this notion must be left aside here.

[64] As Merleau-Ponty writes: «It is necessary to suppress the causal thought which is always: view of the world from without, from the point of view of a *Kosmotheoros*», (*The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. A. Lingis, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1968, p. 227).

[65] As Van Den Eede affirms, «postphenomenology does not like the transcendental», *Thing-Transcendentality: Navigating the Interval of «technology» and «Technology»*, in *Foundations of Science*, 27 (1) (2022), p. 227. As Agostino Cera suggests, the rejection of the ontological questions leads postphenomenology—and, more generally, the entire so-called *empirical turn*—to take shape as an «ontophobic turn», «Beyond the Empirical Turn: Elements for an Ontology of Engineering», *Információs Társadalom*, 20 (4) (2020).

rethinking has been pursued along three axes: first, invention as a relational process between organism and milieu; second, images as quasi-organisms, temporal operators that orient perception and sustain anticipation; and third, technical objects as carriers of imaginal meaning that consistently exceed rational design.

Inventive phenomenology must therefore be recognized as what phenomenology has always tried to be: a practice and a philosophical posture rooted in inter-corporeality, acting inventively toward and through the world, capable of resonating with the symbolic and techno-scientific challenges of its time.

Bibliographical References

Bachelard, G., *La psychanalyse du feu*, Gallimard, Paris 1949.

Bardin, A., *Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon: Individuation, Technics, Social Systems*, Springer, Dordrecht 2015.

Barthélemy, J.-H., *Penser l'individuation. Simondon et la philosophie de la nature*, L'Harmattan, Paris 2005.

Carbone, M., *Philosophy-Screens: From Cinema to the Digital Revolution*, trans. M. Nijhuis, State University of New York Press, Albany 2019.

Carbone, M. – G. Lingua. *Toward an Anthropology of Screens: Showing and Hiding, Exposing and Protecting*. Cham–New York: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer Nature, 2023.

Carrozzini, G., *Gilbert Simondon filosofo della mentalité technique*, Mimesis Edizioni, Milano-Udine 2011.

Cera, A., «Beyond the Empirical Turn: Elements for an Ontology of Engineering», *Információs Társadalom*, 20 (4) (2020) 74–89.

Clarizio, E., *La vita tecnica. Una filosofia biologica della tecnica*, Mimesis Edizioni, Milano-Udine 2024.

Dufourcq, A., *Merleau-Ponty: An Ontology of the Imaginary*, trans. B. Smyth, Springer, Cham 2024.

Dufrenne, M., *The Notion of A Priori*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1966.

— *Le Poétique. Précédé de Pour une philosophie non théologique*, Éditions PUF, Paris 1973.

— *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, trans. E. S. Casey, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973.

— *L'inventaire des a priori. Recherche de l'originaire*, Presses universitaires de Caen, Caen 2021.

Eliade, M., *Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism*, trans. P. Mairet, Sheed and Ward, New York 1969.

Guchet, X., «Théorie du lien social, technologie et philosophie : Simondon lecteur de Merleau-Ponty», *Les Études philosophiques*, 57 (2) (2001), 219–237.

Hui, Y., «Apropos Technophany», *Technophany: A Journal for Philosophy and Technology*, 1 (2024) 1-13.

— «On the Soul of Technical Objects: Commentary on Simondon's "Technics and Eschatology"», *Theory, Culture & Society*, 35 (7–8) (2018) 61–83.

— «On a Possible Passing from the Digital to the Symbolic», in *2 or 3 Tigers Exhibition Publication*, ed. A. Franke – H. Kim, Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin 2017, pp. 1–8.

Husserl, E., *Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass* (1916–1937), ed. R. Sowa, Husserliana 39, Springer, Dordrecht 2008.

— *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. F. Kersten, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1983.

Ihde, D., *Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington–Indianapolis 1990.

— *Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives*, Fordham University Press, New York 2010.

— *Husserl's Missing Technologies*, Fordham University Press, New York 2016.

Malaspina, C., «Invention and Metamorphosis: Intelligence, Automated Optimization (AO) and the Prospect of Synthetic Intelligence with Simondon and Denizhan», *I Castelli di Yale online. Annali di filosofia*, Vol. XII, (2) (2024) 97–107.

Menegalle, G., «Simondon's Heterodox Naturalism: Form, Information and Self-Organization in Imagination and Invention», *Paragraph*, vol. 47, (3) (2024) 341–358.

Merleau-Ponty, M., «The Philosopher and His Shadow», in *Signs*, trans. R. C. McCleary, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1964, 159–181.

— *The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. A. Lingis, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1968.

— «Eye and Mind», in *The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting*, ed. G. Johnson, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1993, pp. 121–149.

— *Institution and Passivity: Course Notes from the Collège de France (1954–1955)*, trans. L. Lawlor and H. Massey, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 2010.

Lindberg, S., «Being with Technique – Technique as Being-With: The Technological Communities of Gilbert Simondon», *Continental Philosophy Review*, 52 (2019) 195-211.

Sartre, J.-P., *The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination*, trans. J. Webber, Routledge, London–New York 2004.

Simondon, G., *L'invention dans les techniques. Cours et conférences*, Seuil, Paris 2005.

— *Cours sur la perception (1964–1965)*, Éditions PUF, Paris 2013.

— *Sur la technique*, Éditions PUF, Paris 2014.

— *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. C. Malaspina e J. Rogove, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2017.

— *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information*, trans. T. Adkins, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2020.

— *Imagination and Invention*, trans. J. Hughes e C. Wall-Romana, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2023.

Sini, C., *Prefazione* to *Metodo fenomenologico statico e genetico*, ed. M. Vergani, Il Saggiatore, Milan 2003, pp. 9-15.

Stiegler, B., *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. R. Beardsworth and G. Collins, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1998.

Van Den Eede, Y., «Thing-Transcendentality: Navigating the Interval of 'technology' and 'Technology'», *Foundations of Science*, 27 (1) (2022) 225–243.

Viana, D., «On Gilbert Simondon's Inheritance from Merleau-Ponty», *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 27 (2) (2023) 247–271.

Voss, D., «A New Notion of the Image: Gilbert Simondon, Imagination and Invention», *Parrhesia*, vol. 39 (2024) 155–176.