The limits of rational knowledge in Theodoric of Freiberg

Resumo

This paper deals with the constitutive limits of the knowing process in Theodoric of Freiberg, with specific reference to the cognitio rationalis and characteristics of its object. In general terms, rationality involves a difference between subject, knowing activity and known object, i.e., an otherness (as identity in the difference) in the intellect. It results in an intrinsic noetic composition, which can be interpreted by resorting to the ontological category of accident. According to Theodoric’s noetics, the object of the agent intellect coincides with the act of its intellection, remaining in itself and thus embracing the universality of the intelligible sphere in a univocal notion (ens). On the contrary, using formal principles to know the same being in the manner of the definition implies the rational activity “moving away” from its substantial core (pure noetic self-identity) and the impossibility of knowing the reality in its fully simple and universal mode.

Keywords: Theodoric of Freiberg, Agent Intellect, Possible Intellect, Theory of Knowledge.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21747/21836884/med41a15