

Daniel Heider*

Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667) and Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673)/Bonaventura Belluto (1600–1676) on Animal Perception of Negations

Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592-1667) e Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673) / Bonaventura Belluto (1600-1676) sobre a percepção animal das negações

Resumo

Este estudo apresenta a teoria “exótica” de Rodrigo de Arriaga sobre a percepção animal de negações, como por exemplo sombras e buracos, na parte do *De anima* do seu *Cursus philosophicus* (primeira edição em 1632). De acordo com Arriaga, Deus fornece a estas criaturas espécies sensíveis que representam estes itens negativos. Por contraposição com este pano de fundo, que se constitui como a visão padrão sobre o tema, o artigo mostra como é que esta teoria foi criticada por dois escotistas italianos barrocos: os franciscanos Bartolomeo Mastri e Bonaventura Belluto,, em *In De anima* (primeira edição em 1643), do seu *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*.

Palavras-chave: percepção; negações; espécies sensíveis; sentido agente; Arriaga; Mastri; Belluto.

Abstract

This study presents Rodrigo de Arriaga’s “exotic” theory of the animal perception of negations, such as shadows and holes, as presented in the *De anima* part of his *Cursus philosophicus* (first edition 1632). According to Arriaga, God supplies these creatures with sensible species representing these negative items. Against the background of what can be called the standard view on this subject, the paper shows how this theory was criticized by two foremost Italian Baroque Scotists, the Francis-

* Associate Professor, Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, Czech Republic; E-mail: heiderd@tf.jcu.cz. This study is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation (project no. GA ČR 20-01710S, “Theory of Cognition in Baroque Scotism”). I would like to thank Dr. Claus Asbjørn Andersen for his helpful comments on the study’s draft.

cans Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto, in their *In De anima* (first edition 1643) of their *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*.

Keywords: perception; negations; sensible species; agent sense; Arriaga; Mastri; Belluto.

Introduction

When discussing the topic of sense perception in *De anima* Aristotle shows that the external senses apprehend not only their external objects (the proper, common, and incidental sensibles) and their own acts¹, but also their inactivity. We can perceive not only that we are seeing and hearing, but also that we are *not* seeing and *not* hearing. In III.2, 425b21–2, he says that «[through sight] we can discriminate darkness from light [...]». In II.9 and II.11, this discrimination is extended to the other sensory modalities. In II.9, 421b3–6, Aristotle notes that

[...] hearing has for its object both the audible and the inaudible [...] smell has for its object both the odorous and the inodorous. Inodorous may be either what has no smell at all, or what has a small or feeble smell. The same holds of the tasteless»².

In II.11, 424a11–3 by referring to the sense of touch, he affirms that «[...] touch has for its object both what is tangible and what is intangible»³. Such formulations show that Aristotle was well aware of the discrimination between the proper sensibles and their negations; apparently, he saw an animal's perceptual reflexive awareness of its own senses' otiosity as important for its well-being and survival⁴.

¹ Aristotle, *On the Soul*, in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984, III.2, 425b12, 677.

² *Ibid.*, 671.

³ *Ibid.*, 674.

⁴ For the diagnostic and compensatory functions of perceiving the external senses' inactivity, see P. Gregoric, «Perceiving That We Are Not Seeing and Hearing», in P. Gregoric – J. L. Fink (eds.), *Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind*, Routledge, New York - London 2021, 2021, pp. 119–37. In his polemic with Victor Caston's reading of Aristotle's crucial passage on perceptual self-awareness in *On the Soul*, III.2, 425b12–25, Gregoric argues that the function of perceiving one's inactivity (and its activity too) is exercised by a higher-order power, the common sense, and not by the external senses. For Caston's opposite interpretation, which can be labelled Same-Order Theory of Consciousness, according to which reflexive awareness is an intrinsic and essential feature of the external senses' states, see V. Caston, «Aristotle on Consciousness», *Mind* 111 (2002) 751–815.

Not only Aristotle, but many other philosophers from the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition, including Second Scholastics, were aware of the significance of negative sensory apprehensions. However, it was the Jesuit philosopher and theologian Rodrigo de Arriaga⁵, who spent most of his life in Prague (from 1625 to his death in 1667), that explained this formation of negative perceptions in a rather original way which provoked a strong critical reaction from a number of seventeenth-century scholastics. In this short study, I shall proceed in three steps. First, I discuss Arriaga's denial of what can be called the standard view. Second, I introduce Arriaga's view according to which by infusing the species of negations and privations in the brutes' interior sense God triggers the negative apprehensions in them. Third, I show how two foremost seventeenth-century Scotists Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto rejected Arriaga's view against the background of their formulation of the standard view⁶.

1. Motivating the Issue

In his *In De anima*, disp. 5 «On material powers», sect. 5 «Whether the interior sense perceives negations», included in his *Cursus philosophicus* (1632), Arriaga says that «a brute could hardly move its foot» without the perception of negations⁷. In the beginning of the section Arriaga mentions the following examples of negative apprehensions: Dogs and other brutes are frightened by shadows cast by other animals or men; they seek refuge from the sun in the shade of a tree; they perceive holes, the empty spaces of doors and windows through which they run; a bear that throws small stones at people selects the stones according to the criterion of their smallness, being the privation of bigness; the same is seen when small dogs do not rise up against bigger ones. All of this shows that to explain animal behaviour the perception of these items needs to be analysed⁸.

⁵ For Arriaga's life and work cf. Stanislav Sousedík, «Rodericus de Arriaga: Leben und Werk», in T. Saxlová – S. Sousedík (eds.), *Rodrigo de Arriaga († 1667), Philosoph und Theologe*, Karolinum, Praha 1998, pp. 9–18.

⁶ For a detailed bio-bibliography of Mastri (and briefly also of Belluto), see Marco Forlivesi, *Scotistarum princeps. Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) e il suo tempo*, Centro studi antoniani, Padova 2002.

⁷ Rodrigo de Arriaga, *Cursus philosophicus*, Balthasar Moretus, Antwerp 1632, *De anima*, disp. 5, sect. 6, § 79, p. 723: «[...] sine cognitione autem hac vix possent [bestiae] pedem movere».

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 722–3.

Before presenting his view Arriaga rejects what can be called the standard view consisting of two doctrinal elements, without, unfortunately, saying who espoused them. According to the first sentiment, a dog is afraid of a shadow cast by a man or a tiger because through the species of the black colour emitted from the shadow and its impression on its organ the dog perceives the presence of a man or a tiger. The species of black mediates an apprehension of the common and the incidental sensibles, such as shape, size, this or that substance, etc. In his reply, Arriaga asks how the dog should apprehend the shadow through this species. Does the dog mistake the shadow for black colour? If so, the dog would take a non-being for a being, which would amount to an operation producing a being of reason, and no proponent of this view would accept such an operation and capacity in brutes. Moreover, how could the species of black be emitted from the shadow? This seems impossible, because the shadow is a «*purum nihil*»; a non-being cannot affect the sense power⁹.

To show that this negative perception could not be mediated through the emission of the sensible species of black from the shadow, Arriaga offers the following example: consider a wall fully covered by a black fabric; suppose a dog is standing in front of it; the dog will not try to run through it, since behind the cloth there is a solid and impenetrable construction and the dog is aware of this; let us now assume that a passage of the same colour as that of the fabric has been made. Arriaga's point is that the dog will certainly, not by chance (*non casu*), run through the hole. This shows that the dog will not perceive the passage through the black species emitted by this *foramen*. In fact, the dog's sight received this species when it faced the wall before the hole was made. At that point, however, the dog did not attempt to run through the wall. Accordingly, the dog does not apprehend the aperture through the species of the black colour emitted from it. It must apprehend it differently, i.e., through a different principle. The same holds for the apprehension of shadows and other negations¹⁰.

According to the second doctrinal element of this view, brutes perceive ne-

⁹ *Ibid.*, §§72–3, p. 722.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, §§73–4, p. 722: «[...] tegatur murus panno nigro usque ad ipsam terram, non tentabit canis egredi per illum pannum; fit autem in medio porta aliqua vel foramen, etiamsi post foramen illud nihil videatur, statim canis recta, non vero casu feretur ad foramen, & inde egredietur; ergo foramen seu porta illa, quae in carentia muri aut alterius corporis abitum impediendi consistit, non percipitur a cane tamquam quid nigrum, nam canis non conatur transire per corpus solidum, etiam nigrum. Quae de porta dixi, etiam intelligenda sunt de umbra & aliis carentiis».

gations because their common sense reflects upon their external senses' acts. The dog sees light at one place but not at another, and it apprehends that there is no object there. This view assumes that animals reflexively apprehend their exterior sensations. It holds that not only the external objects impress their sensible likenesses upon the common sense, but that the internal sense also receives the similitudes of the external senses' acts themselves. It holds that the total object of the internal senses is not constituted merely by the external sensibles. The external senses' acts must be included in the ambit of its adequate object too. Assuming this cognitive function as a part of the beastly cognitive apparatus, it will only be possible for the animal to cognize the inactivity of its own operation against the background of the positive information related to the power's activity. At first, the power is aware of seeing light here, then when seeing no light there it implicitly remembers and compares this state with the previous one in which it saw light here and realizes that it does not see the light there now. The crucial premise of this view, i.e., that of the existence of the perceptual self-awareness, is confirmed by Arriaga by the reference to the perception of bodily pain. In line with the perceptual account of pain, brutes perceive their pain through the sense of touch. «Being in pain» amounts to the act that perceives an inconvenient object or an object that is part of one's body with qualities contrary to the perceiver's nature. Dogs and other animals too remember their feelings of pain; this indeed makes them disciplinable. However, to remember the external senses' acts, the memory must possess their likenesses. Accordingly, before the memory's acquisition, the common sense must have received the species of these acts when they were exercised¹¹.

Arriaga rejects this view with two main arguments. First, this theory implies that brutes dispose of the power of *discursive* cognition. From the premises «I see there is light here» and «I see there is not light there» they are able to infer «There is nothing there». Arriaga is clear that this capacity cannot be admitted in animals. Second, if brutes could reflect upon their exterior acts by means of a higher-order power, they would be able to apprehend their own *substance* as well, because the cognition of one's acts cannot be separated from the cognition of the subject in which these operations conceived as qualities inhere. When I reflect on my acts of vision or suffering, I always, however imperfectly in the case of the sensory self-awareness, am aware also of myself as the subject of those acts. Again, such

¹¹ For his perceptual account of pain, see Arriaga, *De anima*, disp. 5, sect. 6, §§88–91, p. 724.

self-referential cognition exceeds the amount of perfection attributable to brutes' cognitive capacity¹².

2. Arriaga on the Divine Infusion of Negations' Species

What is Arriaga's solution? Following *STh.* I, q. 78, a. 4, where Aquinas introduces the criteria for his theory of the fourfold interior sense including the one differentiating between the sensed and the unsensed species (those representing items sensed and unsensed by the external senses)¹³, Arriaga embraces the existence of unsensed species (*species insensatae*). These comprise not only likenesses representing the well-known (Avicennian) intentions, such as enmity and utility, but also negations. Arriaga denies the view, embraced by Scotus before him and later by Mastri and Belluto¹⁴, according to which unsensed species are not necessary to account for these intentions' perception. For them, sensible objects mediated by the sensed species and the powers are all we need to explain the perception of objects as agreeable or disagreeable. But Arriaga is sure that we need them. A swallow recognizes the usefulness of a straw because in the estimative power it has an unsensed species representing its usefulness with respect to the construction of a nest. The utility of this straw is not a visual object perceivable by sight but something invisible to this power. Only a more perfect sensory capacity, i.e., an internal sense, can perceive it¹⁵.

Although Arriaga espouses the existence of these likenesses, he denies that they are produced by an internal sense, which would serve as «an agent sense»

¹² Arriaga, *De anima*, disp. 5, sect. 5, §§76–7, p. 722: «[...] inde sequi, posse bruta discurrere: non enim immediate percipiunt negationes, sed hoc quasi modo video colorem hic, & nihil video, ergo ibi nihil est; hoc autem illis concedere, est valde durum. Secundum mihi ingerit difficultatem, non solum hinc sequi, bruta percipere suos actus, sed etiam suam substantiam; dicunt enim, Ego non video, vel, Ego torqueor.»

¹³ For Arriaga's reference to Aquinas, see *Physica*, disp. 8, sect. 6, subsect. 2, §§65–6, p. 356.

¹⁴ Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, dist. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 62 (ed. Vat. III), pp. 43–4. For Scotus's rejection of any special normative property in the object represented by an unsensed species in addition to sensible qualities, see D. Perler, «Why is the Sheep Afraid of the Wolf? Medieval Debates on Animal Passions», in L. Shapiro – M. Pickavé (eds.), *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2012, pp. 32–52, at pp. 38–9. For Mastri and Belluto, see the next section.

¹⁵ Arriaga, *De anima*, disp. 5, sect. 5, § 78, p. 722: «[...] in brutis dari species aliquas insensatas (quae est sententia D. Thomae [...]) re bene considerata non potest ullo modo negari». Cf. also Arriaga, *De anima*, disp. 4, sect. 1, subsect. 7, p. 685.

(*sensus agens*)¹⁶. The common sense cannot produce these species since it has only those likenesses that are acquired from the external senses¹⁷. The origin of these species must therefore be explained in a different way. They cannot be «abstracted» or «pulled out» by the interior sense, let alone received from the extramental objects, but must rather be produced from outside by some external motor. The only solution Arriaga finds tenable is that they are infused by God directly into the internal sense. By infusing the species of negations, God produces a negative apprehension in the dog, such as «There is no light under this tree», which invites it to search for refuge there from the burning sun. This cognition occurs immediately. We thus do not have to posit in the brutes a capacity to discourse, compare, and reflect on one's acts¹⁸. Arriaga is aware that his opinion is not standard and employs a «Deus-ex-machina» *explanans*, which can seem redundant to many. This is also why he attempts to diminish a stumbling-block for this rather bizarre view by claiming that his employment of God as a particular cause is not a unique standpoint in philosophy and theology. Indeed, God is often and by many assumed to donate intelligible species to separated souls. If this «external intervention» can hold in this case, why should it not be applicable also to the animals' perception of negations? God cares not only about humans but also about brutes and accordingly provides them with everything they need for the conservation of their lives¹⁹.

3. Mastri and Belluto's Critique of Arriaga and their Standard View

In their *Disputationes in De anima* of 1643, disp. 4, q. 3 (entitled «What are sensible objects and how many are there?») ²⁰, Mastri and Belluto take a critical

¹⁶ I mean here the agent sense as a vehicle of the production of the intentional species, and not conceived as the power producing cognitive acts after the reception of the likenesses.

¹⁷ Arriaga, *De anima*, disp. 5, sect. 5, § 75, p. 722.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, § 78, pp. 722–3: «Dico ergo, eo ipso quod cognoscant & videant objectum aliquod externum, murum v.g. album, in quo sunt foramina, fenestrae, & c. per sensus tantum percipere albedinem illam positivam; Deum autem infundere illis species, quibus forment aliquas apprehensiones negativas, Non est ibi color, Non est ibi Sol sub arbore, ad quam umbram accurrunt, quando Sol eis nocet, hoc autem fit sine ullo discursu aut reflexione super se, aut suos actus».

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, § 79, p. 723: «Confirmo: multi ex adversariis etiam in ipso homine recurrunt ad Deum ut ad causam particularem, qui nostro intellectui infundat omnes species, eo quod ab objectis non eas percipiat, cur ergo non poterimus etiam ad Deum aequaliter recurrere pro speciebus brutorum? Certe etiam Deus est sollicitus ut bestiis ea suppediret, quibus pro vitam tutandam indigent [...]».

²⁰ For the publication history of this work, see Forlivesi, *Scotistarum princeps*, pp. 361–65.

stance against Arriaga's view of the infusion of negations' species. They do this in the context of their discussion of the four necessary conditions for an object to be a sensible object. Such an object must be (1) a real being; (2) a material (corporeal) thing; (3) a singular item; and (4) an accident. While discussing the first qualification they introduce and immediately reject Arriaga's theory. By affirming that a sensible being must be a real being, Mastri and Belluto eliminate beings of reason, including negations from the ambit of sensible being. A sensible being that moves a sense by emitting its likeness must be real, since a non-being cannot imprint a likeness upon the sensory power. Mastri and Belluto say that everybody agrees on this, except for Arriaga who admits that brutes *can* apprehend pure negations of light and colour through the negative apprehensions co-caused by the species infused by God. In their presentation of Arriaga's view they sum up all the important steps in the Jesuit's reasoning: i) We cannot deny that animals have such perceptions; ii) such apprehensions require the existence of proportional species; iii) these species cannot be emitted from the negations; iv) their production can only be understood by recourse to God as a supplier of everything needed for the conservation of animal lives²¹.

The two Scotists agree that brutes somehow perceive negations. The perception of darkness causes fear in them; they feel distress in the absence of their progenies. But they are also sure that this does not require the existence of any species of these negations. The origin of these putative species could be explained in two ways. They could be poured into the brutes' internal sense either (i) at the moment of their generation, or (ii) over time. If the former held, there would be either infinitely many such similitudes from each would represent a single negation, or a single species would represent all of them. While the first claim is rejected by

²¹ Mastrius, Bartolomaeus, Bonaventura Bellutus, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer* (Vol. 3), *Libros de anima* (henceforth: *In DA*), Nicolaus Pezzana, Venice, 1727, disp. 4, q. 3, § 20, p. 66: «Arriaga [...] videtur docere, posse bruta apprehendere puras negationes, puta negationem lucis, coloris, &c. apprehensione quadam negativa, non per species a negationibus causatas, sed a Deo infusas, quibus forment apprehensiones aliquas negativas, non est ibi color, non est ibi Sol, &c. Movetur, quia ex una parte non possumus brutis denegare cognitiones negationum, nam terrentur umbra hominis, vident, ubi sunt portae, fenestrae, vacuitates, & ursus volens in hominem proiicere lapides, non eligit quoscunque, sed parvos, quos potest sustinere, ergo percipit parvitatem lapidis, quae formaliter est negatio majoris quantitatis, non enim solum percipiunt lapides, sed lapides ut parvos. Ex alia partes non videtur rationabilior modus, quo apprehensiones istae haberi possunt, quam per species praedictas, Deus enim etiam de bestiis est sollicitus, ut necessaria ad tuendam vitam subministret, sine tamen hac cognitione negationum vix possent pedem movere [...]».

them as irrational, the latter presupposes a considerable perfection of the species. Accordingly, this perfection would make it difficult to deny such a species to humans too. However, humans are not endowed with such infused species. The second alternative is equally untenable. If these likenesses were supplied over time, God would wrongly be seen as the primary cause that gives what cannot be delivered by the secondary causes. This is not the case²².

Unlike Arriaga, Mastri and Belluto do not assume the existence of any agent sense that elevates the sensible qualities to the level of intentions. This power is something they hold to be a non-Aristotelian invention²³. There is no internal or external agent sense that would bring about the external and the interior senses' species, including those of intentions and negations. Moreover, these species cannot exist since it is not possible to assign an efficient cause to these items. First, this cause, as stated by Arriaga, cannot be a negation since negations are non-beings. Second, it cannot be an opposite affirmation, such as light, since light cannot cause a species representing darkness. Third, unlike the virtual containment of the intelligible in the sensible species, the species of a negation, such as that of darkness, cannot be potentially contained in the species representing light. Accordingly, the internal sense cannot abstract such as a species from the sensible objects²⁴.

Mastri and Belluto propound two explanations of the manner these negations are perceived. They distinguish between two kinds of privations. The first are the total *caentiae*; the other are the partial privations. While shadows exemplify the second type, complete darkness, such as one in a cave when all lights are off, is a case of the first. A shadow can move a brutes' sense because it is not a total privation of light and has a *secondary* light shaped in a particular way. Considering the total lack of light, however, such cognition cannot be an act of a simple apprehension but must be the result of a *divisive* act based on the opposite

²² *Ibid.*, disp. 4, q. 3, § 21, p. 66.

²³ *Ibid.*, disp. 4, q. 5, a. 2, § 55, p. 72: «Dicimus non dari sensum agentem; haec conclusio communis est in Peripatho». For the denial of the *sensus agens* as a device that is productive of the sensible species in Mastri and Belluto, see D. Heider, «Suárez and Mastri/Belluto on the Internal Sense's Species», forthcoming in C. A. Andersen and D. Heider (eds.), *Cognitive Issues in the Long Scotist Tradition*, Schwabe Verlag, Basel-Berlin 2023, pp. 50–3.

²⁴ Mastrius – Bellutus, *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, a. 2, § 249, p. 219: «Non tamen fit haec cognitio per speciem aliquam representantes negationes, quia nulla poterit assignari causa hujus speciei effective, non ipsa negatio [...] non affirmatio opposita [...] neque sensus potest ab illis abstrahere hanc species, quia non est agens [...]».

affirmation²⁵. The species, or visual representation, representing a calf in a cow's memory moves the cow to produce an appetitive act of desire triggered by an occurrent perception of the calf's absence. The cow's internal sense cognizing the absent calf produces this act against the background of the previous cognitive act apprehending the calf. Clearly, if the cow did not have this previous affirmative cognition and did not have the species of its calf or any vision of it stored in the memory, it would never apprehend the absence of the calf and no appetitive act would be triggered. The internal sense is thus not immediately but only mediately carried to this negation. A man blind from birth will not apprehend the negation of colours. In order to be able to do so, she would have to be capable of reflecting simultaneously on her prior cognition of colours, which she is not. A dog will perceive a passage in the wall because it has already seen the colours indicating an impediment there, which now is invisible. The Scotists conclude – by replying to Arriaga's «objection from discourse» – that this discourse is not discourse in the proper that pertains to the third mental operation of reasoning. It is nothing more than a juxtaposition of two connected apprehensions, where no inference of a *tertium quid* takes place²⁶.

4. Conclusions

Mastri/Belluto's theory represents what can be called the standard view. Among others, this view can be found in Francisco Suárez (1548–1617)²⁷. This

²⁵ *In DA*, disp. 4, q. 3, § 21, p. 66-7. «[...] bruta ab umbra terreri, hoc evenit, quia umbra ut plurimum non est privatio totalis lucis, sed habet lumen quoddam secundarium figuratum juxta corporis figuram, cujus est umbra, ideoque potest movere sensum, vel si totaliter abesset omne lumen, tunc non apprehenderet apprehensione quadam simplici, & affirmativa umbram illam [...] sed solum judicio quodam divisivo [...]»; *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, a. 2, § 249, p. 219: «Solum igitur cognoscuntur privationes actu quodam divisivo per affirmationem oppositam, aut ejus speciem [...]».

²⁶ *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, § 258, p. 120: «[...] quando brutum cognoscit absentiam filiorum, non percipit illa ut sic in abstracto, sed in tali loco externo: debet percipere se non videre ibi filios; quare semper erit quaedam reflexio. Dicimus ergo sensum bruti percipere negationes actu quoddam reflexo supra alibi cognitum, & supra sensum externum actu in tali loco illud non cognoscentem, scilicet dum cognoscit in pariete foramen, hoc percipit, quia in aliis partibus parietis videt colores parietis, qui indicant impedimentum ad egressum, in foramine nullum videt colorem, hinc non apprehendit aliquid impedimentum, & consequenter egreditur ex aula, neque hoc est discurrere, quia unum non infertur ex alio, sed solum sunt duae apprehensiones connexae, hic est impedimentum, ubi nullum est impedimentum».

²⁷ Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*, ed. S.

theory attributes proto-discursive and proto-reflective operations to animals; these acts, however, are consistently distinguished from the proper intellectual operations of reflexion and discourse found in humans. Without them we could not explain the perception of negations and the cognition of the inactivity of one's sensory operations, which are necessary to explain beastly behaviour. While Arriaga agrees that this negative apprehension is necessary, he makes also clear that this cannot be explained from the internal sources of non-rational animals. I conclude that by his "occasionalist" recourse to God as an external donor of the species of negations and privations Arriaga anticipates Descartes's view of animals as material automata. Famously, Descartes presented this view in his *Discourse on Method* which appeared in 1637, just five years after Arriaga's *Cursus philosophicus*.

Castellote, vol. 2, Sociedad de estudios y publicaciones, Madrid 1981, disp. 5, q. 2, n. 26, pp. 328–30.