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Ymaginatio in the Commentary on the De Anima Attributed to Petrus Hispanus¹

Abstract

This paper aims to place the role of the imagination in the Commentary attributed to Petrus Hispanus (13th century) on Aristotle's *De Anima* (*Sententia cum questionibus in Aristotelis De anima I-II*), within an Avicennian psychological framework. In fact, imagination, as it appears in the *Sententia*, results from the combination of this Avicennian theoretical background with Petrus Hispanus' intent of preserving faithfulness to the Aristotelian text, as this study tries to show.

Key words: Imagination; Fantasy; Medieval Psychology; Inner Senses.

Ancient and Medieval Authors: Aristotle; Avicenna; Petrus Hispanus.

Ymaginatio no Comentário ao De anima atribuído a Pedro Hispano

Resumo

Este artigo tem como objetivo situar o papel desempenhado pela imaginação no Comentário sobre o *De anima* (*Sententia cum questionibus in Aristotelis De anima I-II*) atribuído a Pedro Hispano (séc. XIII) no quadro da psicologia aviceniiana. A imaginação, tal como aparece na *Sententia*, é o resultado da influência teórica aviceniiana em confronto com a vontade de Pedro Hispano de manter a fidelidade ao texto aristotélico, como o estudo tratará de mostrar.

Palavras-chave: Imaginação; Fantasia; Psicologia medieval; Sentidos internos.

Autores antigos e medievais: Aristóteles; Avicena; Pedro Hispano.

* This work is part of the post-doc project “The Early Latin Reception of Aristotle’s *De anima*. Critical Edition and Systematic Study of the Psychological Works attributed to Petrus Hispanus», SFRH/BPD/95373/2013, within the research group “Aristotelica Portugalsensia. The Reception of Aristotle in Portugal until the 18th Century” of the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Porto, Via Panorâmica, s/n, 4150-564 Porto, Portugal, funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia. Email: celialopez@letras.up.pt.

1. Introduction

The *Sententia cum questionibus in Aristotelis De anima I-II* is, together with the *Scientia libri De anima*, one of the psychological works attributed to Petrus Hispanus whose importance within the psychological tradition has deserved the attention of many scholars, since it was edited by Manuel Alonso Alonso¹.

We have in progress a new edition of the Commentary on the *De Anima, Sententia cum questionibus*, of which we have two manuscripts: the manuscript of Cracow, Biblioteka Jagiellońska Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 726, ff. 41r-134r, and the manuscript of Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana Cod. Lat. Z 253 (= 1826), ff. 54r-99r². At the present stage of the editing process, it is already clear that the Venice manuscript, in some passages, actually provides us with more text than that of Cracow, allowing to solve some of the problems found in the text already edited by Alonso, based on the later manuscript³. In approaching this work, several unanswered questions are raised concerning its context of production; namely, its precise time and place of composition are still problematic issues, and the same can be said about its attribution to either Petrus Hispanus, Pope John XXI; the author of the *Summulae logicales* or any other person called Petrus Hispanus, since this was a very common name in the period, as José

¹ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus in Aristotelis De anima I-II*, ed. M. Alonso Alonso, in *Obras Filosóficas II: Comentario al «De anima» de Aristóteles*, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid 1944; Petrus Hispanus, *Scientia libri de anima*, ed. M. Alonso Alonso, in *Obras Filosóficas I: Scientia libri de anima*, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid 1941 (revised edition: Juan Flors, Barcelona 1961). On these works cfr. especially the studies of R.-A. Gauthier, «Préface», in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Sententia libri de anima*, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 1984, pp. 239*-242*; and J.F. Meirinhos, *Metafísica do homem. Conhecimento e vontade nas obras de psicologia atribuídas a Pedro Hispano (século XIII)*, Edições Afontamento, Porto 2011.

² In fact, the new edition of both works, *Sententia* and *Scientia*, is fundamentally motivated by the discovery of new manuscripts, which will help to improve the texts published over fifty years ago, and that already by themselves present some problems, cf: «Alonso's editions are mere transcriptions of the manuscripts; they are useful to work with, but have to be treated with much caution». N. Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West. The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160-1300*, The Warburg Institute / Nino Aragno Edice, London / Torino 2000, p. 55 n. 247. Cfr. the same appreciation, years before, J.M. da Cruz Pontes, «As «Questiones libri de anima»», in *A obra filosófica de Pedro Hispano Portugalense: novos problemas textuais*, Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra 1972, p. 125.

³ Pontes, «As «Questiones libri de anima»...», cit., pp. 117-158.

Meirinhos aptly pointed out⁴. Ideally, from a more complete critically established text we would be able to proceed with rigour to the analysis of the lexicon and sources quoted, as well as to a detailed analysis of the doctrines found in the text. These are aspects whose resolution would allow us to establish more precisely when and where the *Sententia* may have been written, and, with some degree of reliability, by whom.

The work presents us with two distinct modes of commentary, a combination resembling that found in texts previous to 1260, according to Weijers⁵: on the one hand, the «*intensio auctoris*» or explanation of the Aristotelian text, and, on the other hand, the *quaestiones*⁶. The questions, in general, are of greater interest, for in them the commentator expresses his own «eclectic» reading, to use the terminology of Bazán⁷. Unfortunately, such personal reading came down to us incomplete, since the *Sententia* ends on *De anima*'s second book (both manuscripts end on the *lectio undecima*, though not exactly at the same point). It lacks the commentary on Book III, where the question of the intellect and intellection is the subject of enquiry, and where some «post-sensible» functions are postulated. We thus lack the more substantial part of it, which is required in order to understand the definition and distribution of the epistemological functions of the soul, and, among them, that which is developed by the imagination. This drawback should not prevent us from delving, as far as possible, into the doctrinal analysis of those

4 J.F. Meirinhos, «Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis? Elementos para uma diferenciação de autores», *Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval* 3 (1996) 51-76; Cfr. as well Á. d'Ors, «Petrus Hispanus, O.P., Auctor Summularum (I)», *Dicenda. Cuadernos de Filología Hispánica* 19 (2001) 243-291; «Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (II). Nuevos documentos y problemas», *Dicenda. Cuadernos de filología hispánica* 25 (2007) 139-180.

5 «À partir de 1260 environ, la plupart des commentaires semblent appartenir à deux genres différents: les sententiae d'une part, les quaestiones de l'autre». O. Weijers, «La structure des commentaires», in G. Fioravanti, C. Leonardi, S. Perfetti (eds.), *Il commento filosofico nell'occidente latino (secoli XIII-XV)*, Brepols, Turnhout 2002, p. 19. The fact that this work belongs to the first half of the 13th century coincides with the fact that the author was unaware of the Latin translation of *De motu animalium*, translated approx. by Guilherme de Moerbeke between 1260-1266, and rapidly disseminated, cfr. Meirinhos, «Comentar Aristóteles na primeira metade do século XIII...», cit., p. 153.

6 On the structure of the work, cfr. specially J.F. Meirinhos, «Comentar Aristóteles na primeira metade do século XIII. A *Sententia cum questionibus* in *De anima* atribuída a Pedro Hispano», *Revista da Faculdade de Letras - Série de Filosofia* 23 (2005) 127-160.

7 Bazán, «13th Century Commentaries on *De anima*: From Peter of Spain to Thomas Aquinas», cit., pp. 119-184, here pp. 122-132.

parts in which the doctrine of imagination may have some presence, in Books I and II.

2. Imagination as internal sense

In the *Sententia cum questionibus*, imagination appears in the context of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge as a faculty that reproduces the image in the absence of the object⁸. This faculty of the soul is neither to be identified with the senses nor with the intellect, but rather mediates between them:

Abstractio est multis modis: Uno modo est abstractio specierum per virtutes anime ab ipsis rebus secundum quam abstractionem sensus abstrahit species sensibiles et ymaginatio accipit eas a sensu et intellectus ab ymaginatione et hec abstractio via est ad cognitionem⁹.

Abstraction, thus, originates in the senses and is completed by the action of the intellect, which takes the sensible species from the imagination in order to convert them, through its act of intellection into intelligible species. This faculty, thus, plays a necessary role in induction. As we shall see, then, according to Petrus, imagination is conceived as a necessary part of cognition, in the manner of Aristotle.

Nonetheless, the description of the imagination is problematic, since it addresses a wider medieval framework, which includes a variety of «post-sensible» faculties or virtues that were the subject of much discussion during the first half of the 13th century. In the *Sententia*, indeed, the more complete listing of these controversial virtues makes its appearance when discussing memory:

Virtutum quedam sunt exteriores; quedam interiores. Virtutes exteriores sunt quinque sensus; virtutes autem interiores sunt sensus communis, ymaginatio et fantasia; memoria et reminiscentia. Set in libro *De anima* determinat Aristoteles de virtutibus interioribus et exterioribus que sunt sensus communis, fantasia, ymaginatio. Ergo debet similiter determinare in libro *De anima* de virtutibus interioribus que sunt memoria et reminiscentia. Ergo scientia *de memoria et reminiscentia* est eadem cum scientia *de anima*¹⁰.

The above text outlines two classifications of internal and external virtues, probably based on contemporary or even earlier traditions. In the first one, from an

⁸ Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 2, 425b 24-25.

⁹ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., p. 101.

¹⁰ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., p. 314.

unspecified source, the external virtues correspond to the five senses, while common sense, imagination, fantasy, memory, and reminiscence comprise the internal senses. In turn, the second enumeration is Aristotelian, according to the author. The five senses are not considered there, and only the ensemble of «post-sensible» virtues is mentioned, in order to ascertain whether memory and reminiscence are inner, i.e., rational, or external virtues, i.e., corporeal, as are corporeal the common sense, fantasy and imagination. The commentator concludes that, in accordance with Aristotle's thought, reminiscence and memory must be grouped together with common sense, *ymaginatio* and *fantasia*, all as external senses¹¹.

This reference to Aristotle in order to solve the problem addressed, related to memory, is steeped in the purpose of remaining faithful to the text of the Greek philosopher. Nevertheless, the author takes as valid a set of inner faculties which are, in fact, clearly non-Aristotelian¹².

Both classifications, the latter, which is supposed to be Aristotelian, and the former, which is non-Aristotelian, coincide in providing a list of five virtues: common sense, imagination, fantasy, memory and reminiscence, a list which, as happens with most of the psychological works from the first half of the 13th century, reflects the reception of Arabic psychology¹³.

As we see, the two lists include both *ymaginatio* and fantasy but they do not present them within the same sequence, which is a symptom of how difficult the reception of these terms, which depart from Aristotle's texts, was in the Latin tradition.

Indeed, Aristotle's considerations on φαντασία are the source of all later developments. In his rereading of Aristotle, Michael V. Wedin (who justifies his position with reasons from textual criticism) denies the value of fantasy as a faculty equal in status to the sensitive and rational ones, stating that fantasy, according

¹¹ Cfr. the introduction by Bazán, where he mentions the discussion about the faculties and briefly presents the Aristotelian texts which are the source of inspiration for later theorizing on the inner senses, B.C. Bazán, «Introduction», in Anonymi, Magistri artium, *Sententia super II et III De anima*, ed. B.C. Bazán, Éditions Peeters, Louvain / Paris 1998, pp. 45*-47*.

¹² Going one step further, the classification into five senses has, according to Wolfson, much to do with the reception of the galenic and stoic traditions by the Ikhwân al-Safâ (Brethren of Purity), cfr. H.A. Wolfson, «The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophical Texts», *The Harvard Theological Review*, 28.2 (1935) 69-133,.

¹³ «Et sic cadunt in alia scientia ab anima. Sic autem determinatur de illis in scientia que appellatur *de memoria et reminiscentia*. Et ideo scientia *de memoria et reminiscentia* diuersa est a scientia *De anima*». Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., p. 102.

to Aristotle, conceived as a representational capacity, has a transversal nature, present not only in the acts of the intellect, but also in the acts of the senses, given that the act of sensation itself already requires a representation¹⁴.

In a way, this transversal nature turns the imagination into a power without a clearly fixed position within the hierarchy of faculties established by medieval philosophers. In this field, Avicenna was and is considered the philosopher of reference, the great theorist of the soul's faculties¹⁵. The classic Avicennian theory appears in *De Anima* IV, chapters 1 to 3. Here are described the five internal senses, namely *sensus communis*, *ymaginatio*, imaginative – called cogitative in man – estimative and memorative¹⁶, faculties that form a hierarchy and are by nature different from one another. About imagination, Avicenna speaks of the two imaginations already postulated by Al-Farabi, one retentive and the other compositive. The imaginative – called «cogitative» in man – neither receives nor preserves but has the function of combining and separating forms. Together with the estimative, it constitutes, for Avicenna, the power productive of mental images (the estimative, in its turn, produces non-sensible images, *intentiones*)¹⁷.

As it happens, the great impact of Avicenna's classification of the faculties is reflected in the other work attributed to Petrus Hispanus and edited by Alonso, the *Scientia libri de anima*. In this work, though not explicitly assumed, there is a theory of the faculties clearly subordinate to that of Avicenna, as in many other texts from the first half of the 13th century¹⁸.

¹⁴ «The crucial point is that Aristotle must hold that imagination and perception are co-occurrent in the sense that perception typically involves imagination». M.V. Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, Yale University Press, New Haven / London 1988, p. 52. On the possible senses of the word «fantasia» in Aristotle, cfr. G. Camassa, «Phantasia da Platone ai Neoplatoni», in M. Fattori, M. Bianchi (eds.), *Phantasia-Imaginatio. Atti del V colloquio internazionale del lessico intellettuale europeo*, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, Roma 1988, pp. 23-55, here pp. 34-35.

¹⁵ «Avicenna and his psychology dominated the structure and much of the content of psychological writings in the West of half a century, from John Blund to Albertus Magnus and Petrus Hispanus». Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West*, cit., p. 225. On the classic Avicennian theory, cfr. Meryem Sebt, *Avicenne. L'âme humaine*, PUF, Paris 2000.

¹⁶ Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, ed. S. Van Riet, Éditions Orientalistes / Brill, Louvain / Leiden 1968, v. II, pp. 1-54.

¹⁷ Avicenna was very much under the influence of Al-Farabi's conception of the faculties, the latter having postulated the existence of two imaginations and the estimative power. Avicenna will add the common sense to the classification, cfr. Wolfson, «The Internal Senses in Latin...», cit., pp. 93-95.

¹⁸ «Petrus's main psychological work, the *Scientia libri de anima*, dating from between 1250 and 1260, is perhaps the most Avicennian work written in the West». Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in*

Nevertheless, the well-known Avicennian formulation of the five internal senses in parallel to the five external senses simplifies the complex development of a theory through which the Persian thinker intended to show an organic disposition of the faculties, a development which exhibits variants in each of his most important works¹⁹. The *Canon* and the *as Shifa'*, the only two Avicennian works available in Latin in the 13th and 14th centuries²⁰, show notable discrepancies in their classification of the internal senses. Thus, according to the *Canon*, there is first (1) common sense and imagination (the same faculty, according with the physicians, though not with the philosophers); secondly (2) the compositive imagination – human and animal – and estimation (again, Avicenna asserts that, according to the physicians, the estimative does not exist); thirdly (3) the memory; and fourthly (4) recollection (about the latter, memory and recollection, he gathers the opinion that they are distinct, without discussing it). In turn, in the section of his other great work, *as Shifa'*, devoted to the soul, Avicenna speaks of (1) common sense, also called fantasy; (2) retentive imagination²¹; (3) compositive imagination (human and animal); (4) estimation; and (5) memory and recollection²².

As we see, Avicenna's own writings do not provide a definitive classification and definition of these faculties²³. This fact will allow the different theoretical developments by his epigones, as well as by those who were not that close to his

the Latin West, cit., p. 55. Accordingly, the five internal senses have acts of either an abstractive or conservative nature, whether of sensible or intentional forms. The *sensus communis*, the *y^maginatⁱo* and the imaginative, called cogitative in man, preserve or abstract sensible forms. The estimative power and the memory, on the other hand, operate with non-sensible, intentional forms.

¹⁹ «In histories of philosophy and psychology the entire subject of the internal senses is usually dismissed by a general statement to the effect that in post-Aristotelian philosophy three or five internal senses are contrasted with the five external senses. But the true history of the internal senses is more complicated than this». Wolfson, «The Internal Senses in Latin...», cit., p. 70.

²⁰ Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West*, cit., p. 3.

²¹ Nevertheless, Albertus has also said in this work: «Sensus communis et imaginatio sunt quasi una virtus et quasi no diversificantur in subiecto, sed in forma». Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, cit., p. 5, 1, 64-65.

²² See the nuances of these classifications in Wolfson, «The Internal Senses in Latin...», cit., pp. 96-100.

²³ «En realtà la trattazione di Avicenna era piuttosto fluida: la facoltà venivano distinte terminologicamente soprattutto per ragioni di utilità espositiva». G. Fioravanti, «Phantasia: tra Aristotele e i peripatetici», in M. Bettetini, F. Paparella (eds.), *Immaginario e immaginazione nel medioevo*, Fédération Internationale des Institut d'Études Médiévales, Louvain-la-Neuve 2009, pp. 163-177, here p. 164.

thought²⁴. In the Latin tradition, judging by the number of manuscripts, as well as by its doctrinal influence, the *De anima*, in *as Shifa'*, with its five internal senses, was Avicenna's most influential philosophical work, and its theory, thus, the most recognizably Avicennian²⁵. Nonetheless, even its translation and subsequent transmission testify to the difficulties of its reception in the Latin milieu²⁶.

After Avicenna, Averroes, in his intended fidelity to Aristotle, reduced the list of five internal senses to four, namely: common sense, imagination, cogitative and memory – senses that assume the functions attributed to both the Avicennian imaginative and estimative²⁷. In his turn, Maimonides established another classification, in which imagination assumes the operations usually attributed to the common sense; an imagination both compositive and retentive (animal and human); and estimation²⁸.

3. Imagination and fantasy

To this complex web of faculties another element must be added: fantasy. Seldom does the word «fantasia» appear in the texts of Avicenna. In *De Anima*, when it makes its appearance, in Arabic transliteration, fantasy is equated with common sense; in the *Canon*, however, it figures as equivalent to *ymaginatio*, as we have seen²⁹. Al-Ghazali, who generally follows Avicenna in *The intentions*

²⁴ «Questa indifferenza terminologica, cui abbiamo accennato come ad una testimonianza dell'interesse di Avicenna per la continuità di un complesso processo conoscitivo, aveva creato non poca confusiones tra i primi utilizzatori del filosofo arabo». Fioravanti, «Phantasia: tra Aristotele e i peripatetici...», cit., p. 169.

²⁵ Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West*, cit., pp. 7-8.

²⁶ «Lo esteso traduttore di Avicenna, nel suo *De anima*, aveva in qualche modo scambiato le funzioni tra immaginativa ed *imaginatio* attribuendo alla seconda quele della prima». Fioravanti, «Phantasia: tra Aristotele e i peripatetici...», cit., p. 170. Cfr. also G. Verbeke, «Introduction sur la doctrine psychologique d'Avicenne», Verbeke, «Introduction», in Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, cit., p. 115*, and Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West*, cit., pp. 167, 229.

²⁷ «Avicenne est partout présent dans le Grand commentaire sur le livre de l'âme d'Averroès, mais à titre de repoussoir: Averroès lui reproche d'être de ces commentateurs qui substituent à la pensée du Maître leur pensée personnelle». Gauthier, «Préface», in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Sententia libri de anima*, cit., p. 220*.

²⁸ Wolfson, «The Internal Senses in Latin...», cit., p. 110.

²⁹ J. Hamesse, «*Imaginatio et phantasia* chez les auteurs philosophiques des 12e et 13e siècles», in *Phantasia — Imaginatio. V^o Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo*, Roma, 9–11 gennaio 1986, (Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, 46). Roma 1988, pp. 153-184, here p. 175.

of the philosophers, nonetheless departs from him, by placing the compositive imagination after memory³⁰.

In what concerns the theory of the faculties, the Latin Christian approach of the 13th century faces a scenario fraught with complexity. To the background of Augustinian psychology were added, on the one hand, the above-mentioned theories from Arabic texts; on the other hand, there were the new Latin translations, from the Greek, of Aristotle's natural books³¹. Thus, Albertus Magnus, in his *De Anima* and in the *Summa de creaturis*, despite recognizing a loose, encompassing sense of the word «fantasy»³², confers upon it a clearly autonomous status, distinct from imagination. Indeed, the faculty of fantasy assumes the functions of Avicenna's *vis ymaginativa*, performing the operations of division and composition of images³³. Curiously enough, he also says that it was Avicenna himself who ascribed this property to fantasy³⁴. Similarly, the *Scientia libri de anima*, attributed to Petrus Hispanus, despite being strongly Avicennian, also calls the imaginative «fantasy», as did Albertus Magnus³⁵.

The second half of the 13th century saw a major development of the debate on the faculties of the soul, driven, among other reasons, by the direct reading of

³⁰ Wolfson, «The Internal Senses in Latin...», cit., p. 104.

³¹ On the imagination in the thought of Augustine of Hippo, cfr., among other studies, the part devoted to that question in M.C. Pacheco, J. F. Meirinhos (eds.), *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale : actes du XIe Congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.)*, Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002, Brepols, Turnhout 2006, v. II, pp. 701-797.

³² «Sic igitur sicut sunt quinque sensus exteriores [...] ita sunt quinque sensus interiores, sensus communis, imaginatio, estimativa, fantasia et memoria, et fantasia communiter accepta claudit in se imaginationem et phantasiam proprie dictam». Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, ed. C. Stroick (en Albertus Magnus, *Opera omnia*, ed. Colon., vol. VII, 1), Münster 1968, p. 176, III, 1, 9, 60-65. Cfr. Hamesse, «Imaginatio et phantasia chez les auteurs philosophiques...», cit., pp. 179-181.

³³ «Dicit phantasiam esse veram et falsam, quod convenit potentiae dividendi et componendi ymagines apprehensas». Albertus Magnus, *Summa de creaturis. De homine*, ed. C.A. Borgnet, Vives, Paris 1896, v. 35, p. 334 q. 38, solutio. Cfr. Fioravanti, «Phantasia: tra Aristotele e i peripatetici...», cit., pp. 165 ss.

³⁴ «Secundum Algazelem et Avicennam phantasia est intentio elicita ex compositione imaginum vel divisione». Albertus Magnus, *Summa de creaturis. De homine*, cit., p. 332. q. 38, ad 2.

³⁵ «Eget anima sensibilis usu iudicii discretionis, unionis, diversitatis, distinctionis, compositionis circa ipsas [...] ad hec autem virtus est creata fantastica». «Nominatur autem hec virtus nomibus diversis; dicitur enim fantasia eo quod formas apparentes format ac diiudicat componendo et dividendo; dicitur autem visio nomine [...]; dicitur autem ymaginativa eo quod formarum ymagines ab ymaginatione receptas discernit, distinguit, componit ac dividit». Petrus Hispanus, *Scientia libri de anima*, 2^a edición, p. 263.

Aristotle, without the mediation of Arabic commentaries and texts. In connection with imagination, James of Venice, the translator of the *vetus* in the middle of the 13th century, rarely used the term «imagination», and, when he did, it appeared as a synonym of «fantasy»³⁶. Undoubtedly because of the influence of the above-mentioned translation, the anonymous commentary of 1245-1250, edited by Bazán, presents such identification: «ymaginatio et fantasia sunt una potentia secundum substantiam»³⁷. From this translation, thus, the Latin reader could see that the ideas from the Aristotelian text do not fully match the Avicennian theories, and that fantasy does not appear immersed in a complex system of differentiated internal virtues³⁸. Accordingly, for the sake of rigour, Thomas Aquinas would later postulate the existence of one imagination only³⁹.

What is there of such issues in the commentary attributed to Petrus Hispanus? As we saw, the commentary lists *ymaginatio* and fantasy within the set of virtues which are distinct from both the external senses and the intellect. While it explicitly states that there are five external senses, it does not specify how many the internal ones are, though five elements are presented, in the classic Avicennian manner. Nevertheless, the analysis of the texts provided by books I and II does not seem to confirm the initial hypothesis of a true classification of five internal senses, diverse by nature, with imagination and fantasy as differentiated faculties. Quite to the contrary, most contexts seem to indicate a functional equivalence and a certain lack of distinction in meaning between the terms *fantasia* and *ymaginatio*. The following text is interesting in this sense, because it speaks about the virtue placed between sense and intellect, whence both imagination and fantasy appear:

Cum habuerimus cognitionem accidentium de quibus investigationem habemus secundum viam ymaginationis et fantasie que est virtus proxima sensui media inter sensum et intellectum cognoscens formas accidentales et eas intellectui representans, que accidentia sunt manifesta sensui nostro et sunt manifesta secundum quod accidunt rei determinate loco et tempore, que cognoscitur secundum viam ymaginationis, que accidentia sunt nobis manifesta⁴⁰.

³⁶ Cfr. Spinosa, «Phantasia e imaginatio nell'Aristotele latino», in *Phantasia-Imaginatio. Atti del V colloquio*, cit., pp. 117-133, here p. 127 and note 20.

³⁷ Cfr. Anonymi Magistri artium *Sententia super II et III De anima*, cit., p. 352, II, 27, 21-22; cfr. B.C. Bazán, «Introduction», in *ibidem*, pp. 59*-64*.

³⁸ Fioravanti, «Phantasia: tra Aristotele e i peripatetici...», cit., p. 171.

³⁹ «A differenza di Avicenna, Tomaso considera la facoltà dell'immaginazione e quella della fantasia come sostanzialmente identiche». F. Amerini, «Immaginario e immaginazione in Tommaso d'Aquino. Alcune note», in *Immaginario e immaginazione nel medioevo*, cit., pp. 219-236, here p. 220.

⁴⁰ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., p. 273.

The nature of the virtue «*media inter sensum et intellectum*» is not completely clear, due to the relative pronoun «*que*», with more than one possible antecedent. Nevertheless, the pronoun must have as antecedent «*viam*», and not the immediately preceding «*fantasie*», if we take into account the rest of the fragment, and the reference, further ahead, to a «*viam ymaginationis*». It is thus a single «*via*», this one of imagination or fantasy, between the senses and the intellect, and it is, for some animals, the highest form of spirituality⁴¹.

This hypothesis of a «*synonymic nature*»⁴² of fantasy and imagination, if true, would explain the lack of systematic order between both virtues appearing in the fragments previously seen. The above fragment can be compared to the following, which, again, is about the sensible internal virtues, presumably Aristotelian, though now presented in a different order:

Item virtutum sensibilium quedam sunt interiores et quedam exteriores. Virtutes autem sensibiles interiores non coartantur ad obiecta et accipiunt obiecta abstracta non tamen perfecte abstracta, sicut sensus communis, ymaginatio, fantasia. Virtutes autem sensibiles particulares exteriores que sunt quinque sensus coartantur ad obiecta⁴³.

Curiously, the text again makes it explicit that there are five sensible external virtues, without specifying the number of sensible internal ones. Anyway, the possibility of a confusion of terms is not at all surprising, as we have seen before: the author is in line with other writers of treatises and commentaries, probably influenced by James of Venice's translation of the Aristotelian text.

But although the assumption that fantasy and imagination are synonymous seems to be somewhat predominant, it is possible also to appreciate the awareness of different connotations between the two words, as a result of the aforesaid complex tradition. Thus, the use of one or other seems fundamentally contextual. Whereas *ymaginatio* is, semantically, the widest concept, fantasy, in its turn, has a more restricted sense: occasionally it is the sensible content necessary for cognition, not far in its use from the related term *phantasma*⁴⁴. In this more concrete

⁴¹ «*Quia multa sunt que non habent ymaginationem et multo fortius nec cognitionem sive mentem, ergo nec intellectum; Multa animalia sola ymaginate vivunt sicut virtute superiori*». Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., p. 718.

⁴² Spinosa, «*Phantasia e imaginatio nell'Aristotele latino*», cit., p. 128.

⁴³ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., p. 702.

⁴⁴ «*Ad primam rationem in contrarium est dicendum quod duplex est intellectus: quidam enim est alligatus phantasmatis nec operatur sine illis [...]. Et tamen alius est intellectus qui est proprius ipsi anime. Et non dependet ab ipsis phantasmatis set inest anime nate separari*». Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., p. 296.

sense, a certain passivity is attributed to fantasy, understood as the place of the *phantasmata*, or as the *phantasma* itself:

Ad hoc dicendum est, quod in anima intellectiva duplex est operatio: una per quam respicit corpus [...] et hoc modo operatio sua permixta est cum phantasmate. Alia est virtus anime intellective per quam non respicit corpus set est virtus propria et hec est intellectus agens [...]. Iterum de possibili intellectu contingit loqui duobus modis: uno modo quantum ad suam receptionem specierum et hoc modo a phantasia dependet, cum recipiat a virtutibus sensibilibus mediante fantasia. Alio modo contingit loqui ipso in quantum supra species receptas se convertit et de ipsis iudicat et hoc modo a phantasia non dependet⁴⁵.

Thus, we may consider an encompassing and general meaning of the word «imagination» in the *Sententia*, which would include a range of attributes ascribed within the cognitive process: from those of a more passive character, such as fantasy-*phantasma*, to the more operative and active. Both aspects would belong, as we have stated, to a single faculty: imagination/fantasy⁴⁶.

4. The intellectual imagination

This idea of an inclusive, single imaginative-fantastic faculty, which contains both a passive and an active character, is indirectly confirmed by another passage of the commentary, about the proper or common accidents of the soul (*accidentia propria et communia*). Here, there is mention of the active qualities of a specific operation of the imagination which gathers and transforms the data received. Though sensible, this appears closely related to the intellect. Unfortunately, the fragment is one of those cases in which a wrong punctuation in the edition leads to some confusion regarding the concept:

Quorum accidentium anime quedam videntur proprie eius passiones et sunt ille in quibus anima non operatur mediante corpore et partibus eius, sicut est *ymaginatio*, *intellectiva* et consimiles. Quedam sunt communes anime et corpori, sicut ille quas anima per operationem exercet

⁴⁶ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., pp. 302-303.

⁴⁵ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., pp. 302-303.

⁴⁶ As Anne-Marie Bautier said: «Phantasia et imaginatio ont cependant un champ sémantique similaire dans leque nous discernons deux notions principales : l'‘image’ et la ‘fonction imaginative’». cf. A.M. Bautier, «Phantasia – imaginatio. De l'image à l'imaginaire dans le textes du haut Moyen Age», in *Phantasia-Imaginatio. Atti del V colloquio*, cit., pp. 81-104, here p. 82.

mediante corpore [...]. Quorum quedam insunt corpori per animam, sicut operationes sensuum et ymaginationis. Quedam autem insunt anime per corpus, sicut sompnus et vigilia et similia⁴⁷.

According to the general sense, and because the same designation appears in other fragments, «intellectiva» should be considered an attribute of «ymaginatio» and, as such, the two terms should go together, as «ymaginatio intellectiva». In that way, the issue regarding imagination becomes even more complex, by the assumption of this *ymaginatio intellectiva*, characterized as an accident which is particular to the soul, different from its common accidents, which require the body to operate, such as the senses or the imagination itself, which is just the imagination in its non-intellective dimension.

At this point, it is imperative to ask in what such imagination of an intellectual character consists of. And this, indeed, is not an easy question to answer. If there was a commentary on Book III of Aristotle's *De anima*, it would likely provide more details on this specific dimension of the imagination. But despite this limitation, some parts of the extant text, such as the following passage, already allow us to make headway in its characterization:

Quedam enim est propria operatio anime intellective que ita convenit anime quod non corpori et que competit anime separate, sicut cognitio eius post separationem. Et hec operatio intellectus agentis. Alia est autem eius operatio quam habet in corpore et in corpore exercet et hec est operatio intellectus possibilis; tamen anima non eget corpore nec partibus eius ad illam complendam et talis est, sicut ymaginatio intellectiva, que licet quantum ad receptionem habeat ortum a corpore, tamen quantum ad collectionem et conversionem supra res receptas et operationes non eget corpore, nec corporis partibus⁴⁸.

Indeed, the above fragment adds important information on the behavior of this imagination, which differs from the passive, receptive imagination, since the latter operates with the body. The function of this intellective imagination is to gather and transform the species, and, as such, its operation does not require the body.

Because it is intellectual, such dimension of the imagination occurs only in superior embodied beings, since only they are endowed with an intellectual fac-

⁴⁷ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., pp. 211-212. On dreaming and its relation to the imagination and fantasy, also in *Scientia libri de anima*, cfr. Fioravanti, «Phantasia: tra Aristotele e i peripatetici...», cit., pp. 165-168.

⁴⁸ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., p. 233.

ulty. This human imagination may, perhaps, explain other cognitive processes suggested in the *Sententia* which are not merely abstractive and in which the imagination performs a leading role. One such role is that of the collative or analogical process, which makes it possible to think of non-sensible realities such as, for instance, the *quidditas* of the soul:

Unde, sicut per ymaginationem rerum inferiorum cognoscimus substantias separatas ita per ymaginationem rerum sensibilibus cognoscimus substantiam spiritualem que est anima⁴⁹.

Thus, as it happens with sensible objects, only through a *uia ymaginationis* is it possible to acquire scientific knowledge of spiritual realities. In these cases, the soul, also, understands from the image⁵⁰.

Whatever the case may be, it is clear that the author has difficulty in determining the nature of this imagination, and it supposes one of the challenges of the doctrinal analysis of the *Sententia cum questionibus*, a difficulty of which the author of the commentary himself is aware. He intends to be faithful to the text of Aristotle, leaving aside the theories of the Arabic tradition. Indeed, the author ascribes the discovery of this compositive intellectual function of the imagination to Aristotle⁵¹. Despite this, even Aristotle himself, according with the commentator, struggled to define it:

Difficile est autem, etc., tangit difficultatem incidentem circa potencias anime ut ostendat questionem esse rationabilem dicens quod difficile est ostendere differentiam inter potencias anime ut ostendatur qualiter ad invicem sint altere alterius hoc est diverse, ut quo modo differunt intellectus ab ymaginatione intellectiva et sensus ab ymaginatione sensitiva⁵².

The tension between the Arabic categorizations and the «intensio Aristotelis» itself, concerning this «post-sensible» faculty, is undeniable in the *Sententia cum*

⁴⁹ Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., pp. 75 (qq.) /169.

⁵⁰ Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 7, 431a. On the meanings of the word «science» in the commentary, cfr. J.F. Meirinhos, «Métodos e ordem das ciências no Comentário sobre o *De anima* atribuído a Pedro Hispano», in L.A. De Boni (org.), *A ciência e a organização dos saberes na Idade Média*, EDIPUCRS, Porto Alegre 2000, pp. 219-252, here 229-230.

⁵¹ Cfr. Wolfson's observation: «A suggestion of this type of *imaginatio* is found in Aristotle, when toward the end of his discussion of rational or deliberative *imaginatio* (φαντασία λογιστική or βουλευτική) i.e., imagination combined with δiάνoια, he says: 'Hence we have the power of constructing a single image out of a number of images'. Wolfson, «The Internal Senses in Latin...», cit., p. 92.

⁵² Petrus Hispanus, *Sententia cum questionibus*, cit., p. 255.

questionibus, a work that may be, as previously suggested, the first commentary on the Aristotelian text to appear in the Latin world⁵³.

5. Conclusion

This paper on the *Sententia cum questionibus*, attributed to Petrus Hispanus, is a first approach to its general doctrine on the inner senses, and, specifically, on the imagination, a faculty that seems to be much more Aristotelian than imagination in the *Scientia libri De anima*, which owes so much to Avicenna. Nevertheless, Avicennianism is also present in the *Sententia*, despite its intended faithfulness to the Aristotelian text. The imagination, as we concluded from the texts at our disposal, is a broad, single but versatile faculty, which seems to comprehend qualities of the Avicennian imagination, the imaginative and cogitative, and perhaps even of the estimative, a faculty not described in the original Aristotelian text, and which is also not accepted by the Commentator, Averroes⁵⁴. In this sense, despite his recognition of five inner senses, the author of the *Sententia* seems to be, in the end, more in tune with Averroes, who is more Aristotelian, by omitting the compositive animal imagination and estimation, considering these as subfunctions of a broad imagination that encompasses retentive and compositive acts⁵⁵.

In conclusion, because the *Sententia cum questionibus* is a commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, perhaps one of the first, it exhibits a clear determination to be faithful to the text. Nevertheless, the weight of a rather complex Avicennian tradition, where the author himself, the translator, the copyists and readers time and again modify their categorizations relative to the inner senses, shapes the conceptual schemes of the author, and acts as a lens, mediating the way the Aristotelian text should be read.

The approach to the subject of imagination and the internal senses in the *Sententia cum questionibus* that we have been sketching is based on the extant edi-

⁵³ Bazán, «13th Century Commentaries on *De anima*...», cit., p.124.

⁵⁴ The *estimativa* is considered to be the most influential of Avicennian contributions, cfr. Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West*, cit., p. 141.

⁵⁵ «The fact that both compositive animal imagination and estimation are omitted indicates that he considered them, together with retention, as sub-functions of imagination». Wolfson, «The Internal Senses in Latin...», cit., p. 108.

tion, which must be thoroughly revised, as we already pointed out. Only from the new critical work will we be able to carry out an appropriate analysis of the ideas in the text and place them in relation to former and also contemporary psychological traditions⁵⁶. By doing so, we hope to better understand how these faculties are conceived of in the *Sententia*, despite its limitations as an unfinished text.

⁵⁶ Moreover, the question about the translation of the Aristotelian work used in the commentary is not yet solved. Besides his use of the *translatio vetus*, the author seems to avail himself, at the same time, of the translation from the Arabic by Michael Scotus, cfr. Meirinhos, «Comentar Aristóteles na primeira metade do século XIII...», cit., pp. 136-137.