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## **Grammar, Logic, and Cognition: Magnus Hundt (1449-1519) and the Notion of Material Supposition**

**Gramática, lógica e cognição: Magnus Hundt (1449-1519) e a noção de suposição material**

### **Resumo**

Em numerosos tratados tardomedievais, levanta-se a questão de saber se a suposição material deveria ser tratada na lógica ou na gramática. Tradicionalmente, lidou-se com este tipo de suposição na lógica. Contudo, alguns autores tardomedievais argumentaram que devia ser antes tratada na gramática. À primeira vista, este debate pode parecer ser um exercício escolástico infrutífero. Através de uma inspeção mais próxima, porém, este problema constitui uma ajuda fundamental para o esclarecimento dos diferentes modos em que a escolástica medieval tardia compreendeu a relação entre pensamentos, termos e coisas.

No meu artigo, focar-me-ei principalmente na posição de Magnus Hundt, professor de artes na Universidade de Leipzig perto do final do século XV. Ele não é uma menção frequente na literatura contemporânea. Contudo, a sua posição é bastante notável. Como se tornará claro, a o facto de Hundt rejeitar que a suposição material pertence ao campo da lógica ilustra a sua estratégia de separar a lógica da gramática, de modo a aproximá-la da ciência da metafísica.

**Palavras-chave:** Gramática; lógica; metafísica; teoria da cognição; teoria da suposição; história do tomismo; Magnus Hundt.

### **Abstract**

In a number of late medieval treatises, the question is raised whether material supposition should be treated in logic or in grammar. Traditionally, this kind of supposition was dealt with in logic. However, some late medieval authors argued that it should rather be treated in grammar. At first glance, this debate may seem to be a fruitless scholastic exercise. Upon closer inspection, however, this issue

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sheds fundamental light on the different ways in which late medieval scholastics understood the relationship between thoughts, terms, and things.

In my paper I will focus mainly on the position of Magnus Hundt, who taught the arts at the University of Leipzig towards the end of the fifteenth century. He is not often mentioned in the modern literature. His position, however, is highly remarkable. As will become clear, Hundt's rejection of material supposition as belonging to the field of logic is illustrative of his strategy of separating logic from grammar, in order to bring it closer to the science of metaphysics.

**Keywords:** Grammar; logic; metaphysics; theory of cognition; theory of supposition; history of Thomism; Magnus Hundt.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Grammar and Logic

Grammar and logic were among the basic disciplines studied in late medieval universities, the latter being the more prominent of the two, but not without leaving plentiful room for the former. Even in cases where university statutes only mention logical works on the lists of bachelor-level classes, the so-called *exercitia* and *lectiones*, other parts of the same statutes may show that works of grammar were also read after all, albeit not in the university lecture halls themselves, but in the student houses, the so-called *bursae*, indicating that these were required readings for the students too<sup>1</sup>.

What is more, in the course of time, grammar had gained in doctrinal importance within the late medieval university curriculum. The debates between the *Via Antiqua* and the *Via Moderna*, which originated in the field of logic, increasingly touched on grammar as well. This transformed grammar into a rival of logic in at least one significant respect. Traditionally placed before logic in the disciplinary order, grammar provided new students with their first introduction to the fundamental divisions between the two currents of thought that marked late medieval intellectual culture<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., *The Mediaeval Statutes of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Freiburg im Breisgau*, ed. H. Ott – J.M. Fletcher, The Mediaeval Institute, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 1964, pp. 116 and 119. For information on medieval grammar and logic, see E.J. Ashworth, «Terminist Logic», in R. Pasnau – C. van Dyke (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, vol. 1, rev. edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, pp. 146–158, and I. Rosier-Catach, «Grammar», in *ibid.*, pp. 196–216.

<sup>2</sup> On these debates in the field of grammar, see, e.g., C.H. Kneepkens, «The Donatus Minor between *Via Antiqua* and *Via Moderna*: Grammar Education and the *Wegestreit*», *Historiographia*

This rivalry called into question the predominant position of logic in relation to grammar in practice, even if not in principle. However, a more serious threat to logic came from elsewhere, namely from those humanist study reforms that removed logic, but left grammar together with rhetoric as parts of the trivial curriculum. Similarly critical were the arguments of humanist philosophers such as Lorenzo Valla, who used grammar instead of traditional logic as a means of advancing philosophical claims, for example, on the nature of transcendental terms, such as being, and on the number of the categories<sup>3</sup>.

This constellation incited some scholastics to claim—or rather reclaim—the fundamental position of logic as the science of sciences, as the opening words of the late medieval versions of Peter of Spain’s *Tractatus* had it. In order to bolster this claim, the differences between grammar and logic were highlighted. Logic, and not grammar, is the tool used in the various academic disciplines to define things, to form statements, and to provide proofs. Hence, logic, and not grammar, is the science that teaches us what makes a discipline a discipline at the medieval university<sup>4</sup>.

## 1.2. Material Supposition

An instructive example of this dynamic is the debate on the question of whether material supposition should rather be treated in logic or in grammar. Material supposition is attributed to a term, when the term is taken to refer to itself, as is the case in “man is a noun”, or “man has three letters”. This kind of supposition was commonly dealt with in logic, but some late medieval thinkers argued that logic does not deal with terms taken by themselves, but only with terms signifying concepts. Material supposition, therefore, should not be treated in logic, but rather

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*linguistica* 44 (2017) 355–390, with an extensive bibliography at pp. 385–388.

<sup>3</sup> On such reforms, see A. Buck, «Der italienische Humanismus», in N. Hammerstein – A. Buck (eds.), *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte*, vol. 1: 15.–17. Jahrhundert, C.H. Beck, München 1996, pp. 1–56, at p. 14. For Valla, see L. Nauta, *In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2009, pp. 48–125.

<sup>4</sup> See Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales cum Versorii Parisiensis clarissima expositione*, Venice 1572, Georg Olms, Hildesheim 1981, fol. 2v: «Dialectica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Sola enim dialectica probabiliter disputat de principiis omnium aliarum scientiarum». The highlighted passages are not in earlier versions of the *Tractatus*. See Peter of Spain, *Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales*, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Van Gorcum, Assen 1972, p. 1.

in grammar, or so they claimed<sup>5</sup>.

It was defenders of the *Via Antiqua*, in particular, who argued that material supposition does not belong to logic, but is fundamentally grammatical. In doing so, they criticized the views put forward by representatives of the *Via Moderna*, most prominently William of Ockham, who in their logical works divided supposition into three proper kinds, including not only personal and simple supposition, but also material supposition. These critics felt vindicated by the fact that when dealing with the different types of supposition in the *Tractatus*, Peter of Spain did not mention material supposition. Given that the *Tractatus* was used as the main introduction to logic at so many universities, they considered the inclusion of material supposition into logic as a proper kind to be an unnecessary and even harmful innovation, as it confused the boundaries between the disciplines of grammar and logic<sup>6</sup>.

The basic idea of those who denied true logical status to material supposition was twofold. They argued, first, that logic has to do with meanings and not with words, even though words do carry meaning, and, second, that meanings are not themselves the things in the external world, as William of Ockham among others had argued, but only refer to these things. Meanings are the things not in themselves, but as they are understood by the human mind. Meanings are, therefore, mental products<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Lambertus de Monte, *Copulata omnium tractatum Petri Hispani*, [Ulrich Zell], [Cologne] prope Lyskirchen 1490, *Tractatus suppositionum*, fol. 14r: «Et ideo de modis suppositionis materialis nihil ad propositum, sed videantur in grammatica». Lambertus was master of arts at the University of Cologne.

<sup>6</sup> Instructive for the *Via Antiqua*'s assessment of the *Via Moderna*'s view is the first part of Henricus Greve, *Parva logicalia*, [Gregor Boettiger], [Leipzig ca. 1497], fol. 2v–9r, esp. fol. 8r: «Petrus Hispanus et communiter alii antiqui non ponunt suppositionem materialem quemadmodum moderni». For Ockham's division of supposition, see his *Summa logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner – G. Gál – S. Brown, St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, NY 1974, Pars 1, cap. 64, p. 195: «Sciendum est autem quod suppositio primo dividitur in suppositionem personalem, simplicem et materialem». Whether Peter of Spain intentionally neglected to mention material supposition was a matter of dispute among the masters of arts. See Nicolas Tinctor, *Dicta super Summulas Petri Hispani*, Michael Greyff, Reutlingen 1486, fol. R2ra: «Diversitas est inter logicos sequentes Petrum Hispanum utrum de eius intentione fuerit non ponere suppositionem materialem». To be sure, in the passages quoted, both Henricus and Lambertus would admit that even though material supposition is not a properly logical kind of supposition, at certain points it is good not to ignore it, because logic must deal with all kinds of statements, including those about words.

<sup>7</sup> For the idea that logic is concerned with meaning, see, e.g., Lambertus, *Copulata ...*, cit., *Tractatus suppositionum*, fol. 14r: «Logicus non considerat terminos quantum ad litteras et syllabas, sed quantum ad eorum significationes et proprietates». That the meaning of a word is not the

Against this background, they claimed that logic is the science of things as they exist in the human mind. Logic deals with the properties things acquire when they are represented in the cognitive process. Thus, for example, a flower that exists outside the mind can be represented either in a general way, as a living being or a plant, or in a specific way, as a daisy. Logic directs the mind in organizing these properties coherently. Spoken or written words are not immediately relevant here. They merely name these concepts. As such, they can help human beings to remember their thoughts and to communicate them to each other, but they do not have any impact on the meaning<sup>8</sup>.

### 1.3. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomists

The view that material supposition is not something logical gained particular support from the Thomists<sup>9</sup>. They referred to the writings of Thomas Aquinas on two specific points that they considered relevant here. First, in the commentary on *De interpretatione*, Thomas had argued that words do not immediately refer to things, but rather to the concepts of things and only subsequently, via these concepts, to the things themselves. On this account, logic is concerned with the latter and grammar with the former. Second, in his *Summa theologiae*, Thomas had distinguished between the nature of a thing, for example, human nature, and the carriers of this nature, the so-called *supposita*, i.e., the bodies of individual

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thing but the thing as understood, was highlighted by Henricus, *Parva logicalia* ..., cit., fol. 3v: «Res in praesenti definitione (sc. ‘significatio est rei per vocem secundum placitum repraesentatio’) capitur pro re concepta potius quam pro re ad extra». Ockham had argued against such a view in *Expositio in Librum Perihermenias Aristotelis*, ed. A. Gambatese – S. Brown, St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, NY 1978, Lib. 1, Prooemium, par. 2, p. 347: «Non intendit Philosophus quod voces omnes proprie et primo significant passiones animae ... Sed multae voces et nomina primae intentionis sunt impositae ad significandum primo res».

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Magnus Hundt, *Compendium totius logicae quod a nonnullis Parvulus antiquorum appellatur cum optima declaratione ipsius iuxta doctoris sancti opinionem*, Martin Landsberg, Leipzig 1493, fol. 3r: «Est autem logica ... actuum rationis directiva», and *ibid.*, 7v: «Omnes passiones de quibus considerat tota logica sunt fabricatae per intellectum nostrum». Words are physical carriers that convey conceptual meanings, *ibid.*, fol. 19v: «Vox primo offert se auditui cuius est obiectum praesentando se. Deinde id quod sub eo latet puta conceptum praesentat intellectui». Hundt was master of arts at the University of Leipzig. His views will be discussed in more detail below.

<sup>9</sup> Lambertus de Monte and Magnus Hundt both labelled themselves followers of Thomas Aquinas, and they both denied that material supposition is logical in the proper sense of the word. On late medieval Thomism, see E. Jindráček, «The Western Reception of Aquinas in the Fifteenth Century», in M. Levering – M. Plested (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2021, pp. 93–102 (with an extensive bibliography).

human beings. The nature of a thing is only perceptible to the mind, whereas the *supposita* belong to the world of the senses. What it means to be a human being cannot be seen with the eyes or touched with the hands, but only understood by the mind. Yet, this nature exists in singular bodies, a different one for each individual human being, and these bodies exist in the domain of the senses<sup>10</sup>.

As these references to Thomas show, the problem is that one and the same thing can be assessed from two different perspectives, that of the mind and that of the senses, and each of these approaches has its own properties. Grammar is linked more to the world of the senses, while logic is linked to that of the mind. At the same time, however, it was claimed that the sciences as they are taught at the universities are products of the mind, even when they are addressing the world of material bodies, and that these mental products have certain properties that reveal what the natures of these material bodies are. Logic, therefore, must come first in the disciplinary order<sup>11</sup>.

Seen in this way, the debate about the nature of material supposition deals with an item that is situated at the intersection between these two realms. As we have seen, the Thomists felt the need to avoid confusing them. They judged new developments in locating material supposition as a threat to what they considered to be an appropriate balance. When something that properly belongs to grammar is given its own place in logic, the realm of the senses infringes on that of the mind. In order to restore the balance, they invoked authorities of the past, notably Peter of Spain and Thomas Aquinas. Obviously, for them these authorities had a better understanding of what logic is about and how it is to be distinguished from grammar. As such, they were true adherents of the *Via Antiqua*<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> See, e.g., Magnus Hundt, *Expositio Donati secundum viam doctoris sancti*, Melchior Lotter, Leipzig 1511, fol. Aiiir, fol. Aiiiiv, and Biir. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio Libri Peryermenias*, editio altera retractata, Commissio Leonina, Rome 1989, Lib. 1, lect. 2, pp. 10–11; id., *Summa theologiae*, Typographia Polyglotta, Rome 1888, Pars 1, quaest. 31, art 2 ad 4, p. 345, and *ibid.*, Typographia Polyglotta, Rome 1903, Pars 3, quaest. 2, art. 2, p. 25.

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., Hundt, *Compendium* ..., cit., fol. 15v: «Ex eo enim quod logica notum facit de omnibus entibus ... debet addisci prius omnibus aliis scientiis».

<sup>12</sup> It must be noted, however, that some Thomists judged matters differently. They claimed that, according to Thomas, material supposition is a properly logical type of supposition. A reference for this reading of Thomas was Vincent Ferrer. See, e.g., Peter of Brussels, *Summularum artis dialecticae interpretatio*, Johannes Cleyn, Lyon 1512, fol. p[i]r: «Probabilius dicitur quod suppositio materialis est ponenda, quoniam, ut Menigus Faventinus commemorat, beatus Vincentius scripsit suppositionem esse ponendam secundum beati Thomae et Alberti Magni intentionem». The reference is to Menghus Faventinus, *Expositiones quaestionesque super summulis Pauli Veneti*, Lucas Antonius de Giunta, Venice 1542, fol. 37v. In his treatise on

However, there is more at stake here. To reach a deeper understanding of the motives behind the position just described, let us now focus on Magnus Hundt, who discusses the issue of material supposition in great detail.

## 2. Magnus Hundt

### 2.1. The Dignity of Man

Hundt was a Thomist active at the University of Leipzig around 1500 and the author of several treatises not only on grammar and logic, but also on physics<sup>13</sup>. He embarked on an investigation of the question of whether or not material supposition is a subject proper to logic in his *Codicillus*, a treatise devoted to the properties of terms, which was printed in Leipzig in 1499. The argumentation in the *Codicillus* is rather technical, as is the whole treatise, which deals, in the first part, with issues such as supposition, distribution, the exposition of propositions, and consequences, and, in the second part, with ambiguous propositions, so-called *sophismata*, related to these issues. It is in the second part, in connection with one of these ambiguous propositions, that he considers material supposition and its relationship to logic and grammar more closely. Although he had already alluded to material supposition in the first part of the treatise, he did so only in passing<sup>14</sup>.

The reason that he revisited the issue in the second part, this time from a detailed disciplinary perspective, becomes clear when we look into some of his other works, above all the *Anthropologium*, published in 1501. The *Anthropologium* is a treatise on man, dealing, first, with the body and its parts and, second, with the soul and its faculties, both from a physical and a medical angle. The treatise

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supposition, Vincent Ferrer includes material supposition and frequently refers to Thomas Aquinas, including when he deals with material supposition. See Vincent Ferrer, *De suppositionibus*, ed. J. Batalla – E. de la Cruz Vergari, with an English translation by R.D. Hughes, Institut d'Estudis Catalans, Santa Coloma de Queralt 2021, p. 486: «Quando autem supponit (sc. terminus) pro illo quod materialiter significat, scilicet, prout est vox, dicitur suppositio materialis ... Et hoc totum est de intellectu ipsius sancti doctoris».

<sup>13</sup> For information on his life and writings, see F.J. Worstbrock, «Hundt (Hund, Hunt; Canis), Magnus, d. Ä. (Magnus Magdeburgensis, Parthenopolitanus)», in F.J. Worstbrock (ed.), *Deutscher Humanismus 1480–1520. Verfasserlexikon*, vol. 1, De Gruyter, Berlin 2008, coll. 1176–1185.

<sup>14</sup> Magnus Hundt, *Prima Codicilli pars: Logicas terminorum proprietates, difficultium propositionum expositiones cum regulis consequentiarum comprehendens*, Jacobus Thanner, Leipzig 1499, fol. Aiiiv, and id., *Secunda Codicilli pars: Sophismata generalia circa terminorum proprietates, syncathegoremata ac propositionum expositiones incidentia*, Jacobus Thanner, Leipzig 1499, fol. [Diiii]v-[Dv]v.

opens with a highly remarkable chapter on the dignity of man, which portrays the human being as the most perfect creature, who in his union of body and mind represents the whole universe. In its glorious praise, this passage rivals eulogies, such as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's *De hominis dignitate*, evincing Hundt's humanist vision of man. However, for Hundt, the setting of this homage is not humanist, but scholastic, since it is inspired by the Thomistic notion of the union of body and soul<sup>15</sup>.

For Hundt, man is an image of God. He participates in the divine creational power, in particular through his mind<sup>16</sup>. When thinking about things in the external world, man addresses these things, such that they reveal their natures in the medium of the human mind. These natures exist hidden and silent underneath the veil of matter, but the human mind makes them come alive. Once they have made themselves known through the activity of man, the creational plan they are part of lights up. It becomes clear how these natures are mutually connected, what the hierarchical order between these connections is, and where this order comes from<sup>17</sup>. By means of thought, man, as it were, brings the material objects of the external world back to the divine source, mentally rather than materially. Man is a perfect creature, a minor God who, in his mind, recreates what God has created. He is the creature that uncovers the divine word behind creation<sup>18</sup>.

This is no Platonism, but is rooted in Hundt's reading of Thomas Aquinas. The material world consists of singular, independent entities, such as individual

<sup>15</sup> Magnus Hundt, *Anthropologium de hominis dignitate, natura et proprietatibus*, Wolfgang Stöckel, Leipzig 1501, fol. [Aiiii]v-[Bvi]r, and C. Santing, «Early Anthropological Interest: Magnus Hundt's and Galeazzo Capra's Quest for Humanity», *History and Anthropology* 2018, DOI: 10.1080/02757206.2018.1474353. Cf. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno, e scritti vari*, ed. E. Garin, Vallecchi, Florence 1942, pp. 101–165.

<sup>16</sup> Hundt, *Anthropologium ...*, cit., fol. [Av]v: «Anima rationalis per virtutem quam habet divinam et per intellectualem et animale[m] imago est primae causae et similitudo intelligentiae et exemplum vitae caelestis». He cites Albert the Great, *De animalibus libri XXVI*, ed. H. Stadler, vol. 2, Aschendorff, Münster 1920, Lib. 20, tract. 2, cap. 3, p. 313. Hundt repeatedly calls man *imago Dei artificialis*. See, e.g., the text quoted in note 18 below.

<sup>17</sup> This happens especially when man uses his intellect to define the nature of things. See Magnus Hundt, *Tractatus de definitione secundum doctrinam doctoris sancti*, [Martin Landsberg], [Leipzig between 1486 and 1489], fol. [1]r: «Est enim definitio secunda intentio quam intellectus adinvenit, ut rerum naturas, quas in prima eius operatione cognoscit, perfecte et lucide manifestaret».

<sup>18</sup> Hundt, *Anthropologium ...*, cit., fol. [Aiiii]v: «Non solum ad Dei imaginem factus est homo ... verum etiam solus Dei artificialis perfecta et caeli imago. Ipsius quoque Dei et totius universi nexus existit, omnia ens, omnia continens, omnia cognoscens, potens et arte perficiens».



plants and animals, but they all share in common natures, as these individual plants and animals are all living beings. These common natures are constitutive of the singular entities. However, in the material world, they can show themselves only in terms of individual things, but not according to their proper, general status. Only the human mind is able to appreciate them as common natures in themselves. Taken on its own, therefore, the material world is ontologically deficient. It needs a mediator capable of linking the corporeal world and that of the mind. This mediator is the human being. In his treatise on definition, Hundt elaborates on what he considers to be the human act of understanding the nature of corporeal entities, and in his handbook on logic, when dealing with the nature of universals, he explains how the human mind actualizes the common nature that is potentially present in corporeal things. On both occasions, he refers once again to Thomas Aquinas<sup>19</sup>.

It is this understanding of Thomas Aquinas that lies at the heart of Hundt's distinction between grammar and logic. Grammar is primarily related to the realm of the corporeal individuals as they exist in the external world and can be accessed through the senses. Written and spoken language is first of all concrete. It uses words like 'man' and 'white', referring to men as they walk in the streets and to white as it colors the wall. Only in a derivative sense does it employ the abstract variants of these terms, like 'humanity' and 'whiteness'. Logic, by contrast, is first and foremost concerned with things as they appear in the mind. It therefore deals mainly with abstract terms and only secondarily with concrete ones. Abstract terms express meaning, which, as we saw earlier, is precisely what logic is about<sup>20</sup>.

## 2.2. Univocity and Equivocity

At several places in his commentary on the *Donatus minor*, Hundt mentions a number of differences between grammar and logic, not only the one just discussed, but also others. We will come back to them further on. But let us first turn to the *Codicillus*, where he discusses the issue of material supposition at length. The occasion for considering this issue is the analysis of the ambiguous proposition "Equivocal is a noun that is univocal." Having examined the ambi-

<sup>19</sup> Hundt, *Tractatus de definitione ...*, cit., fol. [1]r-[3]r, and id., *Compendium ...*, cit., fol. 59v-60v.

<sup>20</sup> Hundt, *Expositio Donati ...*, cit., fol. Cir: «Grammaticus considerat vocem dictionis. Ideo dicit quod abstractum derivatur a concreto. Logicus considerat significatum dictionis. Ideo dicit quod concretum derivatur a abstracto».

guity, Hundt lists a number of rules, one of which is that material supposition is necessary, although it is not a proper concern of logic<sup>21</sup>. Material supposition can be helpful, because sometimes the logician has to speak about words taken in themselves—in this case, the expression ‘equivocal’—in order to avoid fallacies. Here, the logician must distinguish the word itself from the meaning it carries. The meaning of the word ‘equivocal’ is ‘ambiguous’. This meaning, however, is not ambiguous in itself. On the contrary, it is plain and perfectly understandable. Or, as the proposition puts it, it is univocal. Therefore, in special cases, where it is necessary to distinguish between the expression and the meaning, the logician has to use material supposition. Otherwise, however, it is not part of his discipline, as words taken in themselves are the subject matter of grammar.

As his account of the proposition “Equivocal is a noun that is univocal” shows, Hundt believes that words may confuse the user. It is not the meaning that causes confusion, but the combination of expression and meaning. Words may have an appearance that clashes with their meaning—or perhaps more accurately, with the nature of meaning. On the level of meaning there is no ambiguity. Meaning is always univocal. But as soon as meaning is attached to vocal sounds, obscurities may arise, as is the case with ‘bank’ as ‘something to sit on’ and ‘bank’ as ‘something to put the money in’. Each of these two meanings is, in itself, unambiguous. However, when hidden behind the verbal expression ‘bank’, ambiguities do arise. For Hundt, this applies to all words<sup>22</sup>.

Now we are in a position to better understand why words taken in themselves, and consequently material supposition, must occasionally be considered in logic. Yet, according to Hundt, they do not constitute its proper subject matter. The key here is the notion of a ‘term’. Logic is not concerned with vocal sounds, as grammar is, but with terms, and terms have everything to do with meaning.

### 2.3. Terms, Cognition, and Adam’s Language in Paradise

A term, for Hundt, is an endpoint, as the expression ‘term’ (*terminus*) itself indicates. It is not an endpoint of any kind, however, but the endpoint of a cognitive act, that towards which the mind is directed when human beings use words. Cognition is not focused on the word as a vocal sound, but on the meaning

<sup>21</sup> Hundt, *Secunda Codicilli pars ...*, cit., fol. [Diiii]v: «Materialis suppositio non est neganda, licet a logico proprie non consideratur».

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., fol. [Diiii]r-v: «Omne nomen in sua latitudine potest dici aequivocum, quia diversimode imponitur a diversis et diversis rationibus se et suum significat significatum».

that is carried by the sound. When words are created, meanings are imposed onto vocal sounds. These meanings are what the inventors of language were thinking of when they coined new words. It is what other people understand when they use these words. Meaning, therefore, has to do with thought. It transforms vocal sounds into terms, which then are studied in logic<sup>23</sup>.

As we saw earlier, meaning does not simply mirror things, but reveals values in them. These values originate in the things, but cannot be expressed by these things themselves. These disclosed values are the expressions of their natures produced by the human mind. Things cannot signify themselves, as Hundt underscores; nor, therefore, can they articulate their own meanings and natures. The meaning of something must always be expressed by something else, in this case the human mind, that grasps the nature of things and thus produces meanings<sup>24</sup>.

When language was created and used for the first time, the meaning of each word was entirely transparent. It was identical with the nature of the thing as it appeared in the human mind. At that stage, words were identical with terms. Such was the language that Adam spoke in Paradise, when God brought the animals and birds to him, to see how he would name them. This naming took place in accordance with the perfect definition of each of the things. But after the Fall, when Adam and Eve lost the capacity to understand the nature of things, the meanings attached to the words were no longer accurate. These meanings came to be identified with the concrete things themselves, and not with their natures, on account of which Adam had defined them. Consequently, words were no longer the same thing as terms, but became mere vocal sounds employed to refer to things by means of imperfect meanings<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> Hundt, *Secunda Codicilli pars* ..., cit., fol. [Diiii]v: «Nulla vox nuda sive materialis proprie est terminus» and *ibid.*, fol. [Dv]r-v: «Vox non est terminus mentis conceptum notificans. Solus quippe terminus conceptus rei significativus ad logicam spectat». See also *id.*, *Compendium* ..., cit., fol. 35r: «Accipitur (sc. terminus) ut terminat intellectum in sua operatione et sic definitur in septimo tractatus Petri Hispani». In the late medieval versions, it is in the seventh part of the treatise that Peter of Spain deals with supposition. For the passage referred to, see Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales* ..., cit., fol. 208r: «Terminus ut hic sumitur est vox significans».

<sup>24</sup> Hundt, *Secunda Codicilli pars* ..., cit., fol. [Diiii]v: «Nihil se aut suas essentialis partes significat, quia idem non est seipso notius».

<sup>25</sup> Magnus Hundt, *Introductorium in universalem Aristotelis Physicen Parvulus philosophiae naturalis vulgariter appellatum cum propria non extranea declaratione*, Leipzig, Wolfgang Stöckel, 1500, fol. 7r: «Unde dicitur Adae primi parentis animo prius quidem sano sana fuisse omnia. Deinde vero infirmo infirma omnia evasisse». For a discussion of Adam's language in the early modern period, see the contributions in *The Language of Adam*, A.P. Coudert (ed.), Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1999.

Now, for Hundt, logic is concerned with meanings similar to those that Adam expressed when naming things before the Fall. To be sure, human beings now are in a different position than Adam and Eve were then. At birth, human beings are marked by original sin. Their minds are no longer able to see the nature of things with the same clarity. Yet, they can still grasp these natures. This happens when they engage in finding their definitions. It is for this reason that Hundt studied the definition, its parts, and its goals in a separate treatise. Definition is the entryway into the world of logic, the realm of meaningful terms<sup>26</sup>.

Grammar, by contrast, deals with words as they are used by humans after the Babylonian confusion, when the original meaning was forgotten and the focus directed toward the vocal sounds and the things in the external world referred to by these sounds. As a result, language has become susceptible to ambiguity. It has adopted elements of the world of the corporeal things. For example, as Hundt argues, it has different tenses and different cases. These variations reflect the transitory character of the corporeal things in the present world, as these are apprehended by human senses. Basically, however, he claims that there is only one tense and one case, namely the present and the nominative. Here, he is thinking of the general form of the definition as expressed in logic, which applies the present-tense verb ‘is’ and in which the genus and the species both are in the nominative, such as in “Man is a rational living being”<sup>27</sup>. Because there is only one tense and one case, ambiguities that may arise in spoken and written language are excluded.

These considerations make clear why, in his *Codicillus*, Hundt is reluctant to include material supposition as a proper part of logic. He wants to keep logic pure; that is, logic should be the ‘language’ of thought. It should not be contaminated with elements that belong to the realm of spoken and written communication, which appeal to the senses and, therefore, may obscure thought.

#### 2.4. Assessing the Nature of Things after the Fall

For Hundt, logic represents the original language that Adam and Eve spoke in Paradise. Even though their language referred to objects of the senses, it ad-

<sup>26</sup> Hundt, *Tractatus de definitione* ..., cit., fol. [1]r: «Quare definitio naturae rei est notificativa, quod noster Aristoteles optime in primo Topicorum declarat: ‘Terminus, id est definitio, est oratio esse rei significans’». Cf. Aristotle, *Topics*, Lib. 1, cap. 5, 101b39.

<sup>27</sup> Hundt, *Expositio Donati* ..., cit., fol. [Biiii]r: «Quia impositio solum fit per nominativum, ideo solus nominativus secundum logicos dicitur nomen» and *ibid.*, fol. Diiv: «De tempore nihil habemus nisi nunc, ut patet quarto Physicorum, quod est idem secundum essentiam». Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, Lib. 6, cap. 3, 233b33–35.

dressed the true nature of things. God enhanced their mental powers with a gift of grace, such that they functioned perfectly and were able to actualize the complete intelligible nature potentially hidden in corporeal things. Thanks to God's help, the language of thought and that of spoken communication coincided. There were no ambiguities then<sup>28</sup>.

Significantly, even though God withdrew his support because of the Fall, leading Adam's and Eve's minds to become darkened, they retained their original capacity to see things clearly. But this was no longer something that happened quasi-naturally. God did not destroy human nature when he expelled the first human beings from Paradise. He left their capacities intact, but it was now Adam and Eve themselves, and with them all subsequent human beings, who had to actualize their mental capacity on their own. In order to do so, humanity developed the various sciences<sup>29</sup>.

For Hundt, among the sciences, two disciplines stand out because of their overarching function, namely logic and metaphysics. The latter studies beings as beings and, as such, provides fundamental knowledge about how the universe is structured. The former, by contrast, deals with the way in which this structure is revealed in the human mind. In the definition, these two disciplines meet. The definition expresses the being of things, their meaning so to speak, and as such belongs to metaphysics, but at the same time, the definition is a product of the human mind, guided by logic. The two disciplines are related such that the one cannot be exercised without the other<sup>30</sup>.

Even though he does not say so explicitly, we can infer that, for Hundt, the relationship between logic and metaphysics is paralleled by that between grammar and physics. The latter is the science dealing with corporeal things that are

<sup>28</sup> Hundt, *Introductorium* ..., cit., fol. 7r: «Homo etenim ad imaginem Dei factus ... divino quoque lumine supernaturaliter condonatus, ut impassibilis, immortalis esset et omnia cognoscens».

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.: «Abstulit enim Deus lumen actuale intellectus quo cuncta in suis naturis et proprietatibus cognovisset (sc. homo). Factus quoque est fere sicut caecus solam aptitudinem retinens propinquam ... Et sic natura disponimur, sed perficimur arte et exercitio, secundo Ethicorum ... Relicta est itaque nobis radix et inclinatio ad scire, primo Metaphysicae». Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Lib. 2, cap. 1, 1103a23-26, and id., *Metaphysics*, Lib. 1, cap. 1, 980a21.

<sup>30</sup> Hundt, *Compendium* ..., cit., fol. 15r: «Impossible est scire logicam absque metaphysica et hoc a priori. Sed rursus a posteriori impossibile est scire metaphysicam sine logica, quia logica considerat res conceptas, quae habent se sicut ideae ad res exteriores». For the idea that logic cannot be studied in separation from metaphysics, Hundt refers to Thomas Aquinas, *Opera omnia*, vol. 5: *Opuscula spuria*, ed. P. Mandonnet, Lethielleux, Paris 1927, pp. 392–398 (*De universalibus*), at p. 398.

subject to movement, just like spoken language. For Hundt, the principal concern of grammar is the utterance, the production of meaningful sounds, not with a focus on meaning, as in logic, but with a focus on sound. Sound is something corporeal, formed by air from the lungs that is manipulated by the larynx, the tongue, etc. Its general corporeal nature is studied in physics. Grammar then deals with the specific way in which these sounds are shaped to convey meanings. To be sure, physics can be studied without grammar, but the converse is not possible. Both relate to the world of change and movement, that is, to the world after the Fall. By contrast, logic and metaphysics are associated with Paradise. They lead the human being to the knowledge Adam and Eve possessed prior to the Fall. In vocal sounds, the worlds of heaven and earth meet, the former providing the form, the latter the matter<sup>31</sup>.

## 2.5. The Ideal University Curriculum

With this in mind, we can now understand how Hundt assessed the curriculum at the late medieval university, which started with grammar and logic, including at Hundt's home institution, the University of Leipzig<sup>32</sup>. Both are important, but logic is definitely more crucial for what the disciplines at the universities are striving for, that is, for understanding the true structure of the world. Because of its link with physics, grammar is related to our present life. It is the science that describes communication between the inhabitants of the earth and therefore the discipline that has to be taught first, as a prerequisite for the acquisition of knowledge that is laid down in works such as those of Aristotle. Logic, by contrast, helps humans to understand things as the inhabitants of Paradise do. It is the science for aspirants to heavenly truth. Once the first steps along this road to heaven have been made, the language of the earthly sphere must be kept apart and

<sup>31</sup> Hundt, *Compendium ...*, cit., fol. 21r: «Fit enim (sc. vox) ab intellectu formaliter, qui attribuit ei formam et finem, quia significatum. Sed a corde materialiter, quod movet pulmonem, qui per aeris attracti expulsionem format vocem quae per linguam et in dentibus et labiis distinguitur» and id., *Expositio Donati ...*, cit., fol. Aiir: «Grammatica est scientia vocalis eo quod voces in ordine ad prolationem tantum considerat».

<sup>32</sup> For information on the medieval University of Leipzig, see E. Bünz, «Gründung und Entfaltung. Die spätmittelalterliche Universität Leipzig 1409–1539», in E. Bünz – M. Rudersdorf – D. Döring (eds.), *Geschichte der Universität Leipzig 1409–2009*, vol. 1: *Spätes Mittelalter und Frühe Neuzeit 1409–1830/31*, Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig 2009, pp. 21–330, and *Die Statutenbücher der Universität Leipzig aus den ersten 150 Jahren ihres Bestehens*, ed. F. Zarncke, Hirzel, Leipzig 1861.

not confused with that of heaven<sup>33</sup>. Certainly, humans cannot make do without grammar in their earthly life, but they must be aware of the differences between grammar and logic, so as not to let ambiguities confuse human thought, causing them to stray from their godly track. It is against this background that Hundt was reluctant to include material supposition as a proper part in logic.

This understanding is corroborated by Hundt's statement in a report dedicated to the reformation of the University of Leipzig on behalf of Duke George<sup>34</sup>. This report collects the testimonies of a large number of university professors, each one giving his own view on the matter. Hundt's account stands out for several reasons. He insists on the traditional set up of the curriculum starting with grammar as the first discipline, followed immediately by logic, which he thinks should not be changed. Significantly, in contrast to grammar, logic should be taught both in the bachelor's and in the master's program<sup>35</sup>. This accords with the then-current arrangements in Leipzig, as the statutes from the period of 1499–1522 show, but obviously there was opposition to this schedule, which Hundt tried to overcome<sup>36</sup>. At the same time, his statement reveals an almost spiritual dedication to the pursuit of truth, disapproving of eloquence and condemning the pursuit of any kind of earthly well-being. He deplores the fact that, at the university, sincere devotion to study is despised and that only a small number of Dominican and even fewer Franciscan friars were attending the theology courses, even though their presence would encourage the seculars and help the university to increase its fame. It was the orders, Hundt recalls, that had built the reputation of Paris and Cologne<sup>37</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> Hundt, *Compendium ...*, cit., fol. 15v: «Grammatica est prior quoad expressionem et quoad 'quia est'. Logica est prior quoad conceptionem et quoad 'propter quid'».

<sup>34</sup> The report is discussed and partly edited in F. Friedberg, *Die Universität Leipzig in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Veit, Leipzig 1898, pp. 95–148. It has survived in Dresden, Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, 10024 Geheimer Rat (geheimes Archiv), Nr. Loc. 10596/01.

<sup>35</sup> Staatsarchiv, 10024 Geheimer Rat, fol. 32r: «In prima mutatione novitus studeret grammaticae et logicae». As to the master's program, *ibid.*: «Prima mutatione studeret logicae et physicae Aristotelis». These passages are only paraphrased in Friedberg, *Die Universität Leipzig ...*, cit., p. 111.

<sup>36</sup> For the relevant passages from the statutes, see *Die Statutenbücher der Universität Leipzig ...*, cit., nn. 1–5, pp. 464–465.

<sup>37</sup> Friedberg, *Die Universität Leipzig ...*, cit. p. 110: «In theologica facultate videtur esse error, quod religiosi hujus civitatis parum student theologie; nam pauci predicatorum, pauciores thomiste, paucissimi minores scholas frequentant theologorum. si frequentiores essent, incitarent seculares. ex hinc fama universitatis Liptzensis cresceret. intellexi a nonnullis coloniensem et parisiensem universitates ita crevisse». Remarkably, Hundt considers the Thomists to constitute



To be sure, in his report, Hundt is not advocating contempt for earthly life. He demands that the study of medicine be more practical and include the study of the human body, as well as that of herbs. He also finds fault with the fact that already at an early stage, students are urged to become priests<sup>38</sup>. His overall intention is that there should be an appropriate balance between the practical and the theoretical, the body and the mind, the earthly and the heavenly. This balance is not, however, one of equal weight on both scales, but rather tilts towards the mind and the theoretical, since they prepare for the final goal of human life, Paradise.

## 2.6. Criticism of the Humanist View of Language

Language is an earthly tool, closely attached to the conditions here. Its use is only pragmatic and temporary, unlike logic, which reveals the eternal structure of the universe, a structure which is the same here as in Paradise. Grammar and logic should therefore be assessed differently. Hundt thinks that the humanists take language too seriously, as if it were more than just a provisional instrument for communication. In the commentary on the *Donatus minor*, as well as in the *Codicillus*, Hundt refers to Lorenzo Valla, in both cases disapprovingly. He reprehends Valla's criticism of Priscian, arguing that it is better to remain with the traditional views of Priscian and Donatus, even where they were wrong. The majority follows these thinkers, and to be wrong in harmony with the majority is still accepted as being right<sup>39</sup>. This perhaps sounds cynical and in tension with his quest for truth, but that is not the case. He rather wants to stress that language is a pragmatic tool and that one should therefore not invest too much creative or recreative energy into it, otherwise people will no longer understand each other, as the result of being confused by the formation of new words or the re-establishment of old meanings. For the same reason he rejects Valla's identification of 'quodlibet' with 'aliquid' which the latter had argued for on the authority of Quintilianus. This is not wrong, Hundt argues, but it is not the way 'quodlibet' is used among

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a separate religious order.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.: «preteia magistrorum ad sacerdotium compellere, videtur mihi, ipsos a studio retrahere. in universitatibus prenominatis (sc. coloniensi et parisiensi) licenciati et doctorandi ad sacerdotium compelluntur» and *ibid.*: «Facultas medicorum solum deficit, ut conqueruntur scholares, quod ad practica non ducuntur; herbas noscere et discernere nemo docet, anathomia non celebratur, apotece non rectificantur».

<sup>39</sup> Hundt, *Expositio Donati ...*, cit., fol. [Cvi]v: «Nos tamen cum Prisciano et Donato ceterisque grammaticis tenebimus. Quia qui cum multis errat, non videtur errare». See also Kneepkens, «The Donatus minor ...», cit., p. 384.



contemporary authors, where it means ‘omnis’. It is for this reason that he rejects Valla’s emendation<sup>40</sup>.

As his assessment of Valla shows, Hundt has some reservations with respect to the humanist view on language that takes Cicero and Quintilianus as its norm. He insists that, in matters of speech and writing, one should follow the tradition. Words are coined by human beings through agreement, and what for the first users is a matter of free choice becomes a rule for the later ones<sup>41</sup>. But this does not imply that once the meanings of words have changed, one should go back to the original ones to correct common discourse. In all his academic writing, Hundt stuck to the vocabulary and syntax of scholastic Latin<sup>42</sup>.

Although sounds do not have permanent value, concepts do, similar to the natures of the things the concepts refer to. Therefore, Hundt does not allow the same pragmatism in his assessment of logic. Whereas the rules of language may change, those of logic never will, as long as things exist<sup>43</sup>. Hence, the two disci-

<sup>40</sup> Hundt, *Secunda Codicilli pars* ..., cit., fol. Biiiv: «‘Quodlibet’ est ... a ‘quod’ et ‘libet’ compositum distribuens terminum commune pro omnis suis suppositis sicut hoc signum ‘omnis’ ... quamvis Laurentius Vallensis auctoritate Quintiliani particulariter accipit ‘quodlibet’ pro ‘aliquid’, ut libro tertio capite de compositis a ‘quis’ vel ‘qui’ patet». Cf. Lorenzo Valla, *Elegantiae linguae latinae*, [Paris], [1471–1472], Lib. 3, De compositis a ‘quis’ vel ‘qui’, cap. 16, fol. [108]r: «‘Quidque’ autem idem esse quod ‘unumquidque’, ante significavi, Quintilianus». I used the copy in Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, Inc 706:1. The point is that Valla takes ‘quodlibet’ as ‘whichever’, not as ‘each’, as Hundt does. Therefore, Hundt says that Valla understands it ‘particulariter’, that is, referring to a particular thing which is not further specified. According to Valla, the term Hundt should use is ‘quidque’, when he looks for an alternative to ‘omnis’, as the quote shows. Notably, Valla uses the term ‘particulariter’ not in the *Elegantiae*, but in the *Dialectical Disputations*, where he criticizes contemporary scholastics for not using Latin accurately. See Lorenzo Valla, *Dialectical Disputations*, ed. B.P. Copenhaver – L. Nauta, vol. 2, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2012, Lib. 2, cap. 5, p. 44: «Nusquam in omni dialectica ac philosophia ex Aristotele translata, nisi forte apud aliquem novorum, reperitur quilibet nisi particulariter positum, sicut uterlibet. Quominus danda venia est iurisperitis ac theologis recentibus, dialectisque ac philosophis nostris, qui verba scientiae suae non audiunt, sed in prave loquendo nescio quomodo conspiraverunt et, quasi diversae civitates, in suam metropolim coniurarunt». Hundt was familiar with this passage as well, as he quotes some of the examples Valla mentions there in his *Secunda Codicilli pars* ..., cit., fol. Biiiv.

<sup>41</sup> Hundt, *Expositio Donati* ..., cit., fol. Biiir: «Quod enim apud omnes antiquos fuit placitum, apud nos est praeceptum». For a comment on this, see Kneepkens, «The Donatus minor ...», p. 369.

<sup>42</sup> For Hundt, the pursuit of truth was more important than that of style, as he argues in the report mentioned earlier. See Friedberg, *Die Universität Leipzig* ..., cit., p. 109: «Philosophie non eloquentie studii veniam posco».

<sup>43</sup> Hundt, *Compendium* ..., cit., fol. 19v: «Conceptus vero, qui est naturalis rei ad extra in mente proferentis similitudo, repraesentat rem ipsam naturaliter».

plines both have their own rationale. Neither should they be confused, nor should the science of logic be removed from the curriculum, as if grammar alone sufficed to educate the human being. Hundt therefore subscribes to the traditional goals of the medieval university, as these were expressed by the defenders of the *Via Antiqua*, in particular, the Thomists.

Significantly, Hundt's problem is not the humanist view of man, which highlights his dignity and divine power. On this point he fully agrees, as we have seen. Rather, it is the humanist focus on the written and spoken language rather than that of thought. Such an approach detracts from the dignity of man as an image of God, the proper carrier of which is the mind and not the body. Hundt shares the enthusiasm of the humanist, but assigns a higher level to the operations of the mind than those of the body. Meaning is a product of the mind. Consequently, for Hundt, logic is more fundamental than grammar, and material supposition—when words are taken according to their sound and not their meaning—should not be a part of logic, but of grammar.

### 3. Conclusion

Hundt was outspoken in his views on the relationship between grammar and logic, as well as on the question of where material supposition should belong. His views are rooted in his understanding of Thomas Aquinas, with whom he sides here, referring to his writings frequently. In his *Anthropologium*, when dealing with human dignity and the divine nature of mind, there is a second thinker that he names frequently, namely Albert the Great<sup>44</sup>. In the late medieval period, both were regarded as the main school heads of the *Via Antiqua*. The fact that Hundt quotes both Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great seems to reflect a relationship with the University of Cologne. Initially, the Cologne Albertist Heymericus de Campo had stressed the differences between these two thinkers, but subsequently the Thomist Gerardus de Monte, in his *Concordantiae dictorum Thomae Aquinatis et Alberti Magni*, vehemently argued that both the Dominicans followed the

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<sup>44</sup> To give just one example of many, Hundt, *Anthropologium* ..., cit., fol. [Av]r: «Et venerabilis Albertus, fidus Aristotelis interpres, vicesimo De animalibus, tractatu secundo, capite tertio dicit: Anima praecipue hominis multum imitatur causam primam et intellectus caelestes». Cf. Albert the Great, *De animalibus* ..., cit., Lib. 20, tract. 2, cap. 3, p. 313.

same line of thought<sup>45</sup>. Gerardus was regent master of the Thomist Bursa Montana until his death in 1480. His successor was Lambertus de Monte, who held the office until 1499<sup>46</sup>. Hundt seems to have been inspired by both of them. He takes the idea that Thomas and Albert complement each other from Gerardus and shares some of the arguments that material supposition does not belong to logic with Lambertus, who defends the same position as Hundt<sup>47</sup>.

To be sure, neither in Gerardus nor in Lambertus do we find a eulogy on the dignity of man comparable to Hundt's. The same goes for authors like Henricus Greve, Hundt's colleague in Leipzig, who takes the same position on material supposition, but lacks the anthropological framework<sup>48</sup>. This makes Hundt's position unique. At the same time, however, his thinking shows the potential of late medieval Thomism to transfer scholastic questions into new settings, building bridges to other currents of thought like humanism and opening new perspectives on the Via Moderna. From Hundt's standpoint, the criticism voiced by Albertists such as Heymericus de Campo on the Moderni, that they are *litterales et superficiales*, that is, grammarians rather than logicians, takes on a new, almost eschatological dimension<sup>49</sup>. It seems that from the perspective of the Antiqui, the Via Moderna was putting young students on the wrong track, by closing their minds to the true and divine origin of logical meaning.

These aspects cannot be further explored here, but it may already have become clear how the answer to a minor scholastic question is related to much

<sup>45</sup> For details see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, «Comment lire les grands maîtres? Gérard de Monte, Heymeric de Campo et la question de l'accord entre Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin (1456)», *Revue Thomiste* 108 (2008) 105–130.

<sup>46</sup> G.-R. Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Böhlau, Köln 1993, pp. 29 and 34.

<sup>47</sup> Compare, e.g., Hundt, *Secunda Codicilli pars* ..., cit., fol. Diiiiiv: «Litterae et syllabae non sunt de consideratione logicae» with the quote from Lambertus', *Copulata*, in note 7 above. Moreover, elsewhere in his works he seems to have used the writings of Lambertus de Monte, and he was familiar with the views of the Albertist Heymericus de Campo, to whom he refers in *Compendium* ..., cit., fol. 61v.

<sup>48</sup> Henricus, *Parva logicalia* ..., cit., fol. 8r: «Suppositio materialis proprie non est logicae considerationis, sed magis grammaticae».

<sup>49</sup> Heymericus de Campo, *Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et sanctum Thomam*, Johannes Landen, Cologne 1496, fol. aiiiv. On this criticism, see P. Rutten, «Contra Occanicam Discoliam Modernorum: The So-Called De universali reali and the Dissemination of Albertist Polemics against the Via Moderna», *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 45 (2003) 131–166, and Z. Kaluza, «Le De universali reali de Jean de Maisonneuve et les epicuri litterales», *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 33 (1986), 469–516, esp. pp. 503–507.

more consequential views on the relationship between the academic disciplines and the destiny of the human being. At the same time, in relation to the general theme of the volume, the focus on cognition that we have seen in Hundt reflects a more general tendency to separate logic from grammar and to move it closer to metaphysics, a bias that culminated in Hegel's thought. Yet, this issue, too, must be elaborated on elsewhere<sup>50</sup>.

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<sup>50</sup> M.J.F.M. Hoenen, «Being as the Object of Knowledge. On the Relationship between Logic and Metaphysics in the Late Middle Ages», in N. Germann – P. Porro (eds.), *Being*, Brepols, Turnhout (forthcoming).